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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

SECTION 1983 AND FEDERALISM
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
any other person within the jurisdictionthereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (I97O)
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I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the themes of federalism and individual rights is one that runs deep in American intellectual and
social history. And it is one that has changed drastically with
changes in the conditions and temperament of our society.1
In the early days of the Republic, federalism was viewed as.
a means of protecting individual rights from the tyranny of a
unified central government. The Civil War brought with it a
rejection of this guiding principle. State autonomy came to be
seen'not as a means to protect the individual from government
abuse but rather as the primary source of that abuse. Unpopular or disadvantaged minorities, unable to protect themselves
when isolated within the processes of states and localities, turned
to the federal government and the federal courts with increasing
frequency - and increasing success. The trend culminated in
the r96o's: where individual civil rights were implicated, concern
for the interests of states as such was sharply reduced.2
In recent years, the pendulum seems to have swung in the
opposite direction. The national mood has displayed increasing
disenchantment with centralized power; the decisions of the Supreme Court have evidenced increasing solicitude for the interests and prerogatives of states.' And inevitably, a sense of conflict has emerged between the developing recognition that states do
mean something in a federal system and the belief that a primary
role of the federal government- through its Constitution, laws,
and courts - is to provide protection for civil rights against state
abuse.
This contemporary conflict between federalism and civil
rights is posed perhaps most sharply in lawsuits brought against
state and local officials in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § I983. 4
Section 1983, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to
enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment by providing
a cause of action in federal court,5 lay dormant as a result of
restrictive judicial construction until the Supreme Court's i961
'See, e.g., B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CnriL RIGHTs (1964); Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 MASS. HisT. Soc'Y PROC. 15 (x965); Note, Theories
of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. oo 7 (x966).
2 See pp. xi76-77 infra.
*See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) ; Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 796 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. i (1974).
442 U.S.C. § 1983 (,970).
'See pp. 1153-56 infra.
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decision in Monroe v. Pape.' In the succeeding decade and a half,
litigation under the statute has burgeoned, 7 but as the volume of
1983 litigation has expanded, so too have the calls for its restriction.8
This Note will examine the enforcement of constitutional
rights under section 1983 in light of the enhanced contemporary
concern with state autonomy and integrity. In doing so, the goal
is not only to suggest the ramifications of the concern with state
interests on the 1983 action, but also to give some content to the
vague contours of "Our Federalism."
Part II examines the history of section 1983 against the background of events and evolving theories of federalism that have
shaped its development. The succeeding Parts deal with the
product of that development. Part III focuses on the standards
governing liability under section 1983 and the availability of
damages and injunctive relief. Parts IV, V, and VI examine the
judicially created doctrines which may restrict or foreclose the
1983 plaintiff's access to a federal forum: the abstention, exhaustion, and Younger doctrines. Even if it were no longer true as it was when the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed and a
choice of a federal forum for 1983 actions guaranteed I -that

state forums are generally less able or willing to enforce constitu6365

U.S. 167 (ig6i).

In ig6o, only about 300 federal suits were filed under all the civil rights acts.
ADmINIsTRATIVE OFFICE or THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 196o ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 232, table C2. By 1972, approximately eight thousand suits were
filed under § 1983 alone. See McCormack, Federalism and Section z983, 6o VA. L.
REv. i, i n.2 (1974). In fiscal 1976, of the 140,189 civil actions pending in the
federal courts, 12,911 of them were general civil rights actions; in addition, there
were approximately 6,341 state prisoner civil rights actions. ADMINISTRATVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR

86. One authority estimates that in 1976, almost one-third of the nearly 57,000
private federal question cases filed in the federal district courts were civil rights
actions asserting constitutional claims against state and local officials. P. BATOR,
P. MIsHmN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 149 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
8
See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90-1OO

(x973); Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section zg83, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc.
ORD. 557; pp. 1265-66 infra.
9
The jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, also originally part of § I of the
Civil Rights Act of 187i, is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(1970). It
bestows jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, on the federal
district courts over all substantive causes of action for the deprivation of all rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, and those rights secured as well by "any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights." See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972); P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MIsHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SySTEM 951-6r (2d ed.
1973).
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tional rights than their federal counterparts, ° forced resort to
state remedies under one of these doctrines would burden or deprive the constitutional plaintiff of an opportunity to decide
whether a particular state or federal forum is likely to prove
more sympathetic to his claim. Finally, Part VII examines the
application of res judicata principles to civil rights decisions in
both state and federal courts.

II.

THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1983

In its modern interpretation of section 1983, the Supreme
Court has, to a considerable extent, purported to rely upon the
legislative history of the statute. The seminal decision in Monroe
v. Pape,' which gave new life to the long dormant Civil Rights
Act, and the subsequent opinions detailing the components of the
section 1983 cause of action and the scope of the statutory exemptions, have all drawn heavily upon the debates of the Reconstruction Congresses.'
Such heavy reliance on legislative history would alone justify
an examination of the Reconstruction debates and of the historical context in which section 1983 was enacted. But perhaps
more importantly, history, while not necessarily determinative
of present dilemmas, may frame the questions which must be
addressed and relate past responses which can inform modern
situations.3 In this Part, it will be suggested that many of the
concerns which prompted the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of i871 have contemporary analogues, and that the widespread
breakdown in law enforcement in the post-Civil War South has
parallels in kind, if not in degree, with current instances of systematic deprivations of - or failures to enforce - constitutional
rights.4 By placing the statute in the context of the evolving role
of the federal government in the protection of individual rights,5
and by delineating the interests and concerns which make atten10 See pp. ii5o-5i, 1154-55 infra.
365 U.S. x67 (ig6i); see pp. 1169-7i infra.
See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. i, 24 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("the sole rationale for construing the 'persons' susceptible of liability under section 1983 as excluding local units of government lies in the legislative history");
City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
x67, 172-92 (i96I).
I See generally C. MILER, THE SUPREME CouRT Am TH USES oF HISTORY
200 (x969); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation,31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 528 (1964).
4 Compare pp. 1153-56 infra with pp. X231-39 infra.
5 See pp. 1,76-77 & n. 247-50 infra.
2

-
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tion to federalism meaningful today, this Part will attempt to
provide a basis for resolution of the conflict between the protection of individual rights and respect for state interests which
underlies the contemporary dispute over the interpretation of
section 1983.
A. Pre-Civil War Federalism
Prior to the Civil War, most thinking about federal-state
relations emphasized the autonomy of the national and state
governments and the primacy of the states as the centers of political and economic life.6 Although political scientists have recently suggested that even during the first half of the nineteenth
century there was considerable federal-state cooperation in the
implementation of government programs, 7 the rhetoric of the
times pictured the nation and the state as two governments, with
each restricted to its sphere of action, independent of the other
and supreme in its respective sphere.8 The national government
was seen as one of limited powers whose operations were closely
confined to the few areas of national concern enumerated in the
Constitution. The bulk of the power of government - what was
later referred to as the police power - was retained by the states,
who assumed the primary responsibilities of government, including the definition and protection of civil rights.'
The assumption of a perfect dualism between the national and
state governments derived in part from the popular view of the
nature of the Constitution. During the Federalist era, the dominant analysis saw the people of the nation as a whole as the
source of the Constitution's authority. This enabled the Federalists to urge an expansive role for the national government
notwithstanding the fact that parts of their program trenched
on the prerogatives of the states; since the state could not be
considered sovereign, the question of the scope of national power
could be resolved independently of the powers of the states.' 0
6

See, e.g., W.

BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 91-159 (1964);
THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1934); H. HYMAN, A
MORE PERFECT UNION 7-o (1973); R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM X2 (1970);
i S. MORISON & H. COMMACER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 434

E.

CORWIN,

(sth ed. 1962); Nichols, Federalism versus Democracy, in FEDERALISM AS A
49-75 (1942).
' See, e.g., M. GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 18-41 (1966); L. VHITE,

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

THE JACKSONIANS 309-10 (1954).

' See, e.g., W. BENNETT, supra note 6, at 9X-125; E. CORWIN, supra note 6, at 6.
' See H. HYMAN, supra note 6, at 8; Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil
Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, IO8-2o (1966); Elazar, Federal-State Collaboration in
the Nineteenth-Century United States, 79 PoL. ScI. Q. 248 (1964).
"oSee, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison); W. BENNETT, supra note 6,
at 83-85; G. WOOD,
524-47 (1969).

THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN

REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,

at
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With the accession of the Jeffersonian Republicans to power in
i8oo, thinking.about the nature of the Constitution underwent a
profound shift." The Jeffersonians asserted that the Constitution
rested not on the will of the people but on a compact among
"sovereign and independent" states; the Union was not a consolidated nation but a "league of nations." 12 Under this view,
each state could decide for itself whether it would be bound by
the actions of the national governmnent or, indeed, by the Constitution itself.'"
The incorporation of ante bellum state-oriented political
theory into legal doctrine was modified and postponed, and the
foundation for a more expansive view of national power laid, by
the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall. In McCulloch v. Maryland 11 and Gibbons v. Ogden,'5 Chief Justice Marshall indicated
the potentially broad scope of national legislative power, finding
that the necessary and proper clause added to rather than limited
national authority, 6 and construing the commerce clause to
create congressional power to regulate to the "utmost extent" "
"every species of commercial intercourse." 18 In these and other
cases, the Marshall Court also rebutted the notion that when an
act of Congress came into conflict with an otherwise valid state
law, the two acts confronted each other on a basis of exact
equality.' The Court vindicated the principle of the supremacy
of national law: that "the government of the union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action." 2o
And the fact that certain subjects might fall within the reserved
powers of the states was held insufficient to put them beyond the
reach of Congress' enumerated powers. 2 ' Finally, the Marshall
" See, e.g., E. CoRwiN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS 75-76,
216-19 (1936); I S. MolusoN & H. COmmACER, supra note 6, at 299-300, 322,
349-51.
12

See W. BENNETT, supra note 6, at iiS-rg (quoting John Taylor of Caroline).

'3 See generally id. at 122-25; E. CoRwIN, supra note 6, at 6.

In subsequent
decades, as the conflict between the sections over slavery and economic development emerged and intensified, proponents of the states' rights position, such as
John Taylor of Caroline and John C. Calhoun, were to urge that the states could
interpose their will and nullify within their borders actions of the national
government which they believed to be unconstitutional; more extreme theorists
and politicians were eventually to urge the right of secession. See generally W.
BENNETT, supra note 6, at 1OO-59; Note, supra note 9, at 1018-20.
14 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
15 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (X824).
16 X7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
17 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at x9o.
" Id. at 196.
"9 See generally J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, 1789-957, at 26-49 (1958).
20 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
21 See E. CoRwIN, supra note ii, at 122-24.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1140

[Vol. 90:1133

Court established the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of
federal-state conflicts and the federal courts as paramount in the
resolution of constitutional questions.22 Marshall Court decisions upheld the power of the federal courts to invalidate state
legislation and to reverse the decisions of state courts on matters
of constitutional interpretation.2 3 In Fletcher v. Peck 24 and the
Dartmouth College Case,25 the Court vigorously enforced the
contracts clause, at that time one of the few provisions of the
Constitution which protected individual rights against state, as
opposed to federal, interference; while in United States v.
Peters 26 and Cokens v. Virginia,2' 7 the Court invalidated state
legislative and judicial efforts to limit federal jurisdiction to
enforce federal law against the states.2 '
With the death of Chief Justice Marshall, however, the
popularly accepted states' rights philosophy began to take hold
on the Supreme Court as well. The Taney Court generally construed the powers of the national government to avoid projecting
it into the internal activities of the states. 9 Moreover, it interpreted the tenth amendment as a reservation to the states of a
field of power beyond the reach of federal legislation. Perhaps
the most extreme application of this "dual federalism" analysis
was in New York v. Miln. ° Writing for the Court, Justice Barbour upheld a state law setting certain requirements for ships
entering New York harbor with aliens on board, 31 fiinding that
with respect to "all those powers which relate to municipal legislation, or what may perhaps more properly be called internal
police . . . the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and
exclusive." 32
2 See W. BENNETT,

supra note 6, at io6.

23

See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, i9 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, i4 U.S. (i Wheat.) 304 (i816).
24 io U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (x8io). See also J. SCHmDHAuSER, supra note 19, at
45-46.
22
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
26

9 U.S. (5 Cranch) ii5 (i8og).

27 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
28
1d. at 407-30; 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 136-4o. See also W. BENNETT, supra
note 6, at io4-o5; J. SCHrmIDAuSER, supra note 19, at 28-45.
29See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (849).

See generally

E. CoRwm, supra note 6, at 11-12.
3036 U.S. (ii Pet.) 102 (1837).
3
Id. at 130-31.

32 Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).

In addition to suggesting that there are some areas subject to government regulation which are by their nature beyond the scope of federal power, the Taney
Court's sensitivity to the prerogatives of the state governments on occasion led
it to limit the effects of federal law in areas admittedly within the ambit of proper
federal activity. Thus, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (r9 How.) 393 (2857),
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The Taney Court's version of the states' rights creed was
limited by the preservation of the principle of national supremacy.3 3

Congressional authority was exclusive and state legisla-

tion invalid in those areas of national concern demanding uniform
treatment. While state legislation in the absence of congressional
action was permissible where the subject, although one of national
concern, allowed for variations in treatment from state to state,
affirmative federal action pursuant
to the commerce power could
34
displace such state legislation.

*The Taney Court, then, enunciated a moderate version of the
states' rights creed, but one consonant with the state-oriented
character of contemporary political reality. Although the supremacy of federal law was generally established in theory, the
scope of federal activity was limited and the states were largely
shielded from federal power. The secession crisis and the Civil
War, however, were to alter profoundly the ante bellum status
of federal-state relations.
B. Section 1983: The Original Understanding

r. The Reconstruction Amendments. -The
victory of the
Northern armies and the infamy of secession effectively terminated this era of state independence and discredited expansive
prewar theories of states' rights. And the new spirit of nationalism which marked the Civil War era was most evident in the area
of civil rights.
The thirteenth, 35 fourteenth,3 6 and fifteenth" amendments
the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise of 1820 which had prohibited the
introduction of slavery into most of the western territories. The Court found that
in regulating the territories Congress could not legislate in such a manner as .to
impair rights guaranteed by state laws, such as the right to hold slaves. The
national government was characterized as little more than a trustee and agent of
the states, which were regarded as coproprietors of the territories. See id. at 44754. Similarly, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (i86), the Court
limited the effect of article IV, § 2, which required the rendition of fugitives from
justice to the state having jurisdiction over the crimes committed. Reasoning that
a "mandatory and compulsory" interpretation of the clause might overload state
officers and thereby disable them from performing their obligations to their own
states, the Court concluded that the "Federal Government under the Constitution
has no power to impose on a state officer as such any duty whatever and compel
him to perform it." Id. at io8, Iog-iio.
3
Ithas been noted that the doctrine articulated by Justice Barbour in Miln
was never used to limit federal power or to invalidate a congressional statute.
See J. SCHMIDHLAUSER,

supra note

ig,

at 62.

"4 See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See generally 3. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 19, at 63-64.
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII; see p. xr43 infra.
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; see pp. 1144-46 infra.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see p. 1147 infra. The post-Civil War amendments were the result of a special concern with racial discrimination, and the civil
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wrote into the Constitution broad new guarantees of liberty and
equality by which the federal government committed itself to
protecting citizens against states and private individuals. The
five major civil rights acts 38 undertook to elaborate these new
liberties and to provide the means for their effective enforcement.
Each act contained jurisdictional provisions conferring on the
federal courts primary responsibility for the vindication of these
liberties.3 9 As a result of these and other acts the lower federal
courts emerged from the Reconstruction period with significantly
greater importance, supplanting the state courts as the principal
forum for enforcing federal law."
The overall shift in the balance of power between the federal
and state governments, however, was moderate.4 The actions of
state governments were limited by federal law, but the traditional
police powers of the state remained largely undiminished.4 2 Indeed, the substantial increase in the activity of the federal government in response to the war and to the turbulent conditions
in the South appears to have been aimed primarily at restoring
the internal integrity of the states through ensuring the proper
administration of justice .and equal treatment of citizens rather
than at replacing
the states as the dominant actors in the federal
43
system.
rights powers they confer "are potentially the most far-reaching" of all the
grants of power in the Constitution. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 899 (9th ed. 1975); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976) (enforcement powers under the fourteenth amendment limit the eleventh
amendment and the principle of sovereign immunity); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (x968) (Congress, acting under the thirteenth amendment, may
reach private conduct).
" Act of April 9, x866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing Southern Black Codes);
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights) ; Act of Feb.
28, 1871, ch. 99, i6 Stat. 433 (protecting voting rights) ; Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13 (suppressing the Ku Klux Klan) ; Act of March i, 1875, ch. 114, 18
Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations).
" See Wiecek, The Reconstruction of FederalJudicial Power, z863-Y875, 13 AM.
J.L.4 0HIST. 333 (1969).
See, e.g., Schwartz, The Amendment in Operation: A Historical Overview, in
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 29, 31 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
4 See H. HYMAN, supra note 6, at 531 (characterizing the resulting shift as a
"moderate revolution"). See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (X955).
2
4 See, e.g., J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 201-02
(1956); P. PALuDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 51-60 (1975); Graham, Our
Declaratory Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3-39 (1954).
" See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 483 (i866) (remarks of Rep.
Bingham) ("I have always believed that the protection in time of peace within
the State of all the rights of person and citizen was one of the powers reserved to
th'e States. And so I still believe."). See also Kelly, Comment, in NEW FRONTIERS
oF THE AMERicA
RECONSTRUCTON 55 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
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The ratification of the thirteenth amendment in 1865 signaled the beginning of a period of constitutional upheaval designed to safeguard the rights of the recently emancipated slaves.
This amendment, directed not only to the federal government,
but also to states and to private individuals, abolished slavery
and gave Congress the power to enforce its provisions through
appropriate legislation." Most Congressmen assumed that the
amendment would have far-reaching effects beyond the abolition
of personal bondage and would provide the basis for guaranteeing
the freedmen certain minimum rights.45 Indeed, the opponents
of the amendment attacked it as an unconstitutional federal invasion of the rights of the states.46
It soon became apparent, however, that the thirteenth amendment alone could not achieve the Republican goal of equal treatment for the freedmen. Atrocities against emancipated blacks
and Union sympathizers were widespread in the South, and the
former Confederate states passed "Black Codes" which effectively
reenslaved the freedmen.47 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 " and
4
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
Section i. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
4 See HowE, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 MASS. HIST. Soc'Y PROC. 15, 23-25
(1965).
" See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1423 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
Saulsbury).
47
See P. PALuDAN, supra note 42, at 215; J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIvM

WAR AND REcONSTRUCTrON 57X-74 (1969).
48 The 1866 Act secured to the freedmen the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued, to give evidence, and to own and transfer property. 14
Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1970)). Although the draftsmen of
the measure had asserted that it reflected their continuing concern for the
preservation of states' rights, P. PALUDAN, supra note 42, at 51, President Johnson
vetoed the bill. He claimed that although the measure did not in fact exceed the
constitutional prerogatives of the federal government, there was no principle
sufficiently distinguishing the rights protected by the statute from interests
beyond the competence of the federal government to prevent it from leading to
an unconstitutional expansion of federal authority. See 8 J. RicnAiRDsoN, MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1843-1914, at 3596-611 (I898). Although
Rep. Bingham, author of the first section of the fourteenth amendment, also felt
that the bill intruded on state prerogatives, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist
Sess. 438 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham), the Act was passed over President
Johnson's veto, with the assent of all but three Republicans in the Senate, J.
RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 47, at 579. The assessment of the impact of the
1866 Act was varied. Sen. Saulsbury remarked that it was "one of the most
dangerous bills that was ever introduced into the Senate of the United States,"
CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866), whereas Sen. Trumbull, sponsor of
the bill, belittled its scope, apparently believing that it was "not a tremendous
constitutional broad jump, but only an a fortiori observation." Fairman, Does
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the Freedmen's Bureau Bill 49 were enacted under the authority
of the thirteenth amendment to do away with these practices.
But the power of the Congress to pass the two acts was questioned,
and two months later, in response to those challenges, the fourteenth amendment was adopted by Congress and submitted to
the states for ratification."
The fourteenth amendment was a product of radical idealism
and political necessity.5 ' Although at the time it was heralded
and denounced as working a fundamental change in the Constitution, 2 the extent of that change was much debated both in
1868 and thereafter. 53 A basic purpose of the amendment was
to affirm the citizenship of the freedmen. 4 In providing that all
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5,
17 (1949). Compare CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 57o (1866) (remarks of
Sen. Morril) ("I freely concede that it [the 1866 Act] is revolutionary"), with id.
at 504 (remarks of Sen. Howard) ("There is no invasion of the legitimate rights
of the States.").
40 The Freedmen's Bureau was created pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1865,
ch. go, 13 Stat. 507. With offices in every Southern state, the Bureau played an
integral role in smoothing the transition from slavery to freedom for Southern
blacks. The Bureau found employment for former slaves, established them on
public lands under the homestead law, provided hospital services and schools,
and, through its own system of special courts, sought to secure equal justice for
the freedmen. See J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 47, at 576-77. In 1866

moderate Republicans introduced a bill providing for the continued existence of
the Bureau, extending its authority to refugees and freedmen throughout the
country, and empowering it to provide military protection to victims of racial
discrimination. Id. at 577. President Johnson vetoed the measure, id. at 577-78,
thereby alienating many Republican moderates and pushing them towards support of a more radical program for Reconstruction.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
51 See, e.g., J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 47, at 58o-8i, 633.
52 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1271 (1866)
(remarks of Rep.
Kerr) ; id. at io65 (remarks of Rep. Hale).
3 Compare H. HYAIN, supra note 6, at 465-70; Graham, supra note 42, at
18-38; and Fairman, supra note 48, with

J.

JA ES, supra note 42, at 151-52 and

Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICI. L. REV.
1323, 1328-33, 1357-58 (1952).

" The fourteenth amendment had at least the effect of overruling the holding
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (xg How.) 393 (1857), that blacks could not
be citizens of the Untied States, id. at 404. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIILTATIONs 653-56 (Ist ed. 1868); Graham, supra note 42, at 23.
Moreover, even commentators who have sought to deemphasize the amendment's
intended impact on federal-state relations have acknowledged that adoption of
the amendment was based in part on a desire to ensure the existence of a constitutional foundation for the rights of citizenship bestowed on freedmen by the Civil
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persons born or naturalized in the United States are "citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside," it
created a national citizenship independent of that conferred by
the states." The amendment also created a federal guarantee
for an ill-defined category of "privileges and immunities," possibly including the provisions of the Bill of Rights, which previously had been applied only to the federal government5 6
This uncertainty as to the reach of the privileges and immunities clause heightens the difficulty of determining the intended impact of the amendment on federal-state relations in the
civil rights area. Although it has been argued that the amendment represented a complete reversal of ante bellum attitudes
and an affirmation of plenary federal power to safeguard individual rights,5 7 this interpretation may go too far. The Congress
58
which adopted the amendment was essentially conservative,
and more radical provisions, which authorized the federal government to secure equal treatment of blacks by private parties and
specifically granted blacks the right to vote, were rejected.59
Rights Act of i866. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 41, at 61; J. JAMES, supra note
42, at 179; Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughterhouse Cases, 4
S.L. REV. 558, 574 (1878).
" See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. app., at 67, 69 (1871) (remarks
of Rep. Shellabarger).
6 Before the Civil War, the Supreme Court had held that the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights served only to limit the actions of the federal government, not
state governments. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Although the fourteenth amendment clearly was designed to provide federal protection against state deprivation of certain rights, whether that protection was
intended to be limited to "fundamental" matters-rights essential to "fundamental principles of liberty or justice"- or to "incorporate" or "absorb" all of the
Bill of Rights guarantees and make them applicable to the states has been the
subject of major debate among judges and commentators. Compare Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173-78 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 62-67 (I947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-28 (1937) (Cardozo, J.); and Fairman, supra
note 48, with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-7x (1968) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-123 (i947)
(Black, J., dissenting); and I. BRANT, THE BILL oF RIGHTS 315-45 (i965).
See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment,
73 YALE LJ. 74 (1963); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (958).
" See, e.g., H. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE at xi (1973);
I. BRANT, supra note 56; Gressman, supra note 53, at 1332-33.
8
See 3. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 47, at 580-85; J. JAMES, supra
note 42, at 151-52.
5"The failure of Congress to provide explicitly for suffrage for blacks in the
fourteenth amendment has been interpreted as evidence of the conservatism, or at
least the cautiousness, of the Republicans who drafted the amendment. See, e.g.,
P. PALUDAN, supra note 42, at 49-52; K. STAmPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION,
1865-1877, at 141-42 (1965).
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Indeed, the amendment as adopted created no new substantive
civil rights. Rather, in accord with traditional notions of federalism, the amendment simply required the states to grant
equally to all citizens whatever rights they saw fit to establish."0
Thus, the states retained power to define their obligations to
citizens and to determine the procedures and remedies available
for the vindication of these rights.
Despite its relative moderation, the Southern states refused
to ratify the amendment.6 ' In response, Congress in 1867 instituted Military Reconstruction.62 The freedmen were given
the franchise, which was denied to the former secessionists. State
conventions chosen by this new electorate framed constitutions
amenable to Congress, ratified the fourteenth amendment, and
The so-called "Bingham Amendment," proposed to the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction on February 3, 1866, by Rep. John A. Bingham of Ohio, would
have gone further than the amendment ultimately passed. Bingham's proposal
would have given Congress the power to secure the civil rights of the freedmen.
Bingham's amendment read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States [article IV, § 2], and to all persons
in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property [fifth amendment].
CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 1034 (x866) ; see J. JAMES, supra note 42, at
82. The Bingham Amendment was criticized as "the embodiment of centralization
and the disenfranchisement of the States of those sacred and immutable states'
rights," CONG. GLOa, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app., at 133 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Rogers), and its rejection has been seen as evidence of the moderate goals of
Congress. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. app., at 151-52 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Garfield); J. JAMES, supra note 42, at 87; P. PALUDAN, supra
note 42, at 51-52.
6
See, e.g., H. HYMAN, supra note 6, at 467-68; J. JAMES, supra note 42, at
179-8o. But see Graham, supra note 42, at 18-2o, 37-39.
11 See J.RANDALL & D. DONALD, supranote 47, at 584-85.
02 On the view that lawful government had ceased to exist in the seceded
states and that those states could be governed by Congress, the Act of March 2,
1867- supplemented by the Acts of March 23 and July ig,1867, and March ii,
1868 - decreed temporary military rule and a drastic reorganization of Southern
state governments. The states deemed unreconstructed -all the former members
of the Confederacy except Tennessee-were divided into five military districts
under federal commanders, empowered to arrest, conduct military trials, remove
civilian officeholders, and use federal troops to preserve order. See J. RANDALL &
D. DONALD, supra note 47, at 565. The district commanders were also given responsibility for implementing the program of political reconstruction, including
the enrollment of black voters and the supervision of the drafting of new state
constitutions.
By 1868, six of the Southern states had completed the Reconstruction process
and were readmitted. Four states -Virginia,
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texasdelayed until after the fourteenth amendment had been ratified and the fifteenth
amendment adopted by a vote of Congress. They therefore were required to
ratify the fifteenth amendment as well. See id. at 595-6oo, 619; K. STAmPP, supra
note 59, at 144-45.
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thereby gained readmission to the Union. 3 Continuing Southern
resistance to military rule and black suffrage, however, necessitated further congressional action.
The fifteenth amendment, prohibiting denial of the right to
vote on the basis of race or previous condition of servitude, was
adopted in 1870.64 The amendment represented a significant departure from ante bellurn federalism, which had given the states
exclusive control over voting qualifications,6 5 but like the fourteenth amendment, it may best be seen as a compromise between
civil liberties and states' rights. In enacting the fifteenth amendment, Congress considered three possible provisions. The most

radical would have given the federal government complete control over the right to vote. A slightly more moderate proposal

would have left control of the franchise in state hands while
proscribing certain conditions, such as race or literacy requirements. The measure as passed was even more moderate, precluding only the explicit use of racial criteria as voting qualifications."
2. The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction.- The years following the outbreak of the Civil War witnessed the greatest expansion of federal court jurisdiction since 1789.6" In a series
of enactments,68 Congress broadened the scope of federal judicial
authority, largely at the expense of the states. Federal removal
jurisdiction was expanded; the habeas corpus powers of the lower
federal courts were significantly increased; and each of the major
civil rights acts specifically guaranteed access to the federal

" See id. Congressional rejection of radical Republican efforts to subject the
reconstructed states to "fundamental conditions" - requirements to be placed in
the states' constitutions barring future constitutional amendments which would
disenfranchise blacks or enfranchise former Confederate officials-has been seen
as further evidence of the relatively moderate spirit of the Republican Congress
at this time. See M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 315-25 (1974).
"'U.S.

CoNsT. amend. XV provides:

Section I. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
6
See H. HYwAN, supra note 6, at 425.
66 See P. PALUDAN, supra note 42, at 52. See also M. BENEDICT, supra note 63,
at 325-36.
6
7 See generally F. FRANKFuRTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME
COURT 6I-65 (1927); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS

i43-6o (1968) ; Wiecek, supra note 39, at 333.
(8 Congress acted primarily out of concern for the war effort and the interests
of the freedmen, but the legislative expansion of federal court jurisdiction also reflected an awareness of the need for national regulation of an increasingly national
economy. See F.

FRANKFURTER

supra note 39, at 333-34, 358.

&

3.

LADIS, supra note 67, at 61-64; Wiecek,
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courts. Finally, in the Act of 1875 the federal courts were granted
jurisdiction over all federal question cases.
During the Reconstruction period the removal legislation was
the most important source of new federal judicial power. 9 Prior
to the war federal removal jurisdiction had been restricted to a
limited class of diversity cases 10 and to actions against federal
customs officials. 7' The Act of March 3, x863, began the expansion of this jurisdiction by providing for the removal of all
criminal and civil suits brought against federal officers for acts
committed during the rebellion allegedly under the authority of
Congress or the President.72 Congress subsequently amended the
1863 Act to void all proceedings in state courts brought after the
removal of the original action, 73 and enacted additional statutes
permitting removal in cases brought against federal officers enforcing the wartime revenue and conscription acts.7 4 The right
of federal removal was extended to private citizens by measures,
adopted for the benefit of the freedmen, providing for removal
of cases alleging state official interference with civil rights.a
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 76 was the source of the
second major expansion of federal judicial power. The statute
" See S. KuTLER, supra note 67, at 143; Wiecek, supra note 39, at 336-42.
o Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79 (First Judiciary Act).
" See, e.g., Act of March 3, 18xi, ch. 94, § 6, 3 Stat. 233; Act of March 2,
7

1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633 (current versions at 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (197O)). As
was the case with the subsequent Civil War removal legislation, these early
enactments were designed to protect federal officers who were being subjected to
suit in state courts because of their role in enforcing unpopular national policies.
The 18iS Act was designed to protect federal customs officers who were being
harassed by New England shipowners protesting the War of x812. The x833
removal provision was part of the Force Act, designed to defeat South Carolina's
resistance to the enforcement of the federal revepue laws. Section 3 of the Act
permitted removal of suits involving "any right, authority, or title" under any
federal revenue statute. See generally S. KuTLER, supra note 67, at 145-46;
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 1X3
U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806-07 (x965). Although the statutes were infrequently used,
the Removal Acts of 18x5 and 1833 have been praised as a "milestone in the
development of inferior federal courts" because they marked the first recognition
that the lower federal courts had an important role to play in enforcing national
policies. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the
FederalJudiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (1972).
72 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 8i, § 5, 12 Stat. 756.
" Act of May is, 1866, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 46.
14 Act of July i3, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. i7I.
"5 Act of April 9, i866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. The x866 civil rights removal
provision is the progenitor of the current 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970). See also
Voting Rights Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, §§ xS, x6, 16 Stat. 438 (repealed
1894).

76 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § i, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c) (3)(,970)).
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not only broadened the power of the federal courts, but also essentially altered the nature of the habeas writ itself. Before 1867
habeas corpus served principally as a means of testing the legality
of confinements imposed by the executive, and was unavailable
to individuals confined by the judgments of jurisdictionally competent courts. 77 After the 1867 Act the writ became a means of
challenging judicial decisions of constitutional questions. The
result was a shift of power to the lower federal courts, who for
the first time were given authority to review the judgments of
state courts, even after they had been affirmed by state supreme
courts. 78 Although subsequently reduced in scope by the Supreme
Court's formulation of an exhaustion requirement 7 9 the 1867 Act,
which, like the postwar removal statute, had been prompted by
Republican concern for the plight of Southern freedmen, 80 represented an effort in the habeas corpus context to extend federal
court jurisdiction to its constitutional limit.8 '
The third new source of judicial power stemmed from the
Reconstruction civil rights acts themselves. The Civil Rights
Act of 187o created federal jurisdiction over suits alleging racially
inspired interference with the franchise; 82 the Act of 1871 embodying the current 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -provided a broad civil
rights jurisdiction for all claims of deprivations of federally
secured rights "under color of" state law; 83 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, assuring blacks equal access to places of public accommodations, granted jurisdiction to the federal trial courts to
enforce its provisions.8 4 Finally, the Judiciary Act of 1875 85
created general federal question jurisdiction in civil actions, thereby providing a federal trial forum for every litigant engaged in
a substantial civil controversy based on a claim arising under the
Federal Constitution and laws.
"See Wiecek, supra note 39, at 344.
"8 The 1867 Act extended the federal habeas power to "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or
of any treaty or law of the United States . . . ." See also H. Hym", supra note
6, at 473-75; Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAv. L.
REv. 1o38, 1o48 (1970).

79 See Ex parte Royall, x7 U.S. 241 (1886). See generally Amsterdam, supra
note 71, at 882-908.
8" See Wiecek, supra note 39, at 344.
81See

CONG. GLOBE,

3 9th

Cong., Ist Sess. 415,

(1866)

(remarks of Rep.

Lawrence).
2 Act of May 3X, 187o, ch. 114, § 8, I6 Stat. 142.
The portions of the Act
8" Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
creating the cause of action are currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970);
the Act's jurisdictional grant was the forerunner of the present 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970).
84 Act
85

of March i, x875, ch. 114, § 3, 18 Stat. 335.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, i8 Stat. 470.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1150

[Vol. 90:1133

This significant expansion of federal judicial power seems to
reflect both the Republicans' belief that the judiciary was the
most appropriate institution to effectuate their "moderate revolution" in civil rights 86 and their increasing distrust of the willingness of state judges to enforce vigorously national laws or fulfill
national policies. Rather than providing for a large-scale displacement of state police power by congressional regulation of
intrastate affairs, the Republicans sought to create in the federal
courts opportunities for litigants -primarily the freedmen and
federal officers enforcing war-related and civil rights laws - to
invoke the power of the national government to safeguard nationally secured liberties threatened by the action or inaction of
the states.
The Republican antipathy to state courts is, at first glance,
somewhat surprising. From the Judiciary Act of 1789 on, access
to the lower federal courts had been largely restricted to citizens
exposed to the possible prejudices of tribunals of foreign states.
The prevailing assumption had been that the state courts were
the appropriate forum for the enforcement of federal law. 7
Moreover, in the two decades immediately preceding the outbreak
of the war, the Republicans, in their efforts to undermine the
fugitive slave laws, had championed the cause of the state courts
and argued for the rights of the states to impair enforcement of
the fugitive slave clause by state court action and the use of state
judicial process, particularly the writ of habeas corpus. 8 It had
been the role of Chief Justice Taney and the slaveholders to affirm
the supremacy of the national government within its legitimate
sphere and to invalidate state efforts to circumvent or thwart the
federal judiciary. 9
During the course of the war, however, the Republicans became progressively alienated from the state courts. In many
border states and in the occupied South, judges and prosecutors
unsympathetic to the Republicans and the Union sought to
impede the war effort. Civil and criminal suits were brought in
state courts charging the national officials attempting to enforce
the conscription, revenue, and antidisloyalty laws with violations
of state laws against unlawful seizure, false arrest, kidnapping,
assault and battery, libel and slander.9 0 State judges issued writs
" See pp. 1145-47 supra.
7 See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 67, at 65; P. BATOR,
P. MISHIN, D. SHA~ro & H. WECHSm, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

as

33-35, 844-45 (2d ed.

1973)

[hereinafter cited

HART AND WECHSLER).

"8 See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, go HARV. L. REv. X105, X1II-14 (1977).
" See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 5og (1859); Neuborne, supra

note9 88, at 1111-14.

See H. HyI~x, supra note 6, at 249; Wiecek, supra note 39, at 338.
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of habeas corpus to release individuals confined by national
military and civilian officers, and, when national officers persisted
in arrests and imprisonments in defiance of state writs, state court
contempt citations were issued against them. Noncomplying national officials - ranging from Cabinet secretaries to army lieutenants - faced fines and prison terms in addition to civil
penalties in private actions." The 1863 removal statute and later
amendments appear to be a direct response to the plight of such
national officers left "naked in the interstices of federalism." 92
Hostility toward state courts also appeared to be linked with
racial attitudes. In the ante bellum period, Southern state courts
had barred blacks from testifying, limited their right to sue, and
excluded them from service on juries, while Democrats continued
their efforts to keep blacks wholly subject to state laws and
courts. 3 The state courts as then constituted thus appeared
unlikely to accomplish the Republican goal of equality before the
law, and the reform required to avoid placing primary reliance on
the national courts might well have seemed not simply unnecessary but unachievable. 4
An additional factor reinforcing the Republican distrust of
state courts may have been their generally poor performance in
nonracial or war-related matters. In the north and west, state
courts, reflecting the popular sentiments, upheld unorthodox fiscal
behavior by local governments.9 5 A number of western states,
under the influence of the Granger movement, adopted legislation
regulating private enterprise which, to the horror of the eastern
conservative Republicans who dominated the party, the state
courts sustained against attack.
Even in the northeast, the
decreasing quality of urban politics, as manifested by the New
York City election frauds of 1868, was attributed to the inade" See H.

02

3

I

HymAN, supra note 6, at 24o-4 .

1Id.

Id. at 273.

See Wiecek, supra note 39, at 338.
" See, e.g., H. HynsAlq, supra note 6, at 229-33. The most notorious contemporary instance of state court capitulation to local pressures was the Iowa
litigation culminating in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (i Wall.) 175
(1864). The city of Dubuque, in an effort to attract a railroad to construct a
line from Dubuque into the interior of the state, had the Iowa legislature adopt
special legislation exempting it from the state constitutional limitation on municipal
indebtedness, but then attempted to evade its obligation to pay its creditors by
contending that the act authorizing the issuance of the bonds was unconstitutional.
See id. at 202-05. The state supreme court bowed to public pressure and sustained
the city's position. See State v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862). The United
States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the state court invalidation of the bondenabling legislation violated the contracts clause. 68 U.S. (i Wall.) at 206-07.
96 See H. HmrAN, supra note 6, at 359-61. See also Wiecek, supra note 39, at
14

1152

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1I33

quate monitoring of the political process by the state courts. 7
Thus, throughout the Civil War and Reconstruction period state
judiciaries often appeared unable or unwilling to withstand local

popular pressures, and national policies, particularly equal treatment for blacks and economic conservatism, were seen as likely

to suffer if primary reliance was placed on the state courts for
their enforcement.

While the Republicans thus were unlikely to entrust the implementation of their Reconstruction program to the state courts,
that program essentially involved judicial enforcement of federal
equal rights laws. Apart from the temporary imposition of Military Reconstruction,9 8 the Republicans generally eschewed efforts
to alter the prewar allocation of substantive lawmaking between
the nation and the states or to involve the national government
in the administration of internal state affairs. This belief in no
more than a moderate restructuring of the federal system was

reinforced by a basic conservative nineteenth-century antipathy
to government spending or the expansion of government bureauc-

racies. 9 Thus, instead of adopting measures or requiring the
states affirmatively to improve the social and economic status of
blacks, °0 the Republicans limited the federal interest to the
provision of equality before the law and restricted the federal
role to the correction of individual violations as they were raised
in case-by-case litigation.

The judiciary -

inexpensive, non-

bureaucratic, and traditionally conservative 10'-

was the most

suitable agency for the enforcement of the Republicans' limited

goals. And given the unreliable behavior of the state courts
during the war and their evident susceptibility to local pressures,
" It has been suggested that conservative Republican concern about urban
political corruption may have played a role in generating Northern support for
the adoption of the fifteenth amendment. See H. HymAN, supra note 6, at 523-26.
" See pp. 1146-47 & notes 62-63 supra.
" See H. HYMAN, supra note 6, at 227-29.
'OOThe three basic elements of the abolitionist platform for securing true
equality for the freedmen in the postwar South were the ballot, free public
education, and land reform through the confiscation of the ante belium plantations and estates and redistribution of the land by the federal government.
Only the right to vote was even theoretically secured; the provision of education
was half-heartedly pursued, while land reform proposals were repeatedly rejected.
The Republican decision to provide only for equal political rights without
attempting to give the former slaves the economic support necessary to make
political equality meaningful and longlasting suggests the essentially conservative
character of the party even during the so-called Radical Reconstruction and
indicates the relatively diminished influence of the abolitionists and more radical
egalitarians and nationalists. See generally J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAIWTY 386-417 (1964); K. STAMP, supra note 59, at 126-31.
101 See generally S. KuTaaR, supra note 67, at z67-68; P. PALUDAN, supra note
42, at 232-33; Wiecek, supra note 39, at 357-59.
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the courts that the Republicans turned to were the federal trial
courts.
3. The Act of 187,.- Shortly after the ratification of the
fifteenth amendment, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1870 2- popularly known as the Force Act- which reenacted
the Civil Rights Act of i866 and provided for the use of federal
troops to police the polls in the South.10 3 Nevertheless, Southern
resistance to Reconstruction continued and by early r871 there
was overwhelming evidence that through tacit complicity and
deliberate inactivity, state and local officials were fostering vigilante terrorism against politically active blacks and Union
sympathizers.0 4 To remedy this situation required a further shift
in the federal-state balance towards a greater, although still
limited, national role in the internal operations of the states.
Until 1871 the Reconstruction measures had largely been con-

cerned with affirmative state activities against blacks. Atrocities
committed by the Ku Klux Klan, however, led Congress in the

Act of 1871 to provide civil rights protection against official iniaction and the toleration of private lawlessness.'0 On March 23,
1871, President Grant requested emergency legislation in a special message, stating that a virtual state of anarchy existed in the
South and affirming that the states were powerless to control the
widespread violence. 0 6 In response, Congress enacted the Act
of April 20, 1871.0'
102

Ch.

114, 16 Stat. I4O (1870).

103 Id. §§ 3, 10.
'"Organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South has popularly been associated with the Ku Klux Klan, founded in Tennessee in i866. See, e.g., Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 6o Nw. U.L. REv.
277, 279-80 (1965). The Klan was one of many such organizations, and drew
its membership chiefly, although not solely, from the poor whites and yeoman
farmers. See K. STAMPP, supra note 59, at 199. Klansmen broke up Republican
meetings, threatened radical leaders, whipped blacks, and drove black voters from
the polls. "They were guilty of shootings, murders, and plundering, until their
lawlessness caused Klan leaders themselves to try, unsuccessfully [in 18691, to
disband the organization." Id. at 2oo. See generally D. CHALMERS, HOODED
AMEICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLux KLAN (1965).
0
' 1 See, e.g., CoNG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app., at 375 (1871) (remarks
of Rep. Lowe) ("It is said that the states are not doing the objectionable acts.
This argument is more specious than real . . . . What practical security would
this provision give if it could do no more than to abrogate and nullify overt acts
and legislation of a State?").
President Grant's message requesting legislation to suppress the Klan read
in pertinent part:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the states of the Union rendering life and property insecure, and the carrying of the mails and collection
of the revenue dangerous ....
That the power to correct these evils is
beyond the control of state authorities I do not doubt; that the power of
the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of the existing
laws is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. 299 (1871).
107 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13

(187I).
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That the draftsmen of the measure were primarily concerned
with suppressing the Klan is suggested by their repeated reference
to its depredations. White vigilantes were described as having
Representative Cobb
whipped, robbed, and murdered blacks.'
of North Carolina, for example, spoke of the "social and political
disability" imposed on blacks and white Republicans by "violence
and lawlessness"; "I Representative Coburn of Indiana emphasized that it was not the commission of "isolated outrages"
which was the cause of national concern, but rather "crimes perpetrated by concert and agreement, by men in large numbers
acting with a common purpose for the injury of a certain class of
citizens entertaining certain political principles." 110 The legislators who proposed the bill saw themselves confronted not with
common felonies but with a concerted plan of organized
violence."'
Moreover, most Congressmen viewed the situation in the
South as exacerbated by the inaction of the state and local governments. A full reading of the debates compels the conclusion that
the Act was aimed at least as much at the abdication of law enforcement responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at the
Klan's outrages." 2 Thus, Representative, later President, Garfield
of Ohio asserted that the problem in the South was not unequal
laws, "but that even where the laws are just and equal on their
face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect
or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are
denied equal protection . .

. .

"3

Other legislators noted that

members of the Klan were virtually immune from prosecution for
generally CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. X53-57, 198-202, 236-4o
(detailing the outrages perpetrated by the Klan). The Klan's misdeeds
were the subject of a voluminous report to Congress. S. REP. No. I, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. (187). See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks
of Rep. Lowe) ("While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings
and lynchings and banishments have been visited on unoffending American
citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to
apply the proper corrective.").
'See

(1871)

'09 CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., rst Sess. 439 (187).

"ld,
lit

at 457.

See, e.g., id. at 519 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).

("the remedy is needed
1.2 See, e.g., id. at 429 (remarks of Rep. Beatty)
because of prejudiced judges and juries"); id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey)
("the courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly
inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity"); id. app., at 186
(remarks of Rep. Platt) (the judges exercised their "almost despotic powers ...
against Republicans without regard to law or justice.").
113Id. app., at

153.
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acts committed in pursuance of Klan orders, and
that the state
114
courts were largely subject to Klan domination.
Although the proposed Ku Klux Klan Act was the subject of
a heated debate, section i-which is today codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 -was the least controversial portion of the bill." 5
Far greater attention was focused on the provisions imposing
criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive of constitutional rights, disqualifying former Confederates from serving
as jurors, and empowering the President to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and use armed forces to suppress "insurrection." 116
Section i caused the least concern, as it only added civil remedies
to the7 criminal penalties established by the 1866 Civil Rights
Act.

11

The constitutional debate on the 1871 Civil Rights Act
focused on the scope of congressional authority to protect constitutional rights and to reach private conduct. In attempting to
give meaning to the "privileges and immunities" which the federal
government could secure, the legislators frequently adverted 118
to Justice Washington's 1823 opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. 19
Justice Washington had suggested that the privileges and immunities safeguarded by article IV comprehended "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety." 120 The language of this opinion was broad, but its import
was unclear. It did not directly confront the question whether
article IV guaranteed substantive rights or only equality of enjoyment of such rights as the several states chose to extend to their
citizens. 2 ' Justice Washington's remarks were cited for both
these interpretations, and the confidence with which Congressmen
4
"

Id. app., at 172 (remarks on Sen. Pool) ("[No member of the Klan] has ever

feared any punishment for a crime committed in pursuance of the orders of the
Klan . . . ."); id. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn) ("The state courts, mainly
under the influence of this [Klan] oath, are utterly powerless.").
115See, e.g., id. at 824 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id. app., at 68 (remarks
of Rep. Shellabarger). See also Gressman, supra note 53, at 1334; Shapo, supra
note 104, at 279 & n.ii; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of
Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1486, 1488 & n.14 (1969).
"' Ch. 22, §§ 2-5, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see CoNG. GLOBE 42d Cong., ist Sess.
app., at 220 (x871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
17 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shelia-

barger).
"'See Graham, supra note 42, at 36-37. See also P.
at 268 n.37.
1196 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)

PALUDAN,

(No. 3,730).

supra note

42,

Justice Washington's

interpretation of the scope of "privileges and immunities" was much cited by
members of Congress throughout the Reconstruction period. See Fairman, supra
note 48, at 9-17.
120 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
121 See Fairman, supra note 48, at 9-13.
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in 1871 relied upon the case suggests that they did not appreciate
the ambiguities involved.' 2 2
An expansive interpretation of the 1871 Civil Rights Act
seems improbable in the light of the political atmosphere in which
the measure was passed. The Radicals controlled neither the Congress nor the country at large, and the framers of the Ku Klux
Klan Act were quick, both by argument and amendment, to
reconcile the statute with prevailing notions of states' rights. 3
The more intrusive provisions of the Act were viewed as necessary
responses to the outrages of the Klan, not foundations for establishing the strong central government advocated by the Radicals.
Thus, while the Act was intended to remedy the deficiencies of
the Southern states, there is little indication in the debates that
Congress sought to impair their political independence. 24
C. The Era of "DualFederalism"
r. Civil Rights Enforcement.- The vagueness of the language
of the Civil Rights Act left the courts- perhaps intentionally with broad latitude to construe these provisions. In the immediate
post-Reconstruction years, this legislation was progressively eviscerated by restrictive interpretations of the interests the federal
government was empowered to protect, and of the range of conduct it could prohibit consistent with the fourteenth amendment.
In reaching such conclusions, the Court seemed to disregard the
"original understanding" of Congress.12 But the nation at large,
apprehensive over the expansion of the federal government and
increasingly apathetic to the plight of the freedmen, appeared to
support the Supreme Court's hostility to the Reconstruction
legislation. 26
122 See id. at 12, 17. Compare The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.)
36, 75-76 (1873) (Miller, J.), with id. at 97-98 (Field, J., dissenting).
121 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., xst Sess. 697-98 (1871)
(remarks of
Sen. Edmunds).
124 See H. HymAN, supra note 6, at 530-31; P. PALUDAN, supra note 42, at
239-42, 245-47-

125The report of The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873),
printed in United States Reports, indicates that neither the counsel who argued
the case nor most of the Justices who heard it consulted the proceedings
and debates of the Congress which adopted the amendment. See Royall, supra
note 54, at 563 (1878). See generally C. COLLINs, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE STATES (1913).
126See, e.g., M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 63 (rev. ed. 1967); Frank &
Munro, The Original Understanding of the Equal Protection of the Laws, 5o
CoLU m. L. REV. 131, 150 (1950). One newspaper praised the Slaughterhouse
decision as a necessary "check upon the centralizing tendencies of the Government,
and upon the determination of the Administration to enforce its policy and to

maintain its power even at the expense of the Constitutional prerogatives of the

States." Chicago Daily Tribune, April i9, 1873, at 4, col. 3.
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Soon after the Civil War, the Supreme Court signaled its
intention to return to the states the primary role in the area of
civil liberties." 7 In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 2 " one of the leading decisions vindicating traditional notions of dual federalism,
the Court rejected the contention of Louisiana butchers that a
state-created monopoly in slaughtering, which denied them their
livelihood, violated the fourteenth amendment's privileges and
immunities and due process clauses.' 2 9 Justice Miller limited the
interests protected by the amendment to only those rights correlative to the existence of national government, 3 ' effectively
127

Two early post-Civil War decisions indicating that the Supreme Court

was anxious to preserve a considerable degree of autonomy for the states are
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (i869), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (ii
Wall.) 1i3 (187). In White, Texas filed a bill in equity in the Supreme Court
against citizens of other states, seeking to enjoin payment of bonds originally
issued by the United States to Texas as part of a border dispute settlement. Part
of the issue had remained in the state treasury when the Civil War erupted, and
the Confederate state legislature had authorized their disposition and sale to
defray the costs of the war. In determining a crucial jurisdictional questionwhether or not Texas, which had not yet been readmitted to the Union by Congress, was a state-the Court essentially affirmed the basic premises of Republican
Reconstruction policy that the seceded states and their people were out of their
proper relation to the Union and that their reconstruction constituted a political
question to be resolved by the legislative, not the judicial, branch of the national
government, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 7,9--21, 725-30. In so doing, however, the
Court used rhetoric strongly affirming the significance of autonomous states:
"[T]he preservation of the States and the maintenance of their governments, are
as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible
states." Id. at 725; see H. HY-mAN, supra note 6, at 517-18; S. KiumLER, supra note
67, at io8-io.
In Day, the Court construed the 1863 national income tax-the first in the
nation's history- to exempt the salaries of state judges from its coverage. Speaking for the Court, Justice Nelson relied primarily on the tenth amendment and
on the 3o-year-old precedent of Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (X842), in which the Supreme Court had granted federal
officials immunity from state taxation. The Civil War and the Reconstruction
amendments apparently changed little for Justice Nelson and the majority of the
Court: "The general government, and the States, although both exist within the
same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respective spheres." 78 U.S. (ii
Wall.) at 124. Thus, if the instrumentalities of the federal government required
tax immunity from the states for their self-preservation, then those of the states
deserved similar exemption. The two governments, the Court concluded, "are
upon an equality." Id. at 127. See generally H. HymAx, supra note 6, at 534-35.
The holding of Day was not reversed until 1939, in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486-87 (1939).
12883 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
12 1 d. at 61, 66-82.
30
' Id. at 78-8o. The Court, relying on Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1867),

enumerated the following "privileges and immunities" of national
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excluding almost all civil rights from its purview. 131 Thus, the
fourteenth amendment was interpreted to have no impact on the
position of the states in safeguarding fundamental rights; ante
bellum federalism's
allocation of powers remained essentially
32
unchanged.

This narrow reading of the amendment was reaffirmed two
years later in United States v. Cruikshank,3 3 where the Court
held that the right to assemble to petition for a redress of
grievances was not a component of the rights of national citizenship unless the petition was directed to the United States government.'34 Cruikshank also contributed to the emerging doctrine
that the fourteenth amendment could reach the conduct only of
state governments or state officials, and not of private persons.
Chief Justice Waite found that the amendment "adds nothing to
the rights of one citizen against another." 13' The state action
citizenship: the right to come to the seat of government to participate in or
transact business with the government; free access to national seaports, subtreasuries, land offices, and courts; the care and protection of the national government when on the high seas or in a foreign jurisdiction; the right to assemble
peaceably and petition the national government for redress of grievances; the
writ of habeas corpus; the use of navigable waters; the benefit of any rights
derived from a treaty with a foreign government; the right to become a citizen
of another state; the right to due process and equal protection; and the rights
secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments. See 83 U.S. (x6 Wall.) at

79-80.
1

' See R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD

44 (1947).
"'2 See generally Graham, supra note 42.
133 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
""4 Id. at 551-52. In Cruikshank, the Court applied the narrow interpretation
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which it had
given to the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases to the civil rights
legislation adopted under the amendment. Cruikshank involved the application
of one of the key provisions of the post-Civil War civil rights legislation- § 6
of the Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (i97o)), which made it a federal crime for two or more persons to conspire to interfere with a citizen's exercise of any rights granted to him by the
laws or Constitution of the United States. Three persons who had forcibly
broken up a meeting of blacks in Louisiana, and participated in the lynching of
two of the blacks, were indicted and convicted under the criminal conspiracy
provision. 92 U.S. at 548, 552-53. In a decision setting aside the convictions, the
Supreme Court refrained from voiding the provision but drastically limited its
usefulness. The right to assemble peaceably was not seen as an attribute of
national citizenship, unless it was directly related to the functioning of the federal
government. Id. at 551-52. In effect, Congress, in the exercise of its power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by appropriate legislation, see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5, was allowed to legislate only on the limited relationship between
the citizen and the federal government. See generally R. CARR, supra note 131,
at 45.
135 92 U.S. at 554. Unlike the cases which subsequently established the state
action requirement, Cruikshank did not regard private misconduct as wholly out-
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prerequisite for invoking federal protection was reiterated in
United States v. Harris136 and the Civil Rights Cases.'37 Moreover, although executive and judicial conduct sanctioned by the
side congressional reach. Cruikshank recognized that there might be constitutional
rights derived from sources not subject to the state action limitation, and that
those might accordingly be protected against private as well as state interferences.
Thus, the Court suggested that when the purpose of an assembly or petition had
direct bearing upon the national government's powers or duties, the Constitution,
by implication, protected these rights from private as well as governmental threats.
See id. at 554. See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 771-72 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting Cruikshank
as "announcting] in dicta a federal right to assemble to petition the Congress for
a redress of grievances") ; G. GuNTiER, supra note 37, at 962-63.
136 io6 U.S. 629 (1882).
Harris held unconstitutional part of § 2 of the
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 23, providing criminal penalties for
conspiracy to deprive any person of "the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges or immunities under the law." Harris, a private person, was
charged with participating in a lynching -killing
one person as well as beating
three others while they were in the custody of a Tennessee sheriff. io6 U.S. at
629-32. The Supreme Court sustained a demurrer, holding the legislation unconstitutional because in providing sanctions against private conduct, it went
beyond Congress' authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 638.
The provision was repealed in 29o9. Cf. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88
(1971) (upholding the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § x985(3) (1970), the civil
counterpart to the civil rights conspiracy provision, which was found applicable
to private conspiracies).
127 io9 U.S. 3 (1883). These five cases involved proceedings against private
persons under §§ i and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, i875, ch. 124, x8
Stat. 335, imposing criminal penalties for private discrimination on the basis of
race in public accommodations such as hotels, theaters, and railway cars. The
legislation was held unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress to enforce
the fourteenth amendment because it was directed against private discrimination.
io9 U.S. at ii. The Civil Rights Cases became the foundation for the requirement
of state action in suits under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER,
supra note 39, at 9o6, 924-i5. See also Virginia v. Rives, ioo U.S. 313, 317-18
(2879) (dicta) (limiting the fourteenth amendment and legislation enacted pursuant to it to "State action exclusively").
The state action requirement became sufficiently entrenched in fourteenth
amendment analysis that it was soon extended to the thirteenth and fifteenth
amendments. See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (19o3) (§ 5 of the Act
of May 31, 2870, providing criminal penalties for interfering with the right to
vote, held unconstitutional under the fifteenth amendment because it was directed
against private persons as well as state officers); Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. i (i9o6) (reversing convictions obtained under the civil rights criminal
conspiracy statute (currently codified at i8 U.S.C. § 241 (,970)) for a conspiracy
to prevent a group of blacks from exercising their right established in § i6 of the
Act of May 3X, x870, x6 Stat. 140, to make contracts for employment; federal
protection against private interferences with the right to make contracts was
found to be beyond the scope of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment), overruled in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78
(z968). See also Howe, supra note 45, at 25 (criticizing the extension of state
action analysis to the thirteenth amendment as inconsistent with the purposes of
the amendment's framers).
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state was deemed to be "state action," conduct by state officers
in violation of their authority was not.' Thus, that very lawless138

See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1904); cf.

Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 3x3, 319-21 (I879) (removal provision of Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1443(0) (z97o)) held to permit removal of state criminal proceeding to federal court only where a state statute
denies, or interferes with the enforcement of, equal rights; assertion that state
judge is likely to deny those rights during the trial through action illegal under
state law insufficient to warrant removal). See also The Civil Rights Cases, xo9
U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (dictum) (state action defined as conduct pursuant to state
authority in "the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings").
The Supreme Court never clearly and unequivocally held that the action of
state officers in violation of state law could not constitute the state action requisite
under the fourteenth amendment. In Barney, the Court determined that it was
without jurisdiction to enjoin the city's construction of a rapid transit tunnel
adjacent to plaintiff's premises, where plaintiff had claimed that the construction
was in violation of the state statute authorizing the general plan of rapid transit
construction. The Court, in finding that there had been no state deprivation of
property without due process, used language suggesting that conduct in violation
of state law could not be "state action":
[The complaint] proceeded on the theory that the construction . . .was not
only not authorized, but was forbidden by the legislation, and hence was
not action by the State of New York within the intent and meaning of the
i4th Amendment. . . . Complainant's grievance was that the law of the
State had been broken, and not a grievance inflicted by action of the
legislative or executive or judicial department of the State; and the principle
is that it is for the state courts to remedy acts of state officers done without
the authority of, or contrary to, state law.
193 U.S. at 483. Barney, however, has been plausibly interpreted as simply the
Supreme Court's rejection of a claim that the mere violation of state law by state
officials is necessarily a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 87, at 942.
Despite the lack of a conclusive decision of the applicability of the fourteenth
amendment to state officer action in the nineteenth century, it was widely assumed that action in violation of state law could not be state action, see, e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167, 202, 212-17 (ig6i) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in
part) ; Shapo, supra note io4, at 284-85; Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal
Courts to Enjoin UnauthorizedAction of State Officials, 40 HARV. L. REV. 969, 969
(1927), and a number of lower federal courts explicitly took that position, see, e.g.,
Huntington v. City of New York, ii8 F. 683 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902), aff'd, 193 U.S.
441 (1904); Kiernan v. Multnomah County, 95 F. 849 (C.C.D. Or. 1899); Manhattan Ry. v. Mayor of City of New York, 18 F. 193 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
Moreover, the cases brought during the nineteenth century under the civil
rights acts charging deprivations "under color" of state law almost uniformly
involved action taken either in pursuance of some specific command of state law
or within the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws.
See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (I9O3); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
ir5 U.S. 611 (1885); Carter v Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885); Crystal Springs
Land & Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 F. 148 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1896), aff'd,
177 U.S. 169 (1897); Fraser v. McConway & Torley Co., 82 F. 257 (C.C.D. Pa.
1897); Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 F. 689 (D. Ky. 1896); Helmsley v. Myers,
45 F. 283 (C.C.D. Kan. i89i); Tuchman v. Welch, 42 F. 548 (C.C.D. Kan. 189o).
In two actions under the civil rights acts where the question of whether the official
conduct involved might have been in violation of state law arose, the courts found
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ness of government agents the prevention of which had been the
primary object of the Act of 1871 was immunized from federal
sanction.
The effect of such a narrow judicial construction of state action
and "privileges and immunities" on section 1983 was devastating.
Despite continuing infringement of the civil liberties of the freedmen and their descendants, virtually no actions were brought
under the statute.13 9 By the turn of the century, federal protection of these rights had declined to the point that the Southern
states were able to introduce Jim Crow laws, resembling the Black
Codes, which imposed patently exclusionary "literacy" tests on
The federal courts, notblacks as a requirement of voting.'
withstanding the fact that it was a specific purpose of civil rights
legislation to secure the vote for freedmen, were reluctant to
intervene even in cases where state officials disenfranchised blacks
with the obvious approval of the state government, and outrages
grimly reminiscent of those perpetrated by the Klan were held
to be beyond the scope of section 1983 . 1"1 Throughout the period

between the end of Reconstruction and the Depression, the federal
judiciary seemed disposed to allow a relatively wide latitude to
state police power, and to place higher priority on the preservation of a tranquil federalism than on the safeguarding of individual civil rights.
2. Views of Federalism.- Even as the Supreme Court was
subordinating the national interest in civil rights enforcement to
its concern for the maintenance of traditional notions of federalism, the premises upon which those ante bellum views were based
were being profoundly altered. The Civil War and the peaceful
resolution of the Reconstruction in 1877 ushered in a period of
the civil rights laws inapplicable. See Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D.
Ga. i9o9) ; United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 563, 563-64 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874)
(No. 15,459).

"Between
1871 and 1920, only 21 cases were brought under § 1983.
See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (i95i). As late as 1953, the statute was still relatively ineffective. See generally Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1286 (,953).
art. VIII, §§ I8o-i87 (1902); GA. CONST. of
"4'See, e.g., ArLA. CONST. of 1oi,
1877, art. 2, § I (i9o8) ; LA. CoNsT. of 1898, art. 197, §§ 2-5; MIss. CoNsT. of 1890,
art. 12, §§ 241-245; N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. 6, §§ 1-4 (1900); S.C. CONST. of
1895, art. 2, § 4. See generally Monnet, The Latest Phase of Negro Disenfranchisement, 26 HARv. L. REV. 42 (1912) ; see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903);
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (19o3).
141 See, e.g., Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. igog) (dismissing a §
1983 action against a southern police officer who whipped and assaulted the female
plaintiff in public, detained her, and eventually released her without charge; the
court saw no deprivation of any constitutionally or federally secured privilege or
immunity).
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intense nationalism. Gone, seemingly forever, was the ante
bellum attitude that the states were the primary centers of
political life. The doctrines of secession and nullification and the
view of the nation as no more than a compact of states, which
had characterized the early debates over the nature of the federal
system, had been rendered untenable by the outcome of the war.
The nation became the focus of popular loyalties, the supremacy
of the national government over the states was everywhere acknowledged, at least in theory, and the United States was increasingly regarded as one organic entity rather than a collection of
states. 4 2
Equally significant for the development of a new view of
federalism was the steady erosion of the prewar economic order.
In the decades between the Civil War and the Depression the
nation of small farms and industries serving and being served by
primarily local areas steadily vanished; technological innovation
and the emergence of new forms of industrial organization led to
the development of a rapidly growing economy of national
scope. 43 The disappearance of a small-scale economy meant the
effective termination of the era in which states and communities
could easily regulate business enterprises. 44 Even in agriculture,
where much production remained in the hands of small operators,
expanded markets made these operators dependent upon conditions which they and the state governments were unable to control.

45

As a result, as Professor Schlesinger has written, the

people who sought to "curb the mighty forces remaking the
economic order . . . turned to Washington, not to their legislatures, for decisive action." 141

This combination of a psychology of nationalism and the
emerging need for national governmental action to deal with the
economy led to an unprecedented period of national peacetime
regulation. The first administrative agencies were established to
supervise the conduct of interstate carriers, businesses engaged
in interstate commerce, and banks and financial institutions. The
federal government became involved in the regulation of railroad
rates, the dissolution of monopolies, and the establishment of
health and safety regulations governing both the conditions of
142

See generally W.

BENNETT,

supra note 6, at x79-95; 1 J. BRYCE, THE

2 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER,
supra note 6, at 2o3-o6; A. SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF MODERN AMERICA, i8651951,4 at 162-66 (i95').
1 1 See generally W. BENNETT, supra note 6, at 198; 2 S. MoRISON & H. ComMAGER,supra note 6, at 165-223; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note X42, at 27-50, 82-1o6.
114 See, e.g., H. HYMAN, supra note 6, at 8.
4' See W. BENNETT, supra note 6, at i98.
4
1 6 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 142, at 164.
AMERICAN

COMMONWEALTH

533-34 (x888);
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labor and
the quality of consumer goods sold in interstate com47
merce.3

While the President and Congress in this era may be seen as
moving steadily toward the creation of an affirmative federal role
in the regulation of the national economy, the Supreme Court took
a more ambiguous stance. A concern for the maintenance of a
free flow of commerce throughout the nation and the need for
uniformity in commercial matters implicating national concerns
often led the Court to give an expansive reading to the negative
implications of the commerce clause. 48 State enactments purporting to exclude certain goods 19 or keep the products of a
state within that state 15' were regularly struck down, as were
state taxes which discriminated against goods which originated
outside the state. 5 ' Moreover, the metaphor of a "flow" of commerce enabled the Court to uphold federal regulation of the
intrastate portions of certain types of interstate business activities. 5 ' Yet for the most part, the Court in this era resisted the
notion that in an economy of national scope all stages in the
process of production, transportation, and distribution for a national market are part of a continuous flow in which local phases
are submerged. For example, in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.,1 53 the Court concluded that the Sherman Antitrust Act could

not be applied to reach the activities of the sugar trust, which
147

See generally

2 S. MORISON & H. CoMMraa,

supra note 6, at 165-224,

476-5o3. Although the regulation of labor relations remained largely a matter of
state concern, see W. BENNE-T, supra note 6, at 198, when the harsh conditions of
industrial life provoked labor unrest on a national scale the national government
was not slow to act; thus President Cleveland defied Governor Altgeld of Illinois
and the states' rights interpretation of the Constitution in 1894 and ordered
federal troops into Illinois over the Governor's objection to quell the Pullman
strike. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 142, at 164. Cleveland's action was vindicated by the Supreme Court in In re Debs, i58 U.S. 564 (1895). See also J.
SCHmIOHAuSER, supra note 19, at 131-32.
148See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, I35 U.S. IOO (i890); Bowman v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1887); Wabash, St. L., & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557
(x886) ; Welton v. Missouri, 19 U.S. 275 (,875).
140 See, e.g., Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (igoo); Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (189O);
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. ioo (i89o). See generally E. CORWIN, supra note. 6, at
18-x9.
IS0 See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
CO., 221 U.S. 229 (I9II).
' See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 5XI ('935); Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).

See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515 - I6 (1922); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (905).
See generally E. CORWIN, supra note 6, .at
40-43.
153 156 U.S. 1 (i895).
12
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had acquired nearly complete control over the domestic manufacture of refined sugar, because manufacturing was a purely
local concern.M And in Hammer v. Dagenhart,5 5 the Court
invalidated a congressional statute forbidding the shipment in
interstate commerce of the products of child labor.'
In doing
so, the Court emphasized the importance of the interest in state
autonomy which the statute would infringe. "The Nation is made
up of States to which are entrusted the powers of local government"; 15" to uphold the child labor act and thereby allow Congress to regulate matters traditionally entrusted to local authority
through the device of prohibiting transport in interstate commerce would mean that "the power of the States over local matters
may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be practically destroyed." 158
54

See id. at 17.
U.S. 251 (1918).
156 Id. at 276-77. Writing for the Court, Justice Day appeared to rest his decision on two grounds: that the Act was not a regulation of commerce among the
states, see id. at 270-75, and that, further, it was an invasion of the powers which
the Constitution reserved to the states, see id. at 275-77. Much of the notoriety
of Justice Day's opinion appears to derive from the second prong of his analysis.
See, e.g., E. CORWiN, supra note 6, at 26-37; J. ScumnHAusER, supra note ig,
at i5o-i5i.
In demonstrating that the statute was in excess of the commerce power, Justice
Day sought to distinguish it from other decisions upholding congressional legislation prohibiting the transportation through interstate commerce of lottery tickets,
see Champion v. Ames, i88 U.S. 321 (19o3), adulterated products, see Hipolite
Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911), or women for the purposes of prostitution, see Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 3o8 (1913). In the previous cases the
goods regulated were harmful in themselves or "the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results," 247 U.S. at 271.
However, in the case of child labor, said Justice Day, the act aimed "to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing
within the states," an objective outside the scope of the federal commerce power.
Id. at
274.
57
'

155 247

1

Id.

at 275.

'Id.
at 276. Although the emphasis on the interest in state autonomy and
the protection afforded the reserve powers of the states by the tenth amendment
appear to suggest the existence of an independent constitutional barrier to the
exercise of federal authority, Justice Day was careful to demonstrate the lack of
federal authority as well. See note 156 supra.
The Dagenhart case underscored the basic paradox inherent in the use of dual
federalism to preserve state autonomy. In the previous decades the Court had
done much in protecting the development of a national economy which effectively
weakened the state regulatory power championed in Dagenhart. Thus, an individual state seeking to take action against the abuses of child labor could not by
itself proscribe the importation of goods made in other states which were the
product of child labor. Moreover, the judicially enforced free competition among
the states on a national scale tended to discourage social experimentation in this
area because legislators feared that if they curtailed the use of child labor in their
own states, competing states which had not adopted similar progressive legislation

1977]

DEVELOPMENTS - SECTION 1983

116

5

The Court's willingness to impose restrictions on federal legislative power in order to preserve areas of state autonomy was unmatched by any similar willingness to allow concern for state interests to limit judicial authority to restrain state regulatory activity. Finding corporations to be persons within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment, 59 the Court infused the amendment's
due process clause with substantive content reflecting laissez faire
notions and designed to protect corporate interests from state eco-

nomic legislation. Through the incorporation into the due process
clause of the doctrine of liberty of contract 160 and the requirement

that administratively determined railroad and utility rates meet
an ill-defined standard of reasonableness,' 6 ' the Court effectively
arrogated to itself the power to define the limits of state regulatory, and especially rate-fixing, competence. At the same time,
the Court moved to guarantee broad access to the lower federal
courts to corporate plaintiffs,' 62 thereby contributing to the further erosion of state autonomy and integrity.

The immunity of the states to suit in federal court, which had
been first pierced in Chisholm v. Georgia 163 and then restored by

the eleventh amendment,'

was again set aside to assure federal

judicial protection of economic rights threatened with unsympacould reap an economic advantage from their ability to sell their products at
lower prices- given the relative cheapness of child labor-as well as through
the migration of industries using child labor.
With both the states and the federal government after Dagenhart thus effectively precluded from regulating certain phases of economic activity, dual federalism, as Professor Corwin wrote, had created a "triple federalism" with a "political
'no-man's land'" between the states and the national government where no regulation was constitutionally permissible. See E. CoRWiN, supra note 6, at 34-35.
1"' See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (i886). See
also Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878); Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877).
ieo See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also Lochner v.
New York, i98 U.S. 45, 74-76 (igo5) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"I'See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (i898) ; Reagan v. Farmers Loan &
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1893).
162 See Neuborne, supra note 88, at iio7-o8.
13 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (i793).
164 The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
In deciding eleventh amendment cases, the Supreme Court has generally looked
beyond the language of the amendment and focused on the principle of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (i8go); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HAv. L. REV. 682, 683-86 (1976).
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thetic treatment by the states. In Ex parte Young, 165 the Court
sustained a federal circuit court contempt citation against the Attorney General of Minnesota for violating a federal court injunction prohibiting him from enforcing a railroad ratemaking statute
alleged to violate the due process clause. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Peckham found that where the action of the state officer
against whom injunctive relief is sought is alleged to be unconstitutional, the suit "does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity," and, thus, the federal court could enjoin the
state official from implementing the state law. 16 Through a somewhat artificial if not illogical distinction between the state officer
formally standing suit and the state policy actually at issue, Ex
parte Young reaffirmed the significance of the fourteenth amendment as a subjection of state sovereignty and substantive lawmaking power to federal standards, while guaranteeing that federal courts would continue to be available as primary agencies for
the enforcement of those federal requirements.
The decision in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of
Los Angeles 117 also sought to assure the practical availablity of
federal judicial enforcement of the fourteenth amendment against
the states. In so doing, the Court implicitly rejected a notion of
a state as an integral unit, with any substantial interest attaching
to correction and control by state -as
opposed to federal courts.' 68 In Home Telephone, the city of Los Angeles argued that
because the telephone rates it had fixed which were alleged to
violate the due process clause also assertedly violated a similar
provision of the state constitution, its acts could not be treated
as state action under the fourteenth amendment nor reviewed by
the lower federal courts until the state courts had passed on the
case and determined the acts to be authorized under state lawY"'
The Court rejected that contention, finding that if it were accepted, then "at least in every case where there was a coincidence
between a national safeguard or prohibition and a state one,"
the power of the federal court to vindicate constitutional rights
against the states "would depend on the ultimate determination
of the state courts." 110 Such a result would be unacceptable since
it would "cause the state courts to become the primary source"
for defining and enforcing constitutional rights. 7 '
Thus, the concerns for federalism and state autonomy which
209 U.S. 123 (i9o8).
'

6

Id. at i59-6o, 163, 166-68.

167227 U.S. 278 (I913).
68

' See pp. 1270-71 infra.

160 227 U.S. at 282-83.
17 0

Id. at 284-85.
171 Id. at 285.
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led the Court to restrict the scope of federal economic regulation
did not preclude a vigorous role for the federal judiciary in enforcing constitutional rights. And in vindicating the corporate interests implicated in the constitutional litigation of this era, the
Court developed some of the doctrinal tools which, when its attention turned to civil rights enforcement, would make section
1983 such a potent and controversial cause of action.
D. The Emergence of Section 1983
During the 1920's, the use of section 1983 was for the most
part confined to deprivations of voting rights. 2 Unlike the situation around the turn of the century,173 however, section 1983
plaintiffs began to achieve a measure of success. In 1927, the
Supreme Court allowed an action for damages against election
judges who in compliance with a Texas statute had prohibited
blacks from voting in a Democratic primary.174 Writing for a
unanimous Court in Nixon v. Herndon,'75 Justice Holmes stated
that "it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious
infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment." 116 And a dozen
years later, the Court in Lane v. Wilson "I upheld the right of
blacks to sue for damages sustained because they were 1 effectively
8
denied the franchise by a discriminatory state statute.
In the same year, the statute received its first significant application in a case not involving race discrimination or the franchise.' 79 In Hague v. CIO,' the Court affirmed a decision restraining various Jersey City officials, acting pursuant to a
local ordinance, from harrassing the plaintiff labor organizers. 1"'
Although the Justices divided'8 2 over whether the right to as172 See Shapo, supra note
1

104, at 282-84; Comment, supra note i39, at 370.

73 See pp. 1157-61 supra.

14

Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927).
U.S. 536 (1927).

175273
1

76 Id. at 541.
177 3o7 U.S. 268 (1939).
78
'
.d at 274. See also Smith v. Alhwright,

321

U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.

Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
179 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Note, supra note 139, at 1287.
18°307 U.S. 496 (1939).
181 Id. at 5oo.
112 Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Black, wrote the principal opinion,
declaring the ordinance void and enjoining its enforcement. This opinion saw the
right to discuss federal legislation as a privilege of national citizenship, secured by
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 512-14. Justices Stone and Reed concurred on
the grounds that freedom of speech and assembly are secured by the due process
clause; they refused to accept the privileges and immunities argument. Id. at 518,
519. Chief Justice Hughes concurred separately, agreeing with Justice Roberts
that the right to discuss federal legislation was a national "privilege," but agreeing
with Justice Stone in his view that the record did not adequately support jurisdic-
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semble and organize under the National Labor Relations Act was
a privilege or immunity of national citizenship 18 or was a component of first amendment protections incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process clause, 18 4 a majority of the Court
agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional and enjoined its
enforcement.' s5
Nixon v. Herndon,Lane v. Wilson, and Hague v. CIO each involved official action taken pursuant to an unconstitutional state
statute or local ordinance, and thus fit squarely within the traditional narrow definition of "under color" of law. In 1941, however,
that requirement of suits under the civil rights acts received a
major reinterpretation. In United States v. Classic, ' the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of charges brought under the
criminal provisions of these acts 187 against election officials who
had fraudulently counted ballots in a primary -a
clear violation of state law. 8 ' Commenting on the "under color" phrase,
the Court implicitly rejected the premise that the term required
that conduct be authorized by a state statute: "Misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state action is action taken 'under color of' state law." 189
Four years later this redefinition of the "under color" requirement was reaffirmed by a closely divided Court. In Screws v.
United States,19 0 the Court held that a sheriff's fatal beating of a
black prisoner constituted conduct "under color" of the law.' 1
Speaking for the four-member plurality,19 2 Justice Douglas
adopted the construction of "under color" announced in Classic,
defining the term as "under 'pretense' of law." 193
Classic and Screws thus established that at least in criminal
tion on that ground. Id. at 532. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented;
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas did not participate.
83
1
Id. at 512 (Robert & Black, JJ.) ; id. at 532 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
184 Id. at 519 (Stone & Reed, JJ.).
85
Id. at 5oo.
ISO313 U.S. 299 (1941).
18 Sections 6 and 17 of the Act of May 31, 187o, ch. 114, x6 Stat. 141 (current
version at x8 U.S.C. §§
188 313 U.S. at 328.
89

1

241, 242 (i97o)).

Id. at

190325

191 Id.

326.
US. 9, (1945).
at 107. Although defendant's action was held to be "under color of"

state law, the Court reversed the sheriff's conviction because the trial judge had
not properly instructed the jury on the nature of the specific intent necessary to
support a conviction. See id. at xo6.
"' Joining Justice Douglas' plurality opinion were Chief Justice Stone and

Justices Black and Reed. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result in a separate
opinion. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Murphy dissented.
3Id. at iiI.
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actions, conduct "under color" of law encompasses unauthorized
and indeed unlawful conduct of a state officer, so long as the "pretense" of authority with which he acted furthered in any way the
constitutional violation.' 94 These decisions made section 1983
increasingly available for suits alleging police misconduct 19 5 and
deprivations of first amendment rights, 9 ' which by their number
and the nature of the issues framed provided significant impetus to the modern expansion of the scope and impact of the statute.
In the decade following Screws, the potential reach of section
1983 was considerably enlarged by the gradual incorporation of
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause
and the emergence of the modern equal protection and due process doctrines. Although section 1983 does not specifically encompass these provisions, the ambit of the statute is determined
by that of the fourteenth amendment which it was enacted to enforce, and as the latter came to comprehend a wider variety of
interests, the foundation for a broad interpretation of the civil
rights acts was laid.
Monroe v. Pape 117 resurrected section 1983 from ninety
years of obscurity. The facts in Monroe were reminiscent of the
"outrages" which had prompted the passage of the Act of 187 . s
Plaintiff and his family sued thirteen Chicago policemen and the
city of Chicago, alleging that the police had broken into their
home without a warrant, forced them out of bed at gunpoint,
made them stand naked while the officers ransacked the house,
and subjected the family to verbal and physical abuse.' 99 The defendants then allegedly took Monroe to the police station where
he was held incommunicado and interrogated for ten hours before
he was released without being charged. 0° Plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants' action constituted a deprivation "under color" of
law of their constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches. The district court dismissed the complaint 2 0 ' and the
'See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 507 (1939).
195See, e.g., Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3

(gth

See also Hague

Cir. 1958); Coleman v.

Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. i957); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th
Cir. 1953); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., ISI F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (i947).
190 See, e.g., Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Hannan v. City
of Havershill, 120 F.2d 87 (ist Cir. x94); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 6o F. Supp. S
(D. Kan. i945). See also Comment, supra note 139, at 374-76.
197 365 U.S. 67 (i96i).
' See pp. 1153-54 supra.
109 365 U.S. at 169.
200

I.

20'

Record at

20

(unreported opinion of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, June 5,

1959).
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Seventh Circuit affirmed. 02
The Supreme Court granted cer20 3
tiorari and reversed in part.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, readily found that the
defendants' conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights 204
and held that the definition of "under color of" law for section
1983 purposes was the same as that established in the criminal
context. As a result, the ultra vires nature of the officers' activity
did not preclude relief.20 5 The Court also concluded that since
section 1983 provides for a civil action and - unlike the criminal
civil rights conspiracy statute - does not contain an explicit requirement that the defendants' conduct be willful, plaintiffs need
not prove that the defendant acted with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." 206 But despite the broad reach
given section 1983, Justice Douglas held that municipalities here the city of Chicago -were
immune from liability under
207
the statute.
In reaching these conclusions, Justice Douglas relied heavily
upon the legislative history of the statute.20 8 He discerned three
purposes underlying the original enactment of the measure in
1871: to override discriminatory state laws; 209 to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate; 210 and to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, although adequate in theory,
was not available in practice.2 1 From these purposes Justice
Douglas derived the expansive interpretation of "under color"
and from this interpretation, a fourth, and the most significant
modern, purpose: to provide a supplementary federal remedy.
202 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
203 365 U.S. at 187 (complaint states cause of action against individuals) ; id. at
192 (municipality immune from suit).
204 Id. at 171 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 2o6 (ig6o); Wolf v.

Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (i949)).
205365 U.S. at 172.
2 6

Id. at 187 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (i945)). The
holding in Screws, see pp. 1168-69 supra, that the criminal liability provisions of
the Civil Rights Act, i8 U.S.C. § 242 (i97o), required a showing that the defendant had acted with the specific intent of depriving another of his constitutional
rights was necessary to save the statute from the argument that it is unconstitutionally vague. See 325 U.S. at 1o3. In Monroe, both the majority and Justice
Frankfurter, in his dissent, concluded that in the context of a civil action, due
process did not require such a rigorous showing and that the standards of tort
liability would suffice. See 365 U.S. at 187, 207 n.6. For a further discussion of
the difficulties posed by the tort liability standard for § 1983 established in Mon-

roe, see pp. 1204-17 infra.
207 365 U.S. at 187-92.
2

°1 See id. at 171, 173-83, 185, 188-91.
9 Id. at 173.
2 0
d. at X73-74.
20

2

Id. at

174.
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"The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked."

212

Justice Harlan concurred in a separate opinion discussing only
the issue of the proper scope of the "under color of" requirement 1 i
Although he felt that the legislative history was unclear with regard to the meaning of this term, he saw no substantial evidence
in the congressional debates that the Forty-Second Congress intended to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized conduct by state officials for the purposes of section 1983.214 Accordingly he felt that on such a legislative record the Court would
not be justified in violating the principle of stare decisis by overruling the "under color" definition of Classic and Screws.21
Justice Frankfurter dissented, except as to the dismissal of the
suit against the city of Chicago.216 In an exhaustive analysis
of the congressional debates, he argued that while "under color"
of state law should have the same meaning in both section 1983
and the criminal conspiracy provision, neither statute should
encompass the broad interpretation of Classic and Screws. 217 He
emphasized the contemporary need to preserve a proper balance
in federal-state relations, and argued that Congress had not intended the civil rights acts to absorb ordinary state torts and
crimes; accordingly, he contended that Classic and Screws should
be overruled.2 18
212

Id. at 183.

...
Id. at

192-202.

Id.at
2
" Id.at
216
Id.

194-98.
202.

21 4

217
2 18

Justice Stewart joined in the opinion.

Id. at 211-58.
d. at 237. Interestingly, none of the opinions written in Monroe dealt

directly with the question of the significance of the existence of adequate state
remedies for the availability of a § 1983 action in federal court. In adopting the
Classic-Screws interpretation of "under color of," with its necessary implication
that the requirements for a § 1983 claim will often be met where the defendants'
conduct is in clear violation of state as well as federal law, the question of whether
a federal court ought to abstain, or require a § 1983 plaintiff to exhaust his state
remedies before having recourse to a federal forum, assumed a new and critical
significance. Justice Douglas, relying on the purposes of the Reconstruction Congress in adopting § 1983 which he had used to support his expansive reading of
the "under color" requirement, found that the availability of adequate state
remedies would not preclude a § x983 suit from being brought in federal court,
nor would it require the exhaustion of state remedies. Id. at 183. However, his
conclusion does not necessarily follow from the purposes given, and no other
reasons for adopting a "no-exhaustion" requirement were given. Although Justice
Frankfurter was more attentive to the federalism implications of an expanded §
X983, he too focused almost exclusively on the "under color" issue and failed to
treat separately with the question of the sufficiency of available state remedies.
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Since the decision in Monroe v. Pape there has been an extraordinary increase in the volume of civil rights litigation brought
in the lower federal courts under section i983. In 196o only two
hundred and eighty suits were filed in federal court under all the
civil rights acts; 219 in 1972 approximately eight thousand claims
were filed under section 1983 alone. 220 Although the Supreme
Court has begun to contract the scope of section 1983,221 the increase in litigation has continued unabated: by 1976 the civil
rights case load of the federal courts had increased by more than
one hundred percent from the 1972 figures.222
This striking increase in section 1983 litigation has prompted
several assertions that the availability of the federal civil rights
action should be limited.223 The need to reduce the pressures on
the already crowded dockets of the federal courts has undoubtedly been an important factor in the calls to restrict the ambit of
section 1983 . 22' However, as Judge Friendly has noted, "[i] t is
hard to conceive a task more appropriate for federal courts than
to protect civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion by the states." 2_oi
More significantly, section 1983 has profoundly disturbed
those analysts concerned about maintaining a "proper balance"
between the national and state governments. 220 The statute has
increasingly been used as a device for bringing federal court suits
which resemble state tort actions against state and local officials.227
The issues of abstention and exhaustion in the context of § 1983 actions vill
be examined in Parts IV & V infra.
"'See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

1960

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 232, table C2.
2 See McCormack, Federalism and Section x983, 6o VA. L. REV. I, r n.2
(974).
21 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) ; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(976);
City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (973); Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (I973); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (973); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
.22 See p.. 1136, note 7 supra.
12 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-107
(973); Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's

Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 557; Shapo, supra note io4; Note, supra note 11.
22 See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 223, at 558-59. See also H. FRIENDLY, supra
note 223, at 87-88; Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK L. REV.
567, 570 (I97I); Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New
Direction, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 9o4, 915 (1976).
225 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 223, at 9o.
2

See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-70X (x976)

(Rehnquist, J.);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-8o (1976) (Rebnquist, J.); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Black, J.); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 223, at 90-92; Aldisert,
supranote 223, at 56o-63.
221 See generally Aldisert, supra note 223, at 573-74; Note, supra note 224, at
917-18, 924-26.
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Under the rubric of the due process or cruel and unusual punishment clauses, almost any common law tort committed by a state
officer can be converted into a constitutional violation and thereby made the basis of a section 1983 action. 22 ' Although the use
of state officer misconduct which resembles tortious behavior as
a "shield" by state criminal defendants is relatively unexceptional today, the use of such behavior as a "sword" to obtain federal jurisdiction and money damages or equitable relief has led
to charges that section 1983 is supplanting state tort law and
that the federal courts are displacing the state courts from their
rightful positions 229
as the primary arbiters of basic standards of
duty and conduct.
Section 1983 actions dealing with systemic problems rather
than individual conduct have also been subject to attack on federalism grounds.23 0 Here, it is argued that the relief sought is
often too sweeping and, if granted, constitutes a substantial federal court derogation of the respect due state and local governments. Suits have been brought against state and local educational, law enforcement, and penal systems, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief which would give the federal courts power
to decide major social policy questions and to effect the basic
budgetary decisions of state and local governments in ways not
necessarily responsive to local needs or popular with local majorities.23 1 This has led to outcries that section 1983 is being
228

See, e.g., Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.

Ct. 740 (1977) ; Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 ( 3 d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1974); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 ( 3 d Cir. 1972); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 ( 4 th
Cir. 1970). But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April i9, 1977)
(challenge to corporal punishment practiced by public schools not cognizable under
due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses); Paul v. Davs, 424 U.S.
693 0976) (defamation by police officer not cognizable under due process clause).
220 See, e.g., Greene v. New York, 381 F. Supp. 579, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Aldisert, supra note 223, at 573-74.
230 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (Rehnquist, 3.);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974) (White, J.). See also Note,
Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against Police Abuse: Picking Up the Pieces
After Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 530, 560-62 (1976); Case Comment,
Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Medical Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1282, 1299-I3o6 (1973); Note, The Federal
Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. X43,
151-55 (I968).
21 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (I973);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 5o9 F.2d 580 (ist Cir. 1974), aff'g 379 F. Supp. 430 (D.
Mass.), enforced by 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 917 (ist Cir.
1975); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (ist Cir.
1974); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd and remanded,
507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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used to undermine the proper, constitutionally mandated balance
between the federal and state governments by giving federal
courts affirmative authority over areas more properly the province of state and local governments. 32
In recent years, the Supreme Court has begun to give voice
to these federalism-based concerns. States and localities have
largely been insulated from money damage awards in section
1983 actions by decisions giving new force to the eleventh amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 3 In a series of
decisions ranging from a section 1983 action brought to enjoin a
pending state criminal proceeding 234 to injunctive suits against
local executive officials,235 the Court has added federalism to
equity and comity as standards for determining the availability
and scope of federal equitable relief.2 6 Finally, in two cases
where state law protected the interests at stake in a federal civil
rights action, the Court found that plaintiffs' claims failed to assert any
federal right or interest cognizable in a section 1983
7
23

suit.

The Court's new sensitivity to asserted state rights and interests seems to reflect a more generalized national mood of distrust
of the federal government. The "New Federalism" of President
Nixon, the anti-"Washington" rhetoric of the I976 Presidential
election campaign, and the blossoming of the "small is beautiful"
philosophy all suggest a widespread public disenchantment with
the growth of federal power and a fear that the values of diversity, liberty, and "grassroots democracy" traditionally associated
with the federal system may be in jeopardy. " "
Notwithstanding this apparent emergence of a popular political orientation favoring decentralization and enhanced local autonomy, the Supreme Court's restriction of the availability and scope
of federal enforcement of civil rights in the name of federalism is
troubling. The Court has repeatedly utilized notions of respect
232 See generally Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes
of Popular Dissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 7o F.R.D. 79 (1976).
231 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (974);
City of Kenosha v.

Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (I973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (2973).
See generally pp. ii91-97 infra.
231 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (x971). See generally Part VI, pp. 12841330 infra.
235 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
6
23 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (xg7x). See also Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) ; Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 32 (1975) ; Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 922 (1975).
237See Ingraham v. Wright, 45 U.S.L.W. 4364, 4369, 4372 (U.S. April 19,
1977) ; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-98, 712 (1976).
.3 8 See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, go HARv. L. REv. io65,
io68-69 (1977).
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for state functions, maintaining the balance between nation and
state, and considerations of "Our Federalism," 239 but has made
little apparent effort to fill those open-ended phrases with meaning or demonstrate why such concerns justify a cutback in section 1983 actions. By its own terms, section 1983 is aimed at

action taken "under color of state law," and therefore every suit
under the statute is one which will necessarily have an impact on
the state and compel a state or local government to take action
that it would not otherwise have taken. To suggest simply that a
renewed concern about federalism compels a jaundiced view of
section 1983 could easily lead to another judicial evisceration of
the action.
The next Section will isolate certain factors critical to an understanding of contemporary federal-state relations and identify
some of the values implicit in the notion of "Our Federalism."
After further examining the effect of federal judicial enforcement
of civil rights on state autonomy, the Section will attempt to suggest the degree to which a concern for federalism justifies restrictions in the availability and scope of section 1983.
E. Federalismand Modern Constitutional Theory
Monroe v. Pape was decided against a background of Supreme
Court decisions which had virtually revolutionized the constitutional theory of federal-state relations. The dual federalism analysis which had for a century dominated constitutional thinking
and had operated as an external check on federal lawmaking and
law-enforcing authority was swiftly interred by a series of Supreme -Court holdings validating congressional New Deal legislation.2 40 The theory that the "reserved powers" of the states are
to be taken into account in determining the extent of the powers
vested in the central government was rejected,' the tenth amendment pronounced a "truism," 242 and the plenary authority of the
federal government to enact economic and social measures regulating all phases of private conduct affirmed. 4 3
2,9

See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) ; Mayor of Philadel-

phia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 6o5, 615 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (197I)24See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 3,7 U.S. iI, (1942); United States v. Darby,
U.S. o0 (ir4I); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 3oi U.S. 548 (1937); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o U.S. 1 (I937).
241 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1i1,
124-25 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. ioo, 118-i9 (1942). See generally W. BENNETT, supra note 6,
at 204-05.
242 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1942).
2
11 See generally J. ScHmIDHAusER, supra note 19, at 184-86. The main vehicle
312

for the expansion of federal power to regulate private conduct has been the commerce clause. The Supreme Court has read the commerce clause broadly, up-
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The decisions of the post-New Deal era enlarging the authority of the federal government to regulate economic activity and
provide directly for individual health and welfare did not for the
most part address explicitly the problem of federal action directed
at the states themselves.244 However, they suggest that the Court
had adopted a relatively limited view of the concept of state sovereignty.2 45 Federal substantive lawmaking and administrative
authority superseded the states in a wide variety of areas traditionally subject to state control. And taxes and sanctions imposed
for the violation of federal regulations were held applicable to
state instrumentalities so long as they were incidental to the full
implementation of a general federal program.246
The Court's fourteenth amendment decisions further support
this limited conception of state sovereignty. In the modern era,
the amendment has become the vehicle for the creation of farreaching restrictions on the power of state and local governments
to regulate the lives of individuals. Even in areas as traditionally
associated with state and local control as elementary public education, 247 domestic relations, 248 law enforcement, 249 and voting, 2 0

holding federal legislation affecting private conduct so long as the conduct affected
could be characterized as either affecting, see, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. oo (1941);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i (I937), or moving through,
see, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); Mulford v. Smith, 307
U.S. 38 (i939), interstate commerce. Even purely intrastate activity was held subject to congressional control if it fell within a class of conduct that had, in the aggregate, a substantial interstate impact. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (197I); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I (1942).
244 Of course, to the extent that the sovereignty of a state is in part composed
of its power to regulate the primary conduct of its citizens, see pp. 1179-83 ina,
the expansion of federal authority during and after the New Deal markedly curtailed state sovereignty.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 428
(1940) ("So long as the things done within the state by the United States are
valid under [the commerce] power, there can be no interference with the sovereignty of the states."); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1936)
("The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.").
246 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (plurality
opinion); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
247 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (197); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But see San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. X (1973).
24'See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 7X (97); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 37, (197i); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
240 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But see Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (x966); Harper v. Virginia
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the Supreme Court has utilized the fourteenth amendment to impose national standards of fair procedure and equal treatment on
states and localities.
Notwithstanding the plenary character of national power in
recent decades, the states continue to have constitutional significance. The Constitution presupposes the existence of states and
obligates the national government to guarantee to each state a
republican form of government, 25 1 protection against invasion and
domestic violence, ' 2 - the integrity of state boundaries, 253 and equal
representation in the Senate. 4 Similarly, attributes of sovereignty central to the effective and independent fulfillment of government functions such as "the power [of a state] to locate its
own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall
be changed from one place to another" 25 have long been recognized as beyond the power of Congress to restrict or impair. Moreover, the recent decisions in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery 256
and Oregon v. Mitchell 25T indicate that the "separate and inde-

pendent existence of states" 258 imposes real limitations on the
scope of federal power under the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment.
The broader significance of the Mitchell and National League
of Cities holdings is far from clear; in the former case, the opinion
of the Court was really that of only one Justice, 259 while the latter
case is the focus of intense scholarly debate..2 60 However, when
these cases are viewed in light of the federalism analysis developed
over the previous forty years, three principles basic to an underBd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
251

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Id.
...Id. art. IV, § 3.
2 52

214 Id.

art. V.
251 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (9x1i).
250426 U.S. 833 (1976).
257 4oo U.S. 12 (1970).
2"8 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).

2"0 At issue in Oregon v. Mitchell were provisions of the Voting Act Amendments of 1970 lowering the voting age to eighteen. By a five-to-four vote, that
provision was upheld as applied to federal elections, but by another five-to-four
division, the eighteen-year-old vote was held unconstitutional as applied to state
elections. justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall found it valid as applied
to any election; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun
thought it entirely invalid; Justice Black cast the deciding vote, holding it constitutional as applied to federal elections but unconstitional as to state elections.
0 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 238; Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
The Permutations of State "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery,
forthcoming in the May 1977 issue of the Yale Law Journal; Note, Municipal
Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment, and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV.
187, (1976).
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standing of the contemporary constitutional theory of federalstate relations and relevant in the context of section 1983 actions
may perhaps be discerned:
States are "independent" governments, not simply administrative subdivisions of the national government.
(i)

(2) Consequently they must be allowed to perform some of
the functions of government and they must be allowed to perform those functions "effectively," free of undue federal impairment.

(3) But there are no specific governmental roles or areas of
substantive lawmaking or administrative competence wholly
reserved to the states or entirely immune from either federal
preemption or the imposition of federal requirements and
standards.
Despite the decision in National League of Cities and the resurgence of the Supreme Court's concern over federalism, the
third principle, which, insofar as it justifies the imposition of federal constitutional norms of procedural fairness and equal treatment on the adoption and implementation of state policies, is at
the core of section 1983, has in no way been impaired. Although
the Court in both National League of Cities and Fry v. United
States2 6 sought to limit the hortatory effect of the language in
United States v. Darby that the tenth amendment is a "truism,"

neither case overruled it.26 2 Moreover, National League of Cities,

when coupled with the decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 213 handed
down shortly thereafter, suggests that greater deference will be
given to congressional enactments pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment which approach the state sovereignty limits to national power than to legislation under the commerce clauseU.S. 542 (i975).
The tenth amendment has been interpreted as a general "declaration" of

261421
262

the fact that the nature of a federal system and the existence of autonomous
states impose limitations on the scope of the power of the national government.

See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976); Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). The National League of Cities Court,
however, did not rely on the tenth amendment to justify its conclusion that the
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, extending federal minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions to state and municipal employees, was unconstitutional. See Tribe, supra note 238, at io67 n.17. In Fry, although the Court
pointedly referred to the "significance" of the tenth amendment, it upheld the application of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 to state employees, finding
that the wage freeze was an emergency measure adopted to counter severe inflation,
that its effectiveness would depend on its being made applicable to state employees,
and that the measure did not intrude appreciably on state sovereignty. See 421
U.S. at 547-58 & n.7.
263427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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a conclusion which is supported by the purpose and history of the
fourteenth amendment.2 64 As a result, the effect of National
League of Cities and the "New Federalism" in the section 1983
context must be to give greater emphasis to the first and second
principles without in any way undermining the third; the current
debate over federalism and section 1983 thus emerges as an attempt to reconcile the third principle with the first two. Stated
otherwise, the question in the section 1983 context is one of what
theoretical limits are imposed by the first principle and what practical ones by the second on the power of the federal government
-

and particularly the federal courts -

to assume the role of the

definer and enforcer of constitutional norms according to the third
principle.
i. The First Principle: States as Governments. - The notion
of states as "independent" governments implies certain limits on
the power of the federal government both to preempt and to review
the decisions of sovereign states. As a general matter, it should
be noted that these constraints need not derive solely from the
peculiar characteristics of states per se; rather, the imposition of
limits

-

or the existence, in fact, of practical deference -

may be

at least partly due to the fact that the state process in question constitutes a separate system or entity performing certain important
functions within the society as a whole, and that an adequate and
efficient level of performance may require the minimization of outside intrusions. This respect, or comity, accorded the separate
state system is without reference to whether the entity is a "state"
or another corporate body, such as the Army.265 For the purposes
of section 1983, the critical inquiry necessarily revolves around
the prerogatives of the states to define through their own legislatures and courts the rights of citizens and the duties and obligations of government. It is an inquiry which cannot be resolved by
reference to precedent alone; while the decisions in Coyle v. Smith
264 See pp.

144-46 supra. In Fitzpatrick, the Court considered the validity of

the 1972 amendments to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorized
federal courts to order attorneys fees and money damage awards against state
governments and in favor of private individuals in cases where unlawful employment discrimination had been proven. Finding that the legislation had been enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment
to enforce the limitations on state sovereignty embodied in that amendment,
the Court rejected claims that the title VII awards violated the eleventh amendment or unconstitutionally infringed on state sovereignty. See 427 U.S. at 452-57
& n. 9 .
25 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 754-57 (1975) (finding
that "considerations of comity, the necessity of respect for coordinate judicial
systems," require that federal district courts be barred from enjoining or otherwise interfering with military court-martial proceedings). See also Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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and National League of Cities v. Usery indicate that the Supreme
Court has placed within a protected core of state sovereignty decisions as to the location of the seat of government and the wages
state employees are to be paid, these decisions - particularly the
latter - are ambiguous as to the state interest deserving protection or the means by which one can determine whether a given
decision is inside or outside of any core. Rather, this inquiry must
be resolved in light of the values and traditions of our federalist
system which are expressed in -

but not confined to -

prior de-

cisions of the Supreme Court.
The power to govern at least some aspects of state-citizen
relations, it could be argued, should be deemed an essential attribute of state sovereignty and one of the premises of a federal
union. The strengths of federalism are said to be that in providing for the decentralization of decisionmaking and administration,
it assures citizens increased access to government, provides an
opportunity for the development of policies and programs responsive to local differences and needs, and secures benefits for
the nation as a whole by enabling the states to serve as places of
experimentation

-

"laboratories of ideas."

26

This conception

of political decentralization as the key to the preservation of diversity and of a government attuned to local values and problems
has been considered particularly compelling in the United States,
given the political and cultural heterogeneity of the American
people and the traditional focus on the community as the center
of political and social life.
Such a view of the positive role of states and localities has
found increased expression in recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. The Court has displayed a greater degree of deference to
referendums and other forms of state and local government decisionmaking designed to distill and reflect the particular will 2 "of8
local majorities.2 67 Indeed, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
the Court apparently gave dispositive weight to a community's
right to define its own character and values in upholding an ordinance which effectively excluded from the community persons
2
whose lifestyle it found not in keeping with its character.

11

Sim-

266 See generally R. LEACH, supra note 6, at 57-82; Benson, Values of De-

centralized Government, in EsSAYS IN FEDERALism I (Institute for Studies in
Federalism 196); Merriam, Federalism in Transition: The Dynamics of Change
and Continuity, in THE UNEASY PARTNERS3IP 5 (R. Feld & C. Grafton eds. 1973).
26 See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976);
James v. Valtieria, 402 137 (1971).
268416 U.S. I (974).
266 Id. at 9 (village ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings,

where the word "family" is defined to exclude groups of more than two unrelated
persons, held constitutional; police power may be exercised to create "zones where
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ilarly, the Court has turned to "community standards" in determining the scope of protection afforded by the first amendment
to assertedly obscene forms of expression.Y ° Finally, in a related vein, the language of the recent Paul v. Davis 271 and Ingraham v. Wright 272 decisions emphasizing the availability of state
causes of action to vindicate the personal liberty interests threatened by the challenged state action while denying the existence
of any federal claim suggests an enhanced willingness to view the
state as an integral unit and to defer to its judgment on individual
deprivations at least
until the state courts have had an opportunity
2 73
to apply state law.

Inevitably, decisions such as these involve value judgments
as to where to draw lines between federal and state power. These
judgments are necessarily based on assessments of the values attaching to state decisionmaking and the needs for federal intervention. But while this may render objective criticism more difficult, there is ample reason to suppose that any federalism-based
benefits secured by the inclusion of the processes of articulating
and enforcing constitutional norms within a core of state sovereignty are substantially outweighed by the dangers presented
by such an approach.
The vision of the nation as a collection of small communities,
each characterized by values and common interests shared within
but distinct from those of other communities, has been of diminishing vitality almost since the birth of the Republic. The development of a national economy and modem means of transportation and communication have served to knit the various communities together and to contribute to the formation of a national
community with shared national values. Moreover, the constitutional revolutions in the middle of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries established, particularly in the area of civil rights,
the primacy of that national community and of those national constitutional norms. The Civil War may be seen as having affirmed
the supremacy of the nation over the states, while the fourteenth
amendment, although a "moderate" enactment, guaranteed a
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air"
may be secured).
27See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (I973).
271424 U.S. 693 (1976).
272 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April i9,1977).
27. See id. at 4369 (cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools, in part
because of the existence of civil and criminal law constraints of teachers and administrators); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-70, (1976) (injury to reputation
by police officer held not to state a claim for violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment; language of the opinion points to the existence of
state tort law of defamation remedies).
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federal presence to ensure that state standards complied with
minimal national requirements of equal treatment and procedural
fairness.274 In this century, the fourteenth amendment has become
the vehicle for the virtual nationalization of the function of articulating and enforcing civil rights.
To be sure, some might view the nationalization of civil rights
as fundamentally inconsistent with a concern for federalism. But
while the allowance of local diversity and the shaping of government decisions in response to local interests and needs may be
considered among the strengths of federalism, the dangers of emphasizing these values in the civil rights context are manifest. As
political scientists from Madison on have noted, the ability of
small but well-organized groups to gain control of the levers of
government and use its power to oppress others is maximized in
smaller units. 5 One of the virtues that Madison saw in the
Federal Constitution was that in creating a national government
over a large territory, it reduced the danger of domination by
"faction." 276 Moreover, the value of states as laboratories for
experimentation in the context of defining and protecting civil
rights seems questionable. As the development of the incorporation doctrine illustrates, where certain principles of fundamental
fairness are at stake, such as the right to counsel or the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, there may be only
one, necessarily national standard adequate to ensure full protection of the personal interest at stake. If experimentation is to be
tolerated, it must take place above this threshold. 7
Indeed, regardless of whether the ability to define the mutual
rights and obligations of citizens and government is a necessary
attribute of sovereignty, the fact remains that a national community adhering to national constitutional values has effectively
stripped the states of much of their function in the definition of
civil rights. 8 This national assumption of the civil rights function may well suggest that, given the supremacy clause and the
fourteenth amendment, the states are not truly "sovereign," as
that term is used in describing independent nations, but only relatively autonomous governments subject to the actual sovereignty
274 See pp. 1144-46 supra.
271 See THE FEDERALIST No. io

(J.

Madison); G. McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER

AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 107-I8 (x966); Note, supra note 9, at X022-24, X029-

33.

27 6

See THE

FEDERALIST No.

io (J. Madison); Diamond, The Federalist's View

of Federalism, in ESSAYS n FEDERALISM 21, 52 (Institute for Studies in Federalism
1961).
277 See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, go HARv. L. REv. 489 (X977).
171 See, e.g., W. BENNETT, supra note 6, at 212-14; M. REACAN, TnENW FEDERALISM 12-13 (1972).

1977]

DEVELOPMENTS -SECTION

1983

1183

of the nation."' 9 This does not mean that the interests of states
are irrelevant to the definition and enforcement of civil rights;
even to offer such a suggestion would be to ignore recent trends in
the Supreme Court. What it does suggest is that efforts to define
at a theoretical level the limits of federal authority in the civil
rights area on the basis of state sovereignty may be a task that is
both virtually impossible and constitutionally unnecessary. Instead, attention might better be focused on a more practical effort
to accommodate the federal interest in articulating and enforcing constitutional norms with the legitimate interests of the state
in its continued effective functioning - that is, the accommodation of the second and third principles.
2. The Second Principle: Effectiveness.The thrust of the
second prinoiple appears to be that federal agencies - the lower
federal courts where section 1983 is concerned- must not exercise power in a fashion which undermines the ability of states
and localities to perform the functions they have assumed or
effectively displaces them from roles for which they remain formally responsible. At least in part, this principle may respond to
deeply felt concerns for fair play and accountability. Surely, it is
perceived as unfair, if not wasteful, to allow a state or municipality to shoulder certain financial burdens and pursue time-consuming policymaking procedures if in the end federal requirements and standards so hamstring state and local efforts that they
cannot achieve their legitimate goals. More significantly, in a
system in which one level of government is ostensibly responsible
for certain functions and services but has been either effectively
displaced or rendered unable adequately to perform its role, the
goal of government accountability to the citizens it serves is
frustrated.
To a considerable extent, however, the conception implicit in
this principle of federal involvement in state activities as an "interference" or "intrusion" - a conception which finds expression
in many of the Supreme -Court's recent decisions restricting the
availability and scope of section 1983 -is mistaken. The concerns underlying this notion were perhaps best articulated by Justice Black in Younger v. Harris,2 80 where he contended that restraints must be imposed on federal equitable relief to ensure that
"79 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-66 (1976)

(Rehnquist, j.)

(the Civil War amendments sanction federal intrusion "into the judicial, executive,
and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States [and] ...
a corresponding diminution of state sovereignty"); Ex parte Virginia, ioo U.S.
339, 345-48 (88o) ("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. ...
[Their] enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.").
280401 U.S. 37 (197).
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"the States and their institutions are left to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways." 21 The model of federalism
implicit in this statement is that of the "layer cake" - the traditional notion that the nation and the states constitute "two governments covering the same ground yet distinct and separate in
their actions." 282 Not only is this model inconsistent with constitutional doctrine which has developed since the erosion of "dual
federalism" analysis, but it is also completely alien to contemporary political theory. The metaphor suggested by the late Professor
Morton Grodzins and subsequently adopted by most contemporary students of American government is the "marble cake" :213
no important function of government is the exclusive province of
one of the levels; rather federal, state, and local governments are
actively involved in virtually all functions of government,
and
24
federal-state cooperation, not separation, is characteristic.
The cutting edge of this new model of federal-state relations
has been the federal grant-in-aid. 28 5 The inability of state and
local governments to finance all the services sought by their citizens has led to increasing reliance on Washington for financial
support. 86 The grant program, however, has significantly undermined state and local autonomy in a number of respects. First, a
28.

Id. at 44.

282 See I J.

BRYCE, THE AmERIcAN

COMMONWEALTH 432 (x888).

See also

Tarble's Case, 8o U.S. (I3 Wall.) 397, 4o6 (1871) ("There are within the territorial limits of each state two governments, restricted in their sphere of action,
but independent of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each
has its separate departments, each has its distinct laws . . . . Neither government
can intrude within the jurisdiction of the other . .
").
283 See M. GRODZINS, THE AmERICAN SYSTEM 8 (D. Elazar ed. 1966). See also
R. LEACH, supra note 6, at 14; M. REAGAN, supra note 278, at 6.
284 See generally M. GRODZINS, supra note 283; R. LEAcH, supra note 6; M.
REAGAN, supra note 278; Sundquist & Davis, The Problem of Coordination in a
Changing Federalism, in THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 24 (R. FELD & C. GRAFTON
eds. 1973).
282See generally M. GROoZINS, supra note 283, at 60-70; M. REAGAN,
supra

note 278, at 54-97.
286 See generally Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Restoring
Fiscal Balance in the Federal System, in THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 55 (R. Feld & C.
Grafton eds. 1973) ; R. LEACH, supra note 6, at 194-220; M. REAGAN, supra note 278,
at 8, 31-53. The fact of increasing popular reliance on the federal government for
the supply of essential services has also been attributed to the structural weaknesses characteristic of most state governments, see Committee for Economic
Development, Modernizing State Government, in THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 91
(R. Feld & C. Grafton eds. 1973); Citizens Conference on State Legislatures,
State Legislatures in the Seventies, in id. at 99; R. LEAcH, supra note 6, at 115-42;
G. McCoNNELL, supra note 275, at x66-95, and on the slowness with which many
state governments responded to demands for increases in services, see W. BENNETT,
supra note 6, at 218-Xg.
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cardinal rule governing the acceptance of federal grants-in-aid has
been that federal regulatory authority follows federal money; 287
as a precondition to federal grants, the government has mandated
basic changes in state and local administrative structures and
personnel policies, as well as minimum standards for the provision
of services. 8" Second, state policy and budgetary decisions have
been substantially affected by the fact that most federal money
has been disbursed in the form of categorical grants, restricting
often quite narrowly the purposes to which the funds can be put. 89
This effect is further exacerbated where federal money is given in
the form of matching grants, which induce states and localities
to adopt federal spending priorities. While the substitutions of
general federal revenue sharing for more specific categorical
grants reduces federal involvement in local policy and budgetary
decisions, general federal regulatory control over local administrative and personnel procedures has continued. 9"
Of course, to deny that the states in fact perform any "separate functions" is not to suggest that they have been reduced to
nonentities. States and localities continue to have an important
role in designing and implementing government policies, with the
federal government relying on state and local governments for the
provision of many social services. The result has been characterized as "cooperative federalism" 291 - a system of complex interaction among federal, state, and local governments which reflects their mutual dependencies. ' 92
The heavy involvement of the federal government in the state
provision of services in areas as traditionally local as education,
law enforcement, and welfare suggests that any federalism-based
concern that section 1983 actions impair the ability of states to
carry out their "separate functions" must be misplaced. 93 Given
the extensive degree of federal-state interaction in all phases of
government, a legitimate federal concern may be seen as in operation in all traditionally local areas. Moreover, section 1983
tracks the characteristic mode of federal involvement with local
government, for, as in the programmatic and policy restrictions
imposed as a consequence of the acceptance of federal grants-inaid, suits brought under section 1983 operate primarily to enforce
287 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 303 U.S. 127 (1947);

J. ScHmIDaAusER, supra note i9, at i89-9o.
288 See, e.g., M. GRODZiNS, supra note 283, at 64, 68-69; M. REAGAN, supra
note 278, at 57.
280 See M. REAGAN, supra note 278, at 59-66.
290 See generally id. at 89-I44.
201 See R. LEACH, supra note 6, at 14.
212 See generally id. at 57-82.
2"See, e.g., M. GRODZINS, supra note 283, at 89-i55; R. LEAcH, supra note 6,

at 83-I4.
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national requirements and standards - in this case constitutional
norms - on local legislative and administrative decisionmaking
rather than as a full-scale displacement of local substantive authority.
An awareness of the already considerable federal role in the
state and local provision of essential services and the regulation
of primary conduct may thus mitigate concerns that federal civil
rights actions, merely because they involve federal institutions in
local affairs, constitute an impairment of the states' ability to
function effectively. In the context of section 1983 actions, however, the federal involvement is judicial rather than executive or
legislative, a distinction which necessarily adds another dimension to the analysis.
On the one hand, it has been the traditional view that judicial
determinations have less ,impact in shaping the conduct of government than legislative or executive measures.2 94 The "least dangerous branch," as Alexander Hamilton characterized the federal
courts,"' has no control over "either the sword or the purse." 20
Moreover, both the scope of judicial determinations and the opportunity for judicial influence on social policy are largely beyond
the control of judges to expand. Courts can act only on those
cases and issues presented to them by litigants, and they can bind
only those litigants involved in the case before them. 97 Indeed,
as has already been suggested,2 98 this sense of the limited nature
of judicial action may explain the decision of the Republicans
during the Reconstruction era to entrust civil rights enforcement
to the courts.
Nonetheless, section 1983 suits may pose a greater threat to
state and local effectiveness than other forms of federal regulatory policy. 9 9 Many of the factors Professor Wechsler identified
as the "political safeguards of federalism" - including the role
of the states 'in the composition and selection of the national government, which often leads members of Congress and, to a lesser
extent, the President, to act with an awareness of state prerogatives
and interests - seem attenuated if not absent in the context of
294 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-83 (976).
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. ig6x).

296 d. at 465-66. See generally A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREMTE COURT

IN€AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103-04 (976).
297 See Chayes, supra note 294, at 128-2-83.
298 See pp. 1152-53 supra.
299 Cf. Tribe, supra note 164 (Congress, because of its representative character,
may override states' eleventh amendment immunity more legitimately than may the

courts).
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federal judicial action300 At best, federal judges are one step
further removed from the states than the President and Senators
who appoint and confirm them. Moreover, many of the indirect
controls which maximize local input in the formulation and effectuation of federal policies may be absent in federal court adjudication. There would certainly appear to be less opportunity for
the kind of intergovernmental lobbying leading to compromise
and adjustment which characterizes the framing of most federal
economic and social policies affecting states and municipalities.
Indeed, that a judicial determination is "legal" rather than "political" not only seems to 'preclude a role for the affected state
officials in determining whether the challenged law or conduct
violates the Constitution but also renders illegitimate techniques
of noncompliance or indirect resistance through which state and
local officers may be able to shape the implementation of federal
policy directives.
This traditional model of federal-state relations in the context
of federal court adjudication, however analytically useful where
damage suits are concerned, begins to break down when one considers those actions which are most often thought to threaten the
the modern injunctive suitY0 1 In a
growing number of section 1983 injunction suits, plaintiffs have
functioning of the state -

requested and federal courts have ordered systemic relief resulting
in sweeping displacements of local decisionmaking and administration and substitution of federal judicial authority. 302 Even in
"'0 See H.

WECHSLER,

The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES,

POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL

LAW 49, 54-56,

64-82

(i96i); THE FEDERALIST No.

45, at 291 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. i961). The notion of the "political safeguards of federalism" may be open to question even in the context
of the legislative and executive branches. State concerns with respect to a given
issue may not be uniform throughout the country, so that federal legislation intruding deeply on the functions of one state may be passed despite that state's
objections; a state's interests may not be accurately represented by its congressional delegation because representatives' actions with regard to any given issue
may be dictated by diverse political pressures distorting their advocacy of the
state's position; a state's interest may not be monolithic or easily discernable, and
representatives may disagree as to their state's interest in a given issue; finally,
the power of state legislatures to compel accountability from their congressional
delegations has been eroded both by the seventeenth amendment, providing for
popular election of Senators, and by Supreme Court reapportionment decis;o.is,
see, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (x969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964), rendering the districting process largely mechanical. See Note,
supra note 260, at 1885 & n.117.
301 See pp. 1227-50 infra. See generally Chayes, supra note 284; D. HoRowITz,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLcY (1977); 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 315-82 (1972).
202 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (granting
relief); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (modifying relief), enforcing 325 F.
Supp. 78I (M.D. Ala. I971), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub. nom. Wyatt
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areas like education 303 and law enforcement,30 4 which have traditionally been viewed as the particular responsibilities of state
and local governments, courts have eschewed the narrow role assigned to them by the traditional model and, on finding a constitutional violation, have assumed relatively extensive power to redress the resulting harms. 0 5 And in ordering states or municipalities to take or refrain from certain actions, or to develop new programs, the federal courts have imposed costs which necessarily
have the effect of limiting the range of government
activity in
30
areas not directly at issue in the section 1983 suit.
Yet the breadth of the remedy sought in the modern section
1983 injunction action, for all that it might seem to betoken a
major disruption of the local delivery of services and the effective
performance of local government functions, may in fact enhance
the ability of state and local units to influence federal civil rights
enforcements. Although lobbying or negotiation may still be inappropriate in the initial liability-determining stage, in injunctive suits - as opposed to damage actions - the issue of liability
no longer so completely dominates the suit,30 7 and the award of a
v. Alderholt, 5o3 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (extensive court reform of state mental hospitals); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming
lower court finding of violation and remanding for adjustment of remedy); 527
F.2d io4I (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming modified relief) (reform of pretrial detention
facilities); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 530 F.2d
431 (ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (3976) (wide-ranging plan for integration of Boston public schools), enforced, 409 F. Supp. 114X (D. Mass. X975),
aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 54o F.2d 527 (ist Cir. 1976) (receivership
of Boston high school); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 3973); 5o5 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974) (reform of state prison system).
103 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (3971)
(broad power of federal courts to fashion remedial decrees in school integration
cases); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431 (Ist Cir. 3975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976) (school integration), discussed at pp.' 1236-39 infra.
304 See, e.g., Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 3343 (3d Cir. I971) (injunction against
police practice of halting and searching long-haired highway travelers); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 397 ( 4 th Cir. 3966) (en banc) (injunction against widescale illegal searches of citizens' homes); Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d x (7th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 902 (3976).
3
..See pp. 3227-33 infra; cases cited notes 303 & 304 supra.
306 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.3 d 333, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1974) (cost of
compliance with affirmative injunction is burden to city in throes of fiscal crisis
and facing hard policy choices with regard to cutbacks in other municipal services),
discussed at pp. 1231-36 infra. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 303, at 6-7. In
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 667 (1974), the Supreme Court, explicitly recognizing
that while most affirmative injunctions run in name against state officials, they
impose substantial costs on the government itself, id. at 667-69, carved out an
exception to the states' eleventh amendment immunity for costs which are "the
necessary result of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question
determination." Id. at 669.
307 See Chayes, supra note 294, at 1293-94, 1302. The point is well illustrated
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specific remedy no longer follows so automatically from a decision
of the merits.3 °8 Rather, the question of liability has become in
large measure a trigger for an exhaustive search for the appropriate remedy. °0 Given the broad range of potentially available
remedies,310 the selection of a particular remedy, although influenced by established principles of equity, becomes a discretionary
decision; as a result, attempts by local government officials to influence the final decree no longer appear illegitimate.3 11 To the
extent that such participation occurs - and the recent work of
Professor Chayes indicates that local input is increasingly welcomed at the relief stage 312 - fears about the "intrusiveness" of
federal judicial action and of the danger it poses to the continued
effectiveness of state and local institutions may be allayed.
In summary, the principle of assuring state and local effecby cases in the area of school integration, where the Supreme Court first articulated the principle that segregated school systems are unconstitutional, see Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1964), and then, in a later opinion in the same
case, see 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and in subsequent cases, see, e.g., Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i (I97I), fashioned standards for implementation of the right to integrated schools, recognizing that the "scope of a
[federal] ... court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies," id. at 15.
308See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i
(1971):
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.
"The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment
and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims."
Id. at 15 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (I944)). See also
Chayes, supra note 294, at 1298-1304; 0. Fiss, supra note 301, at 92; K. PARKER,
MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES 183-252, 264-78 (1975); pp. 1247-50 infra.
309 Compare, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971)
(holding that mental patients in state facility have constitutional right to treatment), with Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (granting
relief); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (modifying relief) (enforcing right
identified in earlier opinion), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt
v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d I3O5 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J.
1338 (1975) ; Chayes, supra note 294, at 1298-1304; PP. 1227-50 infra.
310
See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 301, at 48-83; K. PARKER, supra note 308,
at 12-20, 185-2o6, 264-78; Chayes, supra note 284, at 1298-1304; Note, Monitors:
A New Equitable Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. io3 (ig6o).
311 See Chayes, supra note 294, at 1284, 1298-1308. Indeed, federal court deference, initially, to local government officials in the shaping of relief has characterized
the decree formulation process in most cases ordering affirmative injunctive relief.
See pp. 1227-50 infra.
312 See Chayes, supra note 294, at 1284, 1298-1308.
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tiveness in performing the functions those units of government
have assumed is not necessarily impaired by section 1983 suits.
Even without section 1983, virtually all state and local government services and functions are to a considerable degree intertwined with and regulated by federal legislation and federal agencies.313 Moreover, at least in the damage action context, the federal intrusion into state affairs is a narrow one, limited to adjudicating the claim of the particular plaintiff and leaving plenary
operational authority to the existing state and local agencies.3 14
Finally, in the more potentially disruptive systemic injunctive
suit, mechanisms for securing the participation of affected local
interests in the formulation and implementation of the decree
may be developed and, in assuring the acceptability and workability of the remedy eventually ordered, may become a means for
reconciling the respective federal civil rights and local administrative concerns implicated by section 1983 actions. Thus, as it
emerges from this analysis, the cutting edge of the contemporary
concern for federalism in the context of section 1983 actions assumes the form of an obligation placed on commentators and federal judges to develop principles that will facilitate the fashioning
of forms of injunctive relief which will best accommodate the
vindication of constitutional rights to the need for assuring the
continued effectiveness of state and local government units."'

III. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON LIAmLITY AND RELIEF
Although Congress, in enacting section 1983, intended major
changes in the structure of relationships among citizens, states,
and the federal government, the legislative history and the political theory of the times indicate that neither section 1983 nor the
fourteenth amendment was intended to abolish the states or
" See pp. i "7S-8o, ix83-86 supra.
14Under

the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. x67

(ig6i), local government units are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983 and
thus may not be held directly liable for damages for constitutional deprivations
inflicted by their employees. See pp. 1191-97 infra. While an open-ended damage
liability for public officials under § i983 might operate to work an interference
with governmental operations, either by unduly inhibiting the discretion of public
official defendants or deterring prospective public officeholders from seeking government positions, the state of mind requirements and immunity rules adopted
by the courts for § 1983 damage actions minimize such a danger. See pp. 1204-17
infra.

"' For discussion of possible techniques for achieving such accommodations, see
PP. 1240-50 infra.
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effect their total subordination to the federal government.' Perhaps even in 1871, it was assumed that the statute would not be
given the enormous scope that its open-ended language suggests
that it is capable of sustaining. In any event, the federal courts
in the late nineteenth century through narrow intepretations of
the constitutional rights protected by the statute and of the concept of "under color" of state law successfully restricted the scope
of the statute.2 This judicial effort to develop limiting notions
to cabin section 1983 has to a considerable extent been recapitulated in the aftermath of Monroe v. Pape.3 In the last two
decades, however, the focus of judicial attention has shifted from
the problems of the rights protected and state action- which
have largely been assumed to be coterminous with the fourteenth
amendment - to the other components of the section 1983 prima
facie case. This Part will examine three means which modern
federal courts have used to limit the scope of section 1983: the
restrictive definition of the type of "person" suable under the
statute; the development of state of mind requirements requisite
to finding of liability; and the creation of limits on the availability of effective relief once liability has been found.
A. Defining a "Person" Under Section 1983
i. Municipal and Governmental Immunities. - The Supreme
Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape 4 that municipalities are immune from suit under section 1983 was based solely on an examination of legislative history. Relying on the House of Representatives' rejection of the "Sherman Amendment," 5 which would
have held municipalities liable for damages to any citizen deprived of constitutional rights by acts of violence,6 congressional
doubts as to the constitutionality of that amendment,7 and a reaction it characterized as "so antagonistic" that it strained credulity to believe Congress intended municipalities to be liable, the
Court struck them from the definition of "person" for 1983 purposes. 8 Although only months after passage of section 1983,
'See pp. 1141-56 supra.
2 See pp. 1'56-6I supra.
a 365 U.S. x67 (I961).
4 Id.

at

187-92.

'See id. at i88;

CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., ist Sess. 663 (1871).
365 U.S. at 188-89 &nn.38 & 41.
'Id. at i9o. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804, 820--2

(1871). The
Senate apparently entertained no such doubts, for it passed the amendment, which
was dropped in conference. See 365 U.S. at 188-9o; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist
Sess. 704-05, 804 (1871).
8 365 U.S. at 191.
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Congress enacted a statute defining "person" to "extend and be

applied to bodies politic and corporate," 9 the Court noted that
that definition was "merely an allowable, not a mandatory,
one." 10
Monroe's review of the legislative history is highly questionable. First, the debates involved no explicit discussion of the
definition of the word '"person." 11 Second, the penalties provided
by the Sherman Amendment went well beyond those of section

1983: the amendment would have made each citizen of every
municipality, as well as the municipality itself, strictly liable for
violence perpetrated by other citizens regardless of whether or
not they acted under color of state law.12 And while the second
version of the amendment lessened liability somewhat by exempting citizens from liability and by providing for municipal compensation only where a judgment against a culpable private citizen

went unsatisfied," there may well have been considerable congressional opposition to the notion that municipalities should be

liable at all for acts of private citizens, 14 especially given that in
1871 law enforcement was largely a state, not a local, function;
to hold municipalities liable for failure to perform acts not within
their responsibility was undoubtedly viewed as unjust. 5 At best,
the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to the liability of

municipalities for actions taken under color of law, and some
analysis of the purposes and policies underlying section 1983
would seem to have been necessary to support the Monroe conclusion.' 6
' Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 421. The present code provision does
not apply as broadly. See i U.S.C. § i (1970).
10365 U.S. at Igo-gi.
" See id. at x87-92; Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 132-33 (972).
2 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, i88 n.38 (i96i); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,

1983

ist Sess. 663 (187i).
12365 U.S. at x88 n.41; CONG,. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871). It was
this version that was the focus of most of the congressional debate. See Note,
Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 922, 947 n.132 (1976).
4
See CONG. GI.OBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. 788-89, 794 (1871). As one commentator has noted, rejection of the Sherman Amendment can stand only for the proposition that Congress did not wish to impose strict liability on governmental units
for acts by private citizens. See Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § x983, 55 MiNN. L. REv. 1201, 1205 (971). See also Note, supra note
13, at 946-49.
" See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. 788, 792-93, 795 (1871); PRFSIDENT'S
Cox'N

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADmImISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE

REPORT:
TnE PoLIcE 5-6 (x967) (as of 1871, only large cities had police forces).
"6 See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note ii; Note, supra note 14; Note,
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Following Monroe, section x983 plaintiffs pursued a number
of strategies in attempts to hold municipalities accountable. The
most significant was an attempt to limit Monroe to suits for
damages. While a number of lower courts accepted this reliefbased distinction and found Monroe inapplicable to prayers for
injunctive relief, 17 the Supreme Court flatly rejected a bifurcated8
approach to municipal liability in City of Kenosha v. Bruno.
Raising the issue sua sponte, Justice Rehnquist noted that Monroe
itself had indicated that Supreme Court affirmances of equitable
relief against municipalities should provide no inference that they
were "persons" for 1983 purposes,1 9 and, in one paragraph, ruled
that "nothing in the legislative history . . . or the language actually used by Congress . . .suggest[s] that the generic word
(person' . . . was intended to have a bifurcated application to
municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief
sought ....,,20 Justice Douglas, who had authored the Court's
interpretation of that legislative history in Monroe,2 dissented,
viewing Monroe as resting on a congressional
fear that damage
2
liability would paralyze local government
In another attempt to provide for municipal accountability,
several courts held that if the municipality or government entity
was subject to suit under state law, it should be so subject under
section 1983.23 In doing so, the courts relied on 42 U.S.C. §
1988,24 which provides for reference to state law where federal
law is ineffective to carry out the purposes of the Civil Rights
Acts. The lack of municipal liability, these courts suggested, rendered section 1983 largely ineffective. But in Moor v. County of
Alameda,25 the Supreme Court rejected this derivative use of section 1988. The Court found the provision not intended as an insupra note 13. Indeed, the Court in Monroe specifically eschewed consideration of
the policies underlying the 1983 action. See 365 U.S. at 19I.
1" See, e.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d io84 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Harkless
v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
991 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d

o37

197o),

cert. denied, 400 U.S.

(ioth Cir. I97O).

This posi-

tion drew support from Supreme Court decisions, before and after Monroe, sustaining award of equitable relief against governmental units. See Turner v. City
of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
is412 U.S. 507 (1973)19 Id. at 513 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. x67, 191 & n.5o (1961)).
20 412 U.S. at 513.

U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
412 U.S. at 5x6-18 (Douglas,

21365
22

J.,

dissenting in part). See generally Kates &

Kouba, supra note xi, at 147-50.
2 See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 4x8 (,973).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (197o).
25411 U.S. 693 (1972).
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dependent "Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights," 26 a prerequisite to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(4); 27 rather, the section was designed to complement various
other acts, such as section 1983, which do create federal causes
of action.28 Further, the Court held, section 1988 specifically
provides for recourse to state law only where that law "is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States." 29 The effect of importing state law in this context, however, would be inconsistent with Monroe and its interpretation
of the reach of section 1983, for it would subject municipalities
to liability.30
Monroe and City of Kenosha have had the effect of foreclosing, with few exceptions, an assertion of liability against entities
resembling municipal corporations. Townships 81and counties,82
as well as cities, have been held exempt from liability. Further,
most component municipal agencies have been excluded from
section 1983 coverage, on the grounds that they are "but arms"
of the municipality. 3z Similarly, states and component state
agencies have been sheltered by the Monroe immunity. Municipalities, it has been argued, are but political subdivisions of the
state; if they are immune, so must be the states. 34 And if the
state agency is but an arm of the state, so that any potential liability will in fact be recovered from the state's fisc, that agency
must also be immune .5 School districts and boards of education
20

Id. at 702-o6.

U.S.C. § 1343(4) (197o) (granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts
to hear any civil action "commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover damages or
to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the
protection of civil rights").
28411 U.S. at 703-o6.
29
1d. at 706.
301d. at 7o6-io.
31 See, e.g., Pressman v. Chester Township, 307 F. Supp. 1o84 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
32
See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 706 (2973); Diamond v.
Pitchess, 41z F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969).
3 See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir.
X976) (board of education), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 807 (i977); United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799
(5th Cir. 1974) (county planning board); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503
F.2d 1236, X294 (6th Cir. 1974) (city planning commission).
3"See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413
F.2d 84, 86 n.2 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1o46 (1970); Cheramie v.
Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
35
See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 589 (Sth Cir.) (department of
highways), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197,
201 (gth Cir. 1974) (department of motor vehicles); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d
516 (3d Cir. 1973) (bureau of corrections), cert. denied, 46 U.S. 995 (0974). Socalled "independent agencies" of state and local government have caused greater
confusion. Compare Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., So F.2d 1246, 1255 (2d
27 28
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have caused the most confusion in this area, although the vast
majority of cases hold them analogous to state agencies, political
subdivisions or municipal corporations, and thus not subject to
suit.36

Quite apart from the Supreme Court's decisions in Monroe
and City of Kenosha, the eleventh amendment 37 has been interpreted to operate as an independent bar to suit for either damages
or equitable relief directly against states and their component
agencies 3 -but not their political subdivisions 39 under section 1983. Eleventh amendment jurisprudence has been marked
by a consistent tension between the policies of sovereign immunity
which the amendment reflects 40 and the command of the federal
Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), and Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 52o F.2d 993,
996-IOO (5th Cir. 1975) (panel opinion) (agencies "persons" for § 1983 purposes),
with Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(adopting dissent to panel opinion), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. (U.S.
May 27, 1976) (No. 75-1723), and Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532
F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir. 1976) (agencies not "persons" for § 1983 purposes),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 807 (1977). In general, the courts tend to look to such
factors as whether the agency performs a governmental function, the degree to
which it exercises powers and operates free from state or local control, its source
of funding, its status under state or local law, and whether any ultimate judgment
will be paid from the funds of the governmental entity.
a" See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir.
X976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 807 (I977); Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 51i
F.2d 69o, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1975); Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 5oi
F.2d 429, 430 ( 4 th Cir. 1974). But see Aurora Educ. Ass'n East v. Board of Educ.
490 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. X973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974); Scher v.
Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1970) (semble); Keckeisen v. Indiana
School Dist., 509 F.2d io62, io65 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975). See
also Note, Suing the School Board Under Section 1983, 21 S.D.L. REv. 452 (1976).
The determination of whether such entities are persons would properly seem to
turn on the same factors considered with regard to "independent" state and local
agencies. See note 35 supra. The Supreme Court has left the question open. See
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 571-72 (1977).
" The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
38 The eleventh amendment has been read to apply where the entity sued is
characterizable as the "alter ego" of the state so that any recovery will be paid from
state funds. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct.
568, 572-73 (i977) ; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-64 (1974) ; Jagnandian
v. Giles, 538 F.2d ii66 (5th Cir. 1976).
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (189o).
o)
4
oSee generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (189 ; Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682, 683-88 (1976).
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system that the states conform their conduct to the mandates of
the Constitution. 1 In order to protect individual rights against
unconstitutional state action, the Court has permitted aggrieved
citizens to circumvent the eleventh amendment bar by permitting
suits against state officials for equitable relief to restrain unconstitutional conduct,4 2 although such relief may often have a substantial, direct impact on the state treasury.3 However, relief
which resembles a damage recovery by providing retroactive compensation for an aggrieved citizen from state funds may not be
ordered. 4 The citizen subject to a constitutional deprivation may
proceed against the state official personally for damages under
the section 1983 cause of action only so long as the judgment will
not operate on its face to force a recovery directly from the state
treasury.45

Even this eleventh amendment barrier to damage-like recoveries from the state treasury may apparently be overriden. The
fourteenth amendment, which by its own terms imposes direct
limits on the permissible scope of state action,46 sanctions "in"'

See U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Tribe, supra note 40, at 686-88; Note,

Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875, 1878-82
(x975).
42
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (Igo8) (state official acting unconstitutionally is stripped of official character and is subject to suit in equity) ; Home Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (I913) (unconstitutional action by
state official removing eleventh amendment bar is nonetheless "state action" for
fourteenth amendment purposes).
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65i, 667-69 (1974). See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S 254 (97o).
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1974); Jagnandian v. Giles,
538 F.2d ii66, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976); Note, supra note 41, at 1879-82.
45
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (i974). The eleventh amendment might well bar an action for damages against a state official in his representative capacity, since such a judgment would be paid from state funds, see Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1974), and could not be characterized as imposing
"ird 'dual and personal" liability against such officials. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. at 238. While one court has suggested that damage awards against state
officials might violate the eleventh amendment if the state has agreed to indemnify
the officials, see Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources,
380 F. Supp. 1153, ii59-6o & n.12 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (three-judge court), aff'd per
curiam on other grounds, 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975), such a voluntary assumption of responsibility should not be sufficient to create eleventh amendment immunity, since it would enable the state to shield all of its officials from the § 1983
damage action through an indemnification agreement. Such action might well be
construed as a voluntary waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. See Tribe,
supra note 40, at 687 n.25; cf. Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973) (award
of equitable monetary relief upheld despite indemnification agreement), vacated
and remanded en banc on other grounds, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975); Harkless v.
Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (I97i).
4"See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-55 (1976); pp. 1144-46, 1181-82,
supra.
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trusions by Congress . . . into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States" 7
by granting Congress the power to enforce its commands "by
appropriate legislation." 48 Under this power, Congress may
provide for private suits against states or state officials which
would4 9otherwise be impermissible under the eleventh amendment.
2. Personal Immunities. - The immunities afforded governmental entities by Monroe and City of Kenosha 50 and by the
eleventh amendment 51 require individuals who seek damages or
equitable relief under section 1983 to style their claims as suits
against individual state officers. Monroe and City of Kenosha,
however, may also afford a measure of immunity to individual
defendants. It is generally recognized that Monroe bars damage
actions against officials in their representative capacity since
such suits are, in essence, actions for damages against the governmental unit.52
The broadest reading of City of Kenosha would afford government officials a total immunity from 1983 suits for injunctive
relief, since even naked prohibitory injunctions, and surely wideranging affirmative injunctive decrees, have the effect of imposing costs on the governmental unit and are, in that sense, directed
against that unit.5 3 But such a reading would not only afford governmental units significantly greater immunity than they enjoy
7 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
48

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
41 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (976). Fitzpatrick provides
clear authority for the proposition that Congress may overrule the governmentalexclusion-from-liability holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. x67, i87-91 (x96r),
a question left open in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709 (1973). See
S.35, 95th Cong. ist Sess, 123 CONG. REC. S2oI-o5 (daily ed. Jan. 1o, 1977) (proposed Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977 would establish a species of governmental liability under § 1983) ; pp. 136o--6i infra.
'oSee pp. i193, 1194--95 supra.
51 See pp. 1195-96 supra.
52 See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 264-67 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 807 (1977) ; Hayes v. Cape Henelopen School
Dist., 341 F. Supp. 823, 829 (D. Del. 1972) ; Bennett v. Gravelle 323 F. Supp. 203,
211 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds, 451 F.2d ioir ( 4 th Cir. I97I), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 917 (1972); Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D. Me. 1970).
See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (I974). As in the eleventh amendment context, the fact that a governmental entity not a "person" for § 1983 purposes elects to indemnify its officials should not bar damage recoveries. See note
45 supra.
"' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65I, 667-68 (974); The Supreme Court,
X972 Term, 87 HARv. L. RV. 55, 252, 258-6o (I973). Injunctions imposing affirmative obligations on state and local government officials to correct systemic deprivations may impose considerable costs on governmental units, but have been permitted nonetheless. See pp. 1227-5o infra.
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under the eleventh amendment,54 it would also run counter to
the express language of section 1983, which specifically authorizes
equitable actions against government officers.
Some courts, drawing an analogy to the eleventh amendment
jurisprudence of Edelman v. Jordan,55 have viewed Monroe and
City of Kenosha as implicitly barring suits for equitable relief,
nominally brought against government officials, in which the
relief will have the effect of imposing retroactive damage-like
recoveries payable from government funds. They have, however,
allowed relief which imposes costs ancillary to prospective compliance with the mandates of the Constitution."0
While such an analogy is facially appealing, it is inappropriate; in Edelman, the basis for the Court's limitation on permissible equitable relief was not a general application of the "partyin-fact" doctrine, but rather the constitutional command of the
eleventh amendment, which Justice Rehnquist indicated provides strong protections for states, but not for lesser governmental
entities. 7 When the official sued in the section 1983 action is
not a state official - and thus where no eleventh amendment concerns are implicated - the question of the permissible scope of
relief is a matter of statutory interpretation, not requiring a
construction as strict as that command by the Constitution. The
reading of City of Kenosha most consistent with the purpose and
language of section 1983 would not be to impose artificial limits
54

See pp. 1195-96 supra.

5545 U.S. 651, 667-68 (i974).
56 See, e.g., Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 5oo-o1 (5th Cir.

1976) (en banc) (adopting dissent to panel opinion), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. May 27, 1976) (No. 75-1723); Singleton v. Vance County
Bd. of Educ., 5o0 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Campbell v. Gadsden
County School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 655 n.io (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum) (while § 1983
action against officials in representative capacity will support award of equitable
reinstatement, it will not support award of back pay) ; cf. McGill v. Parsons, 532
F.2d 484, 485 n.i (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing Muzquiz and permitting prospective injunctive relief). Indeed, Muzquiz is unique in that it appears to adopt the
broadest possible reading of City of Kenosha-that local government officials
are not amenable to suit under § 1983 for any kind of declaratory or injunctive
relief whatsoever. Plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
prohibiting refunds of money deducted from their pay and placed in a pension
fund. In addition to prohibiting relief which would have ordered a refund to
the plaintiffs of past contributions to the pension fund, the court of appeals
reasoned that either declaratory or prospective injunctive relief was barred, because "a declaration that [the statute] is unconstitutional, or an injunction against
its enforcement, is in substance a determination of plaintiffs' entitlement to
restitution." 528 F.2d at Soi. But see Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th
Cir. 5976) (Muzquiz interpreted as general bar only to Edelman-like restitutionary
and damage recoveries). See also 55 TEx. L. Rav. 501, 504, 505-09 (1977).
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 & n.12 (1974)
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on equitable relief simply because some of its forms more obviously affect the local governmental unit than others;" indeed,
to engage in such analysis would appear to ignore City of Kenosha's strong condemnation of efforts to define the scope of section 1983 according to the nature of the relief sought. 59
Even when suits are directed at officials in their individual

capacities, immunity may be extended. It is well established that
state judges,
munity from
Brandhove,60
from section

legislators, and prosecutors enjoy an absolute imsection 1983 liability for damages. In Tenney v.
addressing the question of legislative immunity
1983 damage actions, the Court held that immunity

was so firmly established at common law that Congress would
have specifically -provided for its abolition under section 1983 had

it so intended. 6 ' Lower courts quickly applied this rationale
to create a judicial immunity in section 1983 actions,62 and six-

teen years later, in Pierson v. Ray,63 the Supreme Court approved

this extension. The trio of absolute immunities was completed
by the Court last Term in Inbler v. Pachtman,64 which established an absolute immunity for prosecutors. Building on these
decisions, some lower courts have extended absolute immunities
to justices of the peace, 65 municipal referees,6 6 parole board members, 67 and judicial clerks,6 8 as well as to those acting pursuant to

presumptively valid court orders. 69
58

See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 53, at 259-60; accord,

Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School Bd., 521 F.2d 1201 ( 4 th
Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Wood, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1975) (permitting award of
back pay under § 1983 against officials in representative capacity); Harkless v.
Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. i97o) (award of back pay is integral part of remedy of equitable reinstatement), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
See also 55 TEX. L. REV. 501, 505-09; Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 523 F.2d
499, 501-03 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Tuttle, J., dissenting), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U S. May 27, 1976) (No. 75-1723).
59412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973); see The Supreme Court, r972 Term, supra note
53, at 26o.
00341 U.S. 367 (I951).
6"

Id. at 376.

62 See, e.g., Bauers v. Heisl, 361 F.2d 58I (3d Cir. 1965) (en banc).
63386 U.S. 547 (1967).
64 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
6 See Pennebaker v. Chamber, 437 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1971).

See Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 2972) (dictum).
7 See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822 ( 9 th Cir. 1969).
66 See Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973) (clerk with discretionary
duty of fixing bail in misdemeanor cases immune); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d
1019 (3d Cir. 2972) (clerk with ministerial duty part of the judicial process and
hence immune). Many courts refuse to extend absolute immunity to purely ministerial acts performed by judicial clerks. See, e.g., Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d
2057 (8th Cir. 1973); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d i ( 4 th Cir. 2972).
0 See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Giles v. Thomas, 464 F.2d i56 (Sth Cir. 1972);
6
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Though nominally absolute, these immunities are not without
exceptions. To be completely protected, the defendant's challenged conduct must have occurred in the performance of his
official functions. But the exceptions do not undermine the immunities in any significant way, with the result that individuals
suffering a constitutional violation at the hands of legislators,
judges, and prosecutors are generally foreclosed from any recovery, no matter how malicious the underlying conduct. While
this result may be justifiable in the context of suits against legislators, it is clearly unwarranted as applied to judges and prosecutors. The legislative immunity, conceived amid the constitutional struggle in seventeenth-century England and enshrined in
the speech and debate clause of the Constitution,70 enjoys a unique
historical position. Its constitutional basis and the consistency
with which it has been maintained at common law bespeak a concern for protecting the heart of the democratic process from judicial scrutiny that ought not to be lightly overruled. Moreover,
the practical obstacles to permitting suits against legislators are
immense: even to decide who would be an appropriate party defendant when a legislature enacted a constitutionally offensive
statute would pose a massive problem. Only in the area of legislative investigations might this rule be relaxed; " even then, the
difficulty of separating the investigative from the deliberative
function might well be conclusive against damage liability.
No similarly compelling justifications exist for granting
judges and prosecutors absolute immunity. Even beyond the
language of section 1983, which facially creates a liability admitting of no exceptions, there is evidence of a congressional intent
to hold at least judges liable. The model for section 1983 was x8
Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 197o) (court-appointed psychiatrists);
Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 ( 9 th Cir. 1955); Note, The Doctrine of Official
Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. Rav. 1229, 1230, 1232 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Doctrine of Official Immunity]; cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (state psychiatrist not acting pursuant to court order
entitled to only qualified immunity). The justification for absolute immunity here
is twofold: (z) it would disrupt the judicial process to have those responsible for
carrying out its directives entertain doubts as to the propriety of so acting; and
(2) it is unjust to subject those who act pursuant to judicial orders to liability
while shielding those who issue the orders.
0
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 n.4 (974);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (195).
"1Conceivably, a legislator should not be shielded by absolute immunity where
he uses the investigatory authority for his own improper motives, rather than
as an adjunct to the process of enactment of legislation. But cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (95)
(claim of improper motive does not abrogate
legislative immunity).
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providing criminal liability for civil rights violations, under which judges,7 legislators,74 and prosecutors 75 enU.S.C. § 242,72

joy no immunity. In addition, debate on section 1983 itself indi-

cated no great respect for members of state judiciaries; county
judges were -characterized as "despots" who acted "without re-

gard to law or justice," 70 and the specific statements of several
Congressmen that section 1983 would cover judicial acts were

never contradicted.7 7 Moreover, judicial immunity at common
law was not as "solidly established" in i871 as the Supreme

Court concluded in Pierson.8 The states were sharply divided
on the issue, 79 and even the Supreme Court had left open the

question whether malicious or corrupt judicial acts "in excess of
jurisdiction" might be outside the shield."0 Thus, in light of the
72

See CoNG. GLOBE,

4 2d

Cong., ist Sess. app., at 68 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger).

See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (296I).
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law . . . willfully subjects any inhabitant of
any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .
on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, . . . shall be fined not more than $i,ooo or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for
any term of years or for life.
" The legislative history of § 242 indicates an intention to hold judges liable.
See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 475-76, 1154-55, 168o, 1758, 1778, 1837
(1865-1866); Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights
Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. L. REV. 615, 621-23 (i97i) [hereinafter cited as Immunity of State Judges]. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
assumed, without deciding, that judges are not immune from § 242 liability. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
503 (1973).
" Dicta in recent Supreme Court cases indicate that legislators may be held
criminally liable under § 242. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1973)
(citing Gravel v. United States, 4o8 U.S. 6o6, 627 (1972) (the judicially fashioned
doctrine of immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize criminal conduct
proscribed by an Act of Congress")).
" See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (dictum). See also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 227 (criminal liability for prosecutors).
7" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. i86, 277, 394, 505, 654 (1871); see
Immunity of State Judges, supra note 73, at 621-23; Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section x983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 328 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Liability of JudicialOfficers].
" See CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sss. 394 (1871) (Rep. Rainer); id. at
315, 429, 505, 654; id. app., at 186 (Rep. Platt); id. app., at 153, 277, 179.
Specific statements of judicial liability were issued by Senator Thurman, id. app.,
at 227, Rep. Lewis, id. at 385, and Rep. Arthur, id. at 365-66. See also Liability
of JudicialOfficers, supra note 76, at 328 & nn.37-39.
78 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (2967).
70 See Liability of JudicialOfficers, supra note 76, at 326-27 & nn.29-32.
'°Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (x868), the leading Supreme
Court case on judicial immunity, contained dictum to the effect that judicial acts
"in excess of jurisdiction," if done maliciously or corruptly, would not be immune
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murky picture presented by both federal and state law, a Congress intending to subject judges to liability might well not have
felt compelled to state that explicitly.
Exempting classes of potential defendants from the operation
of section 1983 has been justified on several grounds apart from
legislative history and the "background of tort law." Chief
among these has been the fear that vexatious litigation will cause
discretionary decisionmakers to set avoidance of liability above
independence and integrity as goals in choosing among alternative
courses of action. But this rationale would logically support an
absolute immunity for all governmental decisionmakers vested
with discretion - a result which would wholly and impermissibly undermine the section 1983 damage action. As a result, if
absolute immunities for judges and prosecutors are to be justified, there must be some ground that sets these officials apart
from other governmental decisionmakers.
Not until Imbler v. Pachtmandid the Court set forth the factors that putatively differentiate the judicial from other governmental processes." Of greatest weight 82 was the importance of
from liability. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), had yet to be
decided.
81 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Among the factors listed by the Court are a number
that do not appear to apply peculiarly to the judicial process, or that do
not withstand close analysis. First, the opinion articulates the "intimidation"
analysis, by which the court suggested that prosecutors (and presumably judges)
would be subject, absent absolute immunity, to the burden of many vexatious
suits. Id. at 424-25. While the judicial process, focusing as it does on individuals,
may prove a more fertile spawning ground for 1983 plaintiffs than the legislative
process, other state governmental processes, such as the routine conduct of police
business, impinge as directly on as many individuals, and officers involved in
these processes enjoy only a qualified immunity, see pp. 1209-17 infra.
The Court further reasoned that permitting § x983 actions questioning discretion
relative to the judicial process would "require a virtual retrial of the criminal
offense in a new forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay
jury." 424 U.S. at 425. In part, these concerns are not unique to § x983 actions
based on judicial or prosecutorial decisions: actions against state executive officials
often require detailed inquiry into their decisionmaking processes, see Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 4x6 U.S. 232, 246-48 (1974), and will often involve the jury in the
determination of complex questions of law and fact. Suits against judges and
prosecutors, however, may raise difficulties not found in actions against other
officials since principles of collateral estoppel may bar relitigation, and a successful § 1983 damage action may undermine the validity of a criminal conviction.
See pp. i35o-5i infra.
82 A second part of the Court's argument concerning the uniqueness of the
judicial process was based on the existence of post trial procedures to correct
alleged constitutional deprivations occurring at trial. See Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). Absent absolute immunity, the focus of such corrective
mechanisms might "be blurred by even the subconscious knowledge that a posttrial decision in favor of the accused might result in the prosecutor [or judge]
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permitting the factfinder to have access to all relevant evidence.
This rationale, however, does not support absolute immunity for
judicial and quasi-judicial officers under all circumstances. For
example, the factfinding process does not generally involve consideration of questions of law; thus, a concern for the integrity
of the process affords no justification for shielding a judge who
knowingly falsifies the law. Indeed, preserving access to all
relevant evidence militates against an immunity for a prosecutor
who knowingly withholds such information.8" Nor, finally, does
this argument point to an immunity for prosecutors exercising
being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment." Id.
But as Justice White persuasively responds, such reasoning would apply equally
to policemen, who enjoy only a qualified immunity. See id. at 436 n.3 (opinion
concurring in the judgment).
Furthermore, the Court suggested that the § 1983 action was not necessary to
correct any abuses that might occur in the judicial process, since alternative
remedial mechanisms are available: judges and prosecutors could be punished
criminally under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) ; the prosecutor (and presumably judge)
is susceptible to professional discipline; and errors may be corrected on appeal.
424 U.S. at 428-29.
While § 242 applies to judges and prosecutors, see p. 1201 supra, its operation as a deterrent to unconstitutional behavior is highly dubious, since the
government itself must initiate prosecution, and there are no modern cases reported of judges or prosecutors acutally being subject to its liability. The possibility of professional discipline is also slim: the American Bar Association is not
known for its efforts at self-policing. See generally Morgan, The Evolving Concept oj Professional Responsibility, go HARv. L. REV. 702 (,977). While judicial
and prosecutorial errors may be corrected on appeal, such correction may offer
little in the way of compensation to a genuinely wronged § 1983 plaintiff, particularly one who has been confined pending review, see, e.g., Hilliard v. Williams,
465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972), decision on remand rev'd, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir.
X975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 961 (1976) (for consideration in light of
Imbler v. Pachtman), remanded with directions to dismiss, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1976), or who has suffered serious stigmatization as a result of subjection to the
judicial process. In addition, whether or not the appeal technically vindicates
the injured party, the inconvenience and expense of litigation remains. See generally
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The appeal remedy may also not even be available to citizens wronged by actions
of prosecutors and quasi-judicial officials, and the Supreme Court has recognized
that citizens' constitutional rights may be seriously violated although a conviction,
predicate to appellate review in a criminal case, is never obtained. See Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Indeed, one of the evils specifically referred to in
the § 1983 congressional debates, see CoNG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., ist Sess. app., z85
(i87I), was harassing litigation, which although certain to lose, could put the
citizen to considerable expense and annoyance.
2
" See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442-45 (,976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). See also S. 35, 95th Cong., ist Sess., § 2(d) (1976)
(proposed legislation amending § 1983 to abolish prosecutorial immunity for
withholding evidence); 123 CONG. REc. 5203 (daily ed. Jan. io, z977) (remarks
of Sen. Mathias).
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their investigative functions. 84 Although one might well be concerned with suits which cast doubt on the integrity of those
charged with enforcement of the law, respect for the legal sys-

tem in the long run may be hampered rather than enhanced by a
scheme which seems to place at least some individuals beyond the
reach of the Constitution.

The only persuasive reason for protecting the occasional dishonest or malicious decisionmaker is, of course, that it is necessary to protect the majority of honest ones, and to protect the
process.8 5 But the absolute immunities established by the Court
in its zeal to safeguard the honest official and the process he embodies are clearly overbroad. While no form of negligence liability may be appropriate for judges and prosecutors- since such
liability could well chill the independence and integrity of the
adjudicative process - it must be recognized that judges and
prosecutors are in a position to engage in conduct so reprehen-

sible and so potentially harmful to both the parties before them
and to the judicial process that a chilling effect on that conduct is
precisely what is desirable.88 A scheme of qualified immunities,
analogous to those afforded most executive officers,8 7 would adequately preserve the integrity of the processes involved while at
the same time protecting the constitutional rights secured to individuals through section 1983.8
B. State of Mind Requirements
Monroe v. Pape held that a section 1983 plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to deprive
84 See 424 U.S. at 431 & n.33.

a'See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 58, (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 (1976); id. at 436-37 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
" See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 444-45 (1976) (White, J., concurring
in the judgment); Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972), decision
on remand rev'd, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S.
961 (1976) (for consideration in light of Imbler v. Pachtman), remanded with
directions to dismiss, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. i976); Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp.
542 (D. Minn. 1973) ; Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 76, at 331-32.
87 See pp. 1209-17 infra.
" Should there be fear that the qualified immunity standard as applied to
judges and prosecutors might, because of ambiguity in instructions to the jury,
not adequately reflect the nature of their positions and the need to protect the
integrity and operation of the judicial process, although Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974), see pp. 1211-17 infra, would certainly contemplate an
immunity considerate of such factors, liability for judges and prosecutors could
be limited to those cases in which either actual malice or violation of clearly established constitutional rights could be demonstrated. See Liability of Judicial
Officers, supra note 76, at 334-35; Immunity of State Judges, supra note 73, at
623-27.
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the plaintiff of his constitutional rights in order to establish a
cause of action under the statute. 9 Indeed, the broad language
of the Civil Rights Act- which provides for liability for any
when read in
person "causing" a constitutional deprivation "
the context of Monroe's open-ended declaration that section
1983 liability is to be determined by reference to "the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions," "' and of Monroe's characterization of
section 1983 as providing a federal cause of action "because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise,
state laws might not be enforced," 92 could be seen to establish a
right to relief based solely on the fact of tortious injury to the
citizen, so long as the fact of that injury constituted a constitutional deprivation. The courts, however, have developed doctrines relating primarily to the state of mind of the defendant
which, although not uniformly applied, have effectively reduced
the scope of section 1983. First, in some cases, courts have defined the category of actions giving rise to a section 1983 claim
so as to exclude at least instances of isolated negligent misconduct
from the reach of the statute.93 Second, even where the defendant
has acted intentionally so as to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, the courts have nonetheless barred the recovery
of damages when the defendant is able to establish that he acted
94
in good faith.

i. Negligence Liability.- The lower courts have generally
agreed that isolated acts of negligence by state officials do not give
rise to a constitutional violation.9 This view was apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court this Term, at least in the context of
actions claiming denial of rights secured by the eighth amendment.
In Estelle v. Gamble,9" the Court held that "[i]n order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend 'evolving
so 365 U.S. 167, I87 (Ig6i); see pp. 1169-7, supra.
" The language of § 1983 has been interpreted to create liability for
inaction. See The Supreme Court, z975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 242 & n.25
(1976).
91365 U.S. at 187.
02 Id. at i8o.
'3 See, e.g., Walton v. Salter, 536 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1976); Williams v.
Vincent, 5o8 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033
(2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 70, (9th Cir.
x973); Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443
F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970).
o See pp. 1209-17 infra.
. See cases cited note 93 supra.
9897 S. Ct. 285 (1976).
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standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 17
When it applied this standard to the prisoner's claim that the
prison medical director's failure to perform an X-ray or to use
additional diagnostic techniques constituted cruel and unusual
punishment," the Court found no constitutional deprivation, reasoning that "[a]t most, it [the doctor's failure] is medical malpractice, and as such the proper forum is state court under the
Texas Tort Claims Act." "
The standard of "deliberate indifference" enunciated by the
Court for determining eighth amendment violations is consistent
with the judgment of many lower courts that actions of state officials must be characterizable as "wanton," "reckless," or "grossly
negligent" in order to state a claim under section I983,"0 particularly where an isolated incident of abuse occurred. But the
standard does not appear to bar establishment of section 1983
liability where a series of negligent acts or a pattern of negligent
conduct is established, for such a pattern may properly lead to a
finding that the official responsible evinced "deliberate indifference" or, in fact, had acted wantonly or with gross negligence. 10
For many section 1983 plaintiffs, the ability to establish a
claim against the lower level state official alleged to have committed the abuse in question is less significant than securing a
determination of the liability of the officer's supervisor. In many
cases where constitutional deprivations have been clearly established liability on the part of a supervisory official may be
necessary if the plaintiff is to have any hope of a damage recovery.
Supervisors may be better able to bear the costs of a damage judgment. Moreover, in some cases the plaintiff may not be able to
identify the lower level officials who actually inflicted the injury.0 2
Further, assessment of damages against a supervisory official may
offer a more meaningful possibility of deterring future unconstitu9 Id. at 292 (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court
for "improperly attach[ing] to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a
criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted.
Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any, remedy is appropriate
against a particular defendant. However, whether the constitutional standard
has been violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the
motivation of the individual who inflicted it." Id. at 297 (dissenting opinion).
9

Id. at 292-93.

"9 Id. at 293. See also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
100See, e.g., Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.

740 (1977); Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 2970).
"oSee Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (2976) ("Regardless of how

evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a
cause of action under § 1983.").
102 See, e.g., Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, II (7th Cir. 1972).
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tional conduct by lower officials, since the supervisor will be in a
better position to institute corrective measures in the government
operations he controls.
Although the decisions have not been uniform, plaintiffs who
bring damage actions against supervisory officials, attempting
to establish their liability for the acts of their subordinates,
have generally encountered greater difficulty than in suits against
subordinate officers. The doctrine of respondeat superior has
03
been held generally inapplicable to the section 1983 action;and most courts have been unsympathetic to the claim that higher
level officers have a general duty to the public to supervise, correct, dnd control the actions of their subordinates. 4 Plaintiffs
have thus been required to demonstrate that the supervisory defendant actually participated in, encouraged, or directed the illegal conduct of lower level officials.' 0 5 In effect, this has limited
the instances where plaintiffs can recover primarily to situations
where there has been a history of widespread abuse in the conduct
of the governmental operation under the defendant supervisor's
control. Where plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate a pattern
or practice of improper behavior, knowledge of it has been imputed to the responsible supervisory official so that the injury to
the individual no longer appears to be the result of purely negligent conduct - for which the supervisor would not normally be
liable - but of the "deliberate indifference" of the supervisor
who might have, but did not, take action to prevent continued
injuries. 0 6
103 See, e.g., Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 282 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 783 (1977); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274-75
(8th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (I973). But see Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 9oi (9th Cir. X971) (respondeat superior
applicable in § 1983 action if provided for by state law); Lewis v. Brautigam,
227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) (same).
104 See, e.g., Ford v. Byrd, 544 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1976) ; Parker v. McKeithen,
488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (i974); Johnson v.
Glick, 48X F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Delaney
v. Dias, 4x5 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Mass. 1976); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355
F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 81i (3d Cir. 1974). But see Sims v.
Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1976) (supervisory liability available for
personal participation, breach of state law duty; notice of past culpable conduct
and failure to prevent recurrence); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.
X971) (supervisors liable for negligent failure to train subordinates), rev'd on
other grounds sub nona. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
105 See, e.g., Ford v. Byrd, 544 F.2d 194 ( 5 th Cir. 1976); Jennings v. Davis,
476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 27, (3d Cir. 1972); Adams
v. Pate, 445 F.2d xo5 ( 7 th Cir. I971); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
197o), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (197I).
1° See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (sth Cir. X976) (dictum) (notice of
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Supervisory liability is especially necessary where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief, since it may be only the higher level
official who is in a position to implement any affirmative corrective measures that may be ordered by the court. While lower
courts, responsive to concerns that damage judgments are unfairly imposed absent a significant degree of blameworthiness in
the defendant's conduct, have restricted the instances in which
such liability would be assessed against supervisory officials, they
have generally been more willing to grant equitable relief under
section 1983, particularly where the plaintiff can demonstrate a
pattern of unconstitutional conduct and the likelihood of its recurrence. 10 7 But last Term, in Rizzo v. Goode, °8 the Supreme

Court may have approved an even stricter standard for the issuance of equitable relief than for an award of damages against

supervisory officials. Rizzo originated as a pair of section X983
class actions brought to compel the Philadelphia Police Depart-

ment to improve its fashion of handling citizen complaints as well
as to cease violating the constitutional rights of Philadelphia

citizens. 10 9 The trial court, after finding a "pattern of frequent
police violations" 110 of the rights of minority group members

and those who could be classified as dissenters or protestors,
ordered the defendant officials to implement a program for dealing with complaints that satisfied minimum constitutional standards.1 1 ' The order was affirmed by the Third Circuit.1 1

2

But

the Supreme Court reversed, resting its holding on a number of
prior abusive actions and failure to take remedial measures); Williams v. Vincent,
5o8 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974); Bishop v. Stoneman, 5o8 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir.
1974) (deliberate indifference indicated by proof of six closely related incidents
of negligent medical treatment).
In addition, lower courts have found supervisory liability where the responsible official either had a constitutional duty to take remedial action, or
breached a duty to the plaintiff imposed on him by state law. See, e.g., Sims v.
Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp,
1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 872-73 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(dictum).
'07 See, e.g., Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1350 ( 3 d Cir. I97i); Schnell v.
City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d
197 ( 4 th Cir. 1966) (en banc); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492 (M.D.
Ala. 1966). See also Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 1o5, X07 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971) (dictum)
(respondeat superior may be appropriate in actions for equitable relief).
105 423 U.S. 362 (i976).
0'9 Id. at 364-65 & n.i.
0°See Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability & Responsibility (COPPAR) v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. i28o, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd
in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nor. Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542
(3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

'l See 357 F. Supp. at
112

1320-21.

Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
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grounds, 113 including the lack of any evidence that the supervisory
officials had affirmatively implemented an unconstitutional policy,
or ordered the lower officials' unconstitutional acts.114 If the
Court's holding is transplanted into a rule that supervisors may
be held liable for purposes of granting equitable relief only where
they have affirmatively acted to further alleged abuses by their
subordinates, then both the occasions in which negligent patterns
of conduct will amount to constitutional deprivations, and those
in which injunctive relief, based on patterns of negligent or intentional conduct by subordinates, will issue against supervisory
officials to attempt to cure conceded systemic violations, will be
severely limited." 5
2. Qualified Immunities: The Good Faith Defense. -The
unqualified language of section 1983 could be read to impose
strict liability on state and local governmental officials once a
constitutional deprivation has been established." 6 Following
the holding in Monroe v. Pape "1 that a requirement of specific
intent to violate constitutional rights was not consistent with section 1983's imposition of civil as opposed to criminal liability," 8
the lower courts differed widely on the scope of the immunity or nature of defense "I - available to executive and adminisRizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
See id. at 373-77. The Court also suggested the controversy in question
might be too hypothetical to be justiciable, id. at 371-73, and noted that there
were serious federalism objections to federal courts ordering systemic equitable
relief against the executive branches of state or local governments. See id. at 380.
See also The Supreme Court, z975 Term, supra note go, at 238-47.
115 See The Supreme Court, x975 Term, supranote go, at 243-47.
116See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., xI F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945)
1

114

(no immunity even for state judges), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947), overruled
by Bauers v. Heisl, 361 F.2d 58I (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc); McShane v. Moldovon,
172 F.2d iox6 (6th Cir. 1949); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 560 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381-83 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
117365 U.S. 67 (ig6i).
118 Id. at 187.
'19 The term "qualified immunity," often used to describe the protection
afforded state and local executive and administrative officials in the § 1983 damage
action, is misleading. While an absolute immunity, now afforded judges, legislators,
and prosecutors, see pp. 1197-1204 supra, serves to defeat the § 1983 action at
the outset, so long as the protected official acts within the scope of her duties, the
qualified immunity is, in fact, dependent upon the circumstances and motivations
of the defendant's actions as established at trial, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-49 (i974), is
generally a matter of defense, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967);
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975); Knell v. Bensinger,
522 F.2d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 1975), and is ordinarily not determinable on a motion
to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6) but must await the further factual
development attendant to a motion for summary judgment or trial. See Scheuer
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trative officials in the 1983 action. Responding to concerns, similar to those underlying the grant of absolute immunities, as to
the possible impact of open-ended liability, 120 most courts afforded
such officials a form of qualified immunity, or "good faith defense," to actions for monetary damages. 2 ' While such an immunity precludes damage liability for certain official acts concededly violative of individuals' constitutional rights, its scope,
as defined by the Supreme Court, offers significantly less protection for
most governmental officials than is provided at com122
mon law.
The Supreme Court was first faced with the question of the
appropriate scope of this qualified immunity in Pierson v. Ray. 23
In that case, Chief Justice Warren indicated that the "background
of tort liability" referred to in Monroe v. Pape 124 included a
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974); Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472
F.2d 732, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1973); Greenlaw v. California Dep't of Benefit Payments,
413 F. Supp. 420, 425-27 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
120See pp. 1197-1204 supra; pp. 1217-27 infra. See generally Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1229
(1955); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. REV.
263 (1937).
121 See, e.g., Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1974) (apparent absolute
immunity for executive official engaging in discretionary action); Krause v.
Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 437-40 (6th Cir. 1972) (absolute immunity for state
governor and university president), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (i974); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
z968) (immunity for school officials if they show their actions were justifiable);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 344 (ioth Cir. 1973) (en banc) (immunity for
good faith action taken in absence of malice), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) ;
Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972) (school officials immune
for all but malicious acts), rev'd, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973) (immunity for
acts, judged objectively, taken in good faith), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (good faith defense incorporating both
objective and subjective elements). See generally Note, supra note 120.
"'2At common law, judges, legislators, high executive officials, and, in most
cases, prosecutors enjoyed an absolute immunity for actions taken in the course
of their official duties. Lower administrative officials were granted immunity for
so-called "discretionary acts" requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, so long as such acts were done honestly and in good faith, i.e., without
malice or improper purpose. For "ministerial acts" involving little personal
judgment, the official acted improperly at her peril. See generally W. PRossEa,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 132 (4 th ed. 1971); Jennings, supra note 12o;
see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (,975); p. 1212 infra (immunity even for high executive officials and for
discretionary acts not absolute in § 1983 context).
123386 U.S. 547 (1967).
24
Id. at 556-57 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (i96i)). Monroe,
like Pierson, involved alleged unconstitutional acts of police officers; the Court in
Piersonconcluded that the opinion in Monroe had decided no question of immunity,
since in Monroe the
police officers did not choose to . . . defend the case on the hope that they
could convince a jury that they believed in good faith that it was their duty
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defense to a common law action for false arrest which would
acquit a police officer who acted with good faith and probable
cause in making an arrest even though the suspect was later acquitted or the statute permitting the arrect was subsequently
ruled unconstitutional.1 2 5 This defense was also available to
police officers in section 1983 actions."2
The class of state executive officers to whom the Supreme
Court was willing to extend this qualified immunity was broadened in the cases of Scheuer v. Rhodes 127 and Wood v. Strickland,'2 opinions which also served to define in some measure the
nature of the good faith defense. In Scheuer, personal representatives of students killed during the disorders at Kent State University brought suit under section 1983 against the Governor
of Ohio, officials of the national guard, and the president of
Kent State. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by
the eleventh amendment and on the ground that "executive immunity" shielded the defendants; the court of appeals agreed,
finding that the defendants occupied positions requiring wide
discretion," 9 and that "since the courts have granted to themselves absolute immunity, it would seem incongruous for them
not to extend the same privilege to the Executive." 130
Recognizing the difficulties necessarily entailed by any atto assault Monroe and his family ....

[T]hey sought dismissal .

.

. con-

tending . . . that their activities were so plainly illegal under state law that
they did not act [under color of state law] . . . as required by § 1983.
386 U.S. at 556.
125 386 U.S. at 556-57.
I" Id. at 557. The mere assertion of the good faith defense by police officer
defendants will not suffice, however, since the question is one for the jury, which
must determine that "the officers reasonably believed in good faith" that their
actions were constitutional. Id.
By referring to the "background of tort liability," the Court clearly did not
contemplate reference to the common law of any given state, but rather, as in
Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (i95i), see p. ii99 supra, to the "prevailing
view [of the common law] in this country." 386 U.S. at 555. Further, while
Pierson is ambiguous on this point, the prevailing common law view is no longer
decisive as to the availability of a § 1983 defense: that view must be considered
in light of the policies and purposes of the § 1983 action to determine whether importation of the defense, or allowance of a defense where the common law provides
none, is appropriate. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (,975) ; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238-49 (1974). Compare Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 78I, 790-92 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 9oi (i969) (good faith no defense to false imprisonment at common law, so no defense under § 1983), with Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d I2io (5th
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (bverruling Whirl and holding good faith defense generally
available in § 1983 damage actions).
127 416 U.S. 232 (i974).
128 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
129Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433, 437 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
1 0 Id. at 437.
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tempt to hold the highest executive officer of a state liable for his
discretionary decisions, the Supreme Court nonetheless declined
to find the governor absolutely immune.131 The section 1983 action was designed to "enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a
State"; indeed, the danger from which it shields the citizen is
the "misuse of power . . .made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law . . . . 132 Hence,

the acts of a governor could not be treated as a "supreme and
unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights"; 18 3 rather,
the imperatives of the section 1983 action in combination with the
necessities of discretionary executive conduct
suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is ...
based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity.

34

Scheuer left open a number of questions about the scope of
the good faith defense. In particular, the term "good faith" itself assumed a more objective or subjective meaning, depending
on which court was interpreting it.1 35

This problem reached

the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland,136 a suit in which the
trial court had applied a subjective meaning of "good faith" and
131 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 ('974).
32

Id. at 243 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. x67, 172, 184 (ig6i)). Thus,
"government officials, as a class, could not be totally exempt, by virtue of some
absolute immunity, from liability under [§ 1983's] terms." Id. The Court was
thus forced to balance the policies underlying the executive immunity at common
law, which it identified as
the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability
an officer who is required . . . to exercise discretion . . . [and] the danger
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good,
with the purposes of § 1983.
'

id. at 240.

133 Id. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
234 416 U.S. at 247-48. Under such a standard, the scope of the immunity
enjoyed by high level officials would be wider than that enjoyed by police officers,
"since the options which a chief executive . . .must consider are far broader and
far more subtle than those made by officials with less responsibility . .
"
d. at
247.
123See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315-18 & n.7 (1975'), and cases
cited therein.

136 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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one. 37

Not surprisingly, the
the court of appeals an objective
encompasses
standard
good
faith
Supreme Court held that the
both a subjective and an objective element. Clearly, the defendant official must not have acted out of malice; moreover, "an
act violating . . . constitutional rights can be no more justified
by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law . . . than
by the presence of actual malice." 1s
Wood and Scheuer taken together make it clear that the "immunity" extended to state executive officials is in fact a defense
- a defense on the merits, involving proof of both state of mind
and reasonableness of conduct 9 The first part of the defense
has not caused many problems for courts; when there are conflicting allegations as to whether or not the defendant acted out
of malice, the issue can readily be decided by the jury. What has
proved more difficult has been to define the independent content of the reasonableness standard.
The contours of this standard are defined most broadly in
Scheuer, which held that the showing required to satisfy it depends "upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
...
,, 140 In part, this approximates the "reasonable man" test
of negligence law; but it includes the additional element of the
defendant official's range of discretion
and the need to prevent
141
exercise.
its
of
inhibition
undue
'3' Id. at 313-14. The subjective standard would allow liability only where it
could be determined that the defendants acted with malice; the objective test
utilized by the court of appeals would have imposed liability where it is "established
that the defendants did not, in the light of all the circumstances, act in good faith."
Id. at 314.
1'8 Id. at 321-22. The Court specifically held that no immunity would attach
if the school official

knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took .

.

. would

violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to the student. That is not to say that school board
members are "charged with predicting the future course of constitutional
law."
Id. at 322 (citation omitted).
139 See note i19 supra.
140416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
141 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oi? TORTS § 32 (4th ed.
i97I); The Supreme Court, r974 Term, 89 HAv. L. REV. 47, 219, 222 (,975). Of
course, to the extent that traditional negligence law contemplates a judgment of the
defendant's action as measured against that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances, see W. PROSSER, supra, at isi, the duties and discretion of the defendant
would constitute a part of the standard. But Scheuer would seem to compel a
judgment that such factors be given special emphasis, since the qualified immunity
it provides is designed to be responsive to fears of unduly inhibiting discretion on the part of high-ranking government officials, and to avoid unduly "second
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Wood can best be read as
broadening the potential section 1983 damage liability of state
executive officials 142 by adding to the reasonableness test of
Sckeuer a provision for imputing malice where the official acts
so as to violate clearly settled constitutional rights.14 3 But paradoxically, the opinion is also subject to an interpretation which
would significantly reduce the possibility of damage liability:
the only test actually articulated is whether the official acted
maliciously, or in violation of rights he knew or reasonably should
have known existed, with the category of rights encompassed
under the latter test seemingly limited to those clearly established," since the official cannot be "charged with predicting the
future course of constitutional law." 14 Under the narrowing
interpretation, the Scheuer reasonableness test would have no
independent content, since in the absence of malice, unless rights
of the clearly settled category were violated, no liability could be
found.'4
guessing" official
decisionmaking. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
('974).

232,

238-49

142 While the Court in Wood indicated that the immunity it articulated in its
opinion was applicable "in the specific context of school discipline," 420 U.S, at
322, the test has been applied by the Court to officials at a state mental hospital,
see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (x97g), and by lower courts to
a wide variety of executive and administrative personnel. See cases cited note 1so,
infra.
"4 'As the Court stated, "an act violating ... constitutional rights can be no
more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law . . .than by
the presence of actual malice." 420 U.S. at 321. Mr. Justice Powell's dissent, joined
by three other members of the Court, see 420 U.S. at 327-31, criticized the majority
opinion on just this ground: by equating ignorance of settled constitutional rights
with malice, the dissent argued, the majority had departed from the more appropriate general reasonableness standard of Scheuer to impose a "more severe ...
standard significantly enhancing the possibility of personal liability," id. at 331,
by permitting a damage award where the court finds "that a good-faith belief as

to the applicable law was mistaken . . . ." Id. at 329.
44 The question who is to make the "clearly settled" determination has been

answered in two different ways, neither of which appears unreasonable. One commentator has noted that resolution of this issue "would appear to require a decision by a judge," see The Supreme Court, z974 Term, supra note 141, at 222;
on the other hand, at least one court of appeals has apparently approved
a different procedure: expert witnesses, such as law professors, are called to present
testimony on the question, which is then left to the jury. See Laverne v. Corning,
522 F.2d ri44 (2d Cir. 1975). A court adopting the latter procedure should be
careful to instruct the jury that it must make separate determinations on the issues
of whether clearly established rights were violated, whether the defendant's conduct
was malicious, and whether the defendant's conduct, if violative of constitutional
rights, was reasonable under all the circumstances.
145420 U.S. at 322.
" Indeed, one commentator has interpreted Wood to require that the judge
determine that there has been a violation of "clearly settled" constitutional rights

DEVELOPMENTS - SECTION 1983

1977]

1215

But given the -Court's citation of Scheuer and its apparent
to the possibility of an
readiness to impute malice -leading
award of punitive damages 1'7 - where the official ignores clearly
settled constitutional rights, it is arguable that the Court intended
148
to retain the Scheuer reasonableness test for damage liability.
Indeed, many lower courts have taken this view, considering a
wide variety of factors to determine whether the official action
was reasonable.' 49 Under this view, the "clearly settled rights"
prong of the liability test should be utilized sparingly, as it has
in fact been used by lower courts since Wood, 150 to find liability,
before any question of liability can reach the jury, see Supreme Court, z974 Term,
supra note 141, at 223, with the question of reasonableness then submitted

to the jury. But this view overlooks both the language of the Wood opinion equating ignorance of clearly settled rights with malice, see 420 U.S. at 321-22, and the
provision for a finding of liability based solely on malice, see id.
147 See, e.g., Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 7o5 ( 5 th Cir. 1975) ; Batista v. Weir, 340

F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (punitive damages available in § 1983 action where defendent acts maliciously).
148 See 420 U.S. at 313-22. Offering further support for the continued validity
of the reasonableness test, the Court stated:
The immunity must be such that ... officials understand that action taken
in the good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds
of reason under all the circumstances will not be punished and that they need
not exercise their discretion with undue timidity.
Id. at 321. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) ("fate of an
official with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of
his actions, as established by the evidence at trial").
149 For cases applying a Scheuer-like test of reasonableness, see Boscarino v.
Nelson, 58 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
,975) (law permits use of force to apprehend fleeing felon; question of reasonableness is for finder of fact); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 2975);
Stephenson v. Gaskins, 531 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1976) (qualified immunity depends
upon circumstances and motivations of defendant's actions as established at trial) ;
Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974) (fact that warden had sought to be
progressive and remedy prison situation, that there was no specific legal guidance
on the issue in question, and that no malice appeared relevant to defense) ; Bryan
v. Jones, 530 F.2d I210 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 97 S. Ct. 174 (1976);
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d ii44 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendants' belief in lawfulness
of conduct must be reasonable; speed with which they must act is one factor for
jury consideration); Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S.

2072

(1973) (reliance on advice of attorney general, action by state court,

and fear of violence support reasonableness of actions).
1'For
cases finding the constitutional right in question "unsettled," see Knell
v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975) (while right of access by prisoners to
courts settled, right of access during period of disciplinary isolation not settled);
Mims v. Board of Educ., 523 F.2d 7,1 (7th Cir. 1975) (defense that right to due
process prior to employment termination not settled at time of defendant's unconstitutional conduct); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 51g F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73, (i977) (fact that courts split on issue and
that defendant relied on attorney's advice enables official to escape liability) ; Sullivan v. Meade Indep. School Dist., 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976) (right to privacy
ambiguous, firing of school employee for living unmarried with another not
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apart from other factors indicative of reasonableness of official
action, where the character of the right violated is so clearly
settled that ignorance of it simply cannot be excused.151
Absent violation of such a right - as when the right is newly
articulated in the course of the damage action, involved in controversy in the lower courts, or extended to a new and different
factual context-the jury should be permitted to inquire into
the reasonableness of the official conduct under the Scheuer
standard. 2 Otherwise, the 1983 damage action will be deprived
of much of its remaining vitality; officials will be able to escape
liability for unreasonable acts, violative of constitutional rights,
by showing that they did not act maliciously and by resort
to formalistic arguments that the right violated was not of suffiviolation of settled rights) ; Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975) (right
unsettled since only one case from another circuit recognized it and that case
included cogent dissent); Poindexter v. Woodson, 51o F.2d 464 (ioth Cir.) (use
of strip cells authorized by statute; no court with jurisdiction over defendant
had previously declared practice improper; long-standing custom in state; eighth
amendment guarantee ambiguous; right not settled), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846
(1975); Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill.) (no Supreme Court
opinion on issue; division of circuits; this decision settles right for future), af'd,
514 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. xo58 (x975). But see Glasson
v. City of Louisville, 5i8 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.) (while urgency of situation is factor
to be considered, subjective good faith test would foster ignorance, or feigned
ignorance, of law; order to destroy anti-Nixon picket signs clearly unconstitutional), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th
Cir. 1975) (case decided on point two months prior to action of firing student
newspaper editors put defendant on notice; should have consulted attorney; first
amendment right clearly settled); Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974)
(right to circulate letter of complaint among fellow employees clearly settled);
State v. McFetridge, 484 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973) (while precise process rights
with regard to demonstration permit applications not settled, right to quick
determination settled).
' Such a view would serve the additional symbolfc function of assuring citizens
that government officials cannot claim ignorance of clearly established law, particularly where the law in question is controlled by the mandates of the Constitution. See generally The Supreme Court, r974 Term, supra note 141, at 222
(I975). It would also have the desirable consequence of not imputing malice to
government officials absent violation of a narrowly defined area of rights and of
permitting courts to avoid formalistic and often contorted determinations of which
rights are "clearly settled." See note r5o supra.
...The question for the jury in such a case, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (2975); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (975), would be
whether, under all the circumstances, in light of the fact that officials cannot be
expected to be predictors of the course of constitutional law, see Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. at 322, the official knew or reasonably should have known his action would
violate the § 1983 plaintiff's constitutional rights. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. at 578-79 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (such factors as apparent prior state
court approval of defendant's actions relevant to consideration of § 2983 liability);
cases cited note 149 supra.
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ciently settled legal status to warrant an imputation of malice. 153
They may do so regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
actions in question, the alternative courses of action open, or
even the presence of an opportunity, upon reasonable inquiry,
to have discovered that the questioned action would more likely
than not be declared violative of the Constitution.
C. The Section 1983 Damage Action

The immunity rules and the requirements of proof discussed
in the preceding Section combine to limit severely both the occasions on which individual injury at the hands of the state will

be considered a constitutional deprivation and those on which
any damage recovery will result. This Section will seek to isolate and to evaluate the underlying concerns whose compromise
has resulted in the present shape of the section 1983 damage ac-

tion. The next Section will then deal with the evolving scope
of the 1983 injunctive action -

the "public law" action.

Any analysis of the doctrines governing damage recovery in
1983 actions must begin with municipal and governmental immunities. The Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape 154 that a municipality is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983 '55 has,
more than any other single ruling, limited the utility of 1983
damage actions as a means of vindicating individual claims
against state-inflicted injury. 56 Compensation to an individual
injured by state action, if paid by the government, may be justified as a means of spreading the cost of official wrongdoing among

all citizens rather than allowing the cost to fall on the unlucky
few.'57 Indeed, even the individual injured by an unintentional
153

See cases cited note iSo supra; The Supreme Court, r974 Term, supra note

4I, at 223-25 ('975).

Should the narrow view of the Wood holding ultimately
prevail, however, it might be expected that a jury confronted with baldly unreasonable action on the part of a government official, and a sympathetic plaintiff,
viII be moved to find malice in order to impose liability. Cf. Harper v. Cserr, 544
F.2d 1121, 1125 (Ist Cir. x976) (dictum) (right not settled, but perhaps trier of
fact may infer malice from wanton neglect).
154365 U.S. 167 (I96I).
155 Id. at 187-91.
i"'See generally Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section
x983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 131 (,972); Comment, Toward
State and Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial of Racial Equal Protection,
57 CALI. L. Rav. 1142 (1969); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities
for ConstitutionalViolations, 89 HARv.L. REV. 922 (1976).
...See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Some Thoughts
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 8o HAxv. L. Rav. 1I65
(1967). Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 391-92 (197):

Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen and a federal
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or unavoidable act of a public official which might be considered
a background cost of citizenship may have some claim against the
government that compensation should be paid and the costs of
his injury spread. 5 ' It is more difficult to justify a damage award,
however, where the issue is not whether costs should be spread
among all citizens but rather whether they should be shifted from
the injured individual to the individual official who may be
considered responsible. In this context, it is hardly surprising
that notions of fault or blameworthiness have emerged to define
a deprivation and that good faith has been accepted as a defense
to individual damage liability. 15 9 Unless we are willing to treat
state and local officials as if they were the government (on the
grounds that they may well be indemnified for their loss) and
at the same time adhere to the rule that governmental entities
themselves are immune, 16t ° there appears to be little justification
in terms of fairness for requiring compensation when the official
actor is not to blame for the injury. 6' While this reasoning does
not itself mandate refusal to recognize negligent conduct as a
violation of section 1983, it does support the introduction of some
miminal standards of fault.
A similar conclusion is reached if section 1983 damage actions are viewed as a means of deterring injurious conduct. Damage remedies imposed on governmental entities could serve to
0
prevent injuries to individuals by the system as a whole.0'
agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the
relationship between two private citizens. In so doing, they ignore the fact
that power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully used. An agent acting . . .in the name of the United States
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.
158 See Note, supra note z56, at 957.
159 This is true because the question in such cases is not whether it is unfair to
concentrate the costs of social action on any single individual, see Michelman, supra
note 157, at 1216-x8, but rather upon which of two individuals those costs will be
concentrated.
160 See pp. xi91-97 supra.
161 Cf. Michelman, supra note 157, at 1216. ("Society has not yet placed itself
under any systematic discipline designed to assure people of compensation for all
economic losses inflicted by forces regarded as beyond social control, such as earthquake or plague.").
112 The threat of damage judgments against the government
unit might well
induce supervisory officials to design procedures, internal rules, and training programs so as to minimize misconduct. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp.
155, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Kates & Kouba, supra note 156, at 140-41; Note, supra
note z56, at 927. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINr. L. REV. 349, 409-39 (1974). In addition, a damage remedy might well be
considered less intrusive on the operations of local government units than injunctive
relief: not only are the local units free of the continuing supervision which seems
to have troubled the Court in recent cases, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 US. 362 (1976) ;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (974), but they are also left with full dis-
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Whether imposed only where the injury could efficiently have

been avoided or on the basis of strict liability to achieve full
cost internalization, such remedies should, assuming decisionmakers are rational, lead municipalities to take steps to reduce
injuries whenever the steps appear less costly than the injuries
they prevent. 16 3 While the problems of valuation and prediction 164 make it unrealistic to expect perfectly rational deterrence,

it is clear that the immunities of government entities substantially undermine the effectiveness of section 1983 damage ac-

tions as deterrents. To be sure, damages may deter individuals.
But many injuries inflicted by the state may be traceable not to

the decision of any single official, but rather to the actions of one
or more individuals in a context of procedures, rules, and re-

sources which themselves contribute to the injury.

65

While the

state system as a whole may be responsible for the costs which

result, it is difficult to isolate any single individual upon whom
a damage award would serve as an effective deterrent. 6 As a
result, if damages are considered a deterrent, and if liability

must be individualized, recovery should be limited at least to
cases in which the injury was one the defendant could have and

should have prevented. This would leave undeterred those injuries which, while properly charged to the state, cannot be con-

sidered the fault of any single individual.
Thus, with respect to both compensation and deterrence, nocretion to make the basic choices as to policy and implementation of any remedial
scheme, see pp. 1227-50 infra.
.63 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCmENTs (i970).
"64See Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1350 (3d Cir. 1971); Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 397, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc) ; p.
measuring damages).

1226

infra (problems of

.65 See Note, Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against Police Abuse: Picking
Up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 530, 532 (3976) (suggesting
that police misconduct should be viewed "as a function of institutional rather than
individual flaws"); Note, supra note 156, at 957 (in many cases "responsibility
for the wrong is diffused throughout various parts of the government rather than
attributable to the particular individual who operates most directly upon the
victim").
16In
Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
964 (i975), suit was brought against 69 individual state and city police officers, their
superiors, and the city and state for damages arising out of the shootings at Jackson State University. Although the court found that "[tihe barrage of gunfire far
exceeded the response that was appropriate," id. at 1271, it upheld a jury verdict
for all defendants. The state was found immune under the eleventh amendment
and state law, the city under Monroe. Id. at 3273. The court held that the conduct
of some of the individuals was not outside their privilege of self-defense under state
and common law tort doctrine, id. at X275-8o, while verdicts for the others were
upheld because it was impossible to determine who had fired the shots which
killed and wounded the students, id. at 128x-86.
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tions of fault or blameworthiness emerge as the inevitable product
of a scheme of individualized liability. They reflect the fact that
it would be both unfair and ineffective to require an individual
who was not at fault to bear the costs of injuries resulting from
his action. And the consequence is that some injuries for which
compensation might fairly be demanded from the government
and some costs whose incursion might be prevented by requiring
the government to pay damages are left uncompensated and undeterred. 67
Keying 1983 damage liability to individual fault, however,
does not itself explain why negligence is not sufficient to trigger
recovery or why qualified immunities should be available to
foreclose recovery where a violation is proved to be the result of
the defendant's intentional conduct. Indeed, it is in these respects
that the section 1983 damage action differs from the traditional
model of biparty civil litigation with which it is otherwise consistent.6 8 These differences respond not to the mere fact that
liability, as in the traditional private model, is individualized;
rather, they reflect concerns about the undesirability of "federalizing" tort law and the possible adverse impact of broad damage
liability both on governmental officials personally and on the
proper functioning of the state governmental machinery itself.
The specter of "general federal tort law" 169 resulting from a
recognition of liability for negligence is more often invoked than
explained. Conceivably, a number of factors may be supporting
the reluctance of courts to create through section 1983 a remedy
encompassing the broad range of action which, if done privately,
would give rise to a state tort claim. For example, there may be a
notion that harms of a less than egregious nature should not give
rise to federal interference; requiring such claims to be dealt with
as state torts reduces the frequency of federal intrusions into
state affairs and allows the states themselves to correct the ex167

Cf. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 367 & n.27 (D.C. Cir. ig7), rev'd on

other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 48 (973)
("With respect to some government functions, the threat of individual liability
would have a devastating effect, while the threat of government liability would
not significantly impair performance.").
The trend in recent state court decisions has been towards expanding municipal
tort liability. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305
(abolishing immunity of local government units). See generally
A.2d 877 (973)
W. PROSSER, supra note 41, at 985.
"8 The Court's logic in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391-92 (197), see note 157 supra, would suggest that the standard of liability in suits against government officials ought to be
stricter, not more relaxed.

...
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 70, (1976); Shapo, Constitutional Tort:
Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 6o Nw. U.L. RFV. 277 (x965).
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cesses of their officials. 170 The problem with this argument is
twofold. First, it is not at all clear that claims of official negligence, though they may arise with some frequency, lead to interference that is qualitatively substantial in any real sense. The actions are directed at individuals, and the court's role, at least
initially, appears to be a limited one in terms of both the likely
significance of the issues raised in any particular case and the
likely impact of relief orders.1 -7

Second, the fact is that a failure

to recognize a federal cause of action does not generally lead to
self-correction by state courts in any traditional sense; in many
states, tort claims against officials will be dismissed under broader
standards of immunity than those governing 1983 claims. 2
Alternatively, the view that state tort law should not be federalized may respond not to a reluctance to have federal courts
adopt the standards of tortious conduct established by state law
but rather to a concern that broader federal enforcement of section 1983 would deprive each state of the freedom to decide, for
example, that no recovery is appropriate for negligent acts committed by state officials. The federalization of state tort law, in
this sense, would not only impose new constraints on individual
officials; it would also limit the power of the states in their role
of lawmakers and in their attempts to enforce substantive policy
decisions. 73 But if this analysis is correct, it does not mean that
negligence ought never to serve as a basis for recovery in federal
court; rather, it suggests that the federal courts, analogizing to
the due process cases grounded in state-created entitlements, 7 4
might justifiably look to state law in order to determine whether
the state officials in question owe a duty of care to individuals in
the plaintiff's position.Y
170 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. I67, 243 (ig6i) (Frankfurter,

J.,

dissenting);

Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1486 (I969).
71 See injra pp. 1271-72 infra.
172 See note 167. A similar argument might be premised on the need to reduce
the federal caseload, but it seems no more persuasive. See p. 1172 supra.
173 Such an argument would derive support from a broad reading of the values
protected by the Younger doctrine. See pp. 1282-87 infra.
174See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (I974); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 4o8 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"'At some point, of course, the fourteenth amendment places a limit on the
states' ability to make choices of this nature. See pp. 1181-82 supra. One
might argue, relying on those cases holding supervisors liable under § 1983
where a pattern of negligent conduct by their subordinates is established, see p. 1207
note io6 supra, that the state should not be free under the fourteenth amendment
to choose effectively to condone negligent conduct by state officers by failing to
impose any duty of care.
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The policies underlying good faith defenses, on the other hand,
are relevant not to determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred but rather to the question whether damages will
be granted for an established deprivation. 1' From the plaintiff's
perspective, of course, the distinction may be irrelevant to ultimate disposition: in either case, he may be unable to recover
damages. But whether the issue goes to the existence of a deprivation or to the question of immunity directly affects the
evidentiary burden he bears: in the former case, the burden of
production and persuasion rests
with him; in the latter, it rests
77
with the defendant official'
Good faith defenses are said to rest on deeply felt concerns
that
[o]fficials of government should be free to exercise their duties
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties - suits which would consume
time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies
78
of government.
Certainly, there can be little doubt that as a general matter, government officials must inevitably make numerous discretionary
decisions, and that the process of doing so may well not be enhanced by the frequent presence of the decisionmakers as defendants to 1983 actions. But this does not distinguish public
officials from the run of private decisionmakers, who must face
the threat of tort claims unaided by good faith defenses. In the
case of private parties, the availability of such mechanisms as
dismissal on the pleadings for failure to state a claim 170 and summary judgment,'8 0 and the costs to plaintiffs of initiating suits
and pursuing their claims, are generally considered sufficient on
balance to alleviate any burden of defending frivolous actions.' 8'
17
177

See pp. 1209-17 supra.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) ; p.

1209

& n.1i9, p. 1213 supra

(qualified immunity in fact a defense based on good faith).
178 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 57, (1950) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J.);
see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 58i (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (x9so); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, supra
note 12o, at 271; Note, supra note 120.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
180 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
181 The Code of Professional Responsibility also serves as a means of discouraging frivolous actions. The Code provides:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(i) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
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Indeed, in the .private sector, positive value is attached to the
fact that the threat of suits will encourage decisionmakers to
exercise their discretion in ways which are likely to cause the
least injury to other individuals. If good faith defenses are justifiable as applied to government officials, therefore, the reason
must be differences in the nature of the decisions or decisionmakers which render the possibility of suits more harmful and
the effect on behavior less desirable than is true with respect to
private individuals.
First, the availability of good faith defenses has been supported
as a means of furthering the public interest in encouraging the
most qualified and able people to serve as officials of state and
local governments. The potential damage liability for decisions
made in good faith, it has been argued, could deter at least some
such individuals from seeking positions of public responsibility.' 8 2
One response to this argument, of course, would be to suggest
that there is no reason to expect that employment by government
will generally subject a person to greater risks of lawsuits and
recoveries than would similar employment in the private sector.
To the extent that this is true, however, the good faith defense
remains justifiable because it makes public employment that much
more attractive than other opportunities and thus can serve as
a means of furthering the public interest in an optimal force of
government officials. A more basic problem with this argument
is that it necessarily rests on the premise that the willingness of
any individual to accept a particular position is affected by an
evaluation of possible litigation and damage recoveries. Certainly, this might seem likely if the individual felt powerless to
avoid frequent suits or recurring awards. But given that current
standards require not simply fault, as defined by tort law, but
proof of some form of intent in order to recover damages against
individuals,'183 the likelihood that possible liability will influence
the individual employment decision seems substantially reduced.
The second principal argument favoring good faith defenses
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.
ABA CODE OF PROFFSSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, DR 7-02 (A) (I)-(2) (1975).
182 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (I975) ("The most capable candidates for school board positions might be deterred from seeking office if heavy
burdens upon their private resources from monetary liability were a likely prospect
during their tenure.") ; id. at 331 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) ("In view
of today's decision significantly enhancing the possibility of personal liability, one
must wonder whether qualified persons will continue in the desired numbers to
volunteer for service in public education.").
183 See pp. 1205-09 supra.
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takes for granted that the individual does have some control of
his possible liability for damages. Absent qualified immunity,
according to this view, the public official may well exercise his
discretion so as to avoid potential liability, thus directing his
judgment away from the concerns which should govern his decisions." 4 Stated in this stark fashion, the argument is a difficult
one to justify. Whatever other concerns should shape a particular official's actions, certainly one of them should be the constitutional rights of individuals who will be affected by his actions.
To criticize section 1983 liability because it leads decisionmakers
to avoid the infringement of constitutional rights is to criticize one
of the statute's raisons d'gtre. 115 At a subtler level, though, there
may be some merit to this argument, although only in a limited
set of circumstances. Where it was not apparent that action
would infringe any constitutional rights and where the action was
clearly a necessary - or at least a reasonable - means of securing certain social goals within the purview of the official, the
imposition of damage liability on the individual may in fact be
inappropriate. Part of the reason is the fairness of the cost shifting involved; it is difficult to find the official truly "at fault,"
for while his intentional actions resulted in the constitutional deprivation, the fact that the right involved was unclear and that
the action was taken to further goals for which he is publicly
responsible undercuts any sense of "blameworthiness." 180 Moreover, there is a danger that were liability to be imposed in this
case, the decisionmaker would in the future be reluctant to take
action which is necessary to accomplish public goals and which
87
would ultimately not infringe individual constitutional rights.1
Such a result would hamper the ability of public officials adequately to serve state and local needs without any justification
in terms of federal constitutional rights.
"84 The Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (X974), noted two "mutually
dependent rationales" for official immunity:
(i) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to
exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would
deter willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good.
Id. at 240 (citing Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
77 HARv. L. REV. 209, 223 (1963)).
"' See pp. II54-55 supra.
18 6 See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 58I (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.)
("There must indeed be means of punishing public officials who have been truant
to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been
honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors."), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (195o).
"s See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (I974) ; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 572-73 (1959).
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But if this is the rationale for good faith defenses, it is necessarily a limited one. Where constitutional rights are established
with any clarity or where the individual official conduct in question is not reasonably designed to secure the goals of the defendant's office, this rationale cannot be invoked. In such cases,
not only does the official appear "blameworthy," but the federal
interest in the vindication of constitutional rights renders any
rule which would encourage officials to err consciously and unnecessarily on the side of constitutional violations untenable.
Nonetheless, it may well be the trend in the courts to expand,
rather than to contract, the scope of the good faith defense by
narrowly defining the category of clearly settled rights and by
eliminating the objective test of the reasonableness of official
conduct. 88 To the extent that this is true, it will represent a substantial obstacle to the attempts of an individual to vindicate
through a damage claim a deprivation of his constitutional rights
- another obstacle which, like the others, is derived at least in
part from9 the requirement that suits be brought against indi8
1

viduals.

Indeed, the practical effect of the 1983 damage scheme is to
render recovery unlikely even where the individual does not initially seem barred by one of the established doctrines. 190 In what
might be called the typical 1983 action, the plaintiff is likely to
be a person who has .been either charged with or convicted of a
crime, or who displays other stigmas that tend to cast him in an
unfavorable light in the eyes of a citizen who has never been drawn
into confrontation with the established order - the most likely
member of the jury. 9' Moreover, the individual defendant in
such an action is typically a low-level government official, such
as a police officer, both because those officials are readily identi'

See pp.

1212-14

supra.

See Note, supra note I56, at 957:
[T~he risk that imposing liability unqualified by an immunity or good faith
defense upon municipalities would deter their officials from conscientiously
executing their public duties seems much more attenuated than the risk attendant to imposing such liability upon the officials themselves. While it is
possible that damage awards against municipalities might lead to administrative sanctions against the responsible officials, it seems likely that municipal
administrators would refrain from imposing sanctions upon officials who
appear to have been acting reasonably or in good faith.
190 See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85
HAv. L. REv. 1532, 1553-56 (1972); Kates & Kouba, supra note 156, at 136-38;
Note, supra note 156, at 924; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand) (holding
good faith and a reasonable belief in the validity of warrantless search to be a
defense in action for damages).
"'1 Cf. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REV. 493 (I955) (pointing out difficulties of recovering damages when
claims brought as state torts).
189
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fiable as the immediate instruments of constitutional wrongs,
and because court rulings on vicarious liability and immunities
under section 1983 have made government entities and many
higher ranking government officials unavailable as defendants
in damage actions. 9 2 These rank-and-file functionaries may well
be sympathetic defendants in a jury's eyes for they are likely to
be perceived as hard-working employees doing the best they can,
who could ill afford to satisfy a hefty damage judgment.9 3 In
those cases where upper-level state officials can be sued under
section 1983, another set of circumstances conspires to make
recovery improbable. Courts and juries share a measure of deference to governmental authority; the framework of good faith
defenses applicable to high-level defendants permits courts to
bend over backwards in instructing juries on the respect to be
accorded an official's scope of discretion,' 4 and permits juries
to do likewise in obeying those instructions. Finally, many 1983
plaintiffs are likely to face great difficulty in securing adequate
recoveries because of problems of damage measurement. For example, it is difficult to place a monetary value on a given plaintiff's exercise of first amendment rights or his right to vote or
to attend an integrated public school, or on his dignitary and
symbolic interest in not being subjected to false imprisonment,
invasion of privacy, or stigmatization as a result of unwarranted
interferences by government law enforcement officials. 9 5 While
this difficulty of calculation has been ameliorated by the increasing recognition in both tort and section 1983 law that plaintiffs
may recover for injury to so-called "dignitary interests," often
in the guise of emotional stress, 196 the law has not evolved to the
point where it acknowledges an independent monetary value for
constitutional rights per se. In addition, although punitive
damages are generally available in the 1983 action, and indeed,
have often been used to compensate plaintiffs where valuation
of the right infringed would have been difficult, such damages are
most often awarded7 only upon a showing that the defendant
9
acted with malice.
With avenues of relief closed off on all sides, or at least narrowed to mere alleys, 1983 damage actions have not been able to
serve as an effective vehicle for securing either compensation or
192 See pp. 1207-09 supra.
193

See Foote, supra note 191; Note, supra note 156, at 924.

194 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 46 U.S. 232 (1974); pp. 1209-17 supra.
195See Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971); Lankford v. Gelston,
364 F.2d 197, 202 ( 4 th Cir. 1966) (en banc).
.9 See W. PROSSER, supra note 141, at 49-63.
197See

Palmer v. Hall, 57 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.

F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).

975); Basista v. Weir, 340
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deterrence. Since compensation is itself a valid end to be sought
under the statute, this situation ought be rectified.' 98 But even
an ideally functioning scheme of 1983 damage actions would, for
a number of reasons, be insufficient to meet the needs of citizens
whose constitutional rights are infringed or threatened by systemic
violations committed by state or local governmental authority.' 99
First, if the plaintiffs are threatened with but have not yet been
subjected to constitutional deprivations, an immediate award of
damages would be inappropriate. Second, the damage recovery
might well result in a double cost to the government: not only
will damages for past violations be required, but if the damage
judgment is to serve its desired purpose, it will result in the local
government's also bearing the costs of remedial action to prevent
future recurrences. If the particular government is unable simultaneously to bear both costs, constitutional rights may remain
in jeopardy. Finally, a damage approach may be subject to the
objection that it creates a situation in which the government is
free, if it places a high value on certain types of unconstitutional
conduct, to ",purchase" the right to continue to inflict constitutional deprivations on its citizens. To meet violations of this
order, then, a new kind of litigation seems critical.
D. The Section r983 Injunction Action:
"Public Law" Adjudication
The failure of the private damage action adequately to deal
with systemic violations of constitutional rights has contributed
to an increase in the frequency with which a new kind of 1983
suits is brought- suits fitting the description provided by Professor Abram Chayes for "public law" adjudication:
The party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to
change over the course of the litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with negotiating and
mediating processes at every point. The judge is the dominant
figure in organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide
range of outsiders -masters, experts, and oversight personnel.
Most important, the trial judge has increasingly become the
creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief which
have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the judge's continuing involvement in administration and
implementation. 200
"'8 See pp. 136o-6i infra.
See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. r966) (en banc).
20 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAxv. L. REv.
100

1281, 1284 (i976).
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The shift embodied in such 1983 actions away from the individualized focus of the damage action to the broader pattern
of systemic problems may be attributed to a number of factors.
First, the decisions on supervisory liability establishing a distinction between individual acts of negligence and patterns of negligent conduct 201 suggest not an individual constitutional right
never to be injured at the hands of state officials but rather a
right to live in a system which seeks to minimize such injuries.
Under this logic, some injuries to citizens emerge as background
costs of living in our society. We recognize, for example, that
governments should not be required to install the most advanced
computers in every police precinct in order to eliminate the possibility of innocent human error which may lead to false arrest.
The significance of a pattern of injuries, as recognized at least
in part by the courts, is to take the case out of the category of
background costs: citizens may not have a constitutional right
to be wholly free of injury at the hands of the state, but their
claim is a different one when the responsible official fails to take
any action in the face of a pattern of abuses which could efficiently be reduced. '
A second factor contributing to this shift is the development
of modern procedures for multiparty litigation. 0 3 In particular,
the availability of class actions may lead people to begin looking
at government action not as it affects the individual alone, but
rather as it affects definable groups in the population.20 4 A third
force may be the availability of systemic relief itself. Although
it is difficult to isolate cause and effect, the willingness of courts
to grant systemic5 relief is critical to the recognition of real
20
systemic rights.
201 See pp. 1207-09 supra.
202 Under this logic, even a broad pattern of nonnegligent injuries might be

sufficient to support liability because it would suggest a need for some action by
responsible individuals to reduce the harms to citizens. Of course, to the extent
that reasonable measures to accomplish this goal are available and the responsible
officials have failed to take them, they might well be considered negligent. The
point of this approach, however, is not so much to single out any particular official
as "blameworthy" but rather to suggest those instances in which individuals have
a legitimate claim against the government on account of the system which it per-

petuates.

-

203 See Chayes, supra note 200, at 1289--90; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: x966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(pts. i & 2), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 591 (1967, 1968) ; Shapiro, Some Thoughts on
Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L. REV. 721
(1968); Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HAMv. L. REv.
1174 (1976).
204 See generally Developments in the Law -Class
Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1318, 1353-73 (1976).
201 See id. at 1327.
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While the issuance of broad structural relief in 1983 actions
is a relatively modern phenomenon, the concern for breakdowns
in state governmental systems is one that traces back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. It was not simply affirmative state action in
support of the activity and conduct of the Ku Klux Klan that
motivated the enactment of section 1983 in its original form but
also the specter of state systems unwilling or unable to act in the
face of massive violations of constitutional rights. 0 6 The Court's
suggestion in Rizzo v. Goode 207 that a finding of liability is inappropriate when supervisory officials do not affirmatively implement an unconstitutional policy, 0 8 however, has the potential to
undermine section 1983's effectiveness as a means of dealing with
systemic breakdowns. 0 9 Given the governmental immunity established by Monroe and City of Kenosha,21 0 system-wide injunctive relief, to be effective, must gnerally be directed at individuals
at a high level of the governmental organization. A requirement
of proof of deliberate and calculated infringement on the part of
these officials may well be difficult to meet. But it is hard to see
why this should matter. In the context of damage actions, proof
of the individual's blameworthiness is relevant because of a concern for the effectiveness and fairness of imposing on him an
" ' Where
obligation to pay damages to the plaintiff.21
the remedy
sought is injunctive relief to prevent future deprivations or to
undo the effects of past ones, however, the individual defendant
is essentially a representative of the system. The real issue in
such cases is the functioning of the system as a whole, not the
actions of any particular official. 12 Moreover, if personal fault
were considered determinative, the legislative history of section
1983 as well as the "deliberate indifference" standard established
in Estelle v. Gamble,21 1 which was decided after Rizzo, would
seem to support a finding that a responsible official who ignores
a pattern of injuries - even if only negligently inflicted and certainly if done intentionally - is himself fairly deemed "at fault."
Rizzo casts a further cloud on public law adjudication by its
pp. 1153-56 supra.
207423 U.S. 362 (1976), noted in The Supreme Court, r975 Term, go HaRv.
L. RaV. 56, 238 (1976).
20B 423 U.S. at 375-77.
209 See Note, supra note i65, at 532.
208 See

210 See pp. 1191-97 supra.
211 See pp. 1218-20 supra.

212 According to this view, Rizzo should be read not to suggest an unwillingness to treat violations on a systematic basis but rather as resting "on the perceived absence of a showing that the district court's order was directed at practices
that had caused violations in the first instance." Note, supra note 165, at 532.
223 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976).
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suggestion that the decree reversed in that case was an unwarranted interference by a federal court in the internal affairs of a
local government. 214 In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked the language of comity and federalism of the Younger
line of cases. 215 Younger itself, however, barred only the enjoining by a federal court of an ongoing state criminal prosecution.210
In O'Shea v. Littleton, 217 and several lower court cases, this bar
has been held to extend to any relief that would impose "an ongoing federal audit" 218 of state judicial proceedings. Thus, federal courts have declined to undertake a thorough reorganization of a state court system 219 or state prosecutorial decisions;220
to order the assignment of particular counsel to indigent defendants; 221 or to restructure the state system of imposing fines 222
or setting bail.22 3 Never before Rizzo, however, was the Younger
line invoked to bar relief that would have little or no impact on
the state's judicial processes, but only on its executive func22 4
tions.
It is one thing to recognize, as the Court in Rizzo did, that
any time a court seeks to intervene in the affairs of a coordinate
branch of government, problems of judicial competence are
raised; it is quite a different matter to hold that whenever the
other branch is a branch of the state government, the federal
court must utterly stay its hand. Rizzo did not go this far, but
to the extent that it set off down this road, it looms large as a
threat to the viability of major 1983 injunction actions.
While it is still too early to assess the actual impact of Rizzo
v. Goode on the public law model of section 1983, it is clear that
the validity of this new style of litigation under the statute must
be reevaluated. The questions raised by this examination are
concerned with the competence of the federal courts - as courts
214 See 423 U.S. at 379-80.

Id. See generally Part VI, pp. 1274-1330 infra.

21
2

'See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

211 414 U.S. 488 (I974).
21

2 Id. at 5oo.

21' See Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Administration v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d
1241 (ist Cir. 1973).
220 See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1975).

221 See Bedrosian v. Mintz, x58F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975).
221 Karr v. Blay, 413 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
223 See Wallace v. Kern, 52o F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
224 In the only case cited by Justice Rehnquist for this application, Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 6o5 (z974), the Court did
not reach the issue; it recognized that there were "delicate issues of federal-state
relationships," id. at 6z5, but also noted the "special regard of the Fourteenth
Amendment for federal protection of federal rights," id.
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and as instrumentalities of the federal government - to deal
with complex issues of organization, planning, and funding of
functions ordinarily performed by state governments, usually
through their executive branches. To give substance to this
analysis, it is useful to consider the questions involved in light of
two examples of major public law litigation brought under section 1983.

x. Paradigm Cases.Malcolm.

-

(a) Reforming the Prisons: Rhem v.

In this case,22 5 in 1971, inmates at the Manhattan

House of Detention for Men ("the Tombs"), a New York City
detention facility primarily housing pretrial detainees, brought
a section 1983 class action challenging the conditions under
which they were confined.226 Just before and just after the inception of the lawsuit there were disturbances at the facility, during
which prisoners protested both conditions at the Tombs and the
lengthy delays incurred before obtaining trial dates in the New
York City criminal courts. Considerable property damage resulted, giving rise to tightened security measures.2 7 Following
the disturbances, the Rhem plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain prison authorities from continuing to permit
the existence of allegedly unconstitutional conditions at the
Tombs.22 8
The district court denied a motion to dismiss the action, and,
without a hearing, granted in part plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 229 The court found that while overcrowding
and trial delay had "led to severe discomfort and distress among
the inmates" even prior to the disturbances, the disturbances
themselves had led to both tightened security and, through extensive property damage, the inability of the city to provide the
services which the inmates lacked.23
Because the conditions
were not "imposed, or . . . permitted to continue as standing
1 Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 68i (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (preliminary injunction); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (opinion after trial);
377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.) (memorandum and order), aff'd and remanded, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. '974) ; 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (opinion on remand);
356 F. Supp. i195 (S.D.N.Y.) (opinion on plaintiffs' motion for amended relief),
aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d io41 (2d Cir. 1975).
22" Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 658i, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
227 Id. at 683-88.
22
1 Id. Plaintiffs' complaint raised a general due process claim which rested on
the assertion that, as pretrial detainees, their confinement was permissible only under
the "least restrictive" conditions. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 6oo
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Their equal protection claim asserted that as a class, they were
confined under conditions of greater security and oppression than convicted felons
elsewhere
in the state. Id.
22 9
Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 68i (S.D.N.Y. 197i) (Mansfield, J.).
23 0
d.at 683-88.
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policy, by an indifferent, neglectful, or vengeful prison administration," and because prison officials were "making good faith
efforts" to improve them, the court could not find that conditions,
however unsatisfactory, had descended "to a level proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment." 231 A preliminary injunction was issued against interference with private consultation between inmates and their attorneys, 232 and defendants were ordered to
promulgate a complete set of prison rules to be made available to
all inmates after input from plaintiffs and court approval.3 3
The parties next conducted extensive negotiations, culminating in a consent decree concerning overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and medical care;2

34

a trial was held on several remain-

ing issues, including lock-ins, visiting conditions, noise, ventilation and heat problems, recreational activities, and correspondence. 235 During the trial, the court heard testimony from inmates and expert witnesses in penology and prison administration,
and toured the Tombs. 3 6 In a lengthy opinion detailing numerous factual findings and drawing extensively on the expert testimony, Judge Lasker found that conditions at the Tombs violated
the prisoners' due process rights; 237 as a result, the defendants
would be obligated to: (i) eliminate all vestiges of maximum
security not necessary for the safety of the prison or for assuring
inmate presence at trial; 238

(2)

introduce a program of contact

visitation; (3) provide for reasonable physical recreation; (4)
provide a tolerable living environment at the prison; (5) provide
adequate staffing; (6) grant additional procedural rights to prisoners in disciplinary proceedings; and (7) greatly reduce in2311Id.

232

Id.

at 639.
at 69o-9I. The court noted that neither mail censorship nor summary

discipline was claimed by defendants as "necessitated by the inmate disruptions";
it nonetheless upheld incoming mail inspection as a justified means to search for
contraband except in the case of letters from attorneys, which could not be
opened unless defendants provided another means for attorney-client consultation,
Id.
233 Id. at 6g"-92.
234 Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 597 (S.D.N.Y. x974). The city was
apparently motivated to settle by the fact that a liberal judge had been assigned
to the case and by the widespread publicity the case was receiving. See M. Hermann, Rhem v. Malcolm- A Case Study of Public Interest Litigation: Pretrial
Detention x7-ig (May 1977) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Harvard Law
School library).
233 Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 6oo-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
23 8
Id. at 597-98.
23 7
23

Id.at

622.

Id. at 624. In this regard, Judge Lasker noted that it was well within the

expertise of the defendants to develop a classification system separating those detainees needing maximum security from those who could be confined under less
restrictive conditions. Id.
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spection of incoming prisoner mail. 3 9 The court concluded by
instructing the parties to prepare
for a conference to determine
240
the contents of a final order.
Even prior to this opinion, there had been indications of less
than enthusiastic compliance by the city with the earlier consent
decree. The court had held several hearings on compliance, visited
the Tombs, and ordered the city to submit a compliance status
report, which was finally filed two months late.2 4 1 As conferences
on the final order commenced, the city proved no more cooperative. Plaintiffs proposed a judgment requiring the defendants
to "submit [within thirty days] a comprehensive and detailed
plan. for elimination of the [unconstitutional] conditions," and
requested immediate final judgment on the issues which required
little or no physical rearrangement at the Tombs, or expenditure
of funds.2 42 A month later, the city proposed a counterorder
which "failed to deal with the critical issues which required money
and planning." 243 The court then ordered the city to respond
to plaintiffs' proposals, including any reasons why it was unable
to conform to the court's opinion and any suggestions for alternatives. 4 The city responded with a memorandum which failed
to include a comprehensive plan, and requested additional time
to prepare one.245
Finally, the court entered an order setting forth specific
provisions with regard to prison discipline and inmate correspondence, scheduled further hearings, and ordered the city to
present a comprehensive plan for eliminating all unconstitutional conditions at the Tombs. 246 The city's much belated plan,
when filed, was deficient in several respects; moreover, the city
for the first time informed the court that it was "exploring the
possibility of closing" the Tombs, though no date was specified.24?
The city responded to further demands for specific plans with
a "shopping list" it had submitted to the City Bureau of the
Budget, indicating that funding had been approved for some improvements required by the consent decree, but not for several
of those covered in the court's opinion. 248 Though it decided to
continue operating the Tombs, the city declined to report on
,9
24 0

Id. at 625-35.
Id. at 637.
241 M. Hermann, supra note 234, at 21-23.
242 Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995, 997 (S.D.N.Y.
2 43
Id.
2 44
Id.
245

Id.

2 40

Id.

247
2 48

Id. at 997-98.
Id. at 998.

974).
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compliance, informing the court that the cost of improving physical facilities was "far in excess of what is available under the
City's present budget ....
The court responded by ordering the Tombs closed within
thirty days, its order subject to reconsideration should the city
submit a "comprehensive, detailed and specific plan" for the
prompt elimination of unconstitutional conditions.2 5 ° While the
court sympathized with the city's budgetary problems, it noted
that "the law does not permit any government to deprive its
citizens of constitutional rights on a plea of poverty .

. .

. [E]x-

penditures not required by the Constitution may not be given priority over those needed to remedy a deprivation of constitutional
rights." 251 The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Lasker's findings
on the merits,252 and ruled that on remand a decree
should be framed to close the prison to detainees or to limit its
use for detainees to certain narrow functions by a fixed date,
unless specified standards are met ....

Once the appropriate

standards or permissible limited uses are established, the court
can . . . determine whether there has been compliance by the
253
. . . deadline.

One week after the Second ,Circuit decision, the city decided
to close the Tombs and transfer the Rhem plaintiffs to the House
of Detention for Men on Riker's Island (Rikers). While the
city argued that this action rendered the lawsuit moot, the plaintiffs claimed to be entitled to the same relief granted earlier,
except 4on issues specifically related to the Tombs' physical
25
plant.
Judge Lasker, after visiting Rikers and holding extensive
hearings, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to continue their
action, but modified in some respects the specific relief granted in
the Tombs context to reflect different conditions unique to Rikers.25 5 Plaintiffs' motion for additional relief was denied; the court
249
25

Id. at 998, IOO3.

Id. at 999-IOoo.
251 Id. at 999.
.

Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336-39 (2d Cir. 1974).
253 Id. at 340. The court noted that in a situation, unlike this one, where a

252

"closing" alternative
order an expensive,
at 341 n.9 (citing
28-30 (1971); Goss

was not viable, a district court "might have no choice but to
burdensome or administratively inconvenient remedy." Id.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1o44, 1046 (6th Cir. 1973) (en

banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 171 (974)).
224 Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. '975).
25 Id. at 966-72. The court also declined to grant plaintiffs daily telephone

access, the right to meet counsel and receive personal visits in New York County,
and the right to be housed overnight in order to consult with counsel or appear
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ruled that the issues at Rikers raised questions more suitable to
a new plenary action than to a case on remand after a final
judgment. 56 The city then commenced an appeal from the relief that the court had ordered in its most recent Rhem decisions.25 7 And when Judge Lasker granted the plaintiffs' motion
in their new action, Benjamin v. Malcolm,2 58 for a preliminary
injunction extending Rlem's relief to all inmates at Rikers, that
order was also appealed. Both orders were affirmed by the Second
Circuit.25 9 The panel rejected the city's assertion that the district court action represented an unwarranted interference with
prison administration:
We are not unaware of the financial difficulties presently confronting the city defendants. But the need to bear this particular
financial burden hardly comes as a surprise to the penal authorities, who have been fighting losing battles in this litigation for

almost five years. More importantly, an individual's constituthe
ground that the city
tional rights may not be sacrificed on 26
0
has other and more pressing priorities.

By the time of the Second Circuit's final decision in Rhem v.
Malcolm,2 6' conditions in the New York City prison system were
again in a state of crisis. Other litigation had resulted in orders
aimed at unconstitutional conditions at the Brooklyn and Queens
detention facilities, with the practice of "double ceiling" detainees ruled impermissible; 262 at the same time, the city's fiscal
crisis had forced reduction in prison staff and the closing of
several other detention facilities. 263 Finally, the city moved in
in court, all of which would have placed the transferred inmates in a position
close to the status quo they enjoyed at the Tombs. Id. at 97o. The court
sympathized with the plaintiffs, but as this requested relief had never formed a
part of the original Tombs litigation, it felt itself barred from granting it. Id.
at 969-70; see Rhem v. Malcolm, 396 F. Supp. 195, 1196-1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(amended relief).
256 Rhem v. Malcolm, 396 F. Supp. 1195, 1203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
227 Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 396 F. Supp. "195
(S.D.N.Y. I975).

28 Benjamin v. Malcolm, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1975).
29 Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d io41 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
26
1 Id. at Io43-44 (citations omitted).
261 See id.
262 Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520

F.2d 392
Cir. 975) (Brooklyn and Queens detention facilities). When Judge Lasker
inco-porated Judge Judd's order prohibiting double celling into the Benjamin
(2d

litigation, see Benjamin v. Malcolm, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1975),

the city was unable to play "musical jails" by transferring detainees to facilities
not covered by court injunctions, since all its facilities were now under court
See M. Hermann, supra note 234, at 34-40.
orders.
26
3 M. Hermann, supra note 234, at 34-4o.
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Rhem for leave to reopen the Tombs, without being required to
comply with the consent decree of 1973 or Judge Lasker's
orders.2 64 Thus, at the close of six years of litigation in Rhem,

detention facilities remain largely in an unconstitutional condition.
(b) Desegregating the Schools: Morgan v. Kerrigan. 2 0 -In
1974, black students and parents filed a section 1983 class action
seeking desegregation of the Boston school system. 6 Judge W.
Arthur Garrity, after a lengthy trial, issued a detailed opinion
finding that Boston school officials had perpetuated a segregated
school system by their decisions in such matters as use of existing
school facilities and new construction, districting, school feeder
patterns, and assignment of faculty.26 7 While the district court
made the formulation of a comprehensive remedial plan the
responsibility of school authorities, subject to court approval, it
set forth general guidelines concerning the appropriate remedy 26 8
See id. at 39.
262 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D.Mass.), aff'd sub norn. Morgan
264

v. Kerrigan, 5o9 F.2d 58o (ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (975), enforced by 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 917; 530 F.2d 402; 530
F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), enforced by 409 F.
Supp. II41 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 54o F.2d 527
(ist2 Cir. 1976) (appointment of receiver).
61Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. i974). Prior to the
instigation of the federal lawsuit, the Boston school system had been the target
of desegregation efforts on the part of both Massachusetts educational authorities
and the federal government. Under the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37C-37D (West 2969); id. ch. 15, §§ 1-IX,
commanding affirmative action to achieve racial balance in public schools whether
the cause of imbalance was de jure or de facto, but limiting busing as a remedy
to situations where there is parental consent, the Massachusetts State Board of
Education had consistently attempted, with the use of the state courts, to force
the Boston School Committee to eliminate segregation in the city schools. See
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 417-20; School Comm. v. Board of Educ.,
363 Mass. 20, 292 N.E.2d 338; 363 Mass. 125, 292 N.E.2d 870; 364 Mass. 299,
302 N.E.2d 9x6 (i973). The state action, which was accompanied by persistent
intransigence by Boston school officials, 379 F. Supp. at 418-2o, resulted in the
promulgation of a desegregation plan which became "Phase I" of the eventual
federal court desegregation effort, see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 225
(D. Mass. 1975), but which did not moot the federal action because the obligations incurred by the Boston School Committee under state law were not
coterminous with those required under the Federal Constitution, See 379 F. Supp.
at 420; 401 F. Supp. at 224.
In addition, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2oood-2
(1970), the federal government secured a cutoff of substantial funding to the
Boston school system, which was found to have been marked by de jure segregation. See 379 F. Supp. at 420-21.
21 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 425-77 (D. Mass. 1974).
2 8
1 Id. at 482-84. The guidelines included the observation that the defendants
had an affirmative obligation to remedy the constitutional violations; that while
primary responsibility for remedy rested with the defendants, their actions were
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and ordered immediate compliance with a partial integration
plan ordered by the Massachusetts courts in an earlier suit
(Phase I).269 The court of appeals affirmed, noting that while
implementation of the required remedy would doubtless cause
trauma, a constructive solution ultimately "depends . . . upon
'the fruitful exercise of the responsibilities of those charged with
political official power.' " 270
Following the affirmance, the city defendants requested time
to promulgate an alternative plan to the one imposed by the state
courts, but were unable to submit one. 71 The district court's
attention turned to implementation of Phase I of the desegregation order, which was marred by violence and severe community
opposition at several schools. 2 In response, the court, with the
participation of the parties, established "racial-ethnic councils"
of students and parents to aid in calming the atmosphere; at one
particularly troublesome school, state and local police were
utilized to maintain order, and a monitoring program developed
by the United States Department of Justice placed volunteers in
the building to assist the effort.27 3 In the meantime, the court
held numerous hearings and issued additional guidelines for the
formulation of Phase II of the desegregation program, strongly
hinting that some busing might be required to achieve desegregation. 274 When the school committee voted 3-2 not to submit a
plan that its legal staff had already prepared, the staff filed the
plan on its own, and then resigned. 5 Plaintiffs moved to have
the majority on the committee held in contempt; in response to
court questioning, the officials indicated that they would obey
court orders but would take no other action except to ensure the
safety of students and to implement the state plan. 76 The court
held the officials in civil contempt; they purged themselves by
277
submitting a new plan which provided for no forced busing.
All parties were given an opportunity to comment on and suggest
alternatives to the proposals of the school officials and the
plaintiffs. 7 The court also received extensive input from local
to be judged by their effectiveness, and that even techniques, such as busing, personally offensive to defendants might well be required. Id. at 482.
269 Id. at 483.
270 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 598 (ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975)271 401 F. Supp. at
272 Id. at 224-25.

Id.
Id. at 225.
75
2 Id. at 226.
270 Id.
273
27 4

277

Id.
278 Id. at 226-27.

224.
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and state government officials, the teachers' union, and several
community groups, and groups representing Hispanic students
27 9
and white Boston homeowners were permitted to intervene.
Because of what it termed "the complexity and multiplicity
of the . . . plans and proposals filed," the court appointed a

panel of masters, along with several experts to assist them, to
hold evidentiary hearings and advise the court. 280 The masters'
desegregation plan, which was the subject of additional hearings
and comment, was finally adopted by the court, which rejected
the defendants' plan as "not promis[ing] realistically to desegregate the public schools." 281 The Phase II plan was a comprehensive one, -providing for, among other things, redistricting,
reassignment of students, busing, contracting with local colleges,
special educational programs, and hiring of additional supervisory
personnel. 282 Integral to the plan was the court's realization that
any effective remedy required not only numerical redistribution
of students, but the guarantee of an equal educational opportunity for all students, particularly those harmed by the effects
of past discrimination. 8 3 While primary reliance for the remedy
and a successful transition was placed on school personnel, the
court, with the support of most of the parties, established a
Citywide Coordinating Council to monitor compliance and advise
the school committee and court on continuing progress.284 In
addition, all parties consented to the establishment of District
Advisory Councils to provide for citizen participation and input.28 5 Over school committee objections that the plan repre-

sented an encroachment on the educational authority of local
officials, 28 6 the First Circuit affirmed, holding that while "[i]deally
. . . the school committee would be the favored source for a
plan," 287C"[the] overriding fact of the matter is that the district
court . . .has had to deal with an intransigent and obstructionist
School Committee . . .engaged in a pattern of resistance, defiance and delay. . . . [T]his crucial fact justifies . . . a num-

ber of extraordinary measures which might otherwise be open
to question." 288 The plan went into operation beginning with
the 1975-1976 school year.
27

9I.

2 80

Id. at

281 Id. at
282 Id. at
283 Id. at
284 Id. at
285 Id. at

227.
228-29.
250-70.
231-35.
234-35, 248-49.
248-49.

286 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 427 (ist Cir. 1976).
217 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 523 F.2d 917, 922 (ist Cir. 1975).

281 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 53o F.2d 401, 427 (ist Cir. 1976).
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In November 1975, plaintiffs petitioned the district court to
close South Boston High School, a scene of much trouble during
Phase I1,289 on the grounds that black students there were being
denied their right to peaceful, integrated, nondiscriminatory
education.290 After hearing extensive testimony and visiting the
high school,291 Judge Garrity ordered that the high school be
placed under a federal court receivership and appointed the local
district superintendent as receiver 292 So that the "interventions
would least interfere with the normal operations of the school." 293
Restating the now traditional "public law" wisdom that once
a constitutional violation is found, the federal court's equitable
poviers are broad, the First Circuit, with words of caution, approved Judge Garrity's most intrusive step into local school operation. 294 The court reasoned that if the school committee had
evinced a willingness to cooperate, either a voluntary approach
or resort to contempt proceedings or additional injunctive relief
might well have been viable alternatives, but because of the committee's "resistance and subterfuge," the district court had no
real choice.29
This litigation is clearly not over. Though conditions in South
Boston are better now than they have been since suit was brought,
Judge Garrity is still actively involved in the Boston school
system, and the likelihood of further confrontations is far from
2 96
remote.
289 Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 529 (ist Cir. 1976), aff'g Morgan v.

Kerrigan, 4o9 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975). See p. 1237 supra.
2 Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 529 (ist Cir. 1976).
291 409 F. Supp. at 1142-47.
292 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 141 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 530-33 (ist Cir. 1976). The receiver was
later changed. 540 F.2d at 529.
293 409 F. Supp. at 11S1. Some teaching staff and the headmaster of the school
were ordered transferred. Id. at ir5O-Si. The court found that all administrative
personnel at the school were white; that student handbooks -mailed
to all
parents and students -praised the most prominent Boston antibusing organization and ignored the presence of black students altogether; that black students
had been intimidated, subjected to racial epithets, and then disciplined for acting
in self-defense; that the white students consistently chanted, "2, 4, 6, 8, assassinate
the nigger apes," requested that music be played continually over the school's
public address system to "soothe the savage beasts," and were not subject to any
form of discipline. See id. at 1143-48; Morgan v. McDonough, 54o F.2d 527,
530-32 (ist Cir. 1976).
294 Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533-35 (ist Cir. 1976). See generally
Roberts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South
Boston High School, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 55 (976).
291 Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533-34 (ist Cir. 1976).
296 More recently, Judge Garrity issued several orders concerning Phase III
of the desegregation effort which included provisions for the busing of some
kindergarten students; some additional busing of other students; and a blueprint
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2. The Legitimacy of Systemic Relief. - The preceding cases
suggest the substantial problems involved in judicial attempts
to reform and reorder major governmental programs and institutions. The existence of such difficulties gives rise to the need for
careful evaluation of the competency of the judiciary to undertake these tasks. Before doing so, however, it is important to
distinguish the problems which legitimately implicate concerns
for the competency and legitimacy of judicial action from those
with which they are easily confused but which do not call into
question the role of the courts.
First, there is the question of the constitutional norm itselfthe question of when the state has violated an individual's right.
The Bill of Rights is an antimajoritarian creed, imposing limits
on what the majority, through its elected representatives, leaders,
and officials, may do to any individual."' That certain judicially
imposed limits on the popular will 'provoke popular outbursts of
indignation should not be surprising; indeed, it is the recognition
of this attitude that supports entrusting to a body largely isolated
from majoritarian pressures - the judiciary - the role of interpreting the mandates of the Constitution."' One might agree or
disagree with judicial pronouncements as to the scope of constitutional rights, but our tradition leaves no room for the argunorms is not the
ment that the articulation of constitutional
20
appropriate province of the judiciary.
Second, there is the related question of change. Attempts to
reform major institutions or programs - whether inspired by
judicial order or otherwise 80°- may create controversies and
for ending federal court involvement in the Boston schools, under which a
"Permanent Department of Implementation" would "assume responsibility for all
aspects of the court's desegregation plan . . . and the authority to carry it out."
Boston Globe, May 9, x977, at i, col. 5. In issuing the orders, Judge Garrity noted
that "the court must be mindful . . . that the present School Committee, . . .
like its predecessor committees . . . refuses to assume its constitutional obligation
to act affirmatively to implement and sustain desegregated education in the city
of Boston." Id. at I, col. 3. The court also recently denied a request to lift the
federal receivership of South Boston High School, but specified several conditions
which, if met by the Boston School Committee, could lead to the end of federal
court control of the school. Boston Globe, May 10, 1977, at 7, col. r. The School

Committee has indicated that it will appeal at least that part of the Phase III
order97establishing the implementation department. Id.
. See generally A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT si AMERICAN
GOVERNME T 31-56 (z976).
298See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, go HARv. L. REv. X,05, 1127-28

(1977).
29

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 7o4-o5 (974); Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (i8o3).

100Indeed, any efforts to reform existing institutions or to introduce new
social programs, whether by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of gov-
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tensions as those attached to the status quo are forced to readjust
to a new order. And the fact that change is judicially ordered
suggests that at least to some extent, it is in opposition to the
popular or governing will, which in turn may enhance opposition 0 1 The finding of a constitutional violation, however, renders
inapposite any argument that change should not be favored and
that a positive normative value should attach to the status quo.
The real issue, then, is not whether desegregation of the Boston
schools or improvement of the Tombs in New York is a proper
goal; rather, it is whether the judiciary can and should direct
school desegregation or prison improvement. If the answer is
yes, then standards and procedures must be developed which can
guide their efforts; if it is no, then we face the untenable prospect
of rights for which there are no remedies.
The question whether courts can shape relief in public law
cases involves, initially, a question of expertise. 2 While constitutional adjudication in public law litigation never mandates
the establishment of ideal prison or school systems, it does require- if the case is to be considered justiciable 30 3 -that the
courts set minimal standards for government action in these and
other areas with which judges may well be unfamiliar. °4 The
lack of personal expertise, however, need not prove an insuperable
obstacle. In many areas, minimal standards passing constitutional
muster will have already been set by the state legislature, 30 5 thus
eminent, is bound to be attended by serious implementation problems, with the
goal achieved likely to fall short of the aspirations and expectations of those programs instituting the change. See generally J. PRESSMAN & A. WiW-AVSY, ImPLEMENTATION 73-74, 87-91, 107-09 (1973). Thus criticism of public law litigation
solely on grounds that the ultimate goals reflected in the decrees are not fully
realized is overdrawn.
'o' See generally Neuborne, supra note 298, at 1128.
302 See D. HORoWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOcIAL POLICY 17-19 (1977).
'03 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86 (1962).
304For example, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373; 344 F. Supp. 3&7
(M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub
rom.Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the district court was required to formulate minimum
"medical and Constitutional" standards of treatments for civilly committed mental
patients. 334 F. Supp. at 376; see Case Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAv.

L. REV.

1282

(1973).

305 In Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285 (976), for example, the Supreme Court,
in holding that prisoners have a right to treatment for serious medical needs,
relied on legislation in several states recognizing the states' obligation to provide
medical care. See id. at 290-91 & n.8. Moreover, even absent explicit and detailed
legislative standards, legislation may reflect implicit policy choices from which
courts can receive guidance in formulating manageable standards. See, e.g., Rodway
v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 8o9 (D.C. Cir. i975).
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providing the courts with the requisite manageable standards
for relief. Even where they have not, numerous competencyenhancing techniques exist which can provide the judge with
enough information to arrive at adequate standards upon which
to base a decree.30 6 For example, Judge Lasker in Rhem visited
the Tombs personally 30 and relied heavily on the testimony of
experts in penology; 308 Judge Garrity in Morgan sought input
not only from educational experts but also from interested groups
in the community as well as the parties themselves.30 9 Expanded
discovery procedures facilitate the education of judges, and
masters may be employed, as they were in Morgan, to work out
details of complex remedial orders.3 0 Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of an area in which an inventive judge would be unable
to draw on some existing reservoir of knowledge and experience
in order to develop meaningful parameters for relief.311
A far more troublesome aspect of the justiciability question
is whether, even given the existence of manageable standards, a
court should act -whether a particular societal problem can be
attacked only through legislative or executive processes. The
question has on occasion been answered in a relatively simplistic
fashion by a finding that a specific function is explicitly comSee Chayes, supra note 200, at 1299-1301; Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338
30

(1975) ; PP. 1231-39 supra.
307 See Rhem v. Malcolm,

371 F. Supp. 594, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y.

1974);

P.

1232

supra

F. Supp. at 622.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 4o F. Supp. 216, 226-27 (D. Mass. 1975); PP.
1237-38 supra.
30See Draft Report of the Masters, Morgan v. Kerrigan, Civ. No. 72-91-G
(D. Mass. March 21, 1975); Chayes, supra note 2oo, at 23oo-o & n.87.
311 See Case Comment, supra note 304, at X296-97. Even absent legislative
30371
309

standards to guide judicial formulation of relief, generalized minimum standards
can often be derived sufficient to provide some relief for aggrieved citizens without
requiring the courts to make complex technique judgments. For example, in
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. x969), rev'd, 437 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 197), aff'd en banc, 463 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 2972) black
citizens of a small Mississippi town brought a § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services as manifested
in the substantial disparity between services provided in predominantly white
and black areas of town. The district court had dismissed the action, largely on
grounds that formulating relief would require judicial determination of standards
for municipal services and financing - questions more properly left to local government decisionmakers. See 303 F. Supp. at 1167-69. Reversing, the Fifth Circuit
noted that while no statutory standards or regulations existed that defined what
level of services a town like Shaw should provide, "the quality and quantity
of . . . services provided in the white areas of town" presented "a most reliable
yardstick" for the court to use in establishing standards for relief. 437 F.2d at
1292.
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mitted to the legislature or executive. In prisoners' rights cases,
for example, federal courts for many years refused to intervene
at all in state prison operation, finding that the state legislature
had delegated complete authority in that area to the discretion
of the executive, and fearing that any intervention would impair
the objectives of prison administration."1 2 And in Gilligan v.
Morgan, the Supreme Court overturned a lower court's attempt
to issue guidelines to the state of Ohio for the training and
discipline of its National Guard, holding that "[t]he relief sought
. . . would . . . embrace critical areas of responsibility vested

by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches
of Government." 313

Yet as the Court itself recognized in Gilligan, recent holdings
in voting rights and prisoners' rights cases have demonstrated
that a reflex application of "explicit commitment" doctrine may
not be justified.314 To be sure, there are a number of factors
which may render courts less desirable than other forums for
the resolution of certain social problems.315 The most readily identifiable of such factors is that, unlike the courts, legislators and
some executive officials are directly politically accountable to the
electorate; they are therefore the institutions our democratic
system of government grants the responsibility to determine the
content and nature of government programs to address societal
problems.310 A second set of factors stems from the fact that
the proper remedy for systemic flaws is often bound up with
social science issues that courts can grasp only with some difficulty. 317 Legal facts - the facts with which courts are most
accustomed to dealing - are immutable; they concern events
that have already transpired. Social facts, on the other hand,
represent patterns of behavior and render fluid the situations out
"'2 See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Hatfield v.
Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (pth Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (196i). See generally
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79
YALE L.J. 94i, 941 & n.3 (1970); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 5o6
(z963). More recently, of course, changing attitude towards the rights of prisoners
has resulted in substantial judicial scrutiny of prison conditions and procedures.
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S.
539 (1974).
213 413 U.S. 1, 7 (973).
.14 Id. at ii; see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. x86 (1962). See generally Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
31I See generally A. Cox, supra note 297, at 99-118.
310 See D. HoRowITz, supra note 302, at 274-84.
31

7Id.

at 276.
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of which they arise. The extent to which courts should take
cognizance of social science evidence is far from clear; often,
even when a court wishes to use such evidence in structuring
detailed relief, it is not available in sufficiently reliable form.
"These general problems indicate that the fit between law and
social science is not a comfortable one, and will not be for some
time. . .

Rarely does there seem to be a good mesh."

818

Finally, the ability of a court even to attempt to reform a major
societal system is dependent on what cases are brought before
it; courts find it difficult to judge how representative an individual
case may be, and it may often be the most egregious case that is
deliberately made the subject of litigation:
No doubt there is something to be said, in terms of building
public support, for making law from egregious cases. Controversial, innovative decisions are more easily justified when
they spring from extreme circumstances. On the other hand,
general law made from exceptional cases is not likely to be
accorded much legitimacy by the knowledgeable bureaucrats
and specialists who sense that the court was misled by unrepresentative cases. 319
These arguments are all bottomed on the principle of separation of powers. But the doctrine of separation of powers has a
reverse side as well, and that is the doctrine of checks and
balances. It is certainly preferable to have the jails of New
York run by New York City and its Department of Corrections
and to have the schools of Boston controlled by the city of Boston
and its school committee. But it remains the role of the courts
to ensure that constitutional rights are not violated in the process.
Where they are, the deference normally accorded the operations
of the legislative and executive branch no longer is justified, and
the court's function in a system of separated powers may require it to act affirmatively as a check on the responsible branches.
To quote Judge Tuttle in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, the principle
of separation of powers "assumes that we have a system of
checks and balances . . . . Utilizing the power vested in this
court to check an abuse of state . . . power is, in effect, con-

sistent with the principle." 320
Of course, the judiciary should not ignore the politically responsible parties or lose sight of its own limitations. Efforts
should be made, through class certification procedures 3 21 and
a18 Id. at 267.
219 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d I286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971).
320 id.
321 See

Developments in the Law - ClassActions, supra note 204, at

1471-94.
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sample notice, 22 as well as through liberal grants of intervention,323 amici briefs, open hearings, citizen committees, and the
like, to counteract any inherent tendency in the judicial process
to yield a limited picture of a broad social problem. Similarly,
the participation of the responsible political officials, no matter
how culpable in the past, is critical both to the formulation of a
reasonable and workable plan and to its implementation. The
role of the judge in such cases, as Professor Chayes has pointed
out, will often be to mediate between the parties as well as to
direct their negotiations. 324
To the extent that the determination of relief results from
negotiations not only among the court, the defendant, and representative plaintiffs and their lawyers, but also among other interested and expert parties in the community, the process begins more and more to resemble the mutual interest accommodation which characterizes decisionmaking in the political arena.325
There is one crucial difference, however: the fact of a finding of
a constitutional violation, bringing with it judicially determined
minimal standards and the threat of a judicially imposed decree,
greatly enhances the bargaining position of precisely those interests which were unsuccessful in influencing legislative or executive action in the first instance. That this difference is a product of the involvement of the judiciary may be seen as a novel
yet wholly consistent application of Justice Stone's suggestion in
the famous Carolene Products footnote that the judiciary should
play a special role in protecting "discrete and insular minorities"
who because of prejudice may be left unprotected by the political
26
3

process.

Nonetheless, the need to transplant the political process into
the judicial forum may be seen as evidence that the task of effecting change in societal institutions is one that should not be entrusted to the judiciary. Certainly, the formulation of relief will
often take the court out of the role of the objective and neutral
arbiter, and will involve choices which are neither specifically compelled by the finding of a violation nor controlled by any abstract
logic. But this does not distinguish decisions on relief from other
conclusions readily seen as "judicial" - conclusions as to the
constitutionality of statutes and actions which necessarily involve
the courts in value choices as to what is good or bad or right or
222
123

M. Hermann, supra note
See Note, supra note 203.
See

234,

See Chayes, supra note zoo, at

at 75-77.

1298-1301.
See C. LINDBLOm, THE INTELLIGENCE or DEmOCRACY 3-17 (I965).
2 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 3o4 U.S. 144, 52 n4 (1938).
24
2

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1246

wrong."

7

[Vol. 90:1133

While the process of reaching those decisions in pub-

lic law adjudication may look different -

as it should

-

this

difference in form should not obscure the fact that the court is
engaging in one of its most traditional functions: the enforcement of constitutional rights. And that the enforcement may include as one component judicially imposed negotiations between
the adversary parties can hardly be considered truly extraordinary in a system which places as much value and as much confidence in process itself as ours does.32 8
A final question of the legitimacy of systemic relief deals with
its -pure federalism aspects: the fact that public law adjudication
frequently gives rise to reforms of state and local governmental
institutions at the direction and under the supervision of an arm
of the federal government -the federal courts. To speak of the
concept of "federalism" as an absolute limit on the permissible
scope of the section 1983 action, as perhaps intimated by the
Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Goode,329 is to ignore the critical impact of the passage of the fourteenth amendment, which section
1983 seeks to implement. 30 While concerns of federalism may
dictate some deference by federal institutions to state decisions
and processes, states and localities are limited in the exercise of
their powers by the dictates of the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself emphasized last Term in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer:331

The substantive provisions [of the fourteenth amendment] are
by express terms directed at the states. Impressed upon them
by those provisions are duties with respect to their treatment
of private individuals. Standing behind the imperative is Congress' power to "enforce" them "by appropriate legislation."
[I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitation which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power.
33 2
Her rights do not reach to that extent.

And it was to the federal courts that the Reconstruction Congress
entrusted the responsibility to enforce the guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.3 33 Thus, once a constitutional right is identified, the federal system as adjusted by the fourteenth amendment
recognizes a legitimate restriction on state and local authority
321

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); A. Cox, supra note

297,

at

50-55, 111-5l.

"' See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, io HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269
('975).
329 423 U.S. 362, 377-0 (1976). See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra
note 90, at 238-47.
3'o See p. 1155 supra.
231 427 U-S. 445 (1976).
332Id. at 2670-71 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339, 346 (I88o)).
133 See pp. 1147-53 supra.
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and the federal courts are empowered to enforce that restriction
under traditional equity powers.
This is not to say that federalism concerns have no place in
section 1983 adjudication. The expansion of the scope of rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment and the shift in the 1983
action from an individualized dispute between the citizen and
public officials to an action often designed to reform wide-ranging governmental institutions creates a potential for federal judicial involvement in state and local affairs to an extent unknown
in 1871. But this potential should not be considered as a bar to
any relief; rather, it is an element which must be considered by
the courts in exercising equitable powers to determine the most
appropriate form of relief.
"The essence of the equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustments and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims. . .

."

The task [of the courts]

is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution. 334
Properly understood, then, considerations of federalism- which
include both respect for the autonomy of state and local governmental units and a recognition that the Constitution places affirmative limits on the manner in which such units implement policy
choices - should analytically be subsumed in the principles of
equity which must underlie the grant of systemic relief in section
1983 actions.

3. An Incremental Approach to Systemic Relief.-If the
courts can and should act in the face of systemic violations of
constitutional rights, the question remains what standards or
procedures should guide their remedial action. While "the controlling principle consistently expounded . . .is that the scope

of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation," 335 equity leaves the courts with broad flexibility to shape appropriate relief. It is, of course, impossible to
lay down with any degree of specificity a set of general rules to
govern every section 1983 public law action; as the Supreme
Court has recognized, principles of equity require that each case
of a constitutional violation be remedied only after a particulara31 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
see Chayes, supra note 200, at

402

U.S.

i, 15-I6

(i971);

1292-96.

a31Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (i974); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, x6 (,97).
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istic examination of all the factors relevant to that case. But it
may be possible to lay down a set of generally accepted procedures to structure affirmative relief, and to identify the concerns that each court must bear in mind in framing such relief.
Concerns of judicial competency and federalism suggest
that the procedures employed in framing relief ought to allow
for the maximum input and control by responsible government
officials. From the point of view of competency, these are the
individuals most likely to enjoy expertise in precisely those areas
where the court is lacking: knowledge of detailed local circumstances, financial constraints, and the political realities of the
locality. As a result, their participation may be critical to the
development of a workable remedy - and one they are willing
to implement. Their input and control are equally significant in
federalism terms: to the extent that local officials assume the
predominant role in shaping relief (which must, of course, be approved by the courts), the primary responsibility for the direction
of governmental operations is maintained in the individuals to
whom it was entrusted by the political process.
These advantages have not been lost on the courts; in each
of the cases described earlier, the court sought a proposed plan
from the defendant officials before being forced to consider
shaping one of it own over their objections. Absent clear proof
of an intention of noncompliance by the defendants, it would
seem that initial restraint is always the appropriate course for
the federal court, with the judge adopting a more activist role which may expose him to charges based on competency and interference - only incrementally, in the face of default by government officials.
The court's first step should be to issue a form of declaratory judgment, placing the defendants on notice of the
constitutional violation and retaining jurisdiction to determine
whether the defendants have remedied the violations on their
own initiative. In cases where a declaration of rights would not
serve adequately to protect the plaintiffs, the court should issue
a simple, prohibitory decree to prevent continuing injury while
still relying on the defendants to initiate corrective measures.
In the face of recalcitrance by governmental officials to such
first-level declaratory or injunctive action, the proper next step
is for the court to frame a decree requiring the government defendant to submit to the court, for approval and review, a plan
for remedial action which will either demonstrate that continuing
jurisdiction is not required or permit it to embody the proposal in
an affirmative mandatory injunction. While the local officials
are now under external judicial compulsion to exercise their
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policy formulation and implementation powers, they retain, within constitutional limits, their discretion in doing so. The compulsion involved, it would seem, is the minimum required by the
fourteenth amendment.
In passing on the acceptability of such a plan (or in seeking
to draw up a plan of its own following the submission of an unsatisfactory one), the court may properly seek to secure additional input both from representatives of the 'plaintiff class and
from others who will either be affected by a decree or who possess
special expertise which may be valuable to the court. Courts
should, however, still give credence to the policy judgments of
local officials; it is not necessary that a remedial effort secure the
ideal operation of the governmental institution or program in
question; all that is required is compliance with minimum constitutional standards.
Should the remedial plan proffered by the defendants fail
even after reasonable opportunities to amend - to provide a
realistic chance of remedying the violations identified by the
court, the obligation will fall upon the judge to develop a decree.
His first step in this effort should be to call together the parties to
the litigation for decree negotiation. As Professor Chayes has
noted, the judge may participate actively in such negotiations,
channeling the discussions of the parties in order to ensure that
any decree that emerges will both meet constitutional minimal
standards and respect, to the greatest extent possible, the judgments and autonomy of the local government unit.336 If these
negotiations prove fruitless, or if the defendants demonstrate
continued unwillingness to participate reasonably in the process,
the judge will be required to formulate a decree on his own initiative. Depending upon the amount of evidence already available
and the complexity of the case, the court may choose to design
the relief itself or to employ special masters to conduct further
hearings and recommend a remedy. In any hearings conducted,
evidence may be taken not only from the parties, but also from
other concerned governmental agencies, affected citizens, and experts in the field.33 7 But again, proper respect for the local governmental unit and, perhaps more important at this point, the
recognition that implementation will ultimately lie in its hands,
suggests that the court take account of the suggestions and objections of the defendants with respect to any proposed plan.
The imposition of affirmative injunctive relief inevitably involves an intrusion upon the operations of local government
units - an intrusion that is required by the fourteenth amend" See Chayes, supra note 2oo, at 1307-16.
"a See pp. 1236-39 supra.
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ment. The incremental steps outlined above seek to minimize
this intrusion, not by reducing the standards for a constitutionally
acceptable system but rather by placing greatest reliance on the
defendant officials to bring their own system into compliance.
Even a judge who scrupulously follows these steps, however,
may find himself, like Judge Garrity or Judge Lasker, in a position where he must fight the defendants at each stage and where
his legitimacy and effectiveness may appear to be in some jeopardy. But that should not be taken to mean that systemic relief is
inappropriate in such cases. To be sure, the opposition of political leaders and of the community may in reality place limits on
how far the courts can go and how much they can accomplish;
this is true, however, not only in the imposition of relief but also
in the initial interpretation and declaration of constitutional
rights. Ultimately, though, the resistance of the local government unit must be taken as evidence not of a case in which federal court intervention is inappropriate, but rather as one in which
enforcement by the federal courts of the dictates of the fourteenth
amendment against government units is most essential. Such
cases provide not the exception to federal jurisdiction, but the
most basic reason for it.
IV. PullmanABSTENTION
Pullman abstention takes its name from the I941 Supreme
Court decision in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,' where
Justice Frankfurter first clearly articulated the equitable doctrine
that federal courts should decline to exercise their jurisdiction in
cases containing unsettled issues of state law that could moot or
alter the federal constitutional claim. Pullman itself involved
an attack on an order of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring Pullman conductors to be continuously present in all sleeping
cars.2 As was "well known," all Pullman conductors at that time
were white while all Pullman porters were black; prior to the
regulation, the black porters supervised sleeping cars where local
passenger traffic was slight.' The order was challenged as unauthorized by state law and as violative of the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process, as well as of the
commerce clause. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous
Court, acknowledged that the three-judge court convened to
decide the case included "an able and experienced circuit judge
of the circuit which includes Texas" and "two capable district
1312

U.S. 496 (1941).

2Id. at 497-98.
3Id. at 497.
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judges trained in Texas law."' Nonetheless, he rejected their
conclusion that the order was beyond the authority of the Commission under state law, holding instead that the court should
retain jurisdiction until the parties had had an opportunity to
obtain a decision on this question of state law from the state
court.5 According to the Court, "[t]he resources of equity are
equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative
decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication." 6
In the years following Pullman, the Supreme Court has repeatedly -

if inconsistently

-

invoked the abstention doctrine

to foreclose federal court jurisdiction to decide unsettled issues
of state law properly before them. In the process, the costs of
abstention have emerged fairly clearly; the contours of the
doctrine, however, generally have not.
Ostensibly, abstention in constitutional cases results only in
the postponement of the federal court's decision until after state
resolution of the uncertain issues of its own law.' Under the
procedure announced in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners,' plaintiffs, by filing a formal reservation,
may preserve their federal forum for any federal question not
voluntarily litigated in state court.9 State court adjudication of
the state law issues, however, may itself be a time-consuming
and costly process. As a result, litigants temporarily foreclosed
from federal court by the abstention doctrine may well waive
their right to return by submitting all questions to the state
court in order to avoid a subsequent round of litigation. ° Where
they do not, the delay in the final resolution of the suit and the
costs of piecemeal litigation represent a substantial burden both
for the parties and for the judicial system." In either case,
*Id.at 499.
5Id. at 501-02.

61d.at 500.
' Of course, abstention may result in avoiding a federal decision altogether if
the state court invalidates the challenged action on state law grounds.
8375 U.S. 411 (1964).
' Id. at 421-22. The federal court ordinarily should prefer retention of jurisdiction after abstaining to dismissal, see American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey
Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467 (1973), although dismissal may be proper if the
state court would otherwise refuse to issue a declaratory judgment, see Harris
County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 & n. 14 (1975).
' This was the course followed after abstention in Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167 (1959). The NAACP subsequently obtained direct review of the constitutionality of the state statutes in question. NAACP v. Button, 37! U.S. 41S
(z963). See also Fisher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 484 F.2d io99 (ioth Cir. 1973).
" It is not uncommon for abstention to entail delays of several years before
the case is finally decided on the merits, see, e.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (i95I) (seven years); England v. Louisiana State Bd.
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though, abstention serves at least to burden, if not to eliminate,
the plaintiff's legitimate choice of a federal forum to adjudicate
his claims. And it does so without any guarantee that the highest
court of the state will ever hear the suit and rule authoritatively
on the disputed state law issues.12
Traditionally, two policies have been relied on to justify
abstention in constitutional cases: that of avoiding federal constitutional questions where other grounds of decision may be
available, 3 and that of avoiding the intrusiveness and disruption
of erroneous constructions of state law.' 4 The former policy
requires a federal court to resolve all state law claims raised by
a litigant which might dispose of or alter his federal constitutional claim prior to addressing that claim." Abstention becomes
an issue where the state law question is unclear, and there is a
danger that the federal court will reach a conclusion different
from that which the highest state court would reach. To do so,
according to traditional thinking, would involve wasted judicial
resources, unnecessary intrusion upon state activities, and the
possibility of an unnecessary holding on the merits of the federal
constitutional claim.' 6
Whatever the wisdom of these policies, it is at least clear that
they have not served to confine the doctrine within any welldefined limits. The desire to avoid both constitutional questions
and erroneous constructions of state law raises the abstention
issue in a broad range of cases, while the criterion of clarity of
state law - which then serves as the primary basis for determining the appropriateness of abstention - is itself sufficiently
ambiguous to be open to substantial manipulation. 7 Although
of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (x966) (six years), or is disposed of inconclusively, see United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 38! U.S. 413 (1965) (dismissed as moot eight years after abstention ordered).
"' See Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 59o, 604-o
(1977).
13

See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,

312

U.S. 496, 498 (1941); Lake

Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 51o-Ix (1972); Field, Abstention in

Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
L. REv.
1071, 1o96-ioxo
4

122

U. PA.

(1974).

1 See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 50o (1941);
Field, supra note 13, at xo93-96; Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice
Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 8o HAv. L. Rav. 6o4, 617-19 (1967).
"See Siler v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (I99). It is, of
course, firmly settled that federal courts have jurisdiction to decide such state
law matters. See id. at 191; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 7x5, 725
(1966).
'6 See notes 13 & 14 supra.
Compare Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (970)

(abstention

proper because "conceivable" that the statute "might be judicially confined to a
more narrow ambit") (emphasis added), and Harrison v. NAACP, 36o U.S. x67,
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that abstention is only
justified in "narrowly limited special circumstances" 18 where the
need to avoid constitutional decisions on erroneous constructions
of state law is most pressing, its practice has often belied such
rhetoric: its decisions, as well as the positions taken by individual
Justices, often seem to be explainable only in terms wholly unrelated to the traditional policies of the doctrine. 9 Indeed, the
costs of even a "legitimate" abstention, coupled with the doctrine's
realized potential as an illegitimate device to foreclose and delay,
have led many commentators to argue that Pullman abstention
should be abandoned altogether,2" or confined to instances where
the"state has made procedures available for certifying such unsettled questions to its highest court.2 But the doctrine continues
177 (1959)

(abstention ordered where Court could not "agree that the terms of

these three statutes leave no reasonable room for a construction ... which
might avoid" or alter the constitutional question) (emphasis added), with Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965) (abstention inappropriate "ilf
the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is
not fairly subject to an interpretation" avoiding or modifying a federal constitutional question) (emphasis added).
1 See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972);
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
1" See Field, supra note X2, at 602 & n.52 (suggesting that delay is "sometimes
the aim of the abstention procedure, and the desirability of obtaining a clarifying
state decision simply the excuse for the delay," and depicting the shifts in positions
of individual Justices according to the underlying issues at stake).
20
See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
426 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Pt. 2), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 268, 317 (1969). It has sometimes
been suggested that some or all civil rights cases be exempted from the abstention doctrine, see Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 216, 230 (1948) (abstention inadvisable in suits
brought under a civil rights act); ALI, STUDY or THE DrvnsioN op JUISCTIoN
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 297-98 (I968) (abstention improper in
cases alleging denial of voting rights or of equal protection of the laws where
denial is on "basis of race, creed, color, or national origin"), despite the frequently
observed fact that Pullman itself was a civil rights case, see P. BATOR, P. MisHIN,
D. SAPIo & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WEcHsLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 991 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
11 See Field, supra note 12, at 6o5-o9. Numerous states have adopted legislation permitting the highest court to receive and answer questions certified to it by
federal appellate courts, see, e.g., CoLo. Ap. R. 21.1; FLA. STAT. § 25,031 (1946);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 602-636 (1965), and it has been suggested that Congress could
require states to entertain certified questions, see Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE
L.J. 287, 214 (1957), or that federal courts might compel certification, even without congressional authorization, see Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal
Court, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358, 1359-60 (196o). Because certification reduces the
time and expense accompanying abstention, it has generally been well received
by commentators. See, e.g., Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism:
The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-9o (196o); ALI,
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to survive despite such arguments, and closer examination of its
underlying theoretical bases becomes necessary both as a guide
to where its invocation may be supportable - if expensive and as a source of insight into the underlying concerns for federalstate relations which must serve as the ultimate justification for
its continued vitality.
A. The Threshold for Considering Abstention:
The Need to Decide an UnclearQuestion of State Law
The issue of the appropriateness of Pullman abstention arises
in two paradigmatic types of cases: those in which the federal
and state claims are interdependent, in the sense that resolution
of the state law issue is integrally related to the constitutional
claim itself, and those in which the two claims are wholly independent and separable. The first paradigm includes both cases
challenging the application of a statute itself 2 and those challenging actions by executive or administrative bodies purportedly
taken under statutory authorization.23 In the case of the former,
the state law issue which may be unclear is the meaning of the
statute, and the constitutional question of its validity may be
avoided or altered by its construction; in the case of the latter,
the issue of state law relates to whether the statute authorizes
the challenged action, and a holding that it does not will moot
the constitutional claim. In both these instances, the policy
against unnecessary or premature constitutional decisions dictates
that the state law issue first be settled; indeed, in the former, it
is not even necessary to invoke this policy, since some resolution
of the statute's meaning is necessary to any decision on its constitutionality. The policy of avoiding constitutional decisions,
however, does more than establish the proper order of adjudication; if one accepts the wisdom of the rule at all, it also mandates
that the initial decision construing the meaning or authority of
the state statute be made in light of the potential constitutional
problems to be raised by adopting one or more of the possible
constructions. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that where
the federal court abstains, the state court must be made aware
of the nature of the constitutional challenge which might then
inform the construction adopted.2 4 Certainly, it would make little
sense to abstain on an issue of state law in order to avoid an
supra note 20, at 292--96 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1371(e)). But see Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the
Federal Courts, 23 U. MiaM L. Rav. 7,7 (1969).
22 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (i959).
23 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
24 Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364, 366 (1957).

1977]

DEVELOPMENTS -SECTION

1983

1255

unnecessary constitutional question and then to require the state

court, in reaching its authoritative conclusion, to ignore the
presence of an underlying constitutional problem with the result
that a statute that might have been construed so as to remain
valid ultimately must be struck down on constitutional grounds.
The justification and logic of the rule of statutory construction
that courts ought to construe statutes to avoid constitutional
problems 25 and not ascribe to the legislature, in the absence
of some clear statement, an intent to enact an arguably unconstitutional law or delegate powers to act in an arguably unconstitutional manner 26 call into question the premise of separability which underlies abstention procedure. To the extent that
federal constitutional law becomes relevant in the state court
determination, the argument that abstention, apart from its costs,
serves as an ideal means of allocating decisionmaking responsibility by entrusting to state courts the questions of purely state
law and to federal courts those of purely federal law necessarily
becomes attenuated."
In any event, though, it is evident that the threshold for
abstention in such cases should be that the statute appears capable not simply of one constitutional construction, but of a number, with the correct constitutional interpretation posing the
question of unclear state law. If a statute is incapable of a constitutional construction, it is largely irrelevant that it is susceptible
of a number of impermissible ones. Thus, the Supreme Court
has refused to require abstention in suits seeking anticipatory
relief from allegedly overbroad or vague laws where it was not
evident that the statute could be cured in a single proceeding."
2
See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
28 The practice of narrowly construing a statutory delegation of power to an

administrative agency so as to avoid serious constitutional questions is quite comGreene v.
mon. See, e.g., Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (97o);
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (x959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. ii6 (1958). Thus, in
Kent, the Court held that because Congress had "made no such provision in explicit terms," id. at 130, it would not "impute to Congress" the intention to give
the Secretary of State authority to withhold passports from citizens because they
were Communists, id. at 128. The Court noted that had there not been the possibility of the narrowed construction, it would have been "faced with important
constitutional questions." Id. Of course, it is just that sort of "clear statement"
which would make abstention inappropriate in any case.
217See Field, supra note 13, at 1o84-85; Kurland, supra note 21, at 487-90.
28 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) ; Baggett v. BulOf course if no limiting construction at all were
241, 249-50, 254 (1967), abstention
would be inappropriate in any event. In such a case the availability of federal
anticipatory relief would depend on whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge
the overbroad law.
litt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964).

possible, see, e.g., Zwiclder v. Koota, 389 U.S.
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Abstention in favor of a series of state court "as applied" adjudications would not dissipate the uncertainty regarding the reach
of the statute which is itself the substantive defect addressed by
the overbreadth doctrine.29 Moreover, where only one arguably
constitutional interpretation is conceivable, there is again no need
to abstain, because the federal and state courts would presumably
both adopt this same construction. ° Only where there are a
number of permissible constructions is the requisite possibility of
erroneous decisionmaking by the federal courts even introduced.
The threshold for considering abstention in cases within the
second paradigm is reached somewhat differently. In such cases
the question of state law is independent of the federal claim, as
where the unclear state law is itself remedial 31 or is only incidentally related to the federal question. 32 The fact that the
construction of state law will not be colored by considerations of
federal law may make abstention seem more desirable, at least
in theory. The independence of the state and federal claims,
however, also calls into question the need in every case to decide
the state claim, which poses the abstention question, first. While
the Supreme Court has required abstention where the case may
turn on the interpretation of a specialized state constitutional
provision,33 it has held abstention improper in cases involving
state and federal constitutional provisions which are identical or
substantially similar,3" notwithstanding the possibility of avoid"9See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAav. L.

REV.

844, 901-07 (970).
30 A reluctance on the part of federal courts to "rewrite" state statutes, however, may on occasion lead them to abstain in such cases. This seems to be the
theory pursued by Justice Black in his dissent in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 443-45 (Ig7i), where despite the clarity of the statute in question, he
thought the state courts might find the saving provision of notice and hearing in
"the body of other state law." See also Boehning v. Indiana State Employees
Ass'n, 423 U.S. 6, 7 (1975); Field, supra note 13, it I117-8.
"' This will often be the case when the remedial law in question is a provision
of the state constitution. See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 40X U.S. 476, 478 (x971);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
2
" See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 (975); cf.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (x976) (due process claim dependent on construction of statutory entitlement).
"'See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (i97o); Harris County Comm'rs
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 n.8 (975) (abstention appropriate "where the
challenged statute is part of an integrated scheme of related constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, and where the scheme as a whole calls for clarifying interpretation by the state courts").
3"See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 597-98 (I976). Otero involved a challenge to a Puerto Rican statute
excluding aliens from private practice as civil engineers. Rejecting the argument
that the federal court should abstain because the statute might be held to violate
the provision of the Puerto Rican constitution guaranteeing equal protection, the
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ing the federal constitutional claim. Certainly, where the challenged conduct or statute is clearly in violation of the Federal
Constitution, whether or not valid under the independent state
law claim, it is difficult to see any real purpose other than delay
or some preference for state adjudication which is served by initially requiring a ruling, authoritative or otherwise, on state law
grounds.3 5 Moreover, in challenges to statutes on overbreadth or
vagueness grounds, the delay resulting from abstention merely
prolongs the chilling effect which serves as the basis of the substantive constitutional claim. Only where the federal constitutional claim is as unclear as the state claim - or where the federal
claiin is likely to be decided against the plaintiff - can one
justifiably invoke the policy of avoiding constitutional questions
to render decision of the unclear state law claim critical, and to
raise the abstention issue. Only here, in other words, is the
danger of "erroneous" decisions of state law present.
B. The Likelihood and Impact of Error in
FederalDecisions of Unclear Questions of State Law
Mere recognition of the possibility of an erroneous federal
determination of an issue of state law is hardly a mandate for
broad use of abstention, in either the first or second paradigm.
To speak in terms of error is itself somewhat deceptive, suggesting as it does that in some objective sense a federal court will
reach the wrong result where a state court would reach the right
one. Rather, the point is that because the highest court of the
state is the ultimate arbiter of the law of that state, 36 a prior
inconsistent decision of the same point by a federal court is by
definition incorrect. The task of the federal court, then, becomes
one of prediction, with the tools available for its use - precedents
on point or in analogous areas, legislative history, and the like inversely determining the initial weight of the argument for
abstention. Even in cases posing substantial problems of prediction under these standards, though, it is critical, given the costs
Supreme Court said that to abstain because of the "broad and sweeping" constitutional provisions in question "would convert abstention from an exception into a
general rule." .Id. at 598. See P. BATOR, P. MisHKIN, D. S.APnRo & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 16o (2d ed.
Supp. 1977).
" See Field, supra note 13, at 1117-18; Field, supra note 12, at 602-04. Thus,
if the entitlement to a federal remedy is sufficiently clear, it should be irrelevant
that there may be a remedy under state law, whether clear or ambiguous. See
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 689-9i (1964); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963) ; Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 (z962).
" See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (I96O); Murdock v. Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); C. WRIGHT, LAW Or THE FEDERAL COv'RTS 488 (1970).
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of abstention and the federal interests also at stake, to examine
realistically both the likelihood and the impact of inconsistent
decisions by federal and state courts.
In one sense, abstention may be a response to the strictures
placed on federal courts deciding state law questions by cases
following in the wake of Erie.3" To the extent that federal courts
feel themselves bound by clearly outdated precedents and clearly
erroneous reasoning, then the chances of "error" in their construction of state law are substantial.3 8 But abstention need not
be the only response to such problems; a better one- and one
more consistent with Erie- is to allow federal judges to deal
with discredited precedents as their state court counterparts
would, freeing them in fact to engage in the practice of deciding
state law issues as they would reasonably expect the highest state
court to do.39 Thus freed, concern that they will err in this
process is substantially reduced.
Certainly, federal judges are not generally inept at examining
state legislative history or at understanding prior rulings of state
courts; they perform these tasks regularly in the exercise of
their diversity jurisdiction. While state judges may bring greater
experience with the law of their state to bear on the construction
of state law, to the extent that this experience is the product of
their prior decisions, these decisions are available for their federal
counterparts to examine. Indeed, as a general matter, it would
seem that where the state courts have the greatest claim to special
expertise and sensitivity in construing statutory schemes, the
case for abstention is in fact likely to be least compelling because
of the availability of clarifying legal materials which comprise
the body of state law. Moreover, the process of federal decisionmaking does not exclude representatives of the state; even apart
from the fact that federal district court judges must be residents
of the states in which they sit,"° adjudication in the federal court
will be informed by the views of the interested state representatives, either through their direct participation as original parties
a Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (0938).
s The rule that a federal court in a diversity action must follow the decision
of an intermediate appellate state court in the absence of clear evidence that the
highest court of the state would decide differently produced some extraordinary
results. See Gustin v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 154 F.2d 96I (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 866 (946); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169
(1940) ; C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 236-37.
19 See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
This is in
fact the prevailing practice under Erie today. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948) ; C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 237-40.
40 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1970).
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or through their intervention "' or amicus argument.42 To be
sure, there may be slight differences in sensitivity at the margins,
with the state courts more responsive to arguments based on
state concerns and the federal courts tending to be more attuned
to federal constitutional concerns. But the weight of these factors
is limited by the contexts to which the abstention question has
already been confined in the first paradigm, to a choice among
possible constitutional constructions of a statute or grant of
authority; in the second, to an issue of purely state law. Moreover, even if a state court were ultimately to adopt a different
construction than one earlier embraced by a federal court, the
waste involved and the dangers presented by the erroneous
federal determination are easily overstated: justice has ordinarily
been done between the parties before the court,4 and established
procedures allow the subsequent state determination to override
44
any continuing injunction based on the federal adjudication.
These considerations suggest that, in view of the costs involved and, in section 1983 cases, the strong federal interest in
providing an effective forum to enforce civil rights, a decision to
abstain can be justified on only two grounds: the particular and
peculiar dangers of contrary federal and state court decisions in
a certain area or some broader notions of the symbolic role or
position of state courts. The former criterion is fairly straightforward: in areas of continuing state responsibility governed by
complex statutory and regulatory schemes, the costs of inconsistent decisions may be striking, and even the possibility of
such inconsistency should be avoided. What seems critical in
such cases is not so much the fact that the area is in any definable
4

See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)
"'See FED. R. CIV. P. 29.
"At one level, litigants have no claim of injustice so long as the federal court
adjudication provided them a full and fair opportunity to present their claims,
whether or not the result turns out to be inconsistent with a subsequent ruling of
the highest court of the state. But even if one defines "injustice" by reference to
later authoritative state rulings, "justice" will be done in the run of cases. The
exceptions would be those rare cases where the court erroneously denies relief via
its construction of state law and then also refuses constitutional relief, see Note,
supra note 14, at 614, and those in which a federal court erroneously grants relief
on state law grounds when it would have rejected the constitutional claims. But
cases in which the only strong claim is grounded in state law are infrequently litigated within the federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 614 n.75.
44Federal courts frequently will subject equitable decrees to reopening if
state courts later reach an inconsistent construction of an underlying question of
state law, see, e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425-26 (i934) ; Glenn v. Field
Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (i933), thus making the determination of the state law
question tentative even between the parties to the federal suit.
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sense "local" in nature,4" but rather that it is one in which the
disruption owing to a mistaken construction by the federal court
would be of greatest significance.46 But even here, the federal
interest cannot be ignored; to the extent that abstention might
delay or jeopardize the vindication of rights secured by the
Federal Constitution- resulting in harms of a truly irreparable
nature - abstention remains difficult to justify. And even in
the limited category of cases which may fit within this justification, less drastic means may be available to the federal court to
limit the potential disruption of a subsequent inconsistent decision without resorting to the burdensome process of absention.
For example, not only can the federal court generally restrict
itself to declaratory as opposed to injunctive relief, but it can
also refuse to adjudicate any claim of facial invalidity, thus limiting itself to a holding applied only to the particular plaintiffs
before the court.4" If the state finds such a holding unacceptable - or if it would prefer an authoritative decision by the
state courts -in most situations it will be able to seek such a
ruling, at its own expense and without jeopardizing the constitutional rights of the federal plaintiffs, by seeking a declaratory
judgment or initiating an enforcement action in state court.
Given such alternatives, and in view of the costs inherent in
abstention, resort to that doctrine even within this limited
category of cases becomes highly questionable.
Moreover, this justification is wholly inapplicable to some
of the cases in which the Supreme Court has in fact ordered
abstention. 8 If these decisions are capable of justification, it must
be on the basis of some judgment that the state courts are the
most appropriate body to decide certain issues which will often
require them to act in a quasi-legislative capacity- not because
they will reach decisions which are indeed different from those
' Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25
(1959), with County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 36o U.S. 185 (1959).
46 It was partly the susceptibility of the state oil and gas regulatory scheme

to disruption by federal court injunctions that led the Court to order dismissal in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (i943). See pp. 1261-63 infra.
" The flexibility of a declaratory judgment ordinarily ought to permit the
court to afford some relief from uncertainty to the federal plaintiff. An "as applied" adjudication would permit the court to immunize protected conduct from
state interference, without reaching the more difficult task of choosing among
various arguable constructions of the state law. Thus abstention may have been
unnecessary in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. i67, 177 (1959). In some cases,

an "as applied" adjudication could hold that it is procedurally impermissible for
the state to behave in a certain manner, but refrain from specifying the procedures which would cure the statute. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971).
" See pp. 1261-63 infra.
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a federal court would reach, but rather because they are state
courts. This preference for state courts may rest on a number of
grounds: the greater perceived legitimacy or accountability of
state as opposed to federal judges, the notion that the state court
is an integral part of the state government as a whole, with
positive values attaching to self-correction within that unit, and
even the view formally rejected in Home Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. City of Los Angeles,49 that one should have no cause to
complain of a constitutional deprivation until after the state
machinery has had an opportunity to correct any prior errors.
The concern to which these factors are addressed - that there
may be certain areas of decision where state adjudication is to
be preferred for its own sake -does
not neatly correspond to
the cases in which the argument for abstention according to
traditional policies is strongest. This lack of correspondance
may in part explain the apparent confusion in the case law and
the difficulty which one faces in attempting to analyze the pattern
of Supreme Court decisions according to the articulated policies
of abstention. But it seems clear not only that resort to abstention to avoid constitutional questions and errors of state law
cannot be justified on the basis of what is at most a minimal risk
of harm from unnecessary or inconsistent decisions, but also that
the introduction of new considerations supporting a preference
for state forums should not serve as a basis for revitalization of
this doctrine. Whatever the merits of such a preference - and
it should be noted that the considerations supporting it call into
question certain orthodox teaching about ripeness and state
action 5o-

the issue raised is not one of abstention in any tradi-

tional sense, but rather one of whether and when plaintiffs should
be required to exhaust their remedies under state law before they
will, if ever, be heard to complain in federal court. Thus formulated, abstention emerges as an issue of exhaustion requirements
and res judicata rules.
In fact, this has long been the case, at least in part. In
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,5 an order of the Railroad Commission
of Texas granting a permit to drill oil wells was attacked on
state law and constitutional grounds. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the federal district court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case "as a matter
of sound equitable discretion." 52 Justice Black, writing for the
Court, noted:
49 227 U.S. 278 (1913) ; see pp. 1270-7, infra.
"0 See pp. 1270-71 infra.
51 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
52

Id. at 3x8, 334.
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In describing the relation of the Texas court to the Commission, no useful purpose will be served by attempting to label
the court's position as legislative . . . or judicial . . . - suffice it to say that the Texas courts are working partners with
the Railroad Commission in the business of creating a regulatory
system for the oil industry ...
The State provides a unified method for the formation of
policy and determination of cases by the Commission and by
the state courts. The judicial review of the Commission's decisions in the state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts
in the interpretation of state law, dangerous to the success of
state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention
of the lower federal courts. On the other hand, if the state
procedure is followed from the Commission to the State Supreme
Court,3 ultimate review of the federal questions is fully preserved
5
here.
Notably, Justice Frankfurter, the author of Pullman itself, dissented vigorously, arguing that the case depended upon "narrowly
defined standards of law established by Texas for review of the
orders of its Railroad Commission" which federal judges "are
certainly not incompetent to apply." "' Eight years later, in
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway,", the
Court relied on Burlord in holding that the federal district court
should have dismissed an action challenging the Commission's
refusal to permit discontinuance of two intrastate train lines on
the grounds that the refusal constituted a taking of property in
violation of the fourteenth amendmentY
Justice Frankfurter,
while concurring in the result on the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a meritorious claim, strongly challenged the Court's
abstention rationale:
The only reason for declining to entertain the suit is that it
may well be more desirable as a matter of. State-Federalrelations
for the order of a State agency to be reviewed originally in the
State lower court and not to be challenged in the first instance
in a federal court. It is not for me to quarrel with the wisdom
of such a policy. But Congress, in the constitutional exercise
of its power to define the jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts, has decided otherwise. ...
I regret my inability to make clear to the majority of this
Court that its opinion is in flagrant contradiction with the unbroken course of decisions in this Court for seventy-five years. 7
53 Id. at 325-26, 333-34.
"4 d. at 342.
55341 U.S. 341 (i95i).
56 Id. at 349-50.

IId. at 361-62 (Frankfurter,

J.,

concurring) (emphasis added).
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Justice Frankfurter's frustration notwithstanding, Burford
and Southern Railway are at least notable for making explicit
the grounds for the foreclosure of federal jurisdiction. The Court's
decision in these cases to enforce deference to state administrative
and review procedures translates, as Justice Frankfurter suggested, into a policy decision that state courts are more appropriate forums for deciding such cases for their own sake and not
because of any unclarity in the law or any lack of competence
in the federal courts.
While Burford and Southern Railway are unusual cases in a
number of respects,5" their theme of deference to states and their
implicit conception of state courts as a component of an integral
state unit has been echoed in more traditional abstention decisions. In Harrison v. NAACP,59 for example, the Supreme
Court, in ordering abstention as to the constitutionality of Virginia statutes regulating and proscribing activities of organizations involved in litigation, emphasized:
All we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to state
construction or limiting interpretation before the federal courts
are asked to decide upon their constitutionality, so that federal
judgment will be based on something that is a complete product
of the State, the enactment as60 phrased by its legislature and as
construed by its highest court.
The clearest statement of this "exhaustion" vision of federal
question abstention was Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Wiscon6 1 where a state "posting"
sin v. Constantineau,
statute was attacked under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
The Chief Justice suggested that the federal court should have
abstained to permit the state courts to dispose of the claim under
either the Wisconsin Constitution 6 or the United States Constitution - a proposal which he properly characterized as requiring exhaustion of state judicial remedies."3 Although the
58

Both Burford and Southern Railway were based on diversity as well as

federal question jurisdiction and involved regulatory schemes in which state judi-

cial review was concentrated in a single court. See HART & WEcHsLER, supra note
20, at 994-96.

50 36o U.S. 167 (1959).
6
Id. at 178 (emphasis added).

(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 44o. The state constitutional provision was substantially equivalent to
the federal one. Id. at 440 n.i. The majority opinion did not refer to Chief Justice
Burger's argument concerning the state constitution. The majority applied ordinary Pullman principles, and not finding such ambiguity in the state statute as
would permit a saving construction providing for notice and hearing, declined to
require
63 abstention. Id. at 439.
Id. at 44c (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
61400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971)
(2
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court has not explicitly adopted such a practice in the 1983
context,64 the implicit deference in a number of abstention cases,
coupled with a trend in recent Supreme Court decisions to restrict
the availability of federal court protection against state-inflicted
injuries, 5 suggests that the Chief Justice's vision requires closer
scrutiny on its own terms. This is the task of the next Part.
V. EXHAUSTION
It has been considered well-settled law that a plaintiff may
maintain a section 1983 action in federal court without regard
to the availability of adequate state remedies.' The decision in
Monroe v. Pape 2 clearly established this principle with respect
to state judicial remedies. In finding that persons seeking damages for an unconstitutional search need not exhaust state tort
remedies as a prerequisite to obtaining access to federal court,8
the Supreme Court explained that a purpose of section 1983 was
to make available a federal remedy "supplementary" to any
that the state might provide, and, therefore, that "the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 4 In subsequent cases, the Court extended the Monroe
"no-exhaustion" principle to section 1983 claims where the only
available state remedy was an administrative one.' In so doing,
64 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. I67 (ig6i). See also Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
65
See Ingraham v. Wright, 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April 19, 1977); Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
'See, e.g., Chevigny, Section z983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. Ra-.
1352 (197O); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act,

68 CoL m. L. Rav. 1201 (1968); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for
UnconstitutionalPolice Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (x969). Each of the Supreme
Court's major administrative exhaustion cases, however, dealt with a situation
in which traditional principles would not have required exhaustion in any event.
See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983
Cases, 41 U. CHr. L. REv. 537, 544-47 (0974).
2365 U.S. 167 (x961).
3 Id. at 183.
' Id. Prior to Monroe, the Supreme Court had held that one seeking damages
for denial of his right to vote by state officials did not have to exhaust his state
judicial remedies before seeking redress in federal court, but it distinguished the
possibility of requiring exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (I939). The implication was that actions brought under
§ 1983 were governed by the general doctrine requiring administrative, but not
judicial, exhaustion. See, e.g., Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. ig6o);
Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1958); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d
724 (4th Cir. x956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (I957). But see Carter v. School
Bd., 182 F.2d 531 ( 4 th Cir. ig5o).
'See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
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the Court appeared to act as if there were no significant differences between judicial and administrative remedies and paid no
attention to the possible existence of reasons supporting admin-

istrative exhaustion not present in the judicial context; rather,
the "supplementary" remedy doctrine was almost perfunctorily

applied.'
The continued viability of the no-exhaustion rule, however,

may be in some doubt. Judges and commentators have been extremely critical of the rule, particularly in the administrative

context.7 Judge Friendly, for example, has strongly urged that
section 1983 plaintiffs be required to exhaust adequate state administrative remedies as a precondition to access to the federal
courts.' Administrative exhaustion, which is the norm outside the
context of section I983,' is said to promote judicial economy and
(1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963).
'In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the complaint of black
plaintiffs for injunctive relief from alleged segregation in a public school system
was dismissed by the district court because of their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After detailing the remedies available to the plaintiffs under
Illinois law, id. at 67o-71, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, referred to the
no-exhaustion language in Monroe and held that the dismissal had been improper,
id. at 674-75. The opinion left unclear whether the Court was relying on its
finding that the state administrative remedy was inadequate or on an interpretation of Monroe making the adequacy of the state remedy irrelevant. Four
years later, in Damico v. California, 389 US. 416 (1967), a challenge to a
paternal absence requirement of a state welfare program, the Supreme Court
in a per curiam opinion cited Monroe and McNeese without discussion for the
proposition that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted prior to
seeking relief under § 1983:
In McNeese v. Board of Educ., . . . noting that one of the purposes underlying the Civil Rights Act was "to provide a remedy in the federal
courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have," . . we
held that "relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because
relief was not first sought under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy." . . . See Monroe v. Pape ....
Id. at 417 (brackets in original). See generally Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLum. L. Rav. x2ox (1968) (criticizing the
Damico decision for its treatment of the administrative exhaustion issue as if it
were governed by settled law).
' Indeed, the Second Circuit has consistently resisted the conclusion that the
Supreme Court decisions have in fact excluded all x983 cases from an administrative exhaustion requirement. See Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974) ;
Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 1973); Goetz v. Ansell, 477
F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973). In Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567-69 (2d Cir.
x969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 84X (197o), Judge Friendly, pointing to the inadequacy of state remedies in each case, argued that McNeese, Damico, King, and
Houghton established only the proposition that the exhaustion requirement is not
to be applied woodenly.
a See H. FRIENDLY, FnDEA. JuRIsDICTION: A GENERAL Viaw zoo-o (x973).
'See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-53 (1938);
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accurate dispute resolution by diverting litigation, at least initially, from the federal courts to specialized agencies; even if the
plaintiff still seeks judicial relief after exhaustion, the federal
court can benefit from the agency's expertise, its experience in
construing its own statutes and regulations, and its ability to
generate a detailed factual record.Y Moreover, in a federal system, there is an additional salient interest in permitting the states
to design a set of institutions to carry out state functions, and in
affording them a measure of independence consistent with the
supremacy of federal law."
Of course, to the extent that the calls for administrative exhaustion are predicated on concerns for federalism and the workload of the federal courts, the arguments ineluctably shade into
arguments for judicial exhaustion as well. Although the forcefulness of the assertion of the no-judicial-exhaustion rule in Monroe
may have led many commentators to focus their attention on
administrative remedies, several commentators have suggested
that in some cases plaintiffs should be compelled to bring their
claims in state rather than federal court.' 2 Thus, Judge Aldisert
has argued for the statutory imposition of a partial judicial exhaustion requirement.' 3 Other commentators, perhaps also seeking to avoid a head-on confrontation with Monroe, have suggested
that the scope of the interests cognizable under section 1983 be
redefined to exclude those interests adequately protected by existing state remedies. 4 Such proposals would have the more exPrentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (igo8); H. FRIEDLY, supra note 8,
at ioo. The application of the no-exhaustion rule to claims of violations of federal statutory rights which might be brought within the "Constitution and laws"
language of § 1983 is less clear. See P. BATOR, P. MISHEiN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEt
1249-50 (2d ed. 1973).
' 0 See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) ("the basic purpose of the
exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions
within its special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies"); McKart v.
WECHSLER, HART

United States, 395 U.S. 185, i95 (1969); K. DAVIS, ADmiNmlSRATivE LAW TREATISE
382 (3d ed. 1973); J. LANDIS, THE ADIiNisTRATE PROCESS 153 (1938).
" See pp. 1179-83 supra.
12 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (x96x) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 44o (197) (Burger, 0.., dissenting); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
13 See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's

Thoughts on Section x983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc.
ORD.

4

557, 575-78.
See, e.g., Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBe-

yond, 6o Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (I965).
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treme result not simply of postponing federal jurisdiction, but of
denying a federal constitutional claim altogether.
Although formally continuing to adhere to the no-exhaustion
rule, recent Supreme Court decisions have displayed some concern with its effects. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 5 the Court refused
to allow prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement to style their claims as 1983 actions and thus avoid
the exhaustion requirement imposed by federal habeas corpus.'0
In Gibson v. Berrykill, 7 decided the same day, the Court, citing
Younger v. Harris,'8 suggested in dictum that administrative
exhaustion might be appropriate where the state processes were
adequate to protect the federal plaintiff's rights. 9 More recently,
the Supreme Court in the cases of Paul v. Davis 20 and Ingraham
v. Wright 21 has demonstrated a significant attentiveness to the
presence of adequate state judicial remedies in the adjudication
of federal section 1983 claims. In Paul, plaintiff had brought a
section 1983 damages action, contending that the defendant police
chief had unjustifiably included the plaintiff's picture in a flyer
which identified "active shoplifters" and which was distributed
to approximately eight hundred local merchants.2 2 Although the
Court's conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
cognizable under section 1983 formally turned on its finding that
damage to reputation did not constitute the deprivation of any
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, 23 the rhetoric
of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion emphasized the availability of a state tort action which duplicated the plaintiff's section c983 allegations. 24 The plaintiff, noted Justice Rehnquist,
had stated "a classical claim for defamation" actionable in state
court.2 5 To find that the police chief's alleged defamation constituted the invasion of a protected liberty interest would "almost
necessarily" convert any tortious activity of a state officer acting under color of state law into a violation of the fourteenth
U.S. 475 (973).
Id.at 488-89. Exhaustion of state administrative and judicial remedies prior
to a grant of federal habeas corpus is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (,970).
See 1. 1352 infra.
15411

8

411 U.S. 564 (X973).
s401 U.S. 37 (1971) 10 411 U.S. at 573-75.
20 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
2145 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April 19, 1977).
22 424 U.S. at 695.
23 Id. at 699-7,0. See generally The Supreme Court, z975 Term, go
17

H1ARV.

L.

REv.2 456, 86 (x976).
See generally Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, go H-_v.
L. RFV. 293, 324-28 (976).
2

424 U.S. at 697.
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amendment. 2 Rather, the Court leaned in the opposite direction,
implying that state officer harms for which the state had provided
tort remedies were not cognizable as federal section i983 actions. Where a plaintiff's interest, wrote Justice Rehnquist, is
((simply one of a number which the State may protect against
injury by virtue of its tort law," state courts provide "a forum
for the vindication of those interests by means of damage actions." 27
This nexus between the existence of adequate state judicial
remedies and the availability of a section 1983 claim was more
directly suggested in the decision this Term in Ingraham v.
Wright.28 In Ingraham, the Court rejected individual damages
actions and a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief
filed on behalf of a group of Florida school children challenging
the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing disciplinary
corporal punishment. Plaintiffs had contended that the paddling
of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment, and that even if paddling is constitutionally permissible the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.20
Justice Powell prefaced his majority opinion 30 with a separate
section which discussed the role played by "[t] raditional common
law concepts" in illuminating the cruel and unusual punishment
and due process clauses. 3' In a refrain that echoed throughout
the opinion, Justice Powell found a common law background of
historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal
punishment. Where excessive or unreasonable force is used, "the
educator in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and
criminal liability." 32 Proceeding to plaintiffs' allegations, the
Court denied the eighth amendment claim, finding that the pro"scription against cruel and unusual punishment was designed
to protect only those persons convicted of crime.33 In declining
to extend it to the paddling of children in the public schools,
Justice Powell invoked the existence of the "legal constraints of
the common law" to determine that since schoolchildren enjoy
2

" d. at 699.
27

d.at

712.

28 45

U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April 19, 1977).
2 Id. at 4365-66.

"°Justice Powell's opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
32 45 U.S.L.W. at 4366-67 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968)).
32 45 U.S.L.W. at 4367.
33 Id.
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"significant safeguards" against official abuses which are unavailable to prisoners, they have "little need" for the protection afforded by the eighth amendment. 4 Justice Powell relied even
more explicitly on the existence of adequate common law remedies in disposing of the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim.
Although the Court found that the "liberty" safeguarded by
the fourteenth amendment was implicated by disciplinary corporal punishment, it held that traditional common law remedies
are adequate to afford due process.35 At common law, Justice
Powell noted, a teacher's privilege to discipline a student was
limited to the administration of "moderate correction"; as long
as the disciplinary punishment authorized by the state was within
the scope of the common law privilege, he concluded, there was
no deprivation of any of the "substantive rights" of the child. 8
Moreover, there was no need for federal safeguards to protect the
child from excessive punishments not privileged at common law
since "[iun those cases where severe punishment is contemplated,
the available civil and criminal sanctions for abuse" adequately
7
vindicate the rights of the child.3
Like Paul v. Davis, Ingraham may plausibly be interpreted
as an attempt to define or limit the substantive rights protected
by relatively open-ended constitutional provisions. Yet the re" Id. at 4369.
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community
afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the
Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner. In virtually every community
where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools, these safeguards
are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law.
Id. 35

Id.

30 Id. at 4371.

" Id. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, took issue with the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the
protections of the eighth amendment beyond the claims of prisoners. Id. at 4373.
He argued that the proper inquiry should be "whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution,
rehabilitation, or deterrence," id., and that the availability of state remedies should
be considered irrelevant to a determination of the coverage of the eighth amendment, id. at 4374.
The fact that a person may have a state-law cause of action against a
public official who tortures him with a thumb screw for the commission of
an antisocial act has nothing to do with the fact that such official conduct
is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Id. Justice White also took issue with the majority's finding that common law
remedies were adequate to protect the plaintiffs' recognized liberty interest, noting
that not only was a student under Florida law barred from recovery when the
teacher had acted in good faith, id. at 4375, but also that the lawsuit occurs
after the punishment has been imposed, id. at 4376. "The infliction of physical
pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding."
Id.
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peated emphasis and reliance in those cases on the existence of
adequate state remedies may foreshadow the rise of an exhaustion
of state remedies doctrine in the context of section x983 actions. 8
Any decision as to the appropriateness of state exhaustion
must ultimately turn on one's view of the state itself and of its
operations. Given a conception of government as a cluster of
closely connected officers and institutions making the basic policy
and budgetary decisions affecting the lives of the governed, the
notion of state autonomy suggests that there is some inner core
of government which must be shielded from outside review and
correction.3 9 To pierce that inner core is to threaten the autonomy and integrity of the state. With respect to section 1983
actions, the inquiry becomes whether state courts and other remedial agencies are so intimately related to the other branches
of state government that failure to test assertedly unconstitutional conduct of state officers first in state forums according to
state laws invades the inner workings of state government. Another way of approaching the same problem is to treat the state
action issue as a matter of ripeness. Viewed from this perspective,
the problem becomes one of determining when, giving the mechanisms established by a state for promulgating, applying, and
testing a law or rule, the conduct of a state officer or institution
may be considered sufficiently complete to support a constitutional
claim of state action.
The prevailing view since Home Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. City of Los Angeles,4" decided in I913, has been that a state
" See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities v. Usery: Affirmative Rights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. io65, iioo n.135 (x977). See
also Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 131T, 1318-20 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en banc,
545 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1976).
Only Justice Stevens took note of the connection between Paul and Ingraham.
In his separate dissent in Ingraham,45 U.S.L.W. at 4377, he pointed out:
When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater
likelihood that a damage award will make a person completely whole than
when an invasion of the individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has occurred. In the property context, therefore,
frequently a postdeprivation state remedy may be all the process that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires. It may also be true - although I do not
express an opinion on the point- that an adequate state remedy for a defamation may satisfy the due process requirement when a State has impaired an individual's interest in his reputation. On that hypothesis, the
Court's analysis today gives rise to the thought that Paul v. Davis...
may have been correctly decided on an incorrect rationale. Perhaps the
Court will one day agree with Mr. Justice Brennan's appraisal of the importance of the constitutional interest at stake in Paul . . . and nevertheless conclude that an adequate state remedy may prevent every state inflicted injury to a person's reputation from violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"' See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Tribe, supra
note 38, at .1070-72; pp. 1179-83 supra.
40 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
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court decision as to the legality of challenged conduct under state
law is not a necessary predicate to its challenge as "state action"
in violation of the Constitution.41 The Home Telephone interpretation of state action draws support from the legislative history
of the fourteenth amendment and from an examination of the general concerns of the Reconstruction Congress.4 2 As Chief Justice
White's opinion for the unanimous Court in Home Telephone
suggested, "the Amendment contemplates the possibility of state
officers abusing the powers lawfully conferred upon them," and
was intended to apply to such actions.43 Moreover, once the dispute has moved to a stage where a judicial remedy is required,
the notion that the constitutional deprivation is in some sense
"incomplete" becomes somewhat attenuated; while it may be
that state courts, acting under state law, will provide an adequate
remedy, the fact is that the particular defendants' role has ended
and resort to a wholly separate unit of the state government is
necessary to undo the harm that has been caused.
The effect of creating a state judicial exhaustion requirement
would be at least to duplicate the burdens and costs involved in
abstention in cases where there is no unclear state law claim.4 4
In every case in which the state court might provide an adequate
remedy, the plaintiff would be forced to resort to that forum initially. At best, he might later resort to the federal courts to
raise his constitutional claim if an adequate remedy under state
law were not forthcoming; 4 5 at worst - and considerations of
respect for state courts as well as of judicial economy might
support this result - he could be barred from federal relitigation under the doctrines of res judicata.4" In either case, the forum
choice secured for 1983 claims would be substantially undermined
without a clear statement of any intent to do so by Congress and
with little justification in policy terms.
This is not to say that the state's interest in conducting its
affairs and correcting its officers, free from federal interference,
is not a significant one. But the cases where the displacements
of state authority occasioned by the federal courts are most substantial -

the "public law" actions discussed in Part III 4-

41 See pp. 1166-67 supra.
42 See pp. I141-56 supra.
43 227 U.S. at 288.

4" See pp. 1254-57 supra.
41 Cf. England v. Louisana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964) (procedure for reserving federal claims for federal court determination in
absention
cases).
41
See Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134, 138 (1924). See generally Part
VII, pp. 1330-60 infra.
47 See pp. 1227-50 supra.
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are precisely the cases where exhaustion would be least appropriate. However adequate a state remedy may appear in theory,
these are the cases where the federal judiciary's distance from local
government operations and its insulation from majoritarian pressures emerge as most critical advantages, rendering any assumption of parity less persuasive.4 Were frequency of federal interventions the sole factor in determining intrusiveness, one might
well argue that claims which appear cognizable as state law torts
ought be left, at least initially, to the state courts. 9 But because
"intrusiveness" seems more likely to respond to the type of case
than to any numerical calculus, concerns with minimizing intrusion provide weak support for the imposition of a judicial
exhaustion requirement in cases which do not themselves give
rise to serious interferences. And even if they did, the basic point
remains that the fourteenth amendment was intended as a limit
on the autonomy of states, with jurisdiction granted to the federal courts to give effect to this limit °
Administrative exhaustion in the section 1983 context presents a more difficult case. First, many of the traditional justifications for administrative exhaustion - agency expertise, judicial
economy, consistency in the application of a regulatory scheme apply as well in the section 1983 context. 1 Second, administrative exhaustion poses no threat that resort to a federal court will
be foreclosed, since principles of res judicata do not attach to
the agency's determinations.5 2 Third, the notion of ripeness or
state action as a bar to initial assertion of a section 1983 claim
in federal court has greater appeal where the alternative is an
administrative determination. Agencies may often be created
to "fine tune" the application of statutory mandates or general
standards to particular cases. To perform this function, procedures are established within the agency to govern individual complaints of unfair treatment. Where this is true, the view that the
action of any single official should not give rise to a constitutional
claim until other officials within that agency have had the opportunity to review the claim -thus allowing the particular agency
to perform fully one of the functions for which it was established
-begins to make a good deal of sense.
48

See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, go HARv. L. REV. i1o5 (x977).
49 See Note, supra note 12, at 1487, 1494-98, 1501-04 (arguing that cases of
individual deprivations should be brought in state court).
'0 See pp. 1144-46 supra.
"See pp. 1265-66 & note io supra; H. FRIENDLY, supra note 8, at oo-o1;
Comment, supra note i, at 540-42.
52 See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 230 (I9O8); Comment,
supra note i, at 555 & n.68.
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If administrative exhaustion seems to make some sense in abstract terms, the next step is to suggest criteria which will allow
courts to isolate those cases in which exhaustion would in fact be
appropriate. While it is difficult to develop meaningful concrete
criteria solely by reference to concerns for completeness or ripeness, developed principles of administrative law for determining
when exhaustion should be considered inappropriate seem to track,
as well as any criteria could, those cases where the individual's
dispute with the state should be considered ripe for judicial determination.5 3 Thus, exhaustion should not be required where
further recourse to the administrative process would create the
likelihood of irreparable harm5 4 where the litigant would be unable to obtain a remedy from the agency that would vindicate the
asserted right,5 or where his objection goes to the constitutionality
of the process of decisionmaking in the agency.5" In none of these
cases would exhaustion serve interests in judicial economy or
promote the utilization of agency expertise; in none of them would
the agency be called upon to perform a function of "fine tuning"
the application of standards and procedures to ensure fair and
constitutional treatment of the individual.
Properly structured, an administrative exhaustion requirement
7
in the context of 1983 actions would have limited application.
53

See generally L. JAFFE, JUDI IAL CONTROL or ADMMNISTRATIVE ACTION 426-

40 (1965).
54According to Professor Jaffe, "the question is . . .whether an immediate
appeal is necessary to give realistic protection to the claimed right." Id. at 429;
see, e.g., Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 59I-92 (1926).
5
See Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Jaffe, supra note 53, at 42627. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (x963), fits within this category.
Under Illinois law, the Superintendant of Public Education was empowered to
grant only two sorts of relief -upon a finding of discrimination, he could withhold state aid and request that the state attorney general seek an injunction.
Id. at 675. The Court found that withholding aid was "at best an indirect sanction," id. at 676, and that it would be anomalous if a federal suit were delayed
by a state remedy that would at most result in a state court action, id. at 675.
11 This exception would cover most due process objections to the composition,
objectivity, and procedures of the state agency. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973), is a clear example of such a case. In Gibson, a group of optometrists
alleged that the state board of optometry was disqualified from holding proceedings to revoke their licenses both because its members had a pecuniary interest
in the outcome and because it had prejudged the issues in the license revocation
proceedings by bringing a state court action against the optometrists on the same
grounds. Id. at 571. The Supreme Court, noting that the federal courts were
divided on the permissibility of combining prosecutorial and adjudicative functions,
left the question open, id. at 578-79 & n.17; see Withrow v. Larkin, 417 U.S. 35
(1975) (upholding constitutionality of combination of functions against due
process challenge), and held that the bias resulting from a pecuniary interest made
the hearing before the state board an inadequate remedy, 411 U.S. at 579.
57
In cases where it would apply, the question arises whether judicial review
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Indeed, in all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state administrative remedies
were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been
appropriate in any event.58 But even a limited exhaustion rule
would not only serve the state's interest in controlling its affairs
and correcting its officials but could also increase state sensitivity
to federal rights and encourage implementation of adequate procedural responses to constitutional objections.
VI. THE Younger DOCTRINE

In 1971, in Younger v. Harris1 and its companion cases, 2 the
Supreme Court enunciated a doctrine of federal judicial restraint
with profound procedural and substantive implications. Younger
held that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a federal
court is precluded from enjoining a pending state criminal
prosecution. 3 To justify making an exception to the guarantee
of a federal forum provided in section 1983 and enshrined in
by the state courts of the agency determination should be required. See Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (I943); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 342 U.S. 341 (1951) ; Pp. 1261-63 supra. But even if one accepts the view that
the state courts are the "working partners" of the agencies in such cases, Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. at 326, the fact that res judicata effect would attach to
the determinations of the state court, in contrast to the state agency, compare
Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134, 138 (914), with Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U.S. 210, 230 (i9o8), militates against a requirement of judicial review.
58 See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 56o, 569 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Comment, supra note i, at 544-47.
1401 U.S. 37 (1972).
2 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);

Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (971); Dyson v. Stein, 402 U.S. 200 (1972); Byrne
v. Karalexis, 4oi U.S. 216 (1971). In addition, 21 cases were summarily disposed
of in light of Younger. See 401 U.S. at 948-90. The Younger cases have been the
subject of voluminous commentary. See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Courts, State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (2974); Whitten,
Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings:
The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 592
(2975) ; Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the
Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal
Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1976); Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the
Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DuxE L.J. 523; The
Supreme Court, z97o Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 38, 301-15 (i97i); The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. RV. 47, i51-69 (975); Note, Federal Relief
Against Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake
Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (i973). For a pre-Younger discussion
of some of the problems addressed in the text, see Maraist, Federal Injunctive
Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48
TEx. L. REV.535 (970).
2 401 U.S. at 53-54.
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Monroe v. Pape,4 the Court relied on traditional principles of
equity jurisprudence, the notion of federal-state comity, and the
values underlying what Justice Black called "Our Federalism." '
In subsequent decisions, those values have provided a fulcrum
for extending the Younger holding and altering its emphasis.
The result has been a powerful and perplexing tool for channelling
constitutional litigation into state forums and curtailing the
equitable authority of the federal courts. This Part will explore
and evaluate that tool, the circumstances in which it is applied,
and the balance it strikes between federalism values and the
concerns implicit in section 1983's provision of a federal cause of
action and a federal forum for constitutional cases.
A. The FebruaryDecisions
i. The Key Cases. -Harris,
the plaintiff in Younger, had
been indicted for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act.' He sought a federal injunction to halt the pending prosecution on grounds that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.'
The claims of three coplaintiffs- none of them targets of state
proceedings - were dismissed as too "imaginary" or "speculative." 8
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black asserted that Congress had always manifested "a desire to permit state courts to
try state cases free from interference by federal courts." 9 He
discussed three concerns underlying "this longstanding public
policy." 10 First was "the basic doctrine . . . that courts of
equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain
a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
equitable relief." " Second was "the notion of 'comity,' that is, a
proper respect for state functions . . . and a continuance of the
4 365 U.S. 67 (ig6i).
5401

U.S. at 43-44.
The statute had been upheld in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
case that was overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,

61d. at 38.
357 (1927) -a

449 (1969).
S401 U.S. at 38-39.
8
Id. at 41-42. Two of the coplaintiffs were members of the Progressive Labor

Party who claimed the prosecution of Harris inhibited their advocacy of political
change. The third was a college professor who alleged that he feared prosecution
under the challenged statute for teaching the theories of Karl Marx. Justice
Black observed that a federal suit to stop a pending state prosecution "is a serious
matter" and that the three were not "appropriate plaintiffs" in such a case. Id. at
41-42.

' Id. at 43.
10
Id.
" Id. at 43-44.
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belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." 12 This shades into Justice Black's
third concern, the concept of "Our Federalism," which, he wrote,
requires sensitivity to both state and national governments and a
system in which "the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." 13 Accordingly, Justice Black continued, "the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state
courts is not to issue such injunctions." 14
The lower court that awarded relief to Harris had relied
1
heavily on the Warren Court decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 5
which had authorized a federal injunction to block threatened
state prosecutions against civil rights activists in Louisiana.1"
Dombrowski had appeared to rest on alternative grounds. First,
the plaintiffs had alleged a pattern of prosecutorial bad faith and
harassment that distinguished their situations from that of a
defendant in a normal criminal prosecution brought in the hope
of securing a valid conviction. 7 Second, the Court suggested
that the facial overbreadth of the statutes involved in Dombrowski - their chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment
rights - justified special federal vigilance.'8
In Younger, Justice Black said that Dombrowski had been
misunderstood by the lower court and argued that that decision
had turned only upon the allegations of prosecutorial bad faith."
He asserted that the existence of a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms, alone, is insufficient to justify federal intervention with state criminal processes, 2 0 and that facial adjudication
followed by broad injunctions is "fundamentally at odds with
the function of the federal courts." 21
While a mere showing of facial invalidity would be insufficient
1Id. at 44.

3

1d.
I
I at 45.
1d.
38o U.S. 479 (1965). The lower court opinion in Younger considered the
Dombrowski case. 281 F. Supp. 507, 510-1, (C.D. Cal. 1968) (three-judge court).
" See 38o U.S. 479, 497-98 (x965).
17 Id. at 482, 490.
4

"Id. at 486, 490-9x. On first
amendment overbreadth, see generally Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (970).
1940x U.S. at 5o. Justice Black conceded that there were "some statements in
the Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support" a contrary reading, but
argued
that such statements were "unnecessary to the decision." Id.
20
21

d. at 51-52.

Id.at 52.
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to support an injunction, Justice Black conceded that there might
be "extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment." 22 Among them, he said,
would be statutes "flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph .... ,,23
Among the companion cases, Samuels v. Mackell2 4 held that
the propriety of federal declaratory relief when the federal court
plaintiff is the target of a pending state prosecution should be
measured by the standards set forth in Younger for deciding the
availability of injunctive relief.2 5 Writing again for the Court,
Justice Black reasoned that "ordinarily a declaratory judgment
will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption
of state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid." 26 He noted that in some circumstances a declaratory judgment could serve as the predicate for
a later injunction, and that, even if it did not, it would have the
effect of removing the constitutional question from the state court
7
2

system.

Boyle v. Landry "I was a challenge by black residents of
Chicago to a number of statutes and ordinances which they
claimed were being used to harass and intimidate blacks in the
exercise of their first amendment rights. 9 The question on appeal
to the Supreme Court was limited to the propriety of the district
court order declaring invalid one subsection of an "intimidation"
statute and enjoining state officials from enforcing it. 0 No
22

Id.at 53.

23
Id. (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
24 401 U.S. 66 (,971).
25

Id.at 73.
Id. at 72.
"' Id.The Court relied heavily on Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
2
6

359 U.S.

293

(1943), which had denied declaratory relief against a state unemploy-

ment compensation law in somewhat analogous fashion. The Great Lakes opinion
observed that a federal injunction against enforcement of the statute would have
been barred under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (ig7o), in the absence
of a showing that the state provided no adequate remedy. Accordingly, the
Great Lakes Court asserted, declaratory relief should likewise be withheld because
it would "in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes."
359 U.S. at 299.
28401 U.S. 77 (197).
20
Id. at 78.
" Id.at 79-8o. The district court held the provision void for overbreadth.
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 9651-67 (ND. Ill. 1968) (three-judge court),
rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 4o U.S. 77 (1971).
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plaintiffs faced charges under that subsection,"' although several
32
were being prosecuted under statutes not before the Court.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black characterized the
case as follows: "[I]t appears from the allegations that those
who originally brought this suit made a search of state statutes
and city ordinances with a view to picking out certain ones that
they thought might possibly be used . . . for bad-faith prosecutions against them." a3 The 'Court found that the plaintiffs had
failed to show they would suffer irreparable injury if the state
were left free to prosecute them under the statute. Accordingly,
they were not entitled to relief.
Two aspects of the case are noteworthy. First, the Court
used the irreparable harm test in a way that foreshadows a kind
of "Catch-2 2" for plaintiffs.3 4 If Younger imposes an extra-heavy
burden on persons seeking federal relief when state proceedings
are pending and a variant of the irreparable harm test or a strictly
applied ripeness standard restricts relief before charges have
been filed, there will be little time during which the doors of the
federal courthouse are open. Second, the Court showed a willingness to analyze plaintiffs' complaints in discrete pieces - to
require a particularized showing of irreparable harm with respect
to each statute challenged rather than considering the aggregate
allegations of prosecutorial bad faith."3
2. The Background.- The Court enunciated its i97i decisions with some fanfare. In addition to six full opinionsseveral of them containing rather broad language- twenty-one
cases were summarily disposed of in light of Younger and the
total effect was such as to suggest that the Court felt it had done
something of importance.3 6 Yet the Younger opinion also seems
steeped in history and precedent. It quotes case after case asserting the general rule that federal courts should exercise restraint
when asked to interfere with state criminal processes 7 and, with
the exception of the limiting construction given to Dombrowski,
purports simply to be reiterating and applying old adages. Indeed, Justice Brennan, author of the Dombrowski opinion, concurred in Younger. 8 This blend of the extraordinary and the
commonplace stems in part from ambiguities in the prior case
law and in Younger itself.
a1 401 U.S. at 8o-8i.
3aId. at 8i.
3 A discussion of this problem begins at p. 1292 infra.
11 See note 245 infra for a more explicit and recent example of this tendency.
38 See note 2 supra.
" See 4oi U.S. at 45-46.
38 Id. at 56-58.
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The proliferation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries of state schemes for regulating business led to the rise
of substantive due process doctrines and with them to an era of

judicial activism."

Prior to that, the historic reluctance of equity

to entrench on the criminal process 40 had combined with statutory 4 and constitutional restraints 42 to create a general rule
against federal interference. The 19o8 decision in Ex parte
Young 43 made it clear that these restraints could be circumvented
and that federal courts had the power to decide the validity of state
statutes and enjoin their 44enforcement -at
least where no proceedings were yet pending.
The holding in Young was cast as an exception to a broad rule
against federal relief, a rule that required plaintiffs to demonstrate threatened harms and burdens greater than those attendant
to defending any criminal prosecution.4 5 This "defense plus"
" See G. GUNTHER,

CASES AND MATERIALS

ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 557-76

(9th ed. 1975); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REV.
345, 373-74 (i93o); Whitten, supra note 2, at 629-30.
40 See Whitten, supra note 2, at 597-60o; Developments in the Law - InjunctiOns, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 994, 2024 (i965) [hereinafter cited as Injunctions].
Equity's traditional reluctance stemmed from a number of intersecting factors.
Among them: the historic absence in criminal proceedings of property interests
of the kind generally protected by equity; the dominance in criminal cases of
issues of fact within the province of the jury; and equity's dependence-for its
efficacy and at times for its political survival-on remaining a supplemental
forum and therefore its need to avoid defining the burden of defending against
any criminal prosecution as an irreparable harm sufficient to support intervention.
See generally 0. Fiss, INjytcicoNs (1972); Injunctions, supra, at ioo4-13.
41 See Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (i97o). First enacted in 1793,
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5,I Stat. 335, the Act prohibits federal courts from
enjoining state proceedings in most circumstances. See generally Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
42 The major constitutional restraint, of course, was the eleventh amendment.
See pp. 1165-67 supra.
43 209 U.S. X23 (i9o8).
4

Id. at i61-62.

41 Id. at 161-63. The Young Court found grounds for making an exception to

general rules counseling restraint in the fact that the challenged rate legislation
contained penalties so harsh that they effectively prevented the defendant railroads from attacking the rate levels by violating them and risking conviction.
While the holding was limited to cases of threatened state proceedings, the Court
was aware of the controversial implications of its decision and attempted to soothe
potential detractors, id. at 166. See Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47
HARv. L. REV. 795, 803-Io (1934). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHrI, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 965-79 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
Congress responded in a limited fashion by passing the Three-Judge Court Act,
Act of June 18, I9IO, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557, and subsequent amendments increasing the scope of the Act. See generally Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 107-10
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); HART & WECHSLER, supra,
at 967-75. The three-judge court statutes were overhauled last year and the role of
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burden, the Court suggested in Young and later cases, could be
met where the would-be federal plaintiff was faced with a danger
of multiple prosecutions or harassment, 46 where he faced damages
from the threatened prosecution of an employee or business associate who might decline to violate and test an arguably invalid
law,4 7 or where he faced a prosecution brought in bad faith. 8
These principles were fairly elastic, and it has been argued with
some force that exceptions had all but swallowed up the rule in
the pre-Younger years. Certainly the Court's litany of restraint
did not serve as a firm ban on federal interference. Rather, it
was an intermittent obstacle that seemed sometimes to vary with
the judicial predilections and substantive doctrines of the day.
Hence, concern with equitable restraint increased with the demise
of substantive due process and then waned somewhat as the focus
of constitutional law shifted from economic regulation to individual liberties. 50
In the civil rights area - the one most relevant to Younger principles of equitable restraint seem to have been least clearly
established. The Court's major enunciation of the need for restraint in first amendment cases was the 1943 decision in Douglas
v. City of Jeannette.51 Although that case contains a broad call
for federal restraint, 2 the issue it actually addressed was relatively
narrow. Plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against prosecutions under an antisolicitation
such courts substantially curtailed -primarily
in response to increasing docket
loads. See Pub. L. No. 94-381, go Stat. III9 (1976); P. BATOR, P. MISHXIN,
D. SPaimo & H. WvECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(2d ed. Supp. 1977).
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163-64 (i908) (problem of severe or
cumulative penalties); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 5x6 (i939) (risk of multiple
prosecutions and official actions in bad faith); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 485-89 (I965) (same); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941)
(injunction denied after state attorney general agieed to prosecute only a single
test case). Multiple prosecutions may suggest the appropriateness of interim
153-55

"

equitable relief, see p. 1305 infra.
41 See Whitten, supra note 2, at
209 U.S. 123, 163-64 (I908).

602-03

& nn.44-45. See also Ex parte Young,

4 Cf. Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (94i)
("No citizen . . . is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts"); Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. I57, 164 (943)
(same). The bad faith exception

notion is explicitly set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (i97).
" See generally Wechsler, supra note 2; see also Zeigler, supra note 2, at
83.
!o See Zeigler, supra note 2, at 272-78; Whitten, supra note 2, at 632-33.
51 31 9 U.S. 157 (1943).
2 "[C]ourts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary powers should

269-

[refuse] to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state courts save
in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to
prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent . . . ." Id. at 163.
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ordinance. 3 The Court denied all relief. 54 However, another
decision handed down the same day had reversed a state court
conviction under the challenged statute and declared it unconstitutional.55 As a result, although by a different route, the
plaintiffs had obtained the constitutional ruling they sought.
Absent some indication that injunctive relief was necessary in
addition,5 6 dismissal was a clearly proper and easy result to reach.
On these grounds, Douglas is readily distinguishable from the
situation posed in the 1971 cases. Certainly it did not compel
the Younger result."7 Indeed, like the cases in other areas which
it echoed, the apparently strict standard set forth in Douglas
was from time to time ignored altogether in opinions that reached
58
the merits of anticipatory challenges to state criminal statutes.
Younger, against this background, does represent something
of a departure both because of the breadth of its language and
because it specifically confronted the special problems posed
when a plaintiff seeks federal relief against a pending prosecution. With rare exceptions, prior cases either ignored the distinction between pending and nonpending prosecutions or considered
it in dicta.59 Younger, in concert with subsequent cases, built
5 Id. at i59-6o.
4
1d. at i66.
"Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
"The Court observed in Douglas that there was "no allegation ...

and no

proof that [the state authorities] would not, nor can we assume that they will not,
acquiesce in the decision of this Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied .....

319 U.S. at 165.

" Similarly, lower courts were able to escape Douglas or recognize modifications to it in cases challenging segregation laws in the South. See, e.g., Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., i94 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge court),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. ii (ig6i).
Further, Douglas obviously proved no obstacle to the Supreme Court decision in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

18 For example, only six weeks after Douglas was decided, the Court struck
down flag salute statutes without even considering principles of equitable restraint. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

See

generally Wechsler, supra note 2, at 813-33.
5"Dicta in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (i9o8), asserted that "the Federal
court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already
pending in a state court.".Id. at 162. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), approved

injunctions against official harassment and the enforcement of two city ordinances
without considering whether there were pending state proceedings. In Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927), the Court did focus on the presence of a

pending proceeding. It sought to accommodate the Ex parte Young dicta by upholding a declaration that the state antitrust statute at issue was unconstitutional
and an injunction against future enforcement, but reversing that portion of the
injunction that was directed at the pending prosecution. Id. at 452-53, 466.
While it manifests an awareness that pending proceedings may pose particular
problems, nothing in Cline suggests that the applicability of general principles of
restraint should be keyed to the pendency of state charges. Indeed, relief was
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on that distinction and created what amounts to a categorical rule
against certain kinds of federal interference.
B. Possible Justifications
Before analyzing the subsequent development of the Younger
doctrine, it is useful to pause on the 1971 decisions and the
intersecting concerns and values on which they appear to be
premised. This is particularly important in light of a recent
tendency to cite Younger and progeny uncritically for the proposition that federal courts should exercise restraint whenever they
are considering constitutional claims against state actors.00 That
tendency obscures the strengths and also the limits of the Court's
revivified doctrine of equitable restraint.
The 1971 decisions considered what this Part refers to as the
paradigm Younger fact situation: A plaintiff already enmeshed
in state criminal proceedings seeks from the federal courts a
declaration that the state law under which he is being prosecuted
is invalid and an injunction halting his prosecution. The Younger
Court's response to this situation was to establish a categorical
rule against federal interference with pending state criminal proceedings. This rule - like the equity, comity, and federalism
trilogy said to support it 0 -may be seen as a product of two
interrelated clusters of concerns and preferences.
i. Forum Allocation Preferences.-

Younger may be viewed

primarily as an effort to allocate constitutional litigation among
competing forums. The central problem then becomes which of
two remedies in two available court systems is appropriate for a
single constitutional problem. Younger can be seen as a refusal
to authorize a coercive remedy in the civil side of the federal
courts when an equivalent noncoercive remedy is available from
the criminal division of the state courts. In this mold, it expresses
any or all of three preferences.
(a) The Preference for Noncoercive Forms of Relief. Equity has long been concerned with minimizing the use of
coercive, disruptive remedies.12 The refusal to issue an injuncawarded in Cline and the Court's modification of the decree would most likely
have little symbolic- and no practical- significance.
"°See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (976); pp. 1329-30 infra.
"1No attempt will be made here to give precise or discrete definitions of equity,
comity, or federalism. While they may perhaps be isloated, see, e.g., The Supreme
Court, x975 Term, 89 Huv. L. REV. 47, 151 n.2 (1975), Justice Black seems to
have felt that the last two were inseparable, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(971).
As a general proposition, this Part will steer clear of the Court's specific
terminology and try to give content to its reasoning by examining the functional
concerns that underlie the somewhat rhetorical equity, comity, and federalism
trilogy.
02 See p. 1279 & note 40 supra.
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tion in Younger clearly responds to this concern. It expresses a
preference, at the very least, for a declaratory form of relief
where there is no reason to suppose that a declaration of invalidity- whether in the form of a declaratory judgment or a
ruling in criminal court-will not provide a complete remedy
for the plaintiff. This is made explicit by the fact that the
Younger Court carved out an exception for cases involving
prosecutorial harassment, thus reserving the possibility of injunctive relief where a mere declaration of invalidity might not
3
prevent further prosecutions and harassmentY
(b) The Preference for Relief in a Criminal Forum. -Even
in a unitary court system, a number of factors would support
a preference for leaving would-be civil plaintiffs in the criminal
forums in which they are already embroiled. First, requiring
the plaintiff to litigate his constitutional claim in the course of
his criminal prosecution is likely to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources 64 and protect prosecutorial discretion. Second,
it will hasten punishment of unsuccessful claimants and therefore
encourage compliance with the law. Third, it may be seen to
serve an independent, a priori value in permitting the smooth
and unimpeded operation of the collection of procedures that
make up the normal course of criminal justice. Fourth, it might
be argued that, insofar as opponents of the Younger cases belittle
the fairness and competence of state courts, deference to state
" Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (i971), holding that a constitutional de-

cision in the course of a pending state criminal proceeding is preferable to a federal
declaratory judgment, see p. 1277 supra, may be seen in part to res'o-d to t
preference for noncoercive forms of relief because of the Court's conclusion that
a federal declaratory judgment would have the same effect as an injunction, 401
U.S. at 73. Such reasoning, however, provides an incomplete perspective on
Samuels because it assumes away, rather than analyzing, the questions why that
effect will be the same and why it will be negative. The disinclination to award
federal declaratory relief is better understood with regard to the other two
forum allocation preferences discussed in text.
" The expenditure of judicial and prosecutorial resources will be increased by
permitting adjudication in the civil forum whenever the state defendant loses in
his declaratory judgment action and then raises the claim again during his state
court defense. Where the defendant is successful on the merits, the total resource
investment in the litigation will generally be the same as it would if he raised his
claim at the outset of the criminal proceedings. It should be observed that this
judicial economy argument is dependent on the not entirely plausible assumption
that state and federal courts will reach the same constitutional decision. The
contrary assumption that state courts are less sympathetic to constitutional claims
than are federal courts could lead to different judicial economy predictions because whenever the state court incorrectly rules against the plaintiff, the process
of securing a reversal within the state court system, on appeal to the Supreme
Court, or through postconviction procedures will consume resources that might
not have been consumed had a federal declaratory judgment action led to a
correct initial determination.
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criminal courts is likely to be least objectionable because criminal
procedures tend to be the most strictly regulated and scrutinized
by the Supreme Court. 65 In short, criminal forums may be
preferred both from the perspective of the judicial system and out
of concern for a broader view of the need to let law enforcement
authorities function without undue interference.
(c) The Preference for Relief in a State Forum.- Three
kinds of concerns favor state court adjudication. First, the decision to use the federal courts to decide issues that would otherwise be decided in the normal course of state proceedings often
will be perceived as a direct affront to state courts. " The more
inefficient and unexpected such a decision is, the greater will be
the affront. Major and frequent manifestations of disrespect for
state courts and the resulting affront may be seen as undesirable
because of their tendency to undermine confidence in state judges
and therefore to make it more difficult for them to perform the
myriad tasks thrust upon them in a federal system. Moreover,
such manifestations might become self-fulfilling prophecies if
state courts are widely scorned, important matters are habitually
removed from their jurisdiction and incentives to exert political
or social pressure to maintain or improve their quality are removed from prospective litigants."
Second, a preference for state forums may rest upon a series
of broad, a priori views about the history and value of states.
Among them: that it is more appropriate for state courts to decide
the validity of state laws; that such decisions are less intrusive
than would be federal ones, either because the identical decision
would be received with less hostility or because a different decision is likely; 68 that state legislative, executive, and judicial
" Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 6z-16 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that criminal process contains greater safeguards to prevent

its frivolous invocation).

"6 See id. at 61I; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).

" See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, go HAxv. L. REv. iioS (1977).
As in the case of many of the concerns that may be seen to support the Younger
forum preferences, any argument based upon affront is partially dependent upon
an assumption about the caliber of state courts.

A concern with minimizing

affronts to state courts must rationally focus primarily on unjustified affronts and
secondarily on any self-fulfilling prophecy argument. To the extent that one
adopts the assumption that substantial numbers of state courts are not equal to
the task of adjudicating, or are openly hostile to, federally protected rights, the

concern with affront diminishes substantially.
6 Different outcomes might be seen as desirable either because state courts
may be more sensitive to local peculiarities, see Neuborne, supra note 67, at 1128,
or out of a view that state judges are less likely to impose countermajoritarian
norms because of their closer ties to state politics, id. at 1130-31.

19771

DEVELOPMENTS- SECTION 1983

1285

machinery should have the opportunity to function unimpeded
and arrive at equilibrium."
Third, state forums may appear preferable to those eager to
reduce the activities of the federal courts. This approach stresses
either the beleaguered, docket-cluttered posture of the federal
judiciary today 70 or the relatively low priority - from some
unarticulated national viewpoint - of some of the claims raised
in Younger-type cases. In effect it may suggest that federal
courts either are, or should be, recognized as a scarce resource
and reserved for matters of greater dimension. 7 '
The preceding three preferences define the parameters of
what might be termed the forum-allocation component of
Younger. They highlight the concerns with minimizing coercive
remedies, conserving judicial and prosecutorial resources, encouraging compliance with the law, avoiding affronts between
court systems, furthering state autonomy, and curbing federal
judicial activism. Arrayed against them, of course, are the values
underlying section 1983,71 doubts about the competence of state
courts, 73 and the extra protection that forum choice provides for

constitutional claims.74 Our willingness to indulge forum allocation preferences in a given category of cases depends in part on
the degree to which these countervailing factors are implicated."
2. Constitutional Fallout.Forum allocation preferences
alone do not provide a complete framework for discussing the
Younger cases. There is an elusive substantive component as
well - one that goes beyond mere preferences for various forums
and generalizations about the adequacy of state court systems.
This component contains two strands.
First, the decision to discuss Younger in forum allocation
9 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. x67, 178 (1959) (ordering abstention
"so that federal judgment will be based on something that is a complete product
of the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as construed by its
highest court."); p. 1263 supra.
'°See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDaax JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-91
('973).
",See id.
2 See Mitchum v. Foster, 4o7 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972); pp. 1153-56 supra.

" See Neuborne, supra note 67, at

1121-24;

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.

225,

242 (1972).
14 Without

casting any aspersions on the general competence of state courts,
one might observe that the provision of forum choice will shift constitutional
litigation to the most sympathetic - and hence the most protective - forum
because rational forum-shopping plaintiffs may be expected to correct for local
variations between state and federal judiciaries.
's This is particularly true because the forum allocation concerns discussed in
text often support only relatively slight preferences. Further, they tend to be

concerns that are cumulative in nature and therefore would not be undermined
by occasional exceptions.
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terms is itself a decision of constitutional significance. It is a
decision that the only constitutional issue at stake is the validity
of the challenged state law- that being prosecuted under an
arguably (or actually) invalid law is not itself a deprivation.76
Younger dismissals inevitably involve such secondary constitutional decisions about burdens of being prosecuted. These, in
turn, appear to mandate a system of exceptions to the Younger
rules that will be sensitive to the nature of the -plaintiff's constitutional claim."
Second, there is sometimes a tendency to use the categorical,
rule-like quality of Younger to withhold federal relief in situations in which the only real issue is the merits of the plaintiff's
underlying claim. If given free rein, this tendency would cloak
within the forum allocation language of Younger a substantive
command, or at least an advisory opinion, for the benefit of the
state forum. Justice Black's consideration of overbreadth analysis in Younger foreshadowed this danger.7" His holding that
the state court should decide the validity of the challenged
statute was a clear forum allocation choice. Similarly, his conclusion that mere facial invalidity did not threaten the plaintiff
with sufficient harms to abort the state proceedings went to the
converse of the forum allocation choice - the harms of being
prosecuted. But Justice Black fired a broader salvo as well.
He argued that facial adjudication prevents a state "from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing . . . laws

against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good
faith to be punishable." "
The thrust of this attack is less than clear. As already pointed
out, some deference to law enforcement activities may be thought
desirable.8 " If so, it may support a preference for a criminal
forum. And it may also supply an argument against facial declarations of invalidity. But the two arguments are not related. The
rule laid down in Younger is based upon a comparison of different forms of relief in different forums and tells us little about
the substantive legal standard that should ultimately be applied.
Similarly, the propriety of the overbreadth doctrine is indepen" See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (I971) ("No citizen or member of
the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
(quoting Beal v.
acts.") (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (194)
Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (194))).
' It would surely be anomalous to permit a prudential forum allocation rule
to shape the substance of constitutional rights without analysis of those rights.
See pp. 1328-30 infra.
"8 See p. 1276 supra.
"9Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51-52 (1971).
"oSee p. 1283 supra.
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dent of the search for a proper forum.8 ' Younger is concerned
primarily with where and when relief is proper and with the
constitutional implications of decisions about where and when.
To extend it further into the area of whether there is a violation
is to impede analysis.
C. The FirstLimits
As the preceding Section illustrates, the 1971 decisions had a
chameleon-like quality. They could mean different things to
different observers. They considered a fact situation that was
too easy, a plaintiff with too little to complain of, and a forum
choice supported by too many intersecting concerns. It was not
long, however, before the Court made some efforts to clarify and
to narrow its early handiwork in response to concerns and values
central to section 1983.

In Mitchum v. Foster,2 the Court held that suits brought
under section 1983 come within the "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,83
which bans federal courts from enjoining ongoing state proceedings. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court vigorously invoked
the nationalist and constitutional values embodied in the provision of a federal cause of action and a federal forum under
section 1983.84 He noted that one of the problems Congress

recognized was the danger that state courts might be antipathetic
to the vindication of federally created rights.8 5 And he pointed
out that section 1983 was "a product of a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed . . .when

the anti-injunction statute was enacted." 86 While concluding
that section 1983 was therefore an exception to that statute,
From no perspective would it seem that the substantive standard should

8"

depend on which of the following scenarios precedes relief: Wi) a federal district
court applies the standard; (2) a state court applies the standard under the
impression that failure to do so would invite reversal; (3) the Supreme Court
applies the standard on review of a state court decision. The choice among
scenarios may implicate federalism or comity concerns, just as the process of
choosing a standard may. But the relationship stops there.
82407 U.S. 225 (1972).

33First enacted in 1793, Act of March

2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, i Stat. 335, the
U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). It states that a
federal court "may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect and effectuate its judgments." The statute's somewhat
obscure history and original purposes are discussed in Toucey v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 314 U.S. ixi8, 130-32 (194i). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
231-38 (X972); C. WRIGHT, LAW or FEDERAL CoUTs 177-82 (2d ed. 1970).
84 407 U.S. at 242-43.
" Id.at 242.

Anti-Injunction Act is now codified at

8

Id.
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Justice Stewart was careful to note that Mitchum did not "question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and

federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin
a state court proceeding." 87 Yet this reaffirmation of Younger
could not obscure the emphasis on federal rights and the plights
of federal plaintiffs.8"

That emphasis was sharpened and reiterated in Steifel v.
Thompson, 9 which confined the potentially very broad Younger
principles to cases in which state proceedings are pending.
Steffel held that a federal court may issue a declaratory judgment
absent a showing of irreparable harm, bad faith, or other extraordinary circumstances when the plaintiff is not the target of a
pending state prosecution." The Court emphasized that the
Younger concerns with "equity, comity and federalism have little
vitality" 91in the absence of a pending proceeding. Much of the
opinion was devoted to establishing that the Declaratory Judgment Act 92 was enacted to provide a remedy less intrusive than
an injunction and one that should therefore be considered under
8
88

Id. at 243.
The relationship between Mitchum and Younger is curious.

It was by

reference to the Anti-Injunction Act that Justice Black derived what he called
a "longstanding public policy" against federal interference with state proceedings.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Yet he went on to decide Younger
while explicitly reserving the question whether the Anti-Injunction Act applied
to suits brought under § 1983. Id. at 54. Mitchum, however, took the statute
which formed a portion of the foundation for Justice Black's edifice of restraint
and concluded that it does not apply to suits that- like Younger-are brought
under § x983. While not clearly inconsistent, the juxtaposition of the two cases
does suggest a certain circularity. And one might well ask why, if § 1983 qualifies
as an express exception from the letter of the statute, it does not also qualify as
an exception to judge-made rules derived from the statute. The question is not
addressed by the Court.
s941 5 U.S. 452 (1974).
90
1d. at 475. Justice Brennan's majority opinion cites and often tracks his
separate opinion in one of the original Younger companion cases. See Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93-130 (1971) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
91 415 U.S. at 462. In a somewhat different context, the Court had already
held that these same principles "have little force in the absence of a pending
state proceeding." See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 4o6 U.S. 498, 5o9
(,972) (considering the validity of state antipollution legislation). Analagously,
the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had reached the merits of an
anticipatory challenge to criminal abortion statutes without suggesting that anything in Younger and Samuels stood in the way, id. at z66-67, although it did
find that the Younger cases barred the suit of one plaintiff who was already
enmeshed in state proceedings, id. at 125.
In addition to defining the limits of the Younger doctrine, Stefel, Lake
Carriers, and Roe seem to have repudiated the sporadic tendency of earlier cases
to invoke the language of restraint and comity where state proceedings were
only threatened.
92 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201

(1970).
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a different standard.93 The Court recognized that the remedy was
intended to spare plaintiffs from having to make the difficult
choice between forgoing arguably protected conduct on one hand
and violating criminal statutes and risking penalties on the
other,914 and held without hesitation that, if appropriate at all,
such relief was appropriate in federal court.9 5 The possibility
that the case should be dismissed and the remedy sought in state
court was referred to only obliquely and swiftly rejected. 0 In
forum allocation terms, the Court declined seriously to consider
requiring the plaintiff to seek a noncoercive civil remedy in state
court rather than an equally noncoercive civil remedy in federal
couit when the state system was not already involved in the
case. It focused only on whether declaratory relief was appropriate. Where was considered an easy question - almost a given.
Its very easiness sheds a good deal of light on the foundations
of the Younger decisions. If the presence of pending state proceedings is critical to a Younger dismissal - as Steffel holds then the Younger rule clearly does not rest on concerns that are
of equal force whether state proceedings are pending or not.
Accordingly, neither the need to reduce the role of the federal
courts nor a general view of the appropriateness of permitting
state courts to test the constitutionality of state laws can be
sufficient grounds for a Younger dismissal.97 Rather, to the
extent that Younger expresses a preference for state forums, it
responds primarily to the component of that preference which
seeks to avoid affronts by permitting state courts to decide questions that would ordinarily come up in the normal course of ongoing proceedings.9 8
93 415 U.S. at 466-73. See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967)
(recognizing different standards and the need for separate inquiries into appro-

priateness of injunctive and declaratory relief). An injunction and its accompanying threat of contempt citations are likely to be a more intrusive remedy
than a declaratory judgment both because of their symbolic force and because of
the danger that they will genuinely chill prosecutors from bringing charges at the
periphery of the underlying constitutional decision when those prosecutions might
be permissible.
94 415 U.S. at 462.
"' Id. at 475.
96
Id. at 472-73. The Court observed that exhaustion of state judicial remedies
had not been required in suits brought under § 1983, cited Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (i96i), and noted that denying relief in Steffel would have amounted
to the imposition of a form of exhaustion requirement. See 415 U.S. at 473.
See generally Part V, pp. 1264-74 supra.
07 Both factors, of course, are present in Younger and Steffel. They do not
vary with the pendency of state proceedings and are therefore not determinative.
08 It seems quite clear that a concern with avoiding affront to state courts will
vary with the presence or absence of state proceedings. The notion of affront
contains a built-in normative component-it depends on the removal from a
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Further, the Steffel result suggests that the concerns underlying the preference for criminal over civil forums was of substantial importance in Younger. For, in contrast to the 1971
cases, those concerns are almost wholly absent in the Steffel
situation. There is no interest in exacting swift penalties when
the plaintiff is not being prosecuted. 9 The forum choice will have
no impact on prosecutorial or judicial resources.'0 0 And the
availability of anticipatory relief in the forum of the plaintiff's
choice will give him a greater incentive briefly to forgo arguably
prohibited conduct and challenge the statute rather than violating
it -thus
furthering the state's interest in exacting compliance
with its laws. 1°1
The plaintiffs in Steffel did not seek an injunction on appeal,
and the holding was therefore limited to the propriety of declaratory relief.'
For many of the reasons already discussed,
however, the absence of a pending state proceeding would seem
logically to require that an injunction be available without a
Younger showing of extraordinary irreparable harms. An injunction issued in the absence of state proceedings - like a
declaratory judgment in the same situation - would not reflect
poorly on the competence of state courts, interfere with the normal
course of criminal proceedings, or prevent the state from exacting
state court of an issue that would normally be tried in that court under circumstances that suggest the removal is motivated by a lack of confidence. A broad
rule conferring federal question jurisdiction or civil rights jurisdiction on the
federal judiciary does not suggest such a departure from the expected course of
things- or at least does not do so today, more than ioo years after such jurisdiction was created. However, when a state judge is about to decide an issue and
the federal court steps in, the picture is somewhat different and there might
reasonably arise a concern with the respect due to state courts. As Justice
Brennan observed in Steffel, "nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance
[i.e., where no state proceedings are pending], be interpreted as reflecting negatively
upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles." 415 U.S. at 462.
" The plaintiff in a preenforcement declaratory judgment action often will
not have violated the challenged statute and thus cannot implicate any state
interest in exacting penalties.
100 See 415 U.S. at 462.
101 The Steffel result actually supports three interrelated compliance incentives.
First, it ensures the availability of preenforcement relief in a proper case and thus.
enables plaintiffs to test their rights without stepping outside the law and risking
criminal penalties. Second, it gives them an incentive to do so in addition to the
desire to avoid penalties by providing what amounts to a free bite at the apple,
for if the plaintiff loses he can try again as a state court criminal defendant if he
chooses to violate the law. Third, to the extent that some plaintiffs desire to,
secure a federal forum because of their perceptions about the relative desirability
of different court systems, the juxtaposition of Steffel and Younger encourages.
them further to avoid violating the law by keying the availability of federal
relief to compliance.
102 P 5 U.S. at 456.
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a criminal penalty. In short, the drawbacks of both remedies are
diminished where no state charges are pending.' °
Yet the preference for noncoercive forms of relief noted in the
preceding Section and the historic equity rules which reflect it
clearly require a greater showing for an injunction than for a
mere declaratory judgment. 04 As observed above, the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended in part to permit anticipatory
relief in circumstances where a showing of irreparable harm could
not be made and where the coercive nature of injunctive relief
was not necessary. 105 To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff in the
Steffel situation should therefore have to demonstrate that he
needs something more than a declaration that the law he challenges is invalid. 10 This requirement could be met where the
prosecutor's prior behavior supports an inference that he will
ignore a valid declaratory judgment and subject the federal
plaintiff to further burdens. But the process of scrutinizing an
official's record and drawing inferences about the likelihood of his
behaving in bad faith may implicate federalism concerns. While
no reasonable policy of deference to state officials would stand in
the way of an injunction where the inference of bad faith was
clearly accurate, there might well be considerable uncertainty
about the prosecutor's likely future conduct. In such a case,
policies urging respect for state officials might be seen to support
a relatively strict standard to ensure that the federal courts err on
"'The decision this Term in Wooley v. Maynard, 45 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S.
April 20, 1977) suggests that the Court will not apply the stringent Younger
standards to preenforcement requests for injunctions against future prosecutions.
Plaintiffs there won an injunction on the basis of a showing which, notwithstanding language in the opinion to the contrary, id. at 4381, cannot be seen as sufficient
to meet the extra-heavy Younger requirements. The plaintiffs challenged a New
Hampshire statute making it a misdemeanor knowingly to cover the state motto
on automobile license plates. Id. at 4380. The Court found the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement, justifying the decree on the basis of
three successful prior prosecutions against one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 4381. Yet
those prosecutions had predated any determination that the state law was unconstitutional. Id. at 4380. Accordingly, the fact of those prosecutions did
not suggest that future prosecutions were likely to occur in the wake of an
authoritative constitutional pronouncement. Despite its citations to Younger
cases, id. at 438o-8I, it is therefore difficult to conclude that the Court was
applying anything stricter than a minimal irreparable harm standard. Indeed,
even under such a standard the result may be difficult to justify. See note io6
infra. Other aspects of the Maynard case are discussed at pp. 1344-45 infra.
104 See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
105 See pp. 1288-89 supra; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471-72 (1973).
"' This reasoning strongly suggests that the injunction in Wooley v. Maynard,
45 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. April 20, 1977), see note 103 supra, was inappropriate.
Not only must the Court have been applying a nonrestrictive standard to issue
it, but it appears in fact to have applied no standard-in effect to have collapsed
inquiries into the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief into a single quest.
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the side of deference and caution." °7 Where such a standard is
imposed, the plaintiff's federal rights should be protected after
the fact by recognizing that a prosecutor's decision to file charges
under a statute that has been declared invalid would generally
mandate an exception to the Younger rule requiring dismissal.'0 8
Such an exception would not lead to unjustified insults to state
prosecutors because it would only come into play after the uncertain inference-drawing process has been supplanted by a
record of actual conduct. Thus there would be no danger of unjustified inferences of bad faith.
D. Justiciability
Steffel and Younger provide alternative routes for citizens to
challenge the constitutionality of state laws. Under the former, a
person can obtain a preenforcement declaratory judgment. 0 D
Under the latter, he can violate the statute at issue and raise his
constitutional claims in the course of state court proceedings. 110
In a sense, the two routes stand in a reciprocal relationship: to the
extent that preenforcement relief is not available, Younger-type
cases will be more common.
Maintaining access to preenforcement declaratory judgments
will generally be in the interests of prospective plaintiffs and
society alike for a number of reasons."' First, such relief tends
to reduce uncertainty and with it the likelihood that persons will
refrain from engaging in conduct that is actually protected by the
Constitution and hence often valuable. Second, a system which
bars anticipatory relief in effect requires that some persons violate the law to realize the socially desirable goals of reducing the
uncertainty and the chilling effects of vague and overbroad statutes. Building in a need for violations is unlikely to spread re107

The imposition of such a strict standard viould not be proper under the

Younger rubric because, as already observed, the particular concerns that appear
central to Younger are not directly relevant in the absence of pending state
proceedings. This is not, of course, to deny some indirect analogies between
Younger standards and broader policies that may counsel deference. The point
is the more limited one that it can only lead to confusion if all decisions implicating federalism-related values are bundled into a single doctrinal package
with the appellation Younger.
108The text assumes, of course, that the prosecutor is seeking to apply the
law in a way contrary to the substance of a valid declaratory judgment. For a
more general discussion of the effect of federal declaratory judgments, see pp.
1354-60 infra.

See pp. 1288-89 supra.
0 See pp. 1275-78 supra.

10'
1

..See generally E.

BORCHARD,

DFCLARATORY JUDGMENTS

(2d

ed.

194);

Perez

v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (197)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting)
(discussing legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act).
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spect for the law or forward the more general social interest in
exacting compliance with valid laws. Third, such a system will
be forced sometimes to condemn and punish persons for behavior
in which they would not have engaged but for the good faith
belief that it could not be prohibited. Fourth, as already discussed, preenforcement review permits the plaintiff to choose his
own forum. To the extent that plaintiffs will behave rationally
and choose the most favorable forum, this may provide desirable
extra protection for constitutional rights even in a system in which
state courts are presumptively equivalent to federal ones. Where
there exist doubts about state forums, such extra protection is
even more desirable.
The availability of preenforcement review in federal courts
is largely regulated by the "actual controversy" requirement in
the Declaratory Judgment Act," 2 the "case or controversy" requirement of article III,"-' and the various prudential rules that
purport to build on those requirements. A restrictive application
of these threshold standards may in effect permit Younger to
swallow up Steffel" 4 and sharply curtail the availability of
federal preenforcement review.
Inquiries into the justiciability of a dispute or the existence
of an article III case or controversy may be made under a number of overlapping rubrics including standing," 5 injury in fact," 6
118
ripeness and mootness,"T the actual controversy requirement,
112 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
115 U.S. CONST. art. III.
1.4Cf. Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32, 35-37 (D. Minn. 1970) (three-judge
court) (alternative holding), aff'd mem. sub nom. Hodgson v. Randall, 402 U.S.
967 (1971). In that case a doctor's challenge to an antiabortion statute was
dismissed as nonjusticiable because no indictment had been returned. On petition
for a rehearing, the court refused to intervene because state proceedings had

commenced.
"'See generally L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADETrmsTRATIVE ACnoN
459-539 (1965); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (974); Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969); The Supreme Court, z975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56,
205-13 (I976) (discussing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,
426 U.S. 26 (976)).
110See,
e.g., Association of Data Processing
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
117

Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.

See generally Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88

HARv. L. REV. 373 (I974); cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 476 (974)
(Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring) (suggesting plaintiffs will have

difficulty showing that their claims are not too speculative or premature). See
also Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974).
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separation of powers, and the political question doctrines."'
Analysis of the justiciability problem tends to be clouded by the
conclusory language of the cases, 1'2 the blend within the doctrines
of constitutional and discretionary components, 121 and the recurring difficulty of separating what purports to be a threshold question from the merits of the case.'
Beneath the morass, there do exist a number of concerns and
policies which justiciability doctrines are intended to further.
Among them: (i) ensuring that the adversary process will effectively sharpen the issues presented, provide adequate representation for opposing views, and compensate for the fact that the court
may not be well equipped to gather and evaluate all the relevant
18

"Actual controversy," is the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act,

U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). While it could not, of course, cut back on the core
constitutional requirement, the legislative intent to ease access to the federal courts
for anticipatory relief, see p. 1288 supra, would seem to cut against judge-made
rules imposing greater than minimum threshold requirements.
11'See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-18
(x962). As a general proposition, the clearest strand of the political question
doctrine- the notion that certain questions are expressly consigned to another
branch- is of little relevance here.
120 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely
397 U.S. 150, 15, (970)
worthless . . ... "); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. X23,
i5o (ig5)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts
can be invoked only under circumstances which to the expert feel of lawyers
constitute a 'case or controversy.' ")
12 Though hard to identify, the constitutional component is clearly established
in text, see U.S. CoxsT. art. III, embodied in the general notion of separation of
powers, and reflected in the rule against advisory opinions, see HART AND
WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 64-70; Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitua substantial discretionality of Statutes, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1302 (z956). But
tionary component also is reiterated throughout the case law and literature, See,
e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-03
(ig6i) (Frankfurter, J.) (noting that article III "is not the sole limitation on
the exercise of our appellate powers, especially in cases raising constitutional
questions"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 223, x56
(i951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting fact that "hardship of denying
judicial relief" is part of inquiry into justiciability) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussion
of judge-made techniques for avoiding constitutional questions). See generally
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1667, 174--44 (1975) (arguing that restrictive discretionary standing requirements
may be more appropriate in constitutional cases than in statutory ones because
judicial resolution of the former may remove a case entirely from the political
process).
122 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dismissal on case or controversy grounds shades into discussion of merits); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (remarking that standing decision expresses hostility to merits) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490-99 (X974).
28
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data; 123 (2) avoiding unnecessary adjudication, both to conserve
judicial resources and to prevent the court from setting unnecessary constitutional precedents; 124 and (3) preventing the court
from intruding into the jurisdiction of other branches and putting
some checks on the exercise of its essentially undemocratic
powers. 2 5
Ordinarily, a court can make three overlapping inquiries to
further these goals. First, it can scrutinize the parties before it
and require some assurance that they will function effectively in
an adversary setting-perhaps by insisting on plaintiffs with a
personal stake in the outcome 126 and defendants who may
properly be required to provide some relief.'12 While often subsumed under the broad rubric of standing, this issue is perhaps
better referred to as the requirement that there be proper parties.
Second, the court can look to the timing of the litigation whether the claims are not yet ripe for decision or whether they
have become moot in light of intervening events. This is the
proper timing requirement. 28 Finally, the court may conclude
that a claim does not present a proper case- perhaps because
the issues are explicitly consigned to another branch, perhaps
because they are outside the competence of courts, perhaps because they are and always will remain too speculative, or perhaps
elusive, further-flung strand of the
because they implicate some
29
doctrine.'
question
political
As a general proposition, the proper case problem should be of
12'

ton,

See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 83, 99-IOI (I968); Sierra Club v. Mor-

405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (2972).
124 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48

(1936)

(Brandeis, J., concurring).
125 See generally cases cited note i19 supra.
12' See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) ; Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99-101 (r968).
127 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26,
40-42 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-I9 (I973).
128 The timing and party requirements may be intimately related. In particular, a party can be improper because, as to him, the case either is not yet ripe or
has been rendered moot. But parties may be held improper for reasons having
nothing to do with timing. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975).
And a claim may be regarded as not ripe with regard to all rather than just some
possible parties. See, e.g., Poe v. Ulman, 367 US. 497, 507-09 (1961).
120 It is not contended that the proper case requirement can be neatly isolated
from the other two. However, it is useful to attempt to distinguish those dismissals which suggest that the claim can eventually be brought -either by a better
those in which, however classified, the
situated party or at a later time -from
threshold decision effectively means that the claim can never be raised in federal
court. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). The
proper case requirement is meant to include these latter kinds of dismissals and
thus often seems similar to a decision on the merits.
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scant relevance to preenforcement attacks on the validity of
criminal statutes. There is little doubt that the constitutionality
of state laws is a proper issue for the courts, and it is clear that
preenforcement review does not itself force the court onto inappropriate terrain.130 The policies underlying the justiciability
doctrines are therefore primarily implicated in the anticipatory
relief situation by the party and timing requirements.' 3 '
Steffel itself presented a fairly easy case. The plaintiff was
able to show a specific threat of enforcement and to point to a
companion who had violated the challenged criminal trespass law
and been prosecuted .

32

Those showings left little doubt that

state officials intended to enforce the law against Steffel if he engaged in the specific conduct which he claimed could not constitutionally be prohibited. But Justice Stewart, concurring, suggested
that such a showing was "exceedingly rare." 131 And Justice
Brennan's opinion for the majority noted that Steffel still had not
conclusively met a final burden - the requirement that there be
a continuing controversy.3 4 One of the issues left to the lower
court on remand was whether the diminution of concern over the
Vietnam War in the years since the complaint was filed had mooted
Steffel's claim by defusing the issue about which he sought to
distribute handbills.3 5 Both suggestions contain seeds of an un' At the time of the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934, 48
Stat. 955, there was some question whether declaratory judgments would in effect
amount to unconstitutional advisory opinions. See, e.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928). The Court upheld the Declaratory Judgment
Act in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). That case, however,
was an action by the insurance company for a declaration that policies held by
the defendant had been voided by his failure to pay premiums. The defendant
alleged that a disability had relieved him of the obligation to pay. The case thus
considered the consequences likely to flow from prior and continuing events. It
did not pose the question of purely future conduct raised, and now settled, in
anticipatory challenges to criminal statutes like those discussed in this Part.
131 Before discussing these requirements in the context of preenforcement suits
for declaratory relief, it should be reemphasized that those suits do not -after
Steffel-pose Younger problems. In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (i97i), the
Supreme Court had used the Younger requirement of super-irreparable harm to
deny injunctive relief to plaintiffs who were not being prosecuted under the specific state law at issue. See pp. 1277-78 supra. In Steffel's wake it is clear that, what-

ever the wisdom of that outcome, Younger provided an inappropriate route. Its
particular concerns were of little vitality in that situation. There were three
real issues: Was the case justiciable? If so, was the challenged statute invalid?
And, if so, was an injunction proper or would a less intrusive remedy have sufficed?
This Section is concerned with the first question only and thus need not employ
the language of irreparable harm which would be relevant to the third.
132 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 455-56 (1974).
13 3

Id. at 476.

13" Id. at 459-60.
135 Id. at 46o.
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necessarily restrictive approach to justiciability which, if nurtured, could undermine the concerns favoring anticipatory relief.
Although some Supreme Court decisions seem to have required a specific threat of enforcement "I- sometimes under
the theory that the requirement was constitutionally compelled by
the eleventh amendment and the fiction of Ex parte Young "' recent cases have taken a broader view and recognized that the
probability of enforcement and a general picture of the categories
of conduct likely to be prosecuted under the challenged statute
can frequently be inferred from circumstances. 8' Where newly
enacted legislation applies by its terms to a discrete and readily
identified class of persons or conduct, for example, one often may
,presume that it will be enforced against that class.' 39 Similarly,
suphistory and contemporary practice under older statutes may
40
port clear inferences as to likelihood and probable use.
Unlike a specific threat of enforcement made to the plaintiff,
126 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (i961); Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S.

444 (1933).
137 209 U.S.

123 (i9o8). The theory stems from the Young Court's use of an
individual tortfeasor rationale to escape eleventh amendment objections to federal
relief. See p. i196 supra. By casting the complaint as one against an individual official, the Young fiction suggested that a case or controversy had to be
shown with that offcial. Hence a threat that he would enforce the challenged
law could be required rather than a more generalized showing that the law was
of
being enforced. See generally Comment, Threat of Enforcement -Prerequisite
a Justiciable Controversy, 62 CoLuit. L. REv. io6, 111-13 (1962); see also Spomer
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (i974) (remanding for determination whether election
of new State's Attorney moots controversy).
1'See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (975); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (permitting physician to challenge antiabortion law because of likelihood he will be asked to perform an abortion and will then have to
choose between forgoing conduct or facing prosecution); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (x968) (implicitly finding justiciability in teacher's attack on antievolution statute). Somewhat more restrictive is Rincon Band of Mission
Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d i (9th Cir.) (generalized threat to enforce too speculative to create actual controversy), cert. denied, 419 U.S. oo8
(1974).
120 See Lake

Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (3972);

Pierce v.

Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5io (3925) (permitting injunction despite absence
of any threat of immediate enforcement because statute was in effect self-executing); Joseph v. Blair, 482 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 3973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955
(1974) ; cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (sufficient threat
of injury found in statute that might lead to withdiawal of natural gas from
interstate market before provisions permitting such withdrawal had gone into
effect).
It is not suggested that the Supreme Court has steadily adhered to this analysis.
See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (finding nonjusticiable
an attack on statute by the class of persons to whom it applied.)
140 See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (973) ; Anderson v. Nemetz,
474 F.2d 814 ( 9 th Cir. 1973).
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an inference, however justified, that the state plans to enforce
challenged legislation may leave open a further question- the
particular plaintiff's relationship to the case. Where the plaintiff
presents evidence leading to the inference that he will be prosecuted, he will have established the requisite personal stake in the
controversy.1"' But laws may be challenged by persons who could
not themselves be prosecuted and nonetheless have a powerful
and direct interest in the case. It has been held, for example,
that pregnant women may challenge statutes prohibiting doctors
from performing abortions. 4" The Court has not, however, recognized couples in which the woman is not pregnant as proper
parties in such suits. 3 Efforts to make such distinctions apparently depend on the assumption that, by virtue of their relationship to a challenged statute, some plaintiffs are less able to perform their adversary role than others even though all say they are
committed to the litigation. Such distinctions depend as well on
the court's confidence in its ability to recognize improper parties
on the basis of objective criteria. Whether either premise is justified has been sharply questioned.'4 4
Similar problems may be presented by the requirement of a
continuing controversy if it is given too expansive an interpretation. There is no doubt that some claims may genuinely be
mooted.'3 But to dismiss a complaint like that in Steffel on
grounds that the leaflet distributor's cause has become history
appears both harsh and inefficient. There is no reason to believe
that the plaintiff lacks another cause, nor to assume that his
adversary vigor has been sapped.
There may, of course, be anticipatory challenges difficult to
support on the basis of inferences about enforcement probabilities- perhaps because the statute under attack is too vague, or
too new, or too old. Occasionally, such statutes may be of constitutional concern, either because of the opportunity they provide
for prosecutorial bad faith or because of the uncertainty and chill
caused by their broad sweep even if rarely enforced. To guard
against the first problem, it may sometimes be appropriate to require the prosecutor to cooperate in resolving ambiguities about
his future plans with regard to a particular statute and particular
conduct. The danger is that law enforcement officials may secure
a dismissal of suits for anticipatory relief on grounds that the
' In effect, he will have made a showing functionally equivalent to that of
a threat of enforcement.
142 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (I973).
14
3 Id. at 127-29.
14 4
See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analy-

sis, 86
145

HARv. L. REv. 645 (X973).
See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 8x8 (1974) (statutes repealed).
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absence of a threat of enforcement leaves the plaintiff with no
justiciable claim and may then file charges against the erstwhile
plaintiff. This could be prevented, and justifiable reliance protected, by either of two closely related techniques. The prosecutor might be held estopped from enforcing the statute against the
plaintiff, at least until intervening events put the plaintiff on
notice. Alternatively, the plaintiff could be allowed to assert his
reliance on the prosecutor's prior behavior as a defense to criminal
charges. While neither approach at first glance comports entirely
with established notions of prosecutorial discretion,' 46 some control would appear to be justified in a situation that poses such an
obvious risk of bad faith.
The chilling uncertainty of very broad statutes is more problematic. In a partial response, the Court has relaxed standing
under the overbreadth doctrine to allow persons being prosecuted
to attack the facial sweep of statutes without proving that their
own conduct could not constitutionally be prohibited.'47 Where
there exists a threat or inference of enforcement sufficient to support an anticipatory challenge, overbreadth analysis would similarly seem to permit a plaintiff in effect to assert the rights of
others. It is conceivable that there might exist a vague or overbroad statute so successful in chilling arguably protected behavior that no one, or virtually no one, violates it. Such a statute
would defy enforcement probability inferences and escape attacks
by actual defendants so long as no charges were filed. The example, however, is somewhat implausible. It rests on the dubious
premise that legislation which is never enforced will be familiar
to large numbers of persons and will cause them to forgo arguably protected behavior. Should something approaching this hypothetical actually arise, present doctrines seem flexible enough to
permit exceptions.' 4
Maintaining some flexibility is important more broadly because of the danger that timing and party requirements can combine in some contexts to make it impossible ever to assert certain
claims - a result approaching that of a decision on proper case
grounds or even a negative decision on the merits. Such a result
140 Cf. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1973) (subjecting prosecutorial decisions to federal court supervision deemed
inadvisable).
147See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83

HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970). The overbreadth doctrine was narrowed in Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6oi, 612-15 (1973), which limited it explicitly to state
efforts to sanction "pure speech" and required "substantial" overbreadth to trigger

the doctrine, id. at 615.
14 Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (i968) (challenge to unenforced
antievolution statute).
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may, of course, be correct in certain cases. But it should be
reached by a consideration of either the proper case rules or the
merits, not by a mechanical application of prudential doctrines
relating to timing and parties.
O'Shea v. Littleton 141 illustrates the dangers. Plaintiffs, civil
rights activists, charged a magistrate and a judge with discriminating against them in bond setting, jury fees, and sentencing.5 '
The Court held the claims too speculative and dismissed on article
III grounds. 5 ' In addition, the Court felt that plaintiffs who
might be able to assert less speculative claims would be barred
from federal court under Younger. 52 However, as the dissent
observed, the state procedures to which the majority was apparently willing to relegate such plaintiffs probably would not have
provided an opportunity for litigating class-based claims of discriminatory sentencing.' 53
O'Shea thus presents a case in which the alleged discriminatory practices would, if proven, be a fairly clear constitutional
violation.'5 4 It deals with an area -criminal

justice-

in which

the judiciary has broad competence and authority. It was
brought by the only group of plaintiffs available within the constraints imposed by other prudential rules which the Court does
not seem willing to modify. There was no reason to doubt the
vigor with which those plaintiffs would press their claim. Nonetheless, the Court held - explicitly on constitutional grounds '"
- that there was no case or controversy. The result appears to
call either for a more careful application of justiciability rules or
for a more sensitive application of Younger. 5
US. 488 (1974). For decisions echoing the problems in O'Shea, see Calvin
1251 (7th Cir. 1976) ; Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331
(8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976); Gardner v. Luckey,
5oo F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
150 44 U.S. at 491-92.
15 Id. at 493-99. The Court also said, in what seems to have been an alternative holding, that the kind of federal interference with a state criminal justice
149 414

v. Conlisk, 534 F.2d

system which the plaintiffs sought would have been barred by Younger. Id. at
499-500.
'11 Id. at 496. The problem is that to have a less speculative claim, a plaintiff
would have to be enmeshed in the state system. The Court seemed willing to
apply Younger to plaintiffs in that situation. Id.
3
" Id. at 5xo-ii.
54 Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (i886) (discriminatory application
of municipal ordinance violates the Constitution).

455414
U.S. at 493.
156

It is the intersection of justiciability and Younger that gives O'Shea its pre-

clusive power. Slack at either end would permit some group of plaintiffs to assert
the claim.
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E. Coverage Rules
Steffel made it clear that Younger would not, and should not,
become a broad call for federal judicial avoidance whenever the
plaintiff might seek similar relief by filing in state court. It declined, in other words, to reverse the no-exhaustion holding of
Monroe v. Pape 151 and establish state courts as the primary forum
for constitutional claims. Rather it established Younger as a rule
against federal interference in one category of cases - those in
which the plaintiff is the target of a state criminal prosecution.
But the broad language in Younger had strongly suggested - and
nothing in Steffel clearly refuted - the possibility that the rule
requiring dismissal and its underlying policies might have some
ramifications beyond the paradigm Younger fact situation.
The task of giving content to those ramifications has fallen to
subsequent cases which addressed the ambiguities left by the juxtaposition of Younger and Steffel. It continues to be a task with
two components. First, the factors which trigger a Younger dismissal need to be identified and crystallized into a series of criteria that define the coverage of the rule against federal interference. These criteria must also distinguish those situations in
which, -if relevant at all, Younger provides only an analogy and
not a mandate to dismiss. Steffel highlighted one such coverage
requirement: there must be a pending state proceeding. But it
left unanswered a number of important coverage questions. Among
them: At what point in time is the pendency of state proceedings
measured? What kinds of state proceedings require federal dismissal? Who is precluded from seeking relief in federal court?
What kind of federal relief is barred?
These issues sometimes shade into the second component of
the Younger analysis - the need to define those ad hoc considerations which are sufficient to overcome the rule against certain
kinds of interference even when the factors which normally trigger
that rule are present. This is the task of defining exceptions to
Younger which will protect constitutional values and the plaintiffs who assert them. Its goal is to ensure that the Younger rules
minimize not just the costs of federal interference with state activities, but the sum of the costs of federal interference and those of
noninterference in particular cases.
i.

Timing. -

The clear line drawn in Steffel between cases

in which state proceedings were and were not pending when the
federal complaint was filed was smudged by the Supreme Court's
decision in Hicks v. Miranda.'5 8 Miranda, the owner of an adult
theater, brought an action against California authorities who had
157365 U.S. 167 (ig6i).
158422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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seized several copies of an allegedly obscene film and initiated
prosecutions against two theater employees.' 0 Immediately after
they were served with Miranda's civil complaint, state officials
amended their criminal information by adding him as a defendant. 6 ° A three-judge district court ruled that Younger did not
apply because no charges were pending against Miranda when he
filed his federal suit.161 Alternatively, the court found that there
had been a sufficient showing of bad faith to meet the Younger
requirements if they did apply.'6 2 The district court went on to
statute unconstitutional and to order
hold the relevant California
63
the return of seized films.'

The Supreme Court reversed and held that Younger applies
when state proceedings are commenced at any time prior to "proceedings of substance on the merits" in federal court. 4 Further,
it strongly suggested that, even absent the amended criminal
complaint naming Miranda, the Younger burden would have to
have been met because of the substantial connection between
Miranda's interests and those of the employees named in the
original criminal complaint. 6 ' Finally, the Court rejected the
lower court finding of bad faith sufficient to satisfy Younger and
said the case should have been dismissed.' 66
In analyzing the timing rule set forth in Hicks, it is useful to
observe that a plaintiff seeking federal declaratory or injunctive
relief against a statute may be in one of three situations. First,
he may want to embark on a course of conduct that is prohibited
by an arguably invalid state law. This plaintiff poses no timing
problem of the sort faced in Hicks because a state cannot prosecute him for something he has yet to do. Steffel assures him a
federal forum and subsequent cases do nothing to deprive him of
it. If his claim is justiciable he can get a declaration of his rights,
and, in a proper case, an injunction may be available as well."6 7
Second, a plaintiff may have already engaged in forbidden but
arguably protected conduct which he has no intention of repeat159 Id.

at 334-38.
Id. at 338-39.
16' Id. at 340.
I"2 Id; see p. 1323 infra.
60

1

U.S. at 340.
at 349Id. at 348-49. For a discussion of this derivative preclusion theory, see

163 422

164 Id.
'

pp. 1314-17 infra.
166 422 U.S. at 350-52.

'0 See pp. 1290-92 supra. The Court treated the plaintiff in Steffel as
though he fell in this category and did not emphasize the fact that he had violated
the law in the past and had been warned not to do so again. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 455-56 (1974). But, of course, whatever the prior events, a claim can

be styled as one for future relief.
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ing. Such a plaintiff does not pose a compelling case for declaratory relief. He faces no difficult decisions whether to engage in
future conduct and risk penalties. His uncertainty relates only
to the consequences of past acts.' 68 If he is prosecuted, he will
have a forum in which to assert his federal rights. If he is not
prosecuted, he will have no federal rights to assert. While it may
not be necessary or possible for a court to weed out such plaintiffs,' 6 9 their situation appears neither to mandate special federal
solicitude nor to pose serious problems with the Hicks rule.
The third and most difficult case is the intermediate one in
which the plaintiff has engaged in the past and wishes to engage
in the future in conduct that is prohibited by an arguably invalid
law. Prior to the filing of criminal charges, such a plaintiff has
the same compelling need for certainty as the plaintiff in the first
situation. He looks, in short, like Steffel. Yet after charges have
been filed, that plaintiff is transformed into one closely resembling
the plaintiffs in Younger and Samuels. Hicks addresses the question whether prosecutors should be able to force plaintiffs who
have violated the law into the Younger mold despite their own
efforts to stay in the Steffel one.
Justice White's opinion for the majority provides little argumentation for the Hicks result beyond the remark that any other
outcome would "trivialize" Younger.170 Indeed, it is an opinion
remarkable in part for the absence of any effort to identify and
weigh the competing interests. The result, however, appears consistent with the concerns underlying Younger, although it may
suggest some change in emphasis.
The only difference between Miranda and the plaintiff in the
paradigm Younger situation is the historical fact that he filed in
federal court before the prosecutor filed against him. 7' That
distinction may reduce the danger that federal adjudication in a
Hicks-type case would be seen as an affront to state courts. In
Younger, allowing the federal court to hear the case would have
been a major departure from the normal course of criminal prosecutions. The magnitude of that departure and the absence of
other justifications might have led to an inference that doubts
108 He either will or will not be prosecuted and, if he is, he either will or will
not prevail on the merits. It might be argued that his interest in repose justifies
declaratory relief. Perhaps that is so, but it certainly does not compel it. It is
difficult to see why his repose interest cannot be satisfied by the applicable statute of limitations.
"0 They can conceal their status merely by alleging that they will again engage in the forbidden but arguably protected conduct.
170422 U.S. at 350.
171 The relationship between Miranda and the state court defendants is not
cons.dered here. For a discussion of this problem, see pp. 1314-i6 infra.
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about the competence of state courts led to the federal adjudication. Such an inference is less likely when a federal court is permitted to retain a case which was properly filed under Steffel, particularly when it has invested resources in the case. In other
words, commencement of the federal suit begins to provide and investment in that suit strongly reinforces - a visible nonderogatory reason for permitting the district court to retain the
case.
To the extent that an affront to state courts is unlikely, the
Hicks result seems to suggest an increased emphasis on the concerns underlying the preference for criminal over civil forums
because they are the forum allocation factors uniformly present
in Hicks and absent in Steffel. Relegating Miranda to a state
criminal trial before substantial federal involvement in the case
will conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources, hasten penalties
for conduct that can be prohibited, and encourage compliance
with the law. Indeed, it is 7the
course that probably would be fol2
lowed in a unitary system.1

The difficulty with the Hicks situation, though, is that any
rule can create what amounts to a race to the courthouse 173 by
parties seeking to take advantage of that rule. If the date of filing
is determinative, plaintiffs are likely to hurry to federal court to
forestall state prosecutions. And if the state prosecutors can force
dismissal by filing charges subsequently, they often will do so,
since there is every reason to assume that they will prefer prosecuting a criminal action in state court to defending a civil one in
federal court.174 While giving the prosecutor the advantage may
be an appropriate application of Younger during the period immediately after the federal suit is filed, it clearly becomes less so
as the passage of time and the expenditure of federal judicial resources reduce whatever affront is possible, impose interim burdens on the plaintiff,175 and create a situation in which dismissal
would waste rather than conserve everyone's resources.
This problem is only partially answered by the Hicks rule
"' Superimposing a federal-state system upon the concerns that would
ordinarily prevail in a unitary system adds reasons both for greater and for less
deference. The former are the federalism concerns discussed previously. See pp.
1175-90 supra. The latter include the values underlying § 1983, doubts about
the efficacy of state courts, and a related desire for forum choice. See pp. x167-75
supra.
173 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 354 (x975) (Stewart, J, dissenting).
174 Id. at 357.
17' Where the plaintiff seeks to engage in further conduct, delay may be ex-

tremely expensive to him. His need for a relatively swift determination of his
rights will generally not be implicated by a federal dismissal immediately after
his civil complaint is filed. In sharp contrast, if he has already invested time in
the federal proceeding, a dismissal prolongs his uncertainty.
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keying the prosecutor's capacity to secure a Younger dismissal to
whether there had been "proceedings of substance on the merits"
in federal court.1 6 Whatever the wisdom of the substantive balance struck in Hicks, this appears to be an inappropriate timing
formula for realizing it. First, it is ambiguous. Neither a proceeding of substance nor one on the merits is likely to be immediately
recognizable as such. 77 Second, there appears to be no reason
that a substantial federal court investment in procedural hearings
and rulings -

as opposed to those on the merits -

should not be

sufficient to forestall a Hicks dismissal. 7 Third, the rule is likely
to-have an undesirable impact on the course of litigation. Federal
courts may be hesitant to invest resources in declaratory judgment actions either because they would just as soon avoid the
case and want to give prosecutors ample opportunity to file
charges or because they are concerned that the time and effort
spent will not be found sufficient on review to escape the Hicks
rule.
These problems could be resolved by an alternative timing
rule with two triggers. First, a federal court should be permitted
to refuse to dismiss under Hicks a case in which it has made a
substantial investment,' 79 and a finding that the investment was
substantial should be given great deference on appeal. Second,
an arbitrary deadline should also be set so that - whether or not
there have been substantial proceedings - state officials cannot
force dismissal after a known period of time. Such a twofold
timing rule would avoid distorting litigation, ease the danger that
plaintiffs might be deprived of a forum for longer than necessary,
and permit the federal court some flexibility to make a swift investment in pressing cases without fear of dismissal on appeal.
The impact of a Hicks dismissal might be mitigated by permitting plaintiffs to obtain an interim order prohibiting further
prosecutions prior to a decision on the plaintiff's constitutional
claim in state court.180 Such an injunction would not, of course,
be proper unless the plaintiff could show a danger of irreparable
8
interim harms.' '
176422

U.S. at 349.

17 This point is discussed by

justice Stewart in dissent. Id. at 353 & n.i.

As he observes, the district court in Hicks itself had held proceedings bearing some
relationship to the merits: it had denied a motion for a temporary restraining
order on grounds that plaintiffs had failed to show a likelihood of success on the
merits. Id.
178 Id.

171 Whether such dismissal would be on the merits or not is irrelevant.
180 Interim relief is discussed in The Supreme Court, z974 Term, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 47, 165-67 (1975).

"I Preferable to an injunction, of course, would be a stipulation by the prosecutor that he will pursue but a single test case until the constitutional issue has
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The Supreme Court considered and rejected the possibility of
such interim relief in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 182 Plaintiffs in
Doran were three local tavern owners who had in the past offered
topless entertainment but ceased doing so when an ordinance prohibiting such entertainment was approved. 83 In a federal court
action under section 1983, they sought a declaratory judgment
that the ordinance was invalid and a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law pending a decision on the merits. 8 4
After the suit was filed, one of the three, M & L Restaurant, began again to offer topless entertainment and was served with summonses on several occasions. 185 The lower court granted the preliminary injunction for all plaintiffs.8 6'
The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the two plaintiffs
who had remained in compliance until the preliminary injunction
was issued. 8 ' While he expressed doubts about the propriety of
the relief in the particular case, 88 Justice Rehnquist reasoned for
the Court that a preliminary order for the two should be tested
under normal equitable standards, not Younger, 8 9 and that the
trial court's decision required substantial deference. 9 ° With
regard to M & L, on the other hand, Justice Rehnquist held that
the Younger principles prohibited all relief in federal court whether preliminary or final.'' Although his reasoning is not
explicit, the two paragraphs dealing specifically with M & L's
claim suggest that, because it was barred by Hicks from seeking
any final relief in federal court, preliminary relief was necessarily
out of the question as well.
The second proposition does not, however, follow from the
been settled. See, e.g., Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 221 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing prosecutor's stipulation not to seize film or interfere with
future showing pending outcome of trial); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
(suggesting that prosecutor's stipulation to test case creates situation
45, 50 (941)
in which plaintiff faces no irreparable harm).
182422 U.S. 922 (975).
113 Id. at 924-25.
84
' Id. at 924.
85
' Id. at 925.
186 Id.
87
1 Id. at 93o, 934.
188 Id. at 932 ("we regard the question as a close one").
189 Id. at 93o, 931. By holding that preliminary injunctive relief is available,
Justice Rehnquist provided the federal courts with a tool for evading the Hicks
timing rule, see pp. 1301-02 supra, that may mitigate some of its disAdvantaqes. A
plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction obviously cannot be prosecuted;
and a ban on prosecution removes from the state the capacity to trigger a Hicks
dismissal. The interim injunction therefore permits the court to protect its authority over the case.
1 0 422 U.S. at 931-32.
191 Id. at 929.
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first. Unlike final federal relief, an interim order would not have
interfered with the state criminal proceedings, been available in
the normal course of that proceeding, delayed punishment for the
prior act, or consumed additional judicial and prosecutorial resources.' 9' The forum allocation choice presented by a request
for interim relief was between a federal civil remedy and an
identical state civil remedy, and Steffel held that the mere hypothetical availability of a parallel remedy via a state civil suit is insufficient to require a Younger dismissal.' 93
To be sure, an interim injunction should not issue as a matter
of course. The plaintiff would have to meet the traditional requirements of equity - including a showing of irreparable injury
and a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 9 ' The latter
requirement may, at first glance, appear peculiar because the
federal court would have to make a tentative decision about an
issue which it is forbidden from finally resolving.' 95 But an estimate of the likelihood of success need be neither difficult nor
intrusive. To the extent that the Court is correct in its assumption
that state and federal courts are fungible, the federal court will
be perfectly competent to estimate the likely outcome no matter
where that outcome is to be determined. And this estimate is unlikely to interfere seriously with state decisionmaking. It is a
highly tentative determination and would appear to be a good
deal less intrusive than the parallel federal decision on the final
merits which Doran explicitly sanctions. 196
192 The statements in text do not go to the standard to be applied to a request
for interim relief -the amount of interim harm required to support such relief but rather to the fact that Younger does not bar it in federal court. A plaintiff
with a sufficient showing of interim harms has no adequate remedy by way of the
criminal trial. If he halts his conduct pendente lite and then prevails at trial,
he will not be recompensed for the costs of forgoing desirable conduct. Yet if he
continues with that conduct and then loses at trial, he may face substantial
cumulative penalties. The plaintiffs in Doran illustrate the dilemma. They were
potentially subject to daily and cumulative summonses. Id. at 925. They
alleged that if they were required to cease presenting topless entertainment, they
might be driven into bankruptcy. Id. at 932. Such a result, of course, would have
rendered an ultimate victory on the merits - whether in a declaratory judgment
action or a successful criminal defense- not only inadequate but futile. Younger
would therefore seem inapplicable.
19 See p. 2289 supra.
194 See generally Injunctions, supra note 40, at iO56.
1"' In Doran, the federal court actually will decide the final issue as well because, while M & L was dismissed, the complaints of the other plaintiffs continued
in district court. If M & L had been the only party seeking relief, the peculiarity
discussed in text would be more obvious. Then only in a hypothetical later suit
might the federal court decide finally the issue about which a request for preliminary relief requires an estimate.
19
"See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U.S. 922, 928 (i975) ("the interest of
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While it is not anticipated that there will be many successful
pleas for interim injunctions, such relief may sometimes be necessary to accommodate the policies underlying Hicks and Younger
with the needs of plaintiffs who cannot afford to halt their conduct or risk the cumulative penalties that might result from continuing it. Making such an accommodation in those cases will be
the only way of preserving the constitutional issue which Younger
and Hicks say should be decided in state court.
2. The Nature of the State Proceeding.-

The Younger doc-

trine was initially articulated, and seemed most solidly established,
in cases where the pending state proceedings were criminal in
nature. But it soon became apparent that the concerns underlying Younger carried weight even when a federal district court
was asked to enjoin pending state civil proceedings or to decide
issues that would otherwise be litigated in the course of such
proceedings.
The Supreme Court first addressed the problem in Huffman
v. Pursue,Ltd.,19 7 and concluded that a Younger showing must be
made before a federal court can interfere with state-initiated
civil proceedings that are "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." 19' The federal plaintiff's predecessor in a leasehold interest had been the defendant in state court proceedings
brought under an Ohio law characterizing the showing of obscene
films as a publice nuisance. 99 An unappealed abatement order
had been entered in state court requiring that the plaintiff's
cinema be closed and the personal property used in it sold." °0
Plaintiff brought suit under section 1983 seeking an injunction
against the state court order.2 1 Reversing a three-judge district
court, Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the Court that, just as in
Younger, federal interference would intrude on state functions
and reflect negatively on the competence of state courts. 0 2 He
apparently saw in Younger a broad policy of deference to important state functions that applies whenever state officials have instituted proceedings in state court. In addition, Justice Rehnquist held that Younger applies where a plaintiff has failed to appeal an unfavorable state court decision - thus requiring him to
avoiding conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues, while entitled to
substantial deference in a unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated to the
claims of federalism in this particular area . . . ."). The threshold determination
of substantial likelihood does not pose a danger even of conflicting outcomesmerely that of an incorrect estimate.
197 42o U.S. 592 (I975).

'08 Id.

at 604.
19 Id. at 595-98.
200

201
2 02

d.at 598.
Id. at 598-99.
id. at 6o4.
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pursue all appellate remedies once the pendency of state proceedings has triggered the Younger rules. °3 In support of this position, the Justice noted that once a trial has taken place federal
interference would lead to even greater duplication. Such interference would also, he reasoned, deprive states of the function of
"goverseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues." 204
Lower court decisions - both before and after Huffman have extended Younger further. 0 5 They have held, for example,
that a federal court must defer to disbarment proceedings, 0 5 civil
injunctions issued by state courts,2 0 7 eminent domain proceedings,2 °8 domestic relations litigation, 0 9 some administrative proceedings,210 and other litigation.21 '
This Term, in Juidice v. Vail,212 the Supreme Court extended
. 03 Id. at 6o8-og.
204 Id. Justice Rehnquist's result appears proper. In effect, the plaintiff sought
collaterally to attack the continuing effects of a state court abatement order. A
quite different case, of course, is posed when a plaintiff who has in the past been
convicted of an offense challenges the future applicability of the statute defining
that offense. No requirement of appeal would attach to such a case because the
plaintiff would not be seeking "federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding
as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies," id.
at 6og. Rather, he would be seeking prospective relief. This was made clear in
this Term's decision in Wooley v. Maynard, 45 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. April 20,
1977), which affirmed anticipatory relief notwithstanding prior unappealed state
convictions. See note 1o3 supra.
20' A number of Supreme Court Justices apparently favor such an extension.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman suggested that the Court bad created a
"civil counterpart" to Younger. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 6I
(I975). Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
argued that Younger should be extended into the civil area in his dissents in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97-99 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 56o-6i (1972).
206 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (i975) ; Goodrich v. Supreme Court, Si F.2d 316 (8th
Cir. I975); Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132 (D. Hawaii 1976).
207 See Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4 th Cir. x973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (974).

See also Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973) (injunction tied

to criminal statute issued to keep nonstudents from state university campus),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (I974).

See Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975) (using Younger
and abstention doctrines) ; Sorger v. Philadelphia Redev. Auth., 4o F. Supp. 348,
201

353-54 (E.D. Pa.

1975)

(dictum).

See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976).
210 See McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting application
to police disciplinary proceeding) ; Do-Right Auto Sales v. Howlett, 401 F. Supp.
io35 (N.D. Ill. 1975); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (implied in
dictum).
211 See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 6o3 (7th Cir.) (dispute among rival
delegations over certification for political convention), stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201
201

(1972)

(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 22, 1977).
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Huffman and Younger to contempt proceedings initiated by private parties. Plaintiffs, a class of judgment debtors, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against statutory contempt procedures under which the successful creditor could subpoena defaulting debtors to a postjudgment deposition and, when they failed to
comply, take steps leading to a court-ordered show-cause hearing
and ultimately to a contempt citation punishable by fines and imprisonment.2 13 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist first
denied standing to all plaintiffs save those already subject to contempt orders and thus in imminent danger of incarceration.2 14
He then held their claims barred by Younger because they could
have raised their due process objections to the proceedings in state
court if they had complied with orders to attend show-cause hearings.215 Citing the broad federalism language in Younger, Justice
Rehnquist stressed the importance to the state of exacting compliance with court orders. 1 6 He suggested that federal interference
would offend this interest and reflect negatively upon the state
courts.2 1 7

The implications of the Vail decision are far from clear. While
Justice Rehnquist held that Younger and Huffman "are not confined solely to the types of state actions which were sought to be
enjoined in those cases," 218 he explicitly eschewed full consideration of "the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation." 210
Indeed, contempt proceedings of the type at issue in Vail form a
poor basis for further generalizations and may in fact be sui
2 13

id. at 4270.
Id. at 4271. The certified class was made up of "all persons who have been
or are presently subject to the civil contempt proceedings." Id. at 4270. Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that those who had been incarcerated and released and paid
their fines "no longer had a live controversy." Id. at 427x. He noted that there
had been no allegations that the plaintiffs thus excluded might be subject to
future contempt orders. Id. at 4271 & n.9.
2 14

211 Id. at 4272 & n.14. The Court's reasoning seems to divide the due process
issue into two questions: (i) whether the state proceedings were adequate as a
prelude to contempt citations, incarceration, and fines; and (2) whether they
were adequate to consider the due process issues raised by inquiry (i). Justice
Stevens concurred in the opinion on non-Younger grounds. Id. at 4274-75. He
openly, but briefly, reached the merits and approved the state procedures. In effect,
he concluded that the two inquiries suggested above are really one, that the state
proceedings comported with due process, and therefore that the plaintiffs could
constitutionally be relegated to them. Id. at 4275. He felt that the nature of the
case made Younger "inappropriate" because a decision to relegate the plaintiff to
his state proceedings necessarily required a decision that those proceedings were
adequate. Id. This approach may suggest the need to recognize a category of
cases in which Younger dismissal is an improper tool. See pp. 1320-21 infra.
216 45
2 17

U.S.L.W. at 4271-72.

Id. at 4272.

21
21

' Id. at 4271.
1 Id. at 4272 n.13 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420

U.S.

592,

607 (x975)).
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generis. While not part of the normal criminal process, they lead
to penal sanctions of a type rarely imposed except to further
important state interests. While triggered by private parties, they
impose few burdens without the significant involvement of the
judge. While often promoting the interests of private litigants,
they also serve the public interest by protecting the smooth functioning of the court system. Accordingly, notwithstanding their
civil, private posture, these contempt proceedings are in significant respects akin to the more public, prosecutorial, enforcementoriented proceedings held to support Younger dismissals -in earlier
220
cases.
Three possible stopping points suggest themselves as one attempts to answer the question left open in Vail and define the
types of state proceedings that should trigger the Younger rule.
First, one might advocate a retreat to the line drawn in the 1971
decisions and limit the doctrine to pending criminal proceedings.
The rejection of this line in Huffman, however, seems justified.
While nominally civil, the purpose of the action was to enforce
substantive policies to which, wisely or not, the state attached importance. Permitting a federal court to determine the validity of
the state statutory scheme would delay effectuation of those policies, drain prosecutorial resources, cause some duplication of judicial effort, and perhaps impugn the competence of state courts. It
would, in short, run precisely counter to the forum allocation preferences held determinative in Younger.
To be sure, as Justice Brennan argued in his Huffman dissent, 2 11 criminal charges, unlike a civil action, can be brought
22 2
only after a number of formal procedural steps have been taken..
But the safeguards to which he refers - "arrest, charge, informalikely to be but minor checks on
tion or indictment" 223 -are
the dangers of frivolous or bad faith prosecution. 224 And, whether
220 Therefore, at least as a matter of logic, the Vail decision does not support

an extension of Younger to civil cases generally. But in his fiery dissent, Justice
Brennan asserted that the question of further extensions had been reserved in
name only, 45 U.S.L.W. at 4273 n.*, assailed the decision as a "plain refusal to
enforce the congressional direction" underlying § 1983, id. at 4273, and insisted
that Younger had no application to suits between private parties, id. at 4273-74.
221 420 U.S. at 613-18.

22

.dat 615. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion considered the somewhat

different argument that the absence of habeas corpus relief in civil proceedings
renders Younger inappropriate. Justice Rehnquist questioned the "unarticulated
major premise" that every litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to the
"luxury" of a federal forum, and asserted that, if such a right existed, it should
not at any rate be asserted prior to the completion of all state court proceedings.
Id. 2at
6o5-o6.
2

3 Id. at 615.
Whether criminal or quasi-criminal, the state proceedings are invoked by

224

state officials -perhaps

the identical state officials. And there is no reason to
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the state proceeding is civil or criminal, the Younger doctrine
should be able to respond to bad faith prosecutions through its
exceptions, not through coverage rules.
A second possible stopping point for the Younger doctrine
would be the Huffman rule - that the state proceeding must be
in aid of and closely related to a criminal statute.225 Yet it is not
clear that a state's purely civil enforcement actions are less deserving of deference, less important, or less presumptively valid
than its quasi-criminal actions. In either case, state officials are
using the state courts to enforce substantive state policies, and
federal interference will delay enforcement, consume resources,
and give rise to an affront to state courts.
A third effort to contain the Younger doctrine would hold
that it applies to any state judicial proceeding brought by the
state to enforce its laws and policies, but not to civil suits initiated
by private parties. Keying the application of Younger to the
state's involvement in the proceedings has some appeal. 2 Where
the state court action was brought by a private party, no executive or administrative resources will have been committed to
it. In addition, any 'presumption that state authorities by and
large act in good faith would clearly not apply to private parties
who could seek to use a state's judicial machinery for harassment
purposes. 227 Further, when the state leaves certain substantive
policies to private enforcement, it may well have made a judgment
that those policies are less pressing than others to which it devotes substantial executive resources. Accordingly, the delays
that might result from permitting federal interference would
appear less problematic. Finally, while there remains tension
between state and federal courts, and hence some danger of
affront, that danger may be less great during the early stages of
private civil litigation because it often will not be clear which
constitutional issues will be litigated in the state court proceedings.228 This analysis suggests that, at least initially, there is a
assume that it will be more difficult for a hypothetical wanton official to make
out charges or an information and order an arrest than to file a public nuisance
action.
225 420 U.S. at 604.
226 This view is urged in Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine oj

Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUxE L.J. 523, 558-59.
227 It is in the private litigation area that the dangers referred to by Justice
Brennan in his Huffman dissent seem most serious. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 615 (1975) ("To deny . . . the potential federal plaintiff a federal
forum . . . is obviously to arm his adversary . . . with an easily wielded weapon
to strip him of a forum and a remedy that federal statutes were enacted to
assure him.").
221 Insofar as affront responds to departures from the normal course of liti-

gation - from a federal decision on issues obviously pending before a state court-
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good reason not to extend Younger into the area of private civil
litigation. But the picture changes somewhat as the state court
becomes increasingly involved in a lawsuit. Duplication of effort
becomes more serious and affront more likely as the state judge
nears a decision on the constitutional claim the state defendant
would like to assert in federal court.
While the problem of overlapping private state and federal
suits has generally been dealt with under other rubrics,229 it has
been suggested that Younger should apply in this area. 230 If so,
the preceding discussion suggests that a timing rule different
from the one set forth in Hicks is necessary. Where no state
executive resources have been committed to a case and there is
less danger of affront to state courts, the determinative factors
in the Hicks result are absent and Younger should not defeat
a plaintiff's choice of a federal forum for a federal constitutional
claim, even if a private action has been filed against him in state
court.23 ' In contrast, when it is clear that the state judge has
made a substantial investment in the case, is about to decide the
plaintiff's constitutional question, or has already decided it,
Younger could be held to mandate federal restraint in the absence
of recognized exceptions.
By relating the applicability of Younger to the state court's
investment in the proceedings, such an inverse version of the
Hicks timing rule would confine Younger to those private civil
suits in which it seems more nearly relevant. The practical effect
of such a rule might in fact be relatively minor. The federal
court might abstain or stay proceedings even if Younger were
not applied.232 And the state court defendant who seeks federal
a private civil proceeding would appear to pose fewer problems. It generally is
more freewheeling in structure and uncertain in scope; as a result, especially in the
period shortly after the filing of the complaint, it is unlikely that a federal decision on an issue will have the directly intrusive quality present in the paradigm
fact situation.
229 See, e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 1257-61; Note, Stays of
Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 6o
COLULC. L. REV. 684 (ig6o); ALI, STUDY OF THE DivIsIoN OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 137I(f) (1969).
220 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 363, 380 (1976)
(dictum broadening Huffman); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 561 (1972) (White, J., dissenting with Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, 3.) (urging applicability of Younger to civil
cases).
23 1 This is not to say that the federal court may not conclude that it should

stay its hand pending a state determination. The point is that the firm categorical
rule of Younger should not apply.
232 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 8oo (x976); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942);
Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Redo, 52o F.2d 1342 (ist Cir. 1975)
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declaratory relief under section 1983 against the private plaintiff
in the state suit may be faced with serious state action problems
where his claim is triggered only by the filing of a private complaint.3 3
3. Derivative Preclusion.- The parties prevented from raising claims in federal court in the paradigm Younger situation
were themselves the defendants in the pending state court proceedings. In Hicks,2 34 however, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that a Younger dismissal might be required where the
federal plaintiff, although not himself the target of state proceedings, controls the defense to those proceedings, could adequately
assert his constitutional claims within them, and seeks in federal
court to abort them.235 While it ultimately did not rely on this
notion of derivative preclusion,236 the Court asserted that
"[a]bsent a clear showing that appellees . . . could not seek the

return of their property in the state proceedings and see to it
that their federal claims were presented there, the requirements
of Younger v. Harris could not be avoided . .

23

Similarly,

other Justices have suggested that an organization whose asserted
claims and rights are derived from its members would be precluded from challenging a state's prosecution of its members
unless it could make the special showing required by Younger.23
It is submitted, however, that any extension of Younger to
nonparties via a derivative preclusion theory is unjustified. It
should be observed at the outset that some duplication and overlap is inevitable in a federal system. Steffel and Doran leave no
doubt that it is perfectly proper for state and federal courts to
(holding that Younger does not apply to privately initiated state civil proceedings but that exercise of jurisdiction was matter of discretion for district court).
233 See Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300, 1307-12 (5th Cir. 1971) (relying upon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948), for dismissal on grounds that there is no state action
until state courts have acted), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (972) ; Stevens v.
Frick, 372 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 920 (1967); Gras v.
Stevens, 45 F. Supp. 1148, 1I52 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
This approach to state action does not seem inevitable. Cf. Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) (reaching merits without discussion of state action in suit
filed by private tenant against private landlord who had threatened to invoke
state summary eviction procedures).
234 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (i975).
235 Id. at 348-49.
...The Court's holding in Hicks was based upon the new timing rule it advanced. See p. 1302 supra. Accordingly, the force of its discussion of what
this Section calls derivative preclusion is less than clear.
237 422 U.S. at 349. The Court also discussed derivative preclusion in Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975).
211 See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 830-32 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring
and dissenting, joined by White & Rehnquist, J.).
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decide identical issues, nearly simultaneously, at the behest of
legally unrelated parties. 39 The inefficiencies and conflicting
decisions that result are costs of federalism, justified by the need
to accommodate the interests of federal plaintiffs in Steifel-type
situations with those of the state in Younger-type cases. Even
when the federal plaintiff is the state defendant, he may be
asserting what to him is a distinguishable right, one that goes to
the future rather than the past. Younger precludes such a plaintiff's federal suit in those situations in which there is little reason
to doubt that his state defense will provide an adequate remedy
for both facets of his claim. Where the federal plaintiff is not
the state defendant, there is likely to be a greater divergence
between his claim and that at issue in the state proceedings, as
well as a good deal less reason to rely upon the adequacy of a
state court defense. First, unless the nonparty federal court
plaintiff clearly cannot engage in the future in conduct barred
by the arguably invalid statute he challenges,2 4 ° it will be impossible to assume away the Steffel-like facet of his complaint his own desire for certainty as to his future rights. That the
fulfillment of that desire will affect, perhaps seriously, someone's
pending proceeding is not grounds for dismissal under Steffel
or Doran.2"' Second, permitting the nonparty's federal suit will
not interfere with state prosecutorial decisions or consume state
executive resources in cases where the nonparty could have been
named in the criminal complaint. A rule permitting his federal
suit without regard to Younger may encourage state officials to
charge more parties at the outset. 4 2 More likely, it will simply
encourage the state to do what it did in Hicks -amend
the
criminal information after the 1983 suit is filed. 43 Either way,
239

See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,

422

U.S.

922,

927-28 (2975)

(conceding that

parallel and potentially contradictory state and federal suits are necessary result of
a federal system); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (permitting federal
declaratory relief for plaintiff whose erstwhile companion violated the challenged
state law and faced state prosecution). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
240 In such a case he might well be unable to show the requisite case or controversy in any event. See pp. 1292-1301 supra.
241 In Hicks, the Court seemed to suggest that the intentions of the nonparty
federal plaintiff were important. 422 U.S. at 348-49 ("[T]he federal action sought
to interfere with the pending state prosecution."). It is of course true that it is
easier to assume an identity of interests between parties and nonparties where
such an intention is evident. But no rule keyed to the intent of the federal suit
would be workable because pleadings could simply be altered to seek apparently
neutral declaratory relief.
242 It seems unlikely that the threat of a federal action would encourage state
officials to file charges against improper parties who could not conceivably be convicted. But if it did so, that conduct would suggest the kind of bad faith that
is sufficient to overcome the Younger burden. See pp. 1323-24 infra.
24IHicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). As in note 242 supra, where
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the state has considerable latitude to avoid any adverse consequences that might stem from allowing the nonparty's federal
complaint to proceed.
Third, because of the considerations discussed in the preceding paragraph, the class of persons most likely to be precluded
under a derivative theory will be made up of those who could
not have been named as criminal defendants either at the outset
or after the civil rights action was filed. One might well wonder
whether a person who could not have been named 'in the state
information has a genuine opportunity to assert his interests by
virtue of whatever control he exercises over the criminal defense
put on by someone else. Fourth, it might more generally be
undesirable to encourage nonparties to dictate strategy to criminal
defendants. It is quite possible that the defendant will have
divergent interests. For example, he might want to enter a plea
while the nonparty would prefer to litigate a constitutional
claim. 44 Conversely, the nonparty might want the defendant to
plead out and bring an end to the state proceeding so that he
can get swiftly into federal court. In short, the separate rights
of separate persons would be improperly and haphazardly combined by a derivative preclusion rule.245
prosecutors add the nonparty to the indictment merely to forestall the federal suit
without any intention or reasonable expectation of securing a conviction, there
would be grounds for an exception. Hicks suggests that such a showing must include more than the mere fact that charges were filed after the plaintiff filed a §
1983 suit. See id. at 350-51 & n.z9 (reversing lower court determination that
plaintiff had been added to the state criminal complaint in retaliation for instituting federal court litigation and therefore was victim of bad faith prosecution).
244 Litigating the claim-or having it litigated- in the state court might provide the nonparty with a free try at his constitutional assertion prior to instituting
a federal action.
242 The problem may be especially severe where the federal plaintiff is an organization or institution that is asserting the rights of a group of personsperhaps including the state court defendant. In Allee v. Medrano, 46 U.S. 802
(i974), the Court failed to reach the applicability of Younger to a challenge to
state statutes allegedly used in a systematic official campaign to crush union
organizing efforts. Id. at 816--21. The class action suit was brought by union
members and the union organizing committee. In their concurring and dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist urged that a
Younger showing would have to be met if any of the plaintiffs were being prosecuted, id. at 830-31, and that the union would not be able to aggregate the harms
facing its members for purposes of making such a showing, id. at 838-39. Rather,
they concluded that the union could make the required showing only if the state
court defendant could have done so. Id. Both suggestions would appear to ignore
the fact that the organization can assert claims and rights beyond those of the
individual defendant. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 37, U.S. 45, 428 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958); Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc. v. Nassau County, 488 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1973) (Younger
does not bar organization's challenge to antisolicitation ordinance notwithstand-
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It is not contended here that precluding only actual parties
corresponds exactly with the concerns to which Younger responds. There may, to be sure, be cases in which none of the
aforementioned difficulties is likely and, despite his different
identity, the federal plaintiff closely resembles the plaintiff in
the paradigm fact situation."' The question posed here is not
whether such cases exist, but whether the general problem is
best addressed by a derivative preclusion rule-which either
will require a rather close investigation in every case or will
sweep too broadly- or by a party preclusion rule that would
key the applicability of Younger to whether the state had decided
to 1rosecute the federal plaintiff. The second rule would appear
to be preferable.
4. The Nature of the Plaintiff's Claim. -The
preceding
discussion has focused upon plaintiffs seeking declaratory and
sometimes injunctive relief from pending state proceedings on
grounds that the statute being applied in those proceedings is
unconstitutional. It has sought to develop a series of rules for
defining the coverage of the Younger doctrine in such situations.
But even when those requirements are met, a federal plaintiff
who is also the target of state proceedings is properly barred
only from asserting a fairly specific category of federal claims.
A host of possible suits by such a plaintiff would simply have no
impact on or relation to any state litigation in which he is
embroiled. Other suits, although perhaps related to the state
proceeding or to the events which gave rise to that proceeding,
will not raise the specter of affront to state courts, duplication of
judicial effort, consumption of executive resources, and interference with state enforcement that gives vitality to the Younger
preclusion requirement. Accordingly, a final coverage parameter
must be considered - one that seeks to distinguish among claims
made by federal plaintiffs and to isolate the few that, like the
prayers for injunctive and declaratory relief in the paradigm
fact situation, present the peculiar array of factors that justifies
ing pending proceedings against its members because the organization's interest
lies in the future.).
240 Lower courts have sought to identify such cases and apply Younger to
them. See, e.g., Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 205 & n.8 (7th Cir.
1976) (prosecution of theater manager precludes suit in federal court by theater) ;
Gajon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Kelly, 5o8 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974) (Younger applied
to suit by tavern and manager when tavern employees, including manager, were
targets of state proceedings). See also id. at 1323 (Kaufman, C.J., concurring)
(expressing concern about extending Younger to "cases where an institutional
plaintiff exists primarily for the expression and defense of the right sought to be
protected . .. [or where] no individual could adequately safeguard a widely held
interest").
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overriding a plaintiff's choice of forum and relegating him to
his state proceeding.
It is useful to begin with the easy case posed by the prayers
for declaratory and injunctive orders in the paradigm fact pattern.
At the risk of being somewhat repetitive, they have the following
characteristics: (i) the federal court is asked to make a decision
that would directly affect, and might well abort, the pending state
proceeding or some facet of it; (2) there is an opportunity to
raise in state court the issue sued on in federal court; (3) that
opportunity arises in the normal course of the state proceeding
and the relevant constitutional question is one that would otherwise (and might still) be raised during that proceeding; (4) a
favorable decision in state court would generally remedy the
asserted constitutional violation.2 47
These characteristics, in turn, relate directly to the harms
Younger and its progeny seek to avoid. Without (i) there is no
major interference with the state's enforcement of its substantive
policies. Without (2) and (3) there is unlikely to be any affront
to state courts. Without (2) and (4) the federal plaintiff would
not have the adequate remedy which serves as a predicate for a
Younger dismissal. And without (3) the dismissed federal plaintiff would in effect be required to initiate state litigation - to
act like a plaintiff rather than a defendant in state court - which,
under Steifel, is not required and would run counter to the command of Congress.
In contrast, where the federal complaint does not raise issues
identical to those that would have to be decided in the state
proceeding, or where it seeks relief not substantially equivalent
in effect to that available by way of a successful state court
defense, the Younger balance would seem inapposite. Such an
approach may be illustrated by the following examples.
First, in Fuentes v. Skevin,2 48 the Supreme Court struck down
prejudgment repossession procedures that had been challenged
in a 1983 suit filed while the federal plaintiffs were the defendants
in state court replevin actions."' Notwithstanding the dissent's
argument to the contrary,"' federal relief clearly was not barred
24 Closely analogous to the claims for relief against state statutes in the

paradigm fact situation would be a complaint seeking a ruling on an issue of
criminal procedure that would otherwise come up in the course of the state court
trial. See Cleary v. Bolger, 37, U.S. 392 (1963); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117 (1951).
While it purported to apply principles of equitable restraint in
declining to order that evidence be suppressed in state court, id. at 123-24, the force

of the latter case is softened by the fact that it arose before Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1963), had required state courts to exclude illegally obtained evidence.
248407

240
2

U.S. 67

(1972).

Id. at 96-97.

10 Id.

at 97-99 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J.).
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by the Younger cases. The federal suit on the validity of prejudgment repossession had, at most, an indirect and relatively
minor impact on the underlying action for debt. 5' It considered
distinct legal and factual issues and its outcome turned on no
issue that would have come up in the normal course of the state
action. In addition, a successful defense in the state court suit
would not have provided the federal plaintiffs with a remedy for
the unconstitutional deprivation of their property during the
pendency of the state litigation. 52 Finally, while the federal
plaintiffs might, to be sure, have sought relief in a state
civil
253
action, Steffel makes clear that that course is not required.
Second, in Gerstein v. Pugh,254 the Court required state
authorities to provide preliminary hearings 255 in a suit filed by
persons who were the targets of pending state criminal prosecutions.25r For reasons analogous to those discussed in the foregoing paragraph, the Court was correct in recognizing that
Younger posed no obstacle to relief.2 57 Any impact on the
underlying prosecution was incidental. 258

Deciding the con-

2 1

" The majority distinguished Younger with the brief statement that neither

plaintiff "sought an injunction against any pending or future court proceedings as
such. . .. Rather, they challenged only the summary extra-judicial process of
prejudgment seizure of property to which they had already been subjected." Id.
at 71 n.3.

The only likely effect on the state proceeding would result from the substantive federal court ruling striking down the summary procedures and thereby perhaps making it more difficult for creditors to repossess and collect. But that
consequence, while perhaps relevant to the due process issue, see id. at ioo
(White, J., dissenting), has nothing to do with the Younger inquiry into the
proper forum.
252 Indeed, the case was explicitly concerned with the plaintiffs' asserted
property interest in possession of the chattels pending a resolution of the underlying state action. Id. at 84-86. That interim claim would have been washed out
at the conclusion of the state suit. See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972).
253 It should be observed that the Fuentes example is in many respects similar
to that posed by a request for interim relief against cumulative prosecutions
pending the resolution of constitutional issues in the course of a state trial. See
pp. 1305-07 supra. While not as obviously distinct or collateral as the due process issues raised in Fuentes, an interim relief claim may be resolved independently
of anything more than a tenuous estimate about the merits and will not interrupt
the state's adjudication of those merits.
254420 U.S. 103 (1975).
25 Id. at ii6-i9.
0
25 Id. at io5.
2 The Court considered and rejected the possible application of Younger on
grounds that "the injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing." Id. at
io8 n.9 (citing Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir. 1973)).
25 8
As in Fuentes, the substance of the due process holding may have an effect
on state proceedings- perhaps by imposing a stage in the proceedings at which
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stitutionality of prolonged pretrial detention without a hearing
involved none of the factual and legal issues central to the criminal
prosecution. A successful defense to the state charges would not
have been an adequate remedy for unconstitutional pretrial
confinement. And the normal course of the state procedures
therefore provided no opportunity to complain of invalid incarceration. Indeed, it was the absence of such an opportunity
that formed the crux of the plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly,
Younger is simply inapposite to the Gerstein situation.
Third, certain challenges to the procedures to which the
plaintiff is being subjected in state court may defy analysis in
Younger terms because it will be impossible to relegate the
plaintiff to his state remedies without passing upon their constitutionality. In the Vail case,"' for example, the New York
contempt procedures were attacked in part on grounds that there
was no adequate notice of the court-ordered show-cause hearing
that preceded the issuance of a contempt citation.2

0°

By holding

for the majority that that hearing provided the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to raise their claims adequate to support a Younger
dismissal,2 6' Justice Rehnquist seems to have held as well that
the notice of that hearing met constitutional requirements. For
only if a plaintiff was properly notified could the show-cause
hearing provide an adequate opportunity to raise due process
objections.26 2 The broad point is that Younger will not always
evidence can be developed or by requiring the state to commit more resources to
procedures. But any such impact goes to the constitutional standard to be applied,
not to the applicability of Younger. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 781-82
(5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103

(975).
Juidice v. Vail, 45 U.S.L.W.

4269 (U.S. March 22, 1977); see pp. 1309-12
supra.
200 The specific due process claims are discussed in the district court opinion.
See Vail v. Quinlan, 4o6 F. Supp. 95i, 959-6o (S.D.N.Y. i976) (three-judge court).
In addition to the claims that notice of the severe consequences of failure to attend
a state show-cause hearing was inadequate, plaintiffs alleged that the procedures
were violative of the due process clause because they permitted imprisonment
without an actual hearing, failed to provide assigned counsel, and imposed punitive fines. Id. at 959.
250

201

45 U.S.L.W. at

4272.

262 It may be necessary in this regard to distinguish between the two plaintiffs

held to have standing in Vail. Id. at 4270-71. One of them, Ward, had apparently
failed to attend the state show-cause hearing and was subject to an order of contempt. Id. Only the presence of an outstanding restraining order prevented his incarceration. Id. at 4271. The other plaintiff, Rabasco, had received an order to
show cause but had not yet been held in contempt when the lower court restraining order shielded him from further state proceedings. Id. It might be argued
that a dismissal as to Rabasco included no hidden substantive decisions save one
that the state forum was competent to decide the validity of its own procedures.
Ward, however, had missed his only opportunity to appear in state court prior to
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provide a way to avoid a decision on the merits. Just as dismissal
in the paradigm case necessarily included a decision that being
prosecuted was not itself a constitutional deprivation, 63 so dismissal in cases raising procedural attacks may include - and
therefore should recognize - a decision on the merits of some
claims.264
Fourth, the observation in Younger and subsequent cases
that dismissal is not mandated in cases of harassment 2 65 responds in part to the concerns discussed in this subsection. Where
the plaintiff seeks prospective relief against alleged illegal arrests,
searches, seizures, and similar official conduct, the pendency of
criminal proceedings may be irrelevant.2 66 A successful defense
to state charges would not prevent future illegal conduct, and the
plaintiff's federal complaint will raise issues that -like those in
Gerstein and Fuentes- are collateral to the pending state proceeding. Because the relief sought and the issues raised are not
cognizable in the state proceeding, 2 no
extraordinary Younger
67
showing is required to avoid dismissal.

incarceration. Hence, dismissal meant that he might be incarcerated after failing
to attend the show-cause hearing. That in turn seems necessarily to include a
substantive decision that the notice he received of that hearing was adequate under
the due process clause. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion', recognized that
the Vail result required a substantive decision, although he failed to distinguish
between the two plaintiffs. Id. at 4274-75.
203 See p. 1286 supra.
2 4
The majority opinion in Vail did recognize the need to decide whether an
actual preincarceration hearing was required. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4272. Yet, after
concluding that a mere opportunity to be heard was sufficient, it failed to take
the next step and recognize that whether the particular state procedure provided
an adequate opportunity itself required resolution of the notice claim.
265 See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 (,975); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54 (I971).
200 See Allee v. Medrano, 4x6 U.S. 802, 812-15 (X974)
(authorizing injunction
against police misconduct irrespective of possible pendency of criminal proceedings against plaintiffs); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (i939) (same).
207 More troubling would be a request for future relief against harassing prosecutions brought by state officials who seek merely to burden the federal plaintiff's arguably protected conduct. Were it certain that the prosecutor was bent
on harassment and would continue to file new charges regardless of any judicial
determination that the underlying statute was invalid, an acquittal in the pending trial would fail to provide an adequate remedy because it would, by hypothesis, fail to prevent future harassing prosecutions. But such certainty is unlikely
before the fact. And in its absence the presumption is that an acquittal on constitutional grounds will provide an adequate remedy. Further, federal adjudication of a harassment claim would ordinarily include a decision on the constitutionality of the underlying statute because only if that statute is defective may the
prosecutor properly be restrained from continuing to file charges. Accordingly,
in contrast to the situation in the examples in text, the plaintiff's claim in the
prosecutorial harassment case turns on the same issue that would be central to the
pending state proceeding. His argument is that he should be able to pursue his
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It must be conceded that the foregoing effort to discriminate
among categories of claims has not always been followed." 8
Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes tended to dismiss under
Younger without distinguishing collateral issues or inquiring
scrupulously into the adequacy of the plaintiff's state court
remedy." 9 In its least drastic form, this tendency undercuts
.Steffel and approaches a requirement that plaintiffs exhaust even
those state remedies that require the initiation of litigation. More
broadly it is a tendency that can distort the Younger doctrine by
viewing it as an open-ended prescription of federal court action
that would have a substantial impact on state judiciaries. The
result may be to leave plaintiffs without remedies, as well as to
obscure the special concerns which support the Younger rule.
F. Exceptions
Even if the coverage rules developed in the previous Sections
were scrupulously applied, the Younger rule would have constitutional costs because it reflects a categorical balance that is
inevitably overinclusive. But Younger is not a flat ban on federal
interference even where all coverage requirements are met. It
permits plaintiffs to escape dismissal by making an extraordinary
showing and thereby seeks to mitigate the more egregious instances of overinclusiveness without sacrificing the economy 27 0
of the general rule against interference. This Section will consider
five circumstances under which the Younger burden may be
overcome.
federal suit notwithstanding this identity of issues and the presence of a normally adequate remedy because special circumstances have created a situation in
which an acquittal is in fact not substantially equivalent to the injunction he
seeks. This is an argument different in kind from that used to avoid Younger in
Gerstein or Fuentes. The plaintiff does not assert that a Younger showing is unnecessary but instead tries to make out such a showing by introducing whatever
individualized proofs he can muster. He is arguing for an exception to the preclusion requirement.
28 Compare Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973); and Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d
Cir. '971) (all generally following the analysis suggested in text), with Wallace v.
Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (976); Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F.2d 1i59 (9th Cir. 1972); Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.
,971); and Harrington v. Arceneaux, 367 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. La. 2973) (all
suggesting somewhat broader application of Younger). See also New Jersey v.
Chesimard, No. 77-1i04 (3d Cir. March 9, 2977) (en banc).
211 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 188, 5- 01974).
270 In addition to conserving judicial resources, the per se quality of the
Younger rule often permits courts to avoid potentially intrusive and embarrassing
inquiries into the adequacy of the state forum.
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.r. Haiassment.- The Court has frequently reiterated that
federal declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate where
the plaintiff can make out a showing of bad faith or harassment."'
Such an exception responds in part to situations in which the
prior acts or statements of the prosecutor will support an inference that he will continue to file charges and take other action
against the plaintiff even if the underlying statute is declared
unconstitutional in the course of a defense to criminal charges. 2
Making such a showing, and thereby overriding the presumptive
adequacy of the declaration of rights available in the course of the
criminal trial, may be quite difficult. Apparently the plaintiff will
have to show a prior pattern of harassing activities taken without justifiable reliance on state court orders or decisions." 3
2. Normative Federal Interests. The references to bad
faith and harassment have a second component that suggests
grounds for a quite different type of Younger exception - one
that also is implicated by the language permitting federal interference with prosecutions brought under statutes so egregious
as to be "patently unconstitutional." 2"4 Beyond the dangers of
fufure harassment, this language appears to respond to two sorts
of broad federal interests. First, it reflects a normative judgment
that being prosecuted under certain statutes, or by a prosecutor
who has no reasonable expectation of securing a valid conviction,
itself goes beyond the burden of defending against charges
"brought lawfully and in good faith" 25 from which no citizen is
immune. And second, it may respond to the judgment that the
federal interest in swiftly striking down such statutes and censuring such prosecutors outweighs the generally persuasive array of
Younger concerns. It is quite clear that "mere" facial overbreadth will not be sufficient to support an exception. 7 6 How
much more is required remains unclear. The bad faith, patently
271 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
272 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); note 267 supra.
272 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 352 (975)
("each step in the pattern

of seizures condemned by the District Court was authorized by judicial warrant
or order"). Compare Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1972) (o
charges filed, xi acquittals, no convictions), and Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74
(2d Cir. 1967) (multiple illegal seizures), with Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d

:97, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1976) (no bad faith where multiple prosecutions are generally successful), and Sandquist v. Pitchess, 332 F. Supp. 17, (C.D. Cal. 2971)
(mere multiplicity of prosecutions insufficient to establish bad faith). See also
Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 ( 4 th Cir. 1975) (finding likely bad faith).
274 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (197i) (quoting Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387, 402 (194I)).
272Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47 (197)
(quoting Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 329 U.S. 157, x64 (1943)).
276 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (,971)-
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unconstitutional exception without question provides authority
for courts to inquire into this "how much more" question and
into the validity for the particular plaintiff of the categorical
observation that defending criminal prosecutions is merely a
burden of citizenship.
3. Futility.- It may sometimes be appropriate to scrutinize
the actual availability in state court of the putatively adequate
remedy to which a Younger dismissal would remit the federal
plaintiff. The issue here is the extent to which a state's prior
decisional law should be considered by the federal court and
permitted to support a finding that federal relief is appropriate
because it would be futile to send the plaintiff to state court. A
futility exception may be cast into either a substantive or a procedural mold. The former would be triggered whenever prior
decisions suggest that the state courts will reject the substance
of the plaintiff's constitutional claim.1 7
But, even if rarely
utilized in fact, such an exception would be frequently invoked
by hopeful plaintiffs. Each prayer would have to be rejected or
accepted. And the specter of a flood of such requests for federal
district court scrutiny of state court decisions is unsettling. It
would reflect poorly on state courts, ignore the possibility that
they can change their minds, and undermine the Younger rule
by requiring that federal courts look at the merits in any case in
which the state's prior decisional law is contrary to the plaintiff's
desire.
While such a broad substantive futility exception would therefore seem undesirable, there are narrower sorts of circumstances - usually concerning the adequacy of state procedures
and the burdens that they impose - in which a state's prior
decisions and practice would be probative of the need for a
Younger exception. If the state supreme court recently has held
squarely against the plaintiff's substantive claims, lower state
courts may be unlikely to come out differently. Accordingly, the
plaintiff will in effect have little chance of prevailing on the merits
short of either the highest state court (which might change its
mind) or the Supreme Court. Where the plaintiff's claim goes to
...The Supreme Court has rejected such a broad futility exception. See Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 35o n.x8 (I975) (rejecting futility claim because state
courts can change their minds, state remedies are adequate, and - curiouslyadverse state decision came from intermediate court rather than state supreme
court); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 61o (U975) ("no truncation of
the exhaustion requirement merely because the losing party in the state court ...
believes his chances ... are not auspicious").
27 See Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1974) (state courts
repeatedly rejected right to counsel claims asserted in federal suit) ; Anderson v.
Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814, 8M8 (9th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff had raised constitutional
objections four times in state court without success).

19771

DEVELOPMENTS

-SECTION

1983

1325

the burden of being prosecuted or the nature of the proceedings
to which he is being subjected, the fact of the state's prior decision would appear relevant.27 8 For example, if plaintiff raises
a double jeopardy claim in a state the highest court of which has
rejected his legal theory, a federal court dismissal will force him
through a trial and ensuing appeals prior to having a genuine
chance to litigate his objection. 7 9 Yet it is precisely that procedural burden that the double jeopardy clause seeks to avoid.2 "
Hence, the prior state decisions require an exception to Younger
for such a complaint.2 81 More generally, in determining whether
a plaintiff's claim can be raised and remedied in the normal course
of state procedures -and
therefore whether it can be properly
relegated to state court under Younger - it may be necessary to
examine how the state procedures actually operate, what sorts
of claims can be raised within them, how frequently and under
what circumstances extraordinary writs or interlocutory appeals
are available, and how burdensome the procedures are.28 2 Where
a plaintiff can show that the state's prior practice does not provide an opportunity for him to litigate his claim - even though
procedures of the type to which he is being subjected generally
do provide such an opportunity - an exception to the Younger
requirement would seem appropriate. 3
4. Bias. - The logic of Younger may, in unusual circumstances, justify an inquiry into the state forum's adequacy. In
Gibson v. Berryhill,28 4 the Court suggested that structural in279 See Jackson v. Justices of the Superior Court, 549 F.2d 215 (ist Cir. X976)

(finding futility exception because of highest state court's rejection of plaintiff's
double jeopardy theory).
2
"o See United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034,
1037 (3d Cir. I975) ("one of the principal purposes of the double jeopardy clause
is to spare the accused the rigors incident to the subsequent trial") (citing United
States v. Lansdown, 46o F.2d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 1972)).
281 Anticipatory habeas corpus actions like the one in United States ex rel.
Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975), may provide a
favored route for asserting double jeopardy claims. Indeed, such a course might
be required. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (0973) (requiring prisoners
challenging fact or duration of confinement to petition for habeas corpus after
exhausting state remedies rather than suing under § 1983).
282 Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, io5-o6 (1975) (scrutinizing state statutory scheme and practice under that scheme in portion of opinion preceding consideration of Younger).
2
'See G.I. Distributors, Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. io36 (S.D.N.Y.)
(finding irreparable harm and ordering return of seized materials where state's
highest court had ruled against plaintiff's first amendment claim and seeking return of materials in state court would therefore be futile), rev'd on other grounds,
469 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913 (1973). Declining to award
relief would have forced the plaintiff to do without the seized books at least
through lower state court proceedings.
284411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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firmities in the state system can, if sufficiently widespread, mandate an exception. The plaintiff there challenged a pending
license revocation proceeding before a state board composed
entirely of self-employed optometrists with a direct pecuniary
interest in keeping salaried optometrists like the plaintiff out of
business. 8 5 Although the Court had not (and has not) held that
Younger applies to administrative proceedings,28 it reasoned that
"the predicate for a Younger v. Harris dismissal was lacking, for
the appellees alleged, and the District Court concluded, that the
State Board of Optometry was incompetent by reason of bias to
adjudicate the issues pending before it."

287

In addition, the

Court explicitly noted that the availability in state court of judicial
8
review in a de novo proceeding did not compel a different result.

1

The contours of any inadequate forum exception to Younger
are far from clear. While the Gibson Court observed that a
Younger dismissal

"presupposes

. .

. a competent state tri-

bunal," 289 the opinion considered a case in which the tribunal's
incompetence was unusually clear. The Court's subsequent decision in Kugler v. Helfant 290 declined to make an exception to
the Younger rule where there was an allegation of judicial
bias

291 -

thus suggesting a restrictive view of the inadequate

forum exception. The plaintiff in Helfant was a New Jersey judge
who had been indicted for obstruction of justice.29 2 He argued
that 'he could not receive a fair trial in the state court system
because the justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court had
coerced him into giving grand jury testimony against himself."- 3
The Court denied all relief after an inquiry into state procedures
for disqualifying judges and substituting justices on the highest
state court.29 4 The decision showed considerable confidence in
the self-corrective capacity of the state court system, but it did
not rule out the possibility of a Younger exception predicated
on state court bias where state corrective mechanisms are less
inclusive. 95
2. Id. at 570-7,.
286 See generally Part V, pp. 1264-74, supra.
287 41I U.S. at 577.
288 Id.
28 9
Id. at 577.
290421 U.S. 117 (1975).
1
2 1Id. at 129-31.
2 2
29

Id. at

119-21.

Id. at 119-23.
94
'
Id. at 126-29.
292 Indeed, the Court conducted a fairly exhaustive examination of the adequacy
of the state procedures. See id. But see Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 19798 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (suggesting that Gibson does not extend to judicial proceedings), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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Finally, it would seem appropriate

to recognize a somewhat amorphous exception to Younger that.
draws on the language in the cases recalling the balancing tests
of equity jurisprudence. Procedural burdens may be substantial
while not rising to constitutional proportions and Younger concerns may be implicated to greater or lesser extents. Accordingly,
courts need some leeway to conclude in a particular case that the
adverse consequences of limited federal relief would be relatively
minor and the harms caused by its denial substantial. For
example, a declaratory judgment on an issue that in state court
could not be determined until the close of protracted litigation
may seem appropriate to, and even be welcomed by, all sides.
Younger merely strikes a categorical balance. Exceptions are
appropriate where that balance is clearly inaccurate.
G. Conclusion
The Younger doctrine began as a series of judge-made rules
for channeling litigation of constitutional claims into the proper
forums, avoiding unnecessary and unseemly frictions between
state and federal courts, and reducing unnecessary interference
with state enforcement of substantive policies. As such, it responds to general forum allocation preferences which may safely
be indulged in a society in which at least some of the original
congressional suspicion of state prosecutorial and judicial systems
is no longer justifiable. But such indulgence is proper under the
logic of Younger only where the preferences are directly implicated and there exist sound reasons for assuming that plaintiffs
will have adequate state remedies. Justice Black observed in
Younger:
"Our Federalism"...

does not mean blind deference to

"States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and
its courts. . . . [T]he concept does represent . . . a system in
legitimate interests of both
which there is sensitivity to the
296
State and National Governments.

Younger attempts to realize that sensitivity for relatively
specific categories of federal claims filed in relatively specific
situations. The strength of its presumption against interference
depends for its vitality on the care used in deciding its applicability. Accordingly, it cannot be overemphasized that to extend
uncritically the proscriptive requirement of the Younger doctrine
is to distort its rationale and render impossible the kind of
sensitivity to which Justice Black referred. Two recent Supreme
200Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (197I).
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Court decisions evince an unfortunate tendency so to extend
Younger.
The first was O'Shea v. Littleton."7 After holding that the
allegations of discriminatory bond setting, jury fee practices, and
sentencing did not present a case or controvery, 0 8 Justice White's
opinion moved on to the merits and concluded 2 that a showing
of irreparable injury "both great and immediate" is required to
support the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged
in the administration of the state's criminal laws.300 Accordingly,
he asserted that the principles of equitable restraint enunciated
in Younger "preclude equitable intervention in the circumstances
present here." 301 Federal relief, he wrote, would amount to
"nothing less than an ongoing audit of state criminal proceedings
which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that
Younger v. Harris . . . sought to prevent."

302

The Court's error is that Younger did not seek simply to
prevent interference with state officers and intrusion into state
courts. It sought to identify and prevent undue or unnecessary
interference.3 0 3 The mere fact that the sought-after relief would
have an impact -

perhaps a sizable one -

on a state's criminal

justice system is not alone grounds for dismissal for the simple
reason that Younger is predicated upon the existence of an
adequate state remedy. Yet, notwithstanding Justice White's
efforts to the contrary, there are many reasons to doubt the adequacy of the state remedies, and hence the appropriateness of
Younger analysis, in O'Shea. The Court asserted that procedures
for disqualification of judges, change of venue, appeal, collateral
attack, and disciplinary or criminal actions against the state
judges would provide the plaintiffs with an adequate remedy.30 4
In fact, these individualistic and extraordinary remedies would
seem irrelevant to the bond setting and jury fee allegations and
poorly suited to a general claim of systemic discrimination in
sentencing. Such a general claim raises substantial questions
about both the competence of the state court system to hear the
allegations and the constitutionality - or at least the fairness of requiring members of the disfavored class to remain within
that system. Further, even absent such concerns, individual
297 414 U.S. 488 (i974).
298

Id. at 493.
299 See id. at 5o4-o5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (objecting to portion

of opinion reaching the merits).
30 0 Id. at 499.
301 Id.

..2 Id. at

400.

303 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (i97i).
304 414 U.S. at 502-03.
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criminal proceedings and postconviction remedies are unlikely
to provide an adequate opportunity for the defendant to litigate
a challenge based upon a pattern or practice of discriminatory
sentences and thus secure modification of his own sentence. The
substance of the alleged violation would go not to the egregiousness of his sentence standing alone, but to its relationship to
prior sentences meted out against others. In light of the substantial discretion generally accorded to the sentencing judge,
it may be exceedingly difficult to overturn or reduce a facially
reasonable sentence in the course of criminal appeals. 30 5
Finally, it should be observed that the undoubtedly perplexing problems of shaping relief once a violation has been found
in a case like O'Shea are and should be separate from the Younger
calculus. 3 0 The nature of the proper relief will of course depend
upon the violation, the dangers of overinclusiveness and unnecessary intrusiveness, administrability, and other factors. Federalism may play a role in tailoring the relief. But it is a role to
which the Younger doctrine is an outsider, notwithstanding the
presence of some common underlying values. Using Younger
to hold that relief is impermissible and the claim therefore not
cognizable is tantamount to a decision on the merits, or a decision
that the whole area is somehow beyond the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. That such a sweeping result may be reached without analysis of the underlying constitutional claim is an unfortunate testimonial to the dangers of misusing Younger.
An even more eloquent testimonial is provided by the Supreme
Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode.0 7 In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court overturned an injunction requiring the
Philadelphia police department to adopt certain procedures designed to reduce police abuses. 0 8 The decision appears to rest
upon a number of alternative theories, including one sounding
in justiciability," 9 before reaching what Justice Rehnquist seems
to have seen as a Younger problem. 1 ' After citing O'Shea, Doran,
Huffman, and the rhetoric of "equity, comity and federalism,"
Justice Rehnquist asserted:
30' See id. at 5io-ii (Douglas, J., dissenting).
306 This is especially the case in a situation like that in O'Shea when the state

criminal justice system is under attack. If relief is justified because the state
system is violating the Constitution, it would be improper to defer to that system
in the process of shaping relief. Once a violation is found, the Younger concerns
are markedly reduced.
307 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

30s Id. at 366, 370.
'o' Id. at 371-73.
31

°Id. at 379-8o. The multiplicity of theories relied upon by the Court makes

the precise weight given to any one of them difficult to determine.
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[T]he principles of federalism which play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and
state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to
enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited
either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself.
We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought . . . against those in charge of an
executive branch of an agency of state or local governments . . ..
Precisely what Justice Rehnquist meant is less than clear. It
cannot be disputed that some concern for federalism may play a
role in shaping injunctive relief against state officials. But the
quoted language seems to refer more narrowly to the Younger
doctrine- to suggest that the rules compelling restraint in enjoining criminal proceedings "likewise" compel deference to
executive action. Such a view misconstrues Younger, fails to
examine the harms facing the plaintiff or adequacy of other
remedies, and collapses Younger into a decision on the merits.
In doing so, it may keep the court from making a needed inquiry
into the substance of the constitutional claim.
Looked at broadly, the problem originates in the aforementioned fact that every Younger dismissal has a quasi-substantive
component - the decision that being subjected to a pending
proceeding is not itself a constitutional deprivation. Even in
relatively traditional Younger cases, it is necessary to beware
of the danger that dismissal will involve a constitutional decision
that should be considered and decided on its own terms. Where
there is no state proceeding, as in the kinds of cases which Justice
Rehnquist's dicta suggest may now be subjects for Younger
dismissal, the included substantive decision may be extremely
open-ended. The result can be to shape constitutional rights
under the auspices of a doctrine which purports not to concern
itself with substantive rights.
VII. THE PRECLUsIvE EFFECT OF PRIOR STATE AND
FEDERAL JUDGMENTS
The issue of preclusive effect arises in two contexts relevant
to section 1983. First, questions of law and fact pertinent to section 1983 suits are frequently the subject of criminal aud civil
litigation in the state courts, at times because of the mandates of
the Younger doctrine. Whether and when federal courts may reexamine such conclusions of law and fact, or indeed the judgment
3"1

Id. at 380.
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reached in the state proceeding itself, depend upon the preclusive
effect which attaches to the prior state determinations. Second,
there is the question of what preclusive effect attaches to federal
declaratory judgments given in section 1983 suits- that is, to
what extent such judgments bar the state from subsequently prosecuting either the federal plaintiff or any other individual under
a statute declared unconstitutional in the federal proceeding. To.
date, the Supreme Court has avoided any explicit decisions of
these issues,' and the lower courts have reached conflicting results.' The first part of this section will address the question of
federal relitigation of claims or issues decided in state court; the
second, the effect of federal declaratory judgments on subsequent
state proceedings.
A. The Res Judicata Effect of Prior State Court Judgments on
Subsequent Section 1983 Actions
Two related doctrines subsumed under the rubric of res
judicata generally make the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction conclusive on the parties.3 First, claim preclusion,
also known as merger and bar,4 prevents a plaintiff from bringing
a second suit on the same claim,5 although of course he may bring
1 See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 ('975)

(Powell, J., dissenting) ; Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 5o9 n.14 (1973). Occasionally, individual Justices have noticed the urgency of settling the question. See Florida State Bd. of
Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 96o, 960 (i971) (White, J., & Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Court may have impliedy foreclosed at least
collateral impeachment of final state court judgments in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 593 (1975). See p. 1337 and n.32 infra.
2 Although most federal courts have concluded that normal principles of res
jud:cata apply to suits brought under § 1983, see notes 27 and 37 infra, some
courts and individual judges have suggested that the ordinary principles of preclusion might be inappropriate in such suits, see, e.g., Lombard v. Board of Educ.,
562 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339,
343-46 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. X093 (i974);
Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d X012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting);
Whitner v. Davis, 41o F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Mack v. Florida State
Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970) (by implication), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 960 (97i).
' See generally Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. RaV.
818 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Res Judicata]; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§
xi.9-35 (x965); IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE U 0.405-.448 (2d ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 2973).
'The plaintiff's claim is said to be "merged" in the judgment if he wins, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, § 47(a), or "barred" by it if
he loses, id. § 48.
'There is variation among jurisdictions with regard to the scope of a "claim"
or "cause of action" for purposes of preclusion. See id. § 6i, Reporter's Note
at 90-94; Res Judicata,supra note 3, at 824-31. The Second Restatement adopts
the increasingly prevalent "transactional" view of what "should have been con-
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an action on the judgment; 6 and a defendant is estopped from
impeaching an adverse judgment, except in those limited cases
where state or federal law affords equitable relief from a judgment 7 or where federal habeas corpus is available.' Second, the
sidered," defining the claim to include all of the plaintiff's remedial rights against
the defendant growing out of the pertinent transaction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, § 6I, Comment at 78-94; Res Judicata, supra note
3, at 824.
6 See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS,

supra note 3, § 45, Comment a,

at 21; id. at § 47(a).

'A defendant who has lost in the prior suit is precluded from defending a
suit brought on the judgment by raising any defenses that he raised or might have
raised in the prior proceeding. See id. § 47(b), Comment c, at 27-28.
A person otherwise bound or having some legal interest adversely affected by
a state judgment may seek to avoid the judgment's res judicata effects either by
obtaining relief setting aside the judgment or by relying on some rule limiting the
effect of an admittedly valid judgment. Equitable relief from a judgment ordinarily may be given if such relief would have been available in the courts of the
state that rendered the judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § m15, Comment a (1969); 7 J. MOORE, supra note 3, if 6o.37131. Of course,
a state judgment may also be avoided on various federal constitutional grounds.
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (x958); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 92

5-8

(942);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAws 92 (1969).

An independent federal suit seeking equitable relief must have a statutory jurisdictional base, which will depend on the grounds alleged to set aside the judgment.
See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 3, ff 6o.391: at 654. Even where the state law provides the rule of decision as to the permissibility of relief, see 7 id. II 60.37[3], at
640-41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS 115, Comment b (1969),
the procedures and propriety of granting it are federal questions, id. Thus, for
example, if a post-judgment motion for relief, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 6o(b); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE 2H 473-474, could still be brought in the court that rendered the
judgment, the federal court in its discretion might remit the parties to that proceeding. Although there are some decisions, see e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (970), which suggest that federal
injunctions against the enforcement of state judgments are barred by the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (197o), the question is far from settled, see P.
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's TirE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1236, 1253 (2d ed. x973) [hereinafter
BATOR,

cited as HART & WECHSLER]. It would seem that because relief from judgment is
a normal exercise of equity jurisdiction, if a federal court had jurisdiction over an
action for relief, then the injunction would not be barred by § 2283, though of
course the federal court might decline if relief were available in the first court, see
J. MOORE, supra note 3, if 6o.39[2]. Similarly the Younger doctrine should not be
thought to foreclose independently such federal relief, though concerns of comity
will be relevant to both contexts. But see Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4 th Cir. 1973).
The cases treated in this Part do not involve relief from state judgments in the
orthodox sense. Rather they concern attempts to avoid the res judicata effects of
presumedly valid judgments. Of course, such qualifications of res judicata are
often practically indistinguishable from other forms of relief; both frequently
depend on such things as adequacy of hearing. But typically the cases discussed
below seek, often impliedly, to avoid preclusion simply on grounds of error in
the state proceeding raising a federal question or on grounds that the federal claim

....
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doctrine of collateral estoppel, or "issue" preclusion, makes conclusive on the parties issues of fact or law actually litigated and
necessary to the prior judgment, even if the second suit is based
on a different cause of action.
Foreclosure of relitigation under the doctrine of res judiciata
serves several important -interests: the efficient use of judicial resources, preservation of the integrity of prior judgments and
facilitation of the parties' reliance thereon, fostering respect for
the rendering court, and avoidance of inconvenience and harassment of the litigants. ° In the context of section 1983 suits subsequent to state court adjudication, the avoidance of federal-state
friction is implicated as well. To foreclose all subsequent relitiga-

tion in the federal courts, however, would substantially undermine the basic premise of forum choice which underlies the grant
of jurisdiction to the federal courts to decide section 1983
actions." Thus, several courts and commentators have urged

that the rules foreclosing relitigation should be considered inapplicable to section 1983 actions.' 2

An initial difficulty with any exception to traditional rules of
preclusion in section 1983 actions is that a federal statute, implewas not raised at all. While federal habeas corpus permits relief from some judgments on grounds of error, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), it is well
settled that apart from habeas relief, judgments may not be impeached merely
upon a showing of error. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or JuDGmENTs, supra note 3,
§ 45, Comment d, Reporter's Note at 23-24. The question discussed in text then
is whether, as a matter of federal law, allegations of state court error permit federal courts to relitigate the merits underlying state court judgments upon a theory
either that such error invalidates the judgment or, as is more commonly argued,
that federal questions and related facts pertinent to § 1983 suits are immune from
the effects of full faith and credit. It is in this sense of avoiding the orthodox
binding effects of a state judgment that this Part uses the word "impeach."
8

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970).
(SECOND) oF JUDGmENTS, supra note 3,
10 See Res Judicata,supra note 3, at 824-28.
' RESTATEMENT

§ 68.

" A suspension of all res judicata effect of prior state judgments in suits
brought under § 1983 is predicated on an unqualified "right to a federal forum"
for the trial of federal claims, arguably inferred from an expansive reading of
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (ig6i). However, the proposition that state court
judgments resting on federal questions decided adversely to the § 1983 plaintiff
are to be denied finality is not an obvious corollary to the theory that § 1983
afford a remedy "supplementary to the state remedy," id. at 183. Monroe only
declared that § 1983 provided a federal cause of action regardless of the availability
of state tort remedies. It would be a substantial gloss to suppose that state courts
were thereby divested of their usual competence to render final judgments.
11 See, e.g., cases cited note 2 supra; Averitt, Federal Section x983 Actions
After State Court Judgments, 44 U. Cox~o.,L. REv. 191, 195-96 (972); McCormack,

Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (pt. 2), 60 VA. L. REV. 250, 276-77 (974) ; Theis, Res Judicata in
Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 859,
868 (1976).
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menting the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, requires federal courts to give a prior state judgment the same conclusive effects as would the courts of that state.13 While federal
courts frequently disregard this statutory mandate, 4 and instead
seem to decide cases with regard to a general federal law of res
judicata, 15 the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,16 quite clearly provides
a rule of decision:
[Jludicial proceedings ...shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such state .. . from which they were taken.
Exceptions to full faith and credit, however, occasionally have
been founded on special grants of jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts. For example, in Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,"T
the Second Circuit considered the collateral estoppel effect of a
state court determination of an issue raised defensively in a state
law action which, if asserted affirmatively, would fall within the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over antitrust claims.', Recognizing the state court's jurisdiction to pass on the antitrust defense,"
Judge Learned Hand nonetheless held that the federal courts'
exclusive jurisdiction over treble damage actions "should be
13The statutory mandate applies to "every court within the United States,"
28 U.S.C. § I738 (1970), although the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § i, by its terms speaks only of the effects of state court

judgments in other states' courts.
4See, e.g., Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 930 (I973). There is a line of cases holding that the inability of federal

courts to rehear claims already litigated in state proceedings is jurisdictional.
See, e.g., Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d i38, 141 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 906 (1974) ; Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d X012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 95, (1970). Such cases usually rely on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), which held that a district court lacked jurisdiction to hear

a petition to declare a state judgment "null and void." Such a jurisdictional dismissal would be inappropriate unless it appeared on the face of the complaint that
the plaintiff was seeking appellate review of the state court judgment. See Tang v.
Appellate Div., 487 F.2d at 145-46 (Oakes, J. dissenting). Absent such a facial
defect in the pleading, which could easily be remedied under the permissive rules
for amending complaints, FED. R. Civ. P. x5, the federal court would have jurisdiction, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), although the suit still would be susceptible to dismissal on the merits under the doctrine of res judicata.
15 See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 126o (ist Cir. 1974) ; P. BATOR,
P. MisHmKI,
D. SHAPIRo & H. WECeSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
CoURTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 151 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (970).
17 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
18222 F.2d at 185.
1d. at 187.
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taken to imply an immunity of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere." 20
While federal jurisdiction over section 1983 claims is not
exclusive, 2' the establishment of a right of action with an accompanying grant of federal jurisdiction might be understood to
imply an exception to section i738 as an expression of congressional intent that the federal courts be available to redress misconduct by state officials.2 2 Indeed, in Mitchum v. Foster,23 the
Supreme Court found section 1983 to be an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,24 which prohibits
federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings. The analogy
to the Anti-Injunction Act, however, is not without difficulties.
First, the existence of federal equitable power occasionally to enjoin a state proceeding is an intrusion upon state judicial power
of a far smaller order than is a denial of finality to state judg2

1

Id. at i89. It is questionable whether Judge Hand successfully distinguished

Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, 279 U.S. 388

(1929), where the Supreme Court
held that a state court judgment that a patent holder held a patent as a constructive trust for another precluded a federal suit for patent infringement within

the exclusive federal jurisdiction,

28

U.S.C. § 1338 (,970). Judge Hand attempted

to distinguish Becher on the ground that there the state judgment was conclusive
only as to a single fact, while in Lyons, "the putative estoppel includes the whole
nexus of facts that makes up the wrong," 222 F.2d at 189. The distinction is a
difficult one, see IB J. MOORE, supra note 3, 1 o.445 at 4113-14. There is the
further distinction that the decision in Becher was grounded entirely on state law
while in Lyons the state court decided a question of federal antitrust law, see
40 MiNN. L. REV. 638, 620 (I956), but that alone would not explain the denial of
estoppel at least as to questions of fact. Although most later decisions have not
followed the Lyons result, see, e.g., Azalea Drive-in Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft, 540
F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976) ; Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and
the Effect of Prior State Court Determinations, 53 VA.L. REV. 136o, 2369 (1967),
Judge Hand's analysis leads to a satisfying accommodation of the interests involved, and is supported by the functional approach to collateral estoppel between

jurisdictions taken in

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS,

supra note 3, §

68.1, Comment e, Reporter's Note at I86-87; Res Judicata,supra note 3, at 84850; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 71 (2941).
21
See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
22 See pp. 1153-56 supra.
Since it was thought that civil rights litigation would be brought naturally in
the federal courts, it was unnecessary to limit the states' otherwise plenary jurisdiction in order to preserve a hospitable forum for adjudicating federal rights.
23407 U.S. 225

(2972).

24 The first clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2970) codified the judicially recognized

exception that allowed an injunction against a state court proceeding when "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," see pp. 1287-88 & nn. 83, 88 supra.
The Court in Mitchum reviewed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and observing that Congress had "interposed" the federal courts between the
people and abusive state action, 407 U.S. at 238-43, concluded that enjoining
state court proceedings would occasionally be necessary to avert deprivations of
fundamental rights, id. at 242.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1336

[VOL. 90:1133

ments. Second, Mitchum itself is not strong precedent for broad
federal power, since the Court substantially undercut its statutory holding by reaffirming the rule of Younger v. Harris22 that
principles of federalism, comity, and equity generally preclude
federal equitable intrusions into pending state proceedings.2"
A complete exception for section 1983 claims from section
1738 would permit litigants to impeach adverse state court judgments by raising their federal claims in a subsequent 1983
action and obtaining federal relief nullifying the effects of those
judgments." Such a rule would be costly both in terms of federalstate tensions and judicial economy, for it would deny state courts
their usual competence to decide with finality questions that are
within their jurisdiction and would hamper the state's ability to
enforce its substantive law. Only if one believed that state
courts were systematically either unwilling or unable to enforce
federal constitutional rights could such costs be justified. To
adopt such an argument, however, and to allow state judgments
thus to be impeached, is wholly inconsistent with the logic and
application of the Younger doctrine.2 s It would make little sense
25

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

20

407 U.S. at 243-44; see pp. 1275-78 supra.
courts generally have held that a person who has voluntarily

27Federal

brought his claim in state court is barred by an adverse state judgment from
bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court on that same claim, see, e.g., Roy v. Jones,
484 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1973); Lackawanna Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Balen,
446 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 197), even where the federal claim was not presented to
the state courts, see, e.g., Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 418 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 2969); Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d
861 (5th Cir. 1966). But see Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631, 635-37
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975). Federal courts have been more
reluctant to find state judgments res judicata when they have followed state administrative hearings and may have occasioned limited review by the state courts
of the agency action. Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 43o F.2d 862 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (i97); Whitner v. Davis, 4xo F.2d 24, 31
(9th Cir. i969) (dictum) ; Jensen v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965).
Impeachment of a state civil judgment through suits brought under § 1983
appears to have been implicitly rejected in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975). See generally p. 1344 infra. Although the Court has not reached the
question in criminal cases outside the scope of federal habeas corpus, see Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 44o-42 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting), the consensus in the
lower courts is that res judicata precludes collateral impeachment via suits brought
under § 1983 following either criminal cases, see, e.g., Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d
257 (7th Cir. 1963), or civil suits, see, e.g., Lovely v. Liberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1st
Cir. 2974); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 2209 (6th Cir. x97o); Kay v.
Florida Bar Ass'n, 323 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Fla. 197). Collateral attack is impermissible even if the state court defendant was unable to litigate the federal
claim because of an adequate state procedural ground, see, e.g., Mertes v. Mertes,
350 2 F. Supp. 472 (D. Del. 1972).
1See
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (2975) ("Appellee is in
truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be
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to require litigants to resort initially to a state forum if that
court's judgments could routinely be reopened in the federal
courts from which the individual was initially barred. -9 Indeed, in
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,3 ° the Supreme Court, while it did not
reach the res judicata question,3 1 implied that section 1983 would
not be available to impeach state judgments.3 2
Federal habeas corpus is, of course, one instance where the
costs of collateral attack are incurred. But because federal habeas
corpus may be invoked only after the exhaustion of available
state remedies,34 the states retain the opportunity to review and
correct their judgments prior to federal intervention. More
importantly, federal habeas corpus rests on the paramount importance of freedom from unlawful restraint. 35 And even in the
face of this compelling justification, the Supreme Court has recently restricted the circumstances in which collateral attack on a

writ of habeas corpus is available.36 Whether or not cutbacks in

faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do."). But cf.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (applying res judicata in suits brought under § 3983 would ignore "congressional misgivings about the ability and inclination of state courts to enforce federally protected rights").
20 Federal statutes and judge-made rules in addition to the Younger doctrine
operate to confine claims regarding certain subject matter to state courts. See,
e.g., Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (I97o) (forbidding federal injunctions
against state public utility ratemaking if "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may
be had in the courts of such State") ; Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 134x
(i97o); Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922) (marital relations);
(federal suit
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (I95)
challenging state agency action dismissed because matter involved "predominantly
local factors").
30420 U.S. 592 (1975).
"1The affirmative defense had not been properly pleaded and was not, therefore, before the Court, id. at 607-09; see FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
"2Rejecting the argument that the Younger doctrine forecloses access to a
federal forum only where collateral review through federal habeas corpus would
later be available, the Court explained that Younger rested on principles of
comity, equity, and federalism, not on the possibility of later collateral federal
review. 420 U.S. at 605-07. Moreover, in a footnote the Court added:
We in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of access to a federal
forum for the disposition of all federal issues, or that the normal rules of
res judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings.
Id. at 6o6 n.i8.
33 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (970).
See generally Developments in the LawFederal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1O38 (970).
34 28 L.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (970).
" See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1963); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
426, 440-41 (975)
31 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (976) (federal habeas corpus not available
to review claim that unlawfully obtained evidence was introduced at state trial if
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the availability of federal habeas corpus are wise, it seems clear

that in cases where habeas review is not available, permitting
attack on state judgments through actions brought under section
1983 cannot be justified in light of the costs involved and the
constraints imposed by the continued viability of the Younger
doctrine.
These factors do not, however, foreclose a narrower exception
to section 1738, permitting issues of fact and law litigated in state
court to be relitigated in a section 1983 action." While the federal
interest in providing plaintiffs with a choice of forums 'in which

to litigate their constitutional claims remains constant in the two
contexts, the policies justifying res judicata are not as substanstate proceeding afforded an opportunity for full and fair bearing of claim);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (i976) (federal habeas review of state court
convictions on grounds of allegedly unconstitutional grand jury composition unavailable absent showings of "cause" for failure to bring a challenge before trial
and of actual prejudice).
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel by prior state judgment applies to federal
cases through 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), see, e.g., American Mannex Corp. v.
Rozands, 462 F.2d 688 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); in J.
MOORE, supra note 3, ff 0442, with the scope of the estoppel to be determined by
reference to the law of the state whose court rendered the prior judgment, id.
The federal courts have generally held that principles of collateral estoppel operate
in § 1983 suits brought following either state civil suits, see, e.g., Parker v.
McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (x974), or criminal
actions, see, e.g., Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (ist Cir. 2974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 909 (i975); Kauffman v. Moss. 420 F.2d X270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 846 (I97o). Ordinarily the courts are sensitive about whether an issue
was actually litigated and necessary to the judgment, see, e.g., id. at I274; Jackson
v. Official Representatives, 487 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. i973). But see Palma v. Powers,
295 F. Supp. 924, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The practical consequences of according prior state judgments collateral
estoppel effect in suits brought under § 1983 will depend on the application of
state law through § I738 as well as on the informal implications of the adverse
state determination. For example, if state law were to require mutuality of
estoppel, the state court determination would ordinarily not be available to the
§ i983 defendant. See p. 1334 infra. Similarly, were state law to deny estonvel
effects when the first proceeding was criminal, and the second one civil, see Res
Judicata,supra note 3, at 878-79, the state law estoppel would be much less burdensome. Further, if as a matter of federal law the reversal on habeas of a contrary
state finding would remove the estoppel based on the state finding, see Moran v.
Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1973) (dictum), then even if state law
were to allow nonmutual estoppel, successful habeas petitioners might avoid
preclusion. Finally, even were there no formal estoppel, as a practical matter it
is unlikely an official would be found liable given the various immunities and
defenses available to him in § x983 actions, see pp. 2209-X7 supra, particularly if
the state determination could be introduced for its evidentiary value. See, e.g., FED.
R: Evm. 803(8). See generally, C. McCoRmaCK, EVIDENCE § 3x8 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
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tially implicated by collateral estoppel.3" Clearly, the integrity
of the prior judgment and the parties' reliance thereon are not
jeopardized to the same extent when the federal court is engaged
in relitigation of particular issues of law and fact rather than in
reexamination and possible nullification of that judgment. The
waste of judicial resources is ordinarily less severe, as is the inconvenience to the parties and the affront to the court. Moreover, while claim preclusion in the federal system may be justified by the need to foster certainty and uniformity in the enforcement of state substantive law, giving collateral estoppel effect to

state decisions of federal law may undermine the federal interest
in the consistent and correct application of federal law to claims

brought in the federal courts. 39 And with respect to questions of
fact, the Supreme Court itself has recognized the values which

may attach to federal factfinding, regarding them as sufficient to
require the federal courts to find facts independently where they

have abstained on issues of state law.4 °
The argument in favor of a limited exception to section i738
for collateral estoppel "' is further buttressed by examination of
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JuDGm:ENTS, supra note 3, at 14344. 3 Since
collateral estoppel has been narrowly applied
until quite recently, the
Reconstruction Congress could not have anticipated the impediment that a more
liberal usage would be to § 1983 suits. This is particularly true with respect to the
requirement that an estoppel be "mutual" -a condition that is imposed in either
of two forms: (i)that the parties in the second suit were parties or privies to the
prior judgment, or (2) that if the determination had been the reverse, the one now
raising the estoppel would also have been barred. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 3,
0.418
of at 2708. Though various exceptions were later found to these principles in
most jurisdictions, see Res Judicata,supra note 3, at 862-65, only recently have
the principles been more generally relaxed, see Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) ; Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (197); A. FREMa,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW Or
JUDGMENTS §§ 154, 159, 319

(973).

"°See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 4"1,
416-17 (1964). See also Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, go HARV. L. REV. iro5,
i19 & n.53 (x977).
41 Of course, it would be possible to except suits brought under § x983 from
the wooden incorporation of state law of collateral estoppel without adopting a
per se rule allowing relitigation. A functional approach would necessitate inquiry into the opportunity and incentive fully and fairly to litigate a matter in
the state proceeding, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 3,
§ 68.I, and, of course, would not foreclose creation of exceptional categories where
relitigation might be presumptively allowed. However, such an approach would
involve elaborate hearings preliminary to consideration of the merits. See, e.g.,
McCormack, supra note 12, at 276-77 (applying a functional analysis of seven
factors). Moreover, it is doubtful that such hearings will disclose the subtle biases
whose probable existence is a premise of any exception; to the extent that they
would, such hearings might represent a substantially greater affront to the state
courts than a per se rule, cf. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 8o8, 828
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the incentives created by the absence of such a rule. Because
federal constitutional claims will most frequently be raised before
state forums as defenses to criminal prosecutions or civil enforcement proceedings, and because collateral estoppel generally applies only to issues actually litigated, application of traditional
issue preclusion in subsequent section 1983 actions may provide
an incentive to state defendants not to raise their constitutional
defenses in the state proceeding. In such proceedings, litigants
would be forced to choose between asserting their constitutional
objections, thus risking an adverse state court ruling that would
effectively preclude a later federal action, and withholding the
defense to preserve a later federal suit, thus increasing the risk of
adverse state judgment. The latter choice will often seem the
lesser of two evils to state defendants, particularly in cases where
the state court may be less sensitive than a federal forum to
constitutional claims 4 2 and the defendant is more concerned with
obtaining a favorable declaration of his future rights than with
avoiding punishment in the state prosecution."
To structure the litigation incentives to dissuade the assertion of federal claims in state court can hardly serve any justifiable interest of the state; certainly, the just prosecution of state
laws is not enhanced by a system which discourages the litigation
of constitutional defenses. And the alternative of requiring litigants to raise all constitutional issues in the state court 44 is no
more attractive, for it would impair a defendant's ability to adopt
a defense strategy which might allow him to reduce the likelihood of conviction or severe punishment.4" Indeed, the willing(1966) (allegations of bad faith prosecution not sufficient to support removal
under the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), since the statute
"does not permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the
state judiciary on trial").
42 For example, when due process objections are raised in a state criminal trial,
the primary inquiry into guilt may color incidental rulings on the defendant's
federal procedural rights. See Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
7o HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1956); Neuborne, supra note 40, at 1125-26. Moreo er,
an institutional bias of the state court judge might derive in part from his
knowledge of the commitment of the state's resources that accompanies the
decision to bring the prosecution. See Developments in the Law- Federal Habeas
Corpus, supra note 33, at io6i n.xi9. See generally F. MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE D&miSXoN To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969). State courts also
may exhibit a parochial preference for the enforcement of state substantive law
and a consequent insentivity to federal rights raised defensively. See ALI, STUDY
OF THE DIvIsION OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS i66
(1969).
43

See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (I975).
"' Such a theory was rejected in Maynard v. Wooley, 4o6 F. Supp. 1381, 1385
n.6 (D.N.H. 1976) (three-judge court), affd, 45 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. April 20,

'977).
4' For example, in Ellis v. Dyson, 422 U.S. 426 (1975), plaintiffs, prior to their
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ness to forgo constitutional defenses is often a critical element
in reaching plea agreements. 46 Clearly an individual who takes
advantage of such plea negotiations should not be foreclosed
from ever receiving an adjudication of his future rights or of his
claims to relief not available in the state proceeding. If he were,
a defendant would be forced to choose between alternatives
neither more attractive nor more justifiable than those presented
by application of traditional rules of claim preclusion.
Nonetheless, it might be argued that a collateral estoppel exception to section 1738 would trivialize the Younger doctrine by
limiting the effect of state determinations to the validity of the
judgment in the state suit itself. Certainly, if one took an expansive view of Younger and its progeny, and accepted without
question the parity of state and federal courts, the relitigation of
issues in federal court might be viewed as not only an unnecessary
waste of judicial resources, but also an impermissible affront to
state courts. But affronts of this nature do not necessarily implicate the Younger doctrine to any substantial degree. First, as
argued above,47 the Younger doctrine does not extend to suits
in which the state court defendant seeks relief unavailable in
the normal course of state proceedings, notwithstanding the po4
tential indirect impact on pending state proceedingsY.
Moreover,
4'
as the Court's decision in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. and the limitations properly imposed on derivative preclusion illustrate,5"
Younger does not preclude federal courts from deciding questions of fact and law which are simultaneously at issue in pending
state proceedings. Indeed, in Doran, Justice Rehnquist, discussing the possibility of inconsistent judgments on identical claims

brought by similarly situated parties in state and federal suits,
noted that "the interest in avoiding conflicting outcomes in the
litigation of similar issues, while entitled to substantial deference
in a unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated to the
federal action challenging a state loitering statute, had pleaded nolo contendere
to a prosecution under the statute and were each fined $xo.oo and $2.50 in costs,
id. at 428. They were entitled to a trial de novo but would have been subject to
a maximum fine of $200, id. at 429, which they elected not to risk. In systems
without two-tier trials, there is the general likelihood of a more severe penalty
if one puts the state to trial than if one pleads guilty.
46 See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process,
90 HARv. L. REv. 564, 573 (I977).
47 See pp. 1318-22 Supra.
48
A state court might find a federal judgment persuasive, even though not
formally binding, and federal findings may have some evidentiary value in the
state proceeding. See C. McCoaMIcx, supra note 37, § 318.
49422 U.S. 922 (1975).

'*See pp. 134-17 Supra.
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claims of federalism in this particular area of the law." "1Tolerance for inconsistency, then, is required by the overlapping but
distinct interests of state and federal jurisdiction in the federal
system.
More basically, the distinction between the treatment of collateral attack and collateral estoppel is one that makes a good
deal of sense in Younger terms. By immunizing the judgments of
state courts from subsequent federal nullification, the application
of section 1738 protects the state's interest in the enforcement of
its substantive policies and avoids serious affront to the state
courts by rendering their judgment as to the legality of defendant's
past conduct final. But as Steffel v. Thompson 52 makes clear,
while the Younger doctrine may be invoked justifiably to foreclose a state court defendant from seeking to undermine or abort
a pending state proceeding where the remedy available to him in
the normal course is adequate, it is not a mandate to prefer state
court resolution of issues related to state action and policies at all
costs.5 3 Once one moves from the area in which concerns for

comity, efficiency, and the unimpeded operation of the state
criminal justice system are most strongly implicated, it becomes
increasingly unjustifiable to override section 1983's provision of
a meaningful choice of forum for challenges to the constitutionality of state action.
This does not mean, of course, that individuals should always
be free to relitigate issues of fact and law determined in state proceedings. Since section 1983 guarantees, at most, only the choice
of a federal forum for constitutional challenges, a collateral
estoppel exception to section 1738 should not apply to those litigants who voluntarily brought their claims in the state courts.
Since they have chosen a state forum initially, it seems fair to
consider them to have waived any right to choose a federal one.4
51 422 U.S. at 928. justice Rehnquist suggested that a federal declaration that
a state statute was unconstitutional while the state was still successfully prosecuting
other persons under the statute, was a tolerable consequence of the procedural
rules announced in Doran and earlier cases. See pp. 13o6-08 supra. That inconsistency does not depend on an exception to the usual rules of collateral estoppel,
as would the proposal in text. Justice Rehnquist's proposition does admit, however, that the separability of state and federal interests creates a tolerance for
inconsistency and inefficiency that would not exist in a unitary jurisdiction. See
422 U.S. at 928.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
3 See pp. 1288-92 supra.

52

5

54 Thus, a finding of estoppel in Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974), a case where the federal plaintiff, prior to bringing a § 1983 action, had initiated an unsuccessful state tort suit, was correct.
Waiver, however, is an ambiguous concept. A state criminal defendant, for
example, otherwise an "involuntary" party to a state prosecution, could be viewed
as having .waived his right to a federal hearing on the constitutionality of the

19771

DEVELOPMENTS -SECTION

1983

1343

Under the proposed exception, collateral estoppel would not bar

federal relitigation only where the federal plaintiff was either an
involuntary defendant in the prior state proceedings unable to
remove the case 55 or an involuntary plaintiff forced to exhaust
state remedies. 6

Thus far, the lower federal courts have not recognized an
exception to statutory full faith and credit of the scope suggested
here. Because their response to the problem of preclusive effect
has been erratic, and because the circumstances underlying a
plea of collateral estoppel vary, it is useful to consider the two
basic categories of section 1983 actions raising collateral estoppel
questions to highlight further both the problems of current prac-

tice and the contours and operation of the proposed exception.
i.

Nonparallel Actions: Declaratory Judgments Subsequent

to State Proceedings.- Samuels v. Mackell's " holding that an
action for a declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality
of a statute underlying a pending state proceeding is precluded
by the Younger doctrine combines with the timing rule of Hicks

v. Miranda11 to foreclose federal declaratory relief to plaintiffs
who are currently the targets of state enforcement actions and to
those who are charged shortly after the initiation of their section
1983 suit. Whatever the wisdom of requiring the plaintiff to liti-

gate the legality of his past conduct in state court, there seems
little reason to prevent him from receiving a subsequent federal
declaration of his future rights, whether or not he actually litigated the constitutional issue in state court. In Thistlethwaite v.
City of New York, 9 however, the Second Circuit held that a defendant who had litigated his constitutional claim in the state
statute under which he is being prosecuted by engaging in the proscribed conduct
rather than seeking federal anticipatory relief. See The Supreme Court, z974
Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47, 167-68 (1975). Using the concept of waiver in this
context, however, is formalistic, unfair, and unwise. It depends on the artificial
view that individuals generally can foresee possible confrontations with the law
and arrange their affairs sufficiently far in advance to obtain a declaratory judgment prior to engaging in proscribed conduct. Moreover, to comport with reality,
such a waiver doctrine would require a highly factualized inquiry in hearings
preliminary to the merits to determine whether the state defendant could have
obtained declaratory relief before violating the statute.
5
See p. 1336 & n. 27 supra.
"6 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (x973); statutes cited note 29
supra.
57 401 U.S. 66, 72 (197).
58 422 U.S. 332, 349 (i975) ; see pp. i3o--o6 supra.
59497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
The plaintiffs
had not sought direct review of their convictions by the Supreme Court. 497 F.2d
at 34. The Second Circuit assumed that all of the issues raised by the § 1983
suit for declaratory relief had been litigated and decided adversely to the plaintiffs
in state court, id. at 341-42, an assumption disputed by the dissent, id. at 343-44.
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court could not then bring a federal action to have the state's
criminal statute declared invalid.60 In doing so, the court rejected
the arguments that the issue of the law's prospective effect to be
determined in the federal action was distinct from the issue previously litigated, that congressional policies underlying the Civil
Rights Act overcame the competing interests in finality, and that
collateral estoppel should be applied only if the 1983 plaintiff had
had a choice of forum in the prior suit.0"
The Thistlethwaite conclusion is questionable on a number of
grounds. First, as noted, the application of collateral estoppel
contemplated by Thistlethwaite would provide an incentive for
state defendants not to raise their constitutional defenses when
their principal concern is with future conduct -a
result which
cannot be justified in light of any legitimate policies of state law
enforcement. But it would be arguably more unjust to relieve this
incentive "to stand mute in the dock" by barring the declaratory
judgment action if the constitutional defense had not been raised
before the state court. Recently the Supreme Court in Wooley v.3
Maynard 2 rejected the argument that Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd.,
which had required exhaustion of state appellate remedies as a
necessary if not sufficient condition for impeaching a state judgment, 4 should be extended to require that state appellate remedies be pursued before the underlying statute is made the subject
of a declaratory judgment in federal court. Although Wooley was
decided under the rubric of the Younger doctrine, its analysis
strongly supports the exception to collateral estoppel proposed
here. In Wooley, the Court distinguished between federal suits
"designed to annul the results of a state trial" and those where
"the relief sought is wholly prospective." 05 The latter, it held,
were permissible since they did not deprive the state of the legitimate function of "overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues arising in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction." 0" In just the same manner, the proposed collateral
estoppel exception would not intrude into the state trial and appellate functions, but would permit an untrammeled federal jurisdiction for wholly prospective relief.
60 497

F.2d at 342.

"' Id. at 341-42.
6245 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. April 20, 1977), a 'g 4o6 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H.
1976) (three-judge court). The Court stressed that the reasoning of Huff,nan
was inapposite to declaratory relief which leaves the state judgment unaffected.
Id. at 4381.
63 420 U.S. 592 (I975).
64 420 U.S. at 6o8.
65 45 U.S.L.W. at 4381.
66 Id.

19773

DEVELOPMENTS -SECTION

1983

1345

To be sure, concerns for state self-correction, judicial economy, and respect for the competence of state courts may argue
in favor of final state adjudication of challenges to states' laws
and practices. Such a result, however, is more likely to be accomplished under the proposed exception to section I738 than
under the rule in Thistlethwaite. And while the exhaustion rule
rejected by Wooley might as effectively remove the incentive to
withhold constitutional defenses, it seems entirely inconsistent
with the policy of declaratory relief which permits the dissociation of the criminal prosecution
from the scrutiny of the constitu67
tionality of the state law.
Moreover, even where state and federal courts reach conflicting results, the conflict relates not to the characterization of a
historical transaction, as is usually the case where collateral
estoppel is invoked, but rather to a continuing question of law.
Conflicts over purely legal questions are quite common in a dual
system, and the policies in favor of finality have little force in such
cases. Certainly, no legitimate interest is advanced by attempts
to immortalize a state's questionable interpretations of federal
law. Indeed, the Second Restatement of Judgments recognizes
that the rationale for collateral estoppel is weak in cases seeking
only to reopen an issue of law; 68 it would allow relitigation of
issues of law in subsequent suits involving different transactions.
Finally, the state's interest in the integrity of its law is not substantially impaired by permitting a prior criminal defendant to
relitigate questions of federal law. While finding another proper
plaintiff may be difficult,69 any other person presenting a justiciable controversy could obtain the same declaration. And, of
course, the original defendant could relitigate the constitutionality
of the statute, as a defense, were he again prosecuted. Withholding the opportunity to challenge the law in a declaratory judg"7 See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 453, 462-73 (1974); PP. 1288-92
supra.
8
6 RFsATEMErN
(SECOND) OF JuDGmENTs, supra note 3 § 68.1(b), Reporter's
Note at I85. The analogy to the Second Restatement depends upon conceptualizing
the controversy over contingent future rights as arising out of a "transaction"
separate from the historical subject matter of the criminal prosecution. If so
conceived, the more flexible principle of stare decisis would be sufficient to avoid
vexatious litigation, at least in the courts of the same jurisdiction, id., Comment

b at 174, and summary consideration could be given in federal court if necessary
to contain unmeritorious declaratory suits following state convictions.
o Given the stringency of present justiciability requirements, see generally
pp. 1292-94 supra, a declaratory judgment plaintiff might most easily show
a sufficient threat of prosecution if he has been previously convicted under the
challenged statute. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, 14, Thistlethwaite
v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
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ment action may serve only to encourage future violations of the
law or to chill conduct which may be constitutionally protected.
A different case is presented where federal declaratory relief
would amount to collateral attack on the final judgment and
order of the state court. 0 In the normal case, the declaratory
judgment has no impact on the prior conviction; the state court
defendant cannot secure either reimbursement of fines paid 71 or
removal of his conviction on the basis of a later federal declaration of his future rights, and is precluded from seeking such
redress directly in federal court by the application of merger and
bar.7 2 But where the state court decree takes the form of an
injunction against future conduct, a federal declaratory judgment
that the underlying statute is unconstitutional, if accorded res
judicata effect in a subsequent state prosecution or contempt
proceeding, would effectively impeach the state court order.
And if the federal judgment were not res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding, the declaratory judgment would be a largely meaningless exercise by the federal court.7" In either case it seems
that federal declaratory relief should be unavailable. The facts
in Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd.74 fit this pattern: after the state trial
court entered a final judgment against the owner of a movie
theatre and enjoined future operations, the owner, instead of
appealing, brought a section 1983 action for a declaratory judgment that the statute under which he was convicted was uncon7
stitutional and for an injunction against the state judgment. 5
The Supreme Court, avoiding consideration of res judicata directly, held that even were there to be an opportunity for collateral review, it would not be occasioned until state appellate
remedies were exhausted." While one might dispute the fairness
of applying the new exhaustion rule in Huffman itself, 7 foreclosure of access to federal court seems entirely appropriate in
that case, since even a declaratory judgment would have undermined the state court order."' But as noted earlier, that case
70 See pp. 1336-37 supra.

"' A suit for restitution of a criminal fine would probably be barred also by
the eleventh amendment. See pp. IX95-97 supra.
2 See pp. 1332-33 & n.7 supra.
71 See p. 1357 infra.
7442o U.S. 592 (x975).
75
Id. at 598.
76 ld. at 6o6-08.

" The Court failed to inquire into the continued availability of appellate
relief in the state courts. Id. at 611 n.22.
78 If federal declaratory judgments were binding upon a state, see pp. 13,-4-60
& n.i2I infra, then a federal judgment inconsistent with prior state injunctive
relief might be accorded res judicata effect in a third action, see RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) or JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, § 41.2, having the effect of displacing the
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should not be read to foreclose relitigation of issues of law which
would not undermine the state court decision as to prior conduct,79 whether or not the issues were raised as a defense in the
state proceeding.
2. ParallelState and FederalSuits. Frequently, suits arising
out of the same transaction will be brought in both state and
federal courts. This will necessarily be the case whenever an
individual is forced to litigate in a forum which is unable to grant
certain types of relief to which he may be entitled. Thus a
criminal defendant, confined to state court by the Younger doctrine, will be required to resort to another suit-often brought
in federal court-to obtain damages or equitable relief against
state officials. Similarly, a state prisoner challenging his confinement in a state court action, as he is required to do by 28
U.S.C. § 2254

"1

before seeking federal habeas corpus relief, must

ordinarily bring a separate action to obtain damages or other
affirmative relief. The Younger doctrine and the exhaustion requirement of federal habeas corpus embody a substantial interest
in avoiding federal relief in these contexts which would abort or
otherwise supersede the state proceeding.
In a regime where ordinary principles of res judicata applied,
issues underlying the first of these judgments to become final
would be given collateral estoppel effect in the other suit according to the law of the forum that rendered the judgment.8 ' If the
federal suit were concluded first, its findings would ordinarily
not be conclusive on the state, since the state usually will have
been neither a party to that suit nor in privity with the section
1983 defendant.8 2 Indeed, were it otherwise, the maintenance
injunction or avoiding a contempt citation for its disregard. Thus where a state
court has fashioned prospective relief, a federal declaratory judgment that the
underlying law is unconstitutional should be barred by claim preclusion, see id.
§ 4I, Comment c, at 3-4, though ordinarily relief will be available in the state
court if there are changed circumstances, id. § 6i, Comment f, or other equitable
grounds for setting aside the judgment. The federal court should be sensitive,
however, to the possibility of the state court's foreclosing federal court review
of arguably unconstitutional state statutes through the artifice of incorporating
those
laws into simple prohibitory injunctions.
70
See pp. 1338-41 supra.
so28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)
8"

(,970).

See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S.

226,

230 (X922);

RESTATE-

OF CONFLICTS or LAws § 86, Comment a (1969); IA J. MOORE,
supra note 3, II 0.221, at 2606 n.4. As discussed above, pp. 1333-34 supra, the
effect to be given a prior state judgment is ordinarily determined with reference
to state law via § 1738. The effect of a prior federal judgment, at least when
rendered in a federal question case, is a matter of federal common law, see note

MENT (SECOND)

129 infra.
82 Suits

under § 1983 may not be maintained against most governmental units
because of either eleventh amendment immunity or the judicial construction of
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of the federal suit might well be impermissible under Younger
or section 2254.

But while the state cannot be precluded by the federal court's
findings in a private suit litigating such issues as the damages to
be awarded for an allegedly illegal search and seizure, the reverse
is not the case; under the currently prevailing view, the section
1983 plaintiff would be estopped in his federal suit by adverse
the word "person" within § 1983. Of course, some suits may still be brought
against state officials in their representative capacities. See pp. 1196-97 & n.45
supra. Whether a state or municipality is bound by a judgment in a § x983 action
against a public official depends on the legal capacity in which the defendant
official was sued and arguably on the degree of control exercised by the state
over the defense of the action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 80,
83 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). Suits properly brought against public officers in
their official capacity for equitable relief are conclusive on the government and on
the official's successors, see, e.g., Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (0933);
Gunn v. United States, 283 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 196o); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 8o, Comment e, Reporter's Note at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975),
and are accordingly prohibited under some circumstances by the Younger doctrine. See generally pp. 1197-99 supra. On the other hand, when the § 1983
suit seeks to impose personal and individual liability against the named defendants, the official will participate in his individual capacity and the judgment will
not be conclusive on the state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 80,
Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). Therefore, if a preclusive effect against the
state or municipality is sufficient under some circumstances to bar a § 1983 suit,
the court should view the kind of relief sought as determinative of the legal
capacity of the public official in the suit. If relief is sought against the official in
both his official and individual capacities, as in a suit for damages and injunctive
relief, the damage action might be tried separately, if it would be prejudicial to
stay entire suit pending the completion of the state proceedings. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 21. In that case the plaintiff would not be precluded from thus "splitting" his
cause of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8o, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1975).

This "legal capacity" analysis is problematic in the context of habeas corpus
relief for state prisoners where the Supreme Court has allowed § 1983 suits against
prison administrators in their official capacities to proceed simultaneously with
state postconviction relief sought against the same administrators, see Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ; in doing so, the Court purported to preserve the
integrity of the habeas exhaustion requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (297o), although
with questionable success if, as the dissent supposed, 411 U.S. at Sr (Brennan,
J., dissenting), a federal judgment would be conclusive on the state. See pp. 135460 infra.
Even where the § 1983 suit is brought against an official exclusively in his individual capacity, the state or municipality arguably would be bound by the judgment if it substantially controlled the defense of the suit. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 83 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). Although the finding of
control ordinarily does not require that the controlling party have a proprietary
interest in the subject matter of the suit, compare id. with RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (942), often circumstantial evidence of control will be provided by
an agreement with the state to indemnify the official for certain types of liability
or to supply legal defense. However, it would seem more advisable to inquire into
the congruence of the underlying substantive interests of the official and the state,
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state court findings " if the state did not require mutuality to
apply collateral estoppel."4 Obviously, the estoppel would run
only one way, leaving the state hearing unimpeded; nevertheless,
some federal courts, invoking principles of comity and federalism,
have stayed federal suits which might "embarass [or] intrude
into" state procedings, 5 despite the absence of any legal binding
effect. While such a stay of the federal suit might sometimes be
appropriate if the proposed exception to section i738 were
adopted, 6 it would otherwise be highly prejudicial to the federal
plaintiff without being justified by any need to immunize the
state suit from res judicata.
The proposed exception to section i738 would largely relieve
the possible prejudice resulting from the combined effect of a
-(trace to the courthouse" with a one-way estoppel. Concededly,
this exception may result in an inconsistency between federal and
state decisions. But such inconsistencies, while striking because
they may relate to a single past transaction, will be infrequent,
and when they do occur are justified by the importance of vindicating federal rights. Since more must be shown to recover
damages than the mere illegality of the conduct in question, S7 a
state decision favoring the federal plaintiff's claim is not necessarily inconsistent with a federal judgment denying damages.
Real inconsistency exists only where the state court has upheld
the legality of the challenged conduct while the federal court has
which in the case of an adjudication of personal liability incidentally implicating
questions of the legality of state action, would be quite distinct. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975). The "interest" analysis suggests that it would be inappropriate to bind
the state prosecutors, for example, by a finding in a § 1983 fourth amendment
damage action brought against policemen that a search was made illegally, even
if the state provided the defense. Indeed, if the state were bound in such a case,
the § 1983 suit would probably be barred by Younger. just as the voluntary
agreement by the state to indemnify its officers for § 1983 liability should be
insufficient to create an eleventh amendment immunity, see Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682, 686 n.52,
(1976), so should the state not be permitted to bar otherwise permissible federal
civil actions via a "purely intramural arrangement with its officers," id., creating
jural privity.
" See p. 1336 & n.27 supra.
" See p. 1338 & n.37 supra.
85 Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d X249, 1253 (ist Cir. I974) ; Fulford v. Klein,
529 F.2d 377, rehearing en.banc granted, 529 F.2d 384 (sth Cir. 1976) ; Meadows
v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, rehearing en banc granted, 529 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1976);
Grundstorm v. Darnell, 53I F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1976).
'1 See pp. 1334-43 in!ra.
17 Ordinarily the good faith and reasonableness of the conduct in question will
be put in issue. See pp. 1204-17 supra.
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awarded damages under section 1983 .8' Such cases are improb-

able. If the facts arguably would support a state court finding of
the conduct's legality, ordinarily the official would be entitled
at least to a federal finding of reasonableness -particularly
if
the state proceeding were concluded first and its finding admissible in the federal suit.89 Where the federal court finds the
defendant to have acted in bad faith or in violation of the plaintiffs' clearly settled constitutional rights, that finding may suggest
that the state court decision constituted an egregious error. To
the extent that this is true, the state decision deserves little
deference and the concern for affront to presumably competent
forums becomes increasingly attenuated."
Of course, where a federal finding casts doubt on the defendant's guilt, his continued incarceration may seem difficult
to justify. The fourth amendment presents an easy case in this
respect because correct application of the exclusionary rule,
while it may affect the likelihood of conviction, does not also
affect the likelihood of actual guilt." Moreover, since the Supreme
Court has largely excluded state violations of the exclusionary
rule from the scope of federal habeas corpus, 92 section 1983
damage actions may be the only remaining means for the federal
88 Ordinarily the adverse state judgment would not be susceptible to federal

collateral review unless it has resulted in such continuing restraint as to bring the
case within the federal habeas jurisdiction. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 237-40 (1968). See generally pp. 1332-33 & n.7. Thus, the adverse state
judgment commonly would stand while a state defendant sought damnages
under § 1983 for a deprivation which often would underlie the state judgment.
'For example, such results might obtain where damages were sought for an illegal
search and seizure, e.g., Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (ist Cir. 1974), perjury
by an official at the criminal trial, id., withholding of possibly exculpatory evidence, e.g., Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, rehearing en banc granted, 529 F.2d
384 (5th Cir. 1976), or the denial of right to counsel, e.g., Grundstrom v. Darnell,
531 F.2d
272 (5th Cir. x976).
"0 See FED. R. Evm. § 8o3.
" The paradox of inconsistent judgments is most apparent if the damages
awarded in the § 1983 suit were intended to compensate for the penal consequences of the state judgment. Cf. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (dictum)
(damages for denial of good time credits not available prior to seeking habeas
corpus relief), rehearing en banc granted, 529 F.sd 384 (5th Cir. 1976). Such a
recovery is unlikely since, apart from the possible defenses and immunities, it may
be difficult to establish causation. However, if recovery is allowed, the result is
justified by the interest in deterring unconstitutional police conduct, an interest
separable from adjudication of state criminal liability.
"' The fourth amendment presents an "easy" case only upon the view that
the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486 (r976). But see id. at 5o2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Note, Formalism,
Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, go HARv. L. REV. 945, 985-91 (i977).
12 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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court to assist in policing fourth amendment violations. Even
where the federal plaintiff seeks damages for a violation of his
constitutional rights which goes to the accuracy of his conviction,
however, application of collateral estoppel is not mandated. First,
such suits will be extremely rare: most would have to be brought
against the prosecutor or judge, both of whom enjoy absolute
immunity from damage actions under section i 9 83 . Second,
federal habeas corpus provides a means for the plaintiff to secure
a federal redetermination of the constitutionality of his confinement itself, thus relieving the apparent paradox.
The elimination of collateral estoppel effect in section 1983
actions should exert a practical impact on the relative timing of
federal and state litigation. Absent collateral estoppel, state
criminal defendants are more likely initially to concentrate their
energies and resources on defending the state court action, rather
than to conduct two simultaneous actions. Indeed, it is partly
because of this burden of multiple litigation or forgone constitutional defenses that the exception to section 1738 is justified.
The question arises, nevertheless, what course a federal court
should follow where it is called upon to decide an issue which
has not yet been resolved by the state court. In some cases
dismissal would be appropriate independent of concerns of comity
and res judicata, for want of a justiciable controversy. This might
be the case where the alleged deprivation arises out of the state
trial itself, 4 as in the case of perjury impairing the right to a fair
trial. A stay also might be appropriate if it were likely that the
penalty imposed by conviction would be relevant to the measure
of damages for the deprivation. In otherwise justiciable cases,
the burdens placed on the federal plaintiff if the proceeding is
stayed render the stay wholly unjustifiable absent an exception
to section 1738. But if collateral estoppel against the federal'
plaintiff were eliminated, the argument for staying the federal
proceeding would become more compelling. In that case, neither
party would be bound by collateral estoppel: the only impact of
one decision on the other would be the practical and evidentiary
weight of a prior judicial decision on the same issue and the question would become whether as a rule the federal suit should be
subjected to that effect.
" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); see pp. 1197-1204 supra.
Of course, if § 1983 suits could be maintained against municipalities under
an amended or reconstrued statute, or directly under the fourteenth amendment,
See pp. 1191-97 supra, the preceding analysis would be inapposite.
Under
those circumstances it would be less plausible to deny collateral estoppel effects
running against either litigant.
14 See cases cited note 26 supra.
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In the context of a fourth amendment damage suit, it is difficult to see any reason for a stay. The deprivation is consummated at the instant of the intrusion, and an award of
consequential damages to compensate for a penalty predicated
upon improperly admitted evidence is unlikely. Given the unavailability of federal habeas review, the significant federal interest in vindicating fourth amendment claims is increasingly
dependent upon such civil actions. On the other hand, the state's
interest in enforcing its substantive law is in no way jeopardized
by prior conclusions of federal courts that do not formally bind
the state. Moreover, the maintenance of the federal action suggests no affront to state courts - the independent civil action is
required simply because of the unavailability of damage relief
in state criminal court.
The permutations of state and federal proceedings giving rise
to potentially conclusive findings are more numerous in the case
of prisoner's suits. Parallel actions may result from the Supreme
Court's distinction between relief which may be obtained under
section 1983 and that which is available only through habeas
corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez ", held that when a state prisoner
challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, habeas corpus
is the exclusive federal remedy." This conclusion was said to
be mandated by the strong state interest in the administration
of its prisons

"-

an interest which the habeas exhaustion re-

quirement of section 2254 protects by giving state administrative
and judicial organs the first opportunity to hear challenges to
state confinements. Damage remedies, however, as well as equitable relief other than release, were distinguished as being the
proper subject of a section 1983 suit. 8 As the dissent noted,"0
the Preisersolution bifurcating litigation over a single controversy
according to the relief sought would generate severe anomalies
if, as the Court suggested, conventional principles of collateral
estoppel were to apply. 100
A prisoner's section 1983 suit typically arises either out of the
circumstances underlying his conviction, as in the case of a damage
954I1 U.S. 475 (1973).
96

Id. at 5oo.

97 Id. at 491-92.
98

Id. at 494; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (x974).

99411 U.S. at 511-12. Justice Brennan anticipated that determinations in the

§ r983 suit would be binding in the state proceeding. Id. at Sxx. This is plausible
given the identity of parties in the two suits.
100 Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (0974) ("one would
anticipate that normal principles of res judicata would apply in such circumstances"), and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (I973) (dictum) (res judicata has been held fully applicable to § 1983 suits), %ith id. at 5o9 n.14 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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or out of deprivations

pertaining to restraint after conviction, as in the case of a claim
for damages for the denial of "good time credits" without due
process. 0 2 Again, absent an exception to section i738, findings
made in state postconviction proceedings as well as the original
trial would be conclusive on the prisoner in his civil rights
suit '" - a result which, as argued earlier, would unfairly burden
the vindication of federal rights. 04
An independent federal suit need not undermine the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Of course, the warden or
other similar official frequently will be named as defendant in his
representative capacity in a 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief, or
if sued personally, will be defended by the state, thus satisfying
traditional notions of privity to warrant binding the state. 5
Nevertheless, as a matter of federal law reconciling section 1983
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254, findings in a 1983 suit should not be conclusive in the state habeas proceeding.
If the policies underlying section 2254 are sufficient to deny
collateral estoppel effect to a prior federal judgment, it is arguable
that they should also be sufficient - assuming the application of
the proposed exception to section 1738 - to require federal courts
to stay parallel 1983 actions whenever habeas is available. If
stays were costless, this might be an appropriate resolution. While
precedential and evidentiary impact '" - as opposed to collateral
estoppel - would not undermine the exhaustion requirement, the
substantial state interest protected by this requirement may suggest that the federal courts defer any decision which would intrude into the state proceeding. Such stays, however, might work
07
real hardships on the federal plaintiffs. In Wolff v. McDonnell,'
for example, state prisoners brought a section 1983 action challenging prison disciplinary procedures on due process grounds
and seeking damages, the restoration of good time credits, and
See cases cited note 26 supra.
See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (,974); Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
0 3
' But ef. Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172, 180-83 (S.D. Tex. X974)
1o

(dictum) (doubt whether adverse judgment in state habeas suit should bar § 1983
action).
104 It is unsettled whether a successful federal habeas suit removes the collateral estoppel effect of a prior contrary state court determination. See Moran v.
Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1973) (dictum). However, the finding of
the habeas court could not be used offensively to estop a person not a party to
that proceeding. See Davis v. Eide, 439 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 0 843 (1971); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 n. 27 (1976).
' 5 See p. 1338 & n.37 supra.
06
' See C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 37, § 318.
107

48 U.S. 539 (1974).
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other equitable relief.'
The Supreme Court held that under
Preiser,restoration of good time could not be awarded in a 1983
action since such relief went to the duration of the prisoner's
confinement. The action for damages and other equitable relief,
however, was permitted to go forward without exhaustion of state
remedies. 0 9 Were the federal court in Wolff instead to defer
decision on the due process question - without granting any
interim relief- until the required habeas exhaustion proceedings
were completed, the plaintiffs and other inmates would be subjected to an arguably unconstitutional system. Indeed, even in
actions seeking only damages, the delay resulting from the grant
of a stay pending lengthy state proceedings might jeopardize or
at least burden the plaintiff's ability ultimately to establish his
right to recovery. What seems needed in such cases, then, is a
flexible stay policy through which the federal courts can accommodate the plaintiff's interest in speedy relief with the interests embodied in the habeas exhaustion requirement. Where a
hardship of any substance will result from delay, a stay plainly
cannot be justified in view of the marginal nature of the intrusion
occasioned by a prior federal court decision.
B. The Effect of FederalDeclaratory
Judgments on State Proceedings
In Steffel v. Thompson,"' the Supreme Court held that when
no state proceedings are pending, federal declaratory judgments
on the constitutionality of state laws are obtainable regardless of
the existence of conditions justifying injunctive relief."' The
Court left open, however, the questions of the legal effect of a
declaratory judgment " 2 as well as the availability of further
1 8

o Id. at 553-54.
o Id. at 554-55.
110415 U.S. 452 (1974).
1 9

" Id. at 462-63. See Wooley v. Maynard, 45 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. April 20,
1977) ; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (i975).
112 Observing that a declaratory judgment might have some res judicata effect,
Justice Brennan also noted that the "point is not free from difficulty and the
governing rules remain to be developed with a view to the proper workings of a
federal system." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470-7 x (974)
(quoting
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (0971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting)). Concurring separately in Steffel, Justice Rehnquist purported to express no
opinion on the question of res judicata effect, 415 U.S. at 482 n.3, but did address
numerous other related matters not before the Court, opining that the declaratory
judgment would not preclude the state from prosecuting the federal plaintiff.
Further violations of the statute, according to Justice Rehnquist, would remit the
plaintiff to relief in the state prosecution, where the federal judgment could be
raised "for whatever value it may prove to have," id. at 482, presumably just
that of a more or less persuasive but nonbinding decision. Injunctive relief against
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relief in the event of threatened or actual prosecutions under a
statute previously the subject of such a judgment."13 These
matters clearly determine the attractiveness of declaratory relief
as an alternative to violation of state law followed by defense of
a state prosecution.
The threshold determinant of the effect of a Steffel-type judgment is the nature of the constitutional defect declared. A federal
plaintiff may seek a declaration that a state statute is unconstitutional on one or more of four grounds. First, the statute
may be attacked "as applied" to certain of the plaintiff's conduct." 4 The gravamen of an "as applied" challenge is that the
plaintiff's past or contemplated conduct is constitutionally protected; as a result, a declaration to that effect is not conclusive
with regard to the permissibility of reaching other conduct under
the statute. Second, if the statute allegedly proscribes only constitutionally protected activity, it may be declared facially invalid in toto. The declaration would reflect the opinion that there
are no permissible applications of the statute. Third, a statute
purporting to reach both protected and unprotected activity
would be objectionable on its face as unconstitutionally overbroad. 1 5 A substantially overbroad statute may not be applied
even to unprotected conduct until it has been given a sufficiently
narrowed construction. Thus, unlike "as applied" adjudications,
a declaration of overbreadth is in one sense contingent: the immunity from prosecution is dependent on the statute's infirmity,
not on the lawfulness of the plaintiff's conduct.1 6 Fourth, a
statute which is sufficiently vague might be declared unconstitutional on its face, having no permissible application until a resuch a prosecution would be available only if the showing required by the
Younger cases were made, id. at 483, and a prosecution itself would not be indica-

tive of prosecutorial bad faith sufficient to justify an injunction, id. Justice White,
writing "in light of" Justice Rehnquist's opinion, suggested that a final declaratory

judgment should be accorded some res judicata effect in later prosecutions, id.
at 477, and that injunctions might be available against such prosecutions, id. at
477-78. Two lower federal courts have suggested that such a declaratory judgment would be res judicata between the parties to the suit. See YWCA v. Kugler,
463 F.2d 203, 204 (3d Cir. 1972) (declaratory judgment binding only on parties),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (i974); United States ex. rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432
F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
" See pp. 1296-1300 supra.
14 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rv.
844, 847-52 (,970).

"'5See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6oi (i973).

422

U.S.

205,

216

(1975);

Broadrick

11"Thus a valid narrowing construction may be applied even to conduct
occurring prior to the date when the narrowing construction was obtained, provided such application affords fair notice. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51
(1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 n.7 (1965).
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habilitating construction has been obtained. The infirmity of an
impermissibly vague statute is not that it purports to reach protected activity, 117 but that it violates due process by not providing
fair notice of its reach or standards for its enforcement.1 1
The nature of the declared constitutional shortcoming will
determine the permissibility of a subsequent prosecution under
the statute apart from any res judicata effect the judgment may
be given. A declaratory judgment that a statute is vague or overbroad is not iniconsistent with a subsequent prosecution, so long
as a narrowing construction has been obtained or is sought through
that prosecution. "1 9 And of course, objections to the statute as
applied to certain conduct will not foreclose other applications.
Whatever the grounds for declaring a statute unconstitutional,
a declaratory judgment derives its legal effect from two sources.
First, if the judgment has been affirmed by the Supreme Court,
it is binding on all state courts as controlling authority under the
supremacy clause, 120 and the Supreme Court would reverse any

subsequent impermissible application of the statute sustained by
the courts of the state. While such disregard by state authorities
of controlling decisional law is highly unlikely,' 2 ' further federal
relief might be warranted if the state does proceed with a prosecu12 2
tion.
When a judgment in favor of the plaintiff has not been ap117 However, in the context of first amendment rights, the defects of over-

breadth and vagueness often are practically indistinguishable. See Note, supra
note 114, at 873.
11 See Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, io9 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (ig6o). The Court has recently limited the availability of standing
to challenge regulations of speech on vagueness grounds. See Young v. American
Mini11 Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 5o (1976).
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (197I).
120 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The judgment is not less binding because summarily affirmed by the Court. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344
(0975); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 495 (2d ed. 197o).
121 Of course, further litigation is probable if there is argument over the
meaning of the Supreme Court decision, as is especially likely in the case of summary dispositions.
122 The Federal Declaratory judgment Act provides for "further relief" against
an adverse party to a declaratory judgment, which in appropriate cases will include injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970); see Wooley v. Maynard, 45 U.S.L.W.
4379 (U.S. April 20, 1977); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (White,
J., concurring). Of course, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (970),
would not independently bar an injunction against state proceedings brought in
contravention of the federal declaration, since it expressly allows injunctions "where
necessary . . . to protect or effectuate" federal judgments, id. Moreover, the
Younger doctrine ought not be invoked to remit the federal plaintiff to state court
to raise his plea of res judicata to a demonstrably impermissible prosecution.
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pealed by the state, its conclusive effect is more problematic. If
the state were not bound as a party to the suit for declaratory
judgment by res judicata, the judgment would have only the effect
of persuasive but nonbinding authority in the state courts. 2 3 To
treat the declaratory judgment as a wholly noncoercive means of
obtaining a determination of rights, however, would be inconsistent with the statutory language giving a declaration the "force
and effect of a final judgment." 124 Such a construction would
also disregard both the legislative purpose to provide meaningful relief from uncertainty, 12 5 albeit less severe than an injunction,
and the impermissibility under article III of advisory opinions by
federal courts.""' And as a matter of policy, there is no reason to
decline to apply principles of finality to a declaration simply because it is unaccompanied by coercive relief. Generally, in litigation between private parties, declaratory judgments are accorded
full res judicata effect. 1 ' The fact that the state is a party does
not alter the need for finality; if anything, principles of federalism reinforce ordinary justifications for finality and mandate that
the state not be permitted simply to disregard the decision of a.
federal court when it is a party to the suit.12 8 While the Supreme
Court has not yet resolved the issue, it seems clear that, as a matter of federal common law, declaratory judgments should be accorded some res judicata effect in the state courts. 29
"'The judgment

would not be accorded the stare decisis effect that it would

have in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal jurisdiction. See Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); United
States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d X072 (th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 983 ('97'); State v. Coleman, 46 NJ. i6, 34-35, 214 A.2d 393, 402-03
(1965).
124 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970); see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477
(1974) (White, J., concurring); E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGNENTS 10-II (2d
ed. 1941).
125 See S. RE.
No. i005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1934); Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, i1-16 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
2
' See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477 (1974) (White, J., concurring);
E. BoRcAIR, supra note 124, at 10-14. But see Note, The Res Judicata Effect of
DeclaratoryRelief in the Federal Courts, 46 S. CAL.. L. REV. 803, 836-39 (1973)127 RESTATEINT (SEcoND) OF JUDGIINTS § 76, at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975).
121
129

See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477 (White, J., concurring).
Although without explicit constitutional or statutory mandate, it is clear

that federal judgments must be afforded full faith and credit by the state courts.
See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. z65 (1938); Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata,
85 YALE L.J. 714, 744-45 (1976). While cases decided under the regime of the
Conformity Act of June x, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. i96, suggest that the effect of a
federal court judgment should be determined by the law of the state in which that
court sits, see, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. at I70, with the establishment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1 9 70), it appears that the effect of federal judgments should be a matter
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Of course, the immunity given the plaintiff in the declaratory
suit will not be unqualified. Subsequent prosecutions under the
statute will be permitted if they would not impeach the right declared. Additionally, a declaration of a question of law ordinarily
will not bind the parties if by reason of changed circumstances for example, a reversal of decisional law -preclusion 130would
result in unfair or inconsistent administration of the law.
Assuming a declaratory judgment has preclusive effect, a further question is whether a person may estop the state in a subsequent prosecution on the basis of a declaratory judgment to which
he was not a party. 31' Of course, if the federal judgment has been
affirmed by the Supreme Court, any individual may rely on it as
controlling authority. In cases not reviewed by the Court, however, this question is more difficult. Generally, the requirement
of mutuality of estoppel - which would prohibit defensive use
of a prior judgment by a nonparty - has been steadily relaxed.3 2
Still, where one party is a state and the matter declared is the unconstitutionality of one of its laws, nonmutual estoppel might be
somewhat disruptive. It would permit any person to secure a dismissal of a prosecution brought under the statute so long as it
remained unreformed, thus affording the unappealed decision of
a lower federal court the practical effect of a Supreme Court
decision. 3 Even so, a number of factors suggest that binding
the state vis-a-vis other parties may be an appropriate accommodation of the interests at stake. First, the state could avoid
of federal law. See Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464
(3d Cir. i95o), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (i95i); Degnan, supra at 766-73. See
also Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University of III. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324
nl.1213('971).

oSee

RESTATEMENT

(SEcom)

OF JUDGMENTS,

supra note 3, § 68.x(b);

Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). The justification for persisting
in the prosecution in light of the prior judgment may be presented at the outset
of the state trial to resist summary dismissal. If at that point the state court
denies a proper motion for dismissal, further relief should be available in federal
court. Alternatively, the state court defendant immediately might seek a federal
injunction if the likelihood of a permissible prosecution were sufficiently small to
support a showing of bad faith.
1"1 In other contexts, federal courts have commonly held that a nonparty may
rely on a prior federal judgment to estop a party to the prior suit, particularly
when asserted defensively against a person who, as plaintiff in the prior action,
lost on the issue in question. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University
of fi1 Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324-25 (i97i) ; Bruszewski v. United States, x8I
F.2d 419,
421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (xg5o).
"'2 See p. 1339 & n.39 supra.
1.3 The sources of this effect are, of course, distinguishable.
In one case the
supremacy clause obliges state courts to follow the Constitution as interpreted
by the Supreme Court; in the other, state officials are bound as parties to a final
lower federal court judgment.
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being bound by exercising its right of appeal to the Supreme
Court,'34 thereby obtaining a decision of general applicability. To
the extent that this rule would encourage states to seek such re-

view, fairness and predictability would be enhanced by a final
declaration of rights. Second, while it could be argued that any

given suit might be an inappropriate vehicle of appeal for the
state, the state is never wholly free to choose the test case of the

constitutionality of one of its statutes.'3 5 Third, despite the practical risk of summary dispositions which may not afford the state's
claim a full hearing, it would appear that the state, appealing
from an adverse federal judgment, would be less likely to be

victimized by such summary dispositions than an individual
appealing from state court on an often limited record. Finally,
the specter of an endless queue of potential declaratory judgment
plaintiffs, binding the state by the first successful suit,' 36 seems
overdrawn in light of the infrequency with which persons satisfy
justiciability requirements '37 and the ability of federal courts to
dispose summarily of frivolous claims. 8 If the res judicata
effects of a declaratory judgment were confined to the immediate
parties, the protection afforded by a single judgment could be

broadened by joining parties
action.

40

or framing a suit as a class

Anyone who failed to obtain declaratory relief would
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'See

39

§ 1254(2)

(1970).

28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)

(1970).

Nonmutual estoppel would present a difficult question of the res judicata effect
of a final declaratory judgment pending appeal. Ordinarily a final judgment on
appeal is given res judicata effect, see RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JJDGMENTS,
supra note 3, §§ 41, 41.3, but in the case of declarations that a state statute is
unconstitutional, it might be most appropriate to postpone preclusive effects until
appeals are concluded.
1 6 See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 285 (1957).
127 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 476 (I974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
129See FED. R. CiV. P. 20(a). The joinder device is, however, of limited
usefulness because of the requirement that the court otherwise have jurisdiction,
see C. WaIGHT, supra note 12o, at 305 (I97o), and that the claims be independently
justiciable, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (I97i).
4
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), (3). A number of courts, however, have refused to certify challenges to the constitutionality of government action as class
actions, see, e.g., Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (Ioth Cir. 1973),
sometimes reasoning that if the practice or law were held unconstitutional with
respect to one class member, the government would not continue to enforce the law
against other potential class members, see, e.g., United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974), or that apparent differences in the situation of potential class members may make case by case adjudication preferable
to class litigation, see, e.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566,
572-73 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). Unless genuine differences in situation compel case-by-case treatment, class certification should not be
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still be able to raise the unconstitutionality of the statute as a
defense to a state prosecution, with an appeal of right to the
Supreme Court.14 '
Another possible source of protection for nonparties distinct
from res judicata is the argument that a declaratory judgment
fosters reliance, such that those who are later prosecuted could
maintain that they had not had the fair notice required by due
process. 142 However, such notice tends in practice to be largely
fictional and arguments about reasonable reliance are inevitably
somewhat circular; a nonparty's reliance is reasonable only to the
extent that the unappealed federal judgment is binding on state
courts. Absent a more compelling justification, the due process
clause should not be viewed as an independent source of nonmutual estoppel.
VIII. CONCLUSION

With the rebirth of section 1983 after Monroe v. Pape, the
courts began to fashion doctrines limiting both the substantive
scope of the section 1983 action itself and the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear such suits. While vague notions of federalism have often been invoked to provide support for such
limitations, closer analysis, in the light of the history and purposes of section 1983, has suggested that the courts have unduly
restricted the potential of section 1983 to protect constitutional
rights against state infringement.
One alternative, of course, would be judicial reexamination of
these limiting decisions. It is, however, doubtful that the Court
which has played such a major role in fashioning these restrictive
doctrines will actively participate in their liberalization. Congressional action may be the more realistic alternative. Indeed,
the current Congress is now considering legislation which would
substantially revamp the section 1983 cause of action by in effect
overruling a number of the Supreme'Court's recent decisions which
have reduced the effectiveness of the statute.' S. 35, for example,
denied, as that would deprive litigants of the protection against mootness which
the class device provides, see Developments in the Law -Class
Actions, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1318, 1464-66 (1976), as well as general access to the contempt power,
id. at 1354 n.ixg, to insure that government compliance is not limited to the immediate parties.
41
'28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
142 See Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief from Unconstitutional State
Statutes: The Implications of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rzv.
520, 557-58 (1974).

' See, e.g., S. 35, 95th Cong., ist Sess.,
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would eliminate governmental immunities, expand supervisory
liability, eliminate absolute immunities for prosecutors, prohibit
the application of doctrines of abstention or judicial exhaustion
in the context of section 1983 suits, and substantially limit the
preclusive effect of both the Younger doctrine and principles of
res judicata.2
While greater elaboration and more explicit definition are
needed before the legislative provisions dealing with forum allocation issues in section 1983 actions can be fully analyzed, it
seems clear that Congress can and should constrict the scope of
personal immunities, and eliminate the absolute immunities enjoyed by governmental bodies. Whether or not considerations of
state sovereignty should serve as a constraint on judicial interpretation of section 1983, these concerns do not limit the reach of
congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,3 Justice Rehnquist, in upholding
a Title VII action for back pay by state employees in the face of
an eleventh amendment challenge, noted that "[w]hen Congress
acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations
on state authority." I
As Fitzpatrick indicates, whatever the considerations of limited judicial power and state sovereignty which have caused
courts, faced with a century-old and open-ended statute, to limit
the effectiveness of section 1983's promised vindication of constitutional rights against unlawful state activity, further congressional action to affirm and broaden the reach of section 1983
undermines the legitimacy of those limiting concerns. Given the
history and purpose of the fourteenth amendment, any appearance
of a conflict between federalism and constitutional rights in the
context of congressional action is illusory: congressional enforcement of constitutional rights against the states is of the essence of
modern federalism.
2 See

id.

z427 U.S. 445 (1976).

4 Id. at 456. See also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HAIv. L. REv. 682, 683-99 (1976) (arguing that the eleventh amendment was intended to be, and is in fact, only a limitation on the power of the
federal courts to entertain actions against states, but that the amendment places
no constraint on the power of Congress, acting under the fourteenth amendment,
to abrogate state sovereign immunity).

